Strict Distinction Research Articles

REIMAGINING REPRESSION: NEW CENSORSHIP THEORY AND AFTER

ABSTRACTEmerging from the work of Foucault and Bourdieu in particular, a powerful theoretical critique of prevailing notions of censorship and its opposite, free speech, emerged in the waning decades of the last century. The principal theoretical contribution, I will argue, of this “New Censorship Theory” has been not to overthrow the dominant liberal conception of censorship, but rather to bracket this conception as a separate and ultimately subordinate species of censorship. In this article I reexamine the development of New Censorship Theory, especially its antecedents in the Marxist critique of bourgeois civil society. In place of an exclusive focus upon state actions, newer conceptions of censorship have enshrined self‐censorship as the paradigm and have seen traditional forms of censorship as secondary to impersonal, structural forms like the market. I argue that historians' qualms about New Censorship Theory stem from concerns over this erasure of the specificity of state repressive force. Rather than simply accepting the division of censorship into a dichotomy of repressive/authoritative and productive/structural, this article argues that no strict distinction ought to be drawn. Instead, investigations of censorship in the traditional sense must incorporate the insights of newer theories to understand state censors as actors internal to communication networks, and not as external, accidental features. By investigating the intellectual trajectory of New Censorship Theory, I posit a way forward for historians to incorporate its insights while addressing their concerns.

Unusual Syllogisms: Avicenna and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī on per impossibile Syllogisms and Implication (luzūm)

In his proofs of e- and e-conversion in Logic for Shams al-Dīn, Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 1276/7) accepts syllogisms that have redundant premises as theses. Similarities in Avicenna’s and Kātibī’s doctrines of the per impossibile syllogism suggest that Avicenna could have adopted such proofs and remained consistent with the principles of his syllogistic. However, analysis of their modal syllogistic and their ideas about the nature of implication (luzūm) reveals that Avicenna could not employ the type of per impossibile syllogism that Kātibī does and remain faithful to his modal theory, or to the Aristotelian vision of the theory of syllogistic as a theory of reasoning. In his commentary on Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī’s (d. 1248) Disclosure of Secrets Kātibī offers a second analysis of per impossibile syllogisms. Kātibī envisions a generic sense of logical necessitation that accommodates the sense in which an antecedent implies a consequent and premises imply a conclusion. This evidence may explain why Kātibī admitted redundantly concluding syllogisms as theses. If Avicenna was committed to a strict distinction between these senses, this may partially account for why Avicenna does not adopt Kātibī’s unusual syllogisms.

“Willing the Event”

A major problem threatens Deleuze’s project in The Logic of Sense. He makes an ontological distinction between events and substances, but he then collapses a crucial distinction between two kinds of events, namely, actions and mere occurrences. Indeed, whereas actions are commonly differentiated from mere occurrences with reference to their causal dependence on the intentions of their agents, Deleuze asserts a strict ontological distinction between the realm of causes (including psychological causes) and the realm of events, and holds that events of all types are incorporeal happenings which are inseparable from expressed sense. For Deleuze, what counts as one’s action thus does not depend on one’s intention, but rather on a process of “making sense” of that action. Nevertheless, Deleuze continues to speak of the need to “will” the event. In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, I will read a conception of “expressive agency” into The Logic of Sense.

The nature of domains and the relationships between them in metaphorization

In 2011 I proposed a new approach to metaphor analysis and typology, based on the strict distinction between the material and phenomenological worlds. I concluded that the ultimate source domain (experiential basis) is the world of physical objects. The present paper develops these ideas, presenting a more detailed analysis of each of the metaphor types. Thus, I claim that the concrete-to-concrete metaphors are based on metonymy and abstract-to-concrete on the OBJECT schema. Abstract-to-abstract metaphorization falls into two traditional types: structural and orientational metaphors. As to the former, I show that the vague expressions “more concrete domain” or “more abstract domain” can be made clearer by considering the ontological status of the component elements of the domain: the “more concrete” domain has more elements of physical ontology. Orientational metaphors have been found to be only superficially orientational, their true objective being valuation. I conclude that all these metaphor types eventually refer to the world of physical objects for their experiential basis.

Social Peace as conditio tacita for the Validity of the Positive Legal Order

My article investigates the paradoxical dualism in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, in which exists on the one hand a strict distinction and on the other hand a necessary relation between Is and Ought. I shall further try to answer the question whether Kelsen’s pure theory tacitly assumes in the conditions for validity of the positive legal order a basic value and underlying condition, namely, that of ‘social peace’. In order to answer that question, I will first sketch why Kelsen actually differentiates Is and Ought and conceives of a relation between both categories. Then I will examine if and in what way the conditio tacita of social peace is implied in the conditions (‘basic norm’ and ‘effectiveness’) for legal validity. The concluding section will suggest what this implication possibly means for the (re)valuation of the Pure Theory of Law and of its normative concept of the positive legal order.

Far beyond declarative and non-declarative memories.

Far beyond declarative and non-declarative memories.

Eugen Ehrlich State Law and Law Enforcement in Societal Systems

In this article, the author examines the socio-legal conception of Eugen Ehrlich and its relation to state law and judicial law enforcement. The attention is focused on the practical implications of this conception on the functioning of judicial systems. Analyzing the criticism raised against Ehrlich’s conception, the author emphasizes that this thinker stood on a scientific platform which did not necessitate any strict distinction between the factual and the normative — between Is and Ought — considering any attempt to draw a net distinction between societal phenomena as pointless. Ehrlich sought to enlarge the province of jurisprudence through the application of sociological methods to the factual material from which arise social institutions. These institutions crystallize social practices into rules of behaviour, but this crystallization does not happen automatically. It requires an intellectual reconstruction of these practices by the actors acting in the legal order. A scientific examination of law implies that all these components (social facts, institutions, mental constructions, rules and norms) are taken into consideration. Ehrlich critically assesses both the state-centrist ideology of the doctrinal law and the metaphysic speculations about law, arguing that correct law enforcement needs to rely on sociological analysis. The judge should take advantage of methods of sociological research, which allows stating the actual trends of justice in society and comparing these trends with those existing at the time the applicable legal rules were adopted. This comparison leads to a correct balancing of the conflicting interests with a view to the values protected by the legal order. At the same time, the sociological data just help the judge to reveal the will of the lawmaker who would protect the conflicting interests in the same manner as those which were protected when the lawmaker adopted the legal rules in question.

Gaston Bachelard and his reactions to phenomenology

In this essay, I show how the French philosopher of science, Gaston Bachelard, reacted to the idea of phenomenology at different stages of his philosophical development. During the early years, Kantianism (through a Schopenhauerian reading of Kant) had the greatest influence on his understanding of phenomenology. Even if he always considered phenomenology a valuable method, Bachelard believed that the term noumenon is necessary, not for a full description of reality, but for probing possible sources of reality. For him, phenomena are not only static objects or things observed in nature, but dynamic objects that can be produced or even created (hence phenomenotechnique). The noumenal realm lies beyond the structure of the phenomenal world. In his later “poetical” years, Bachelard did not make a strict distinction between noumena and phenomena, but instead situated the poetical (literary) image, a phenomenon of literary consciousness, in specific zones between subjectivity and objectivity; the term phenomenotechnique no longer plays any role in his study of imagination or daydreams. For the later Bachelard, phenomenology became the method or attitude that can best lead us into the unexplored regions of our consciousness (reverie) which remain largely forgotten by Western philosophy, or drowned out by its exclusive concern with other aspects of consciousness, such as rational thought.

A Lightweight Middleware Platform for Distributed Computing on Wireless Sensor Networks

The peculiar features of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) suggest to exploit the distributed computing paradigm to perform complex tasks in a collaborative manner, in order to overcome the constraints related to sensor nodes limited capabilities. In this context, we describe a lightweight middleware platform to support the development of distributed applications on WSNs. The platform provides just a minimal general-purpose software layer, while the application components, including communication and processing algorithms, as well as the exchanged data, are described symbolically, with neither preformed syntax nor strict distinction between data and code. Our approach allows for interactive development of applications on each node, and requires no cross-compilation, a common practice that makes the development of WSN applications rigid and time-consuming. This way, tasks and behavior of each node can be modified at runtime, even after the network deployment, by sending the node executable code.

Saccade-like behavior in the fast-phases of optokinetic nystagmus: an illustration of the emergence of volitional actions from automatic reflexes.

As a potential exemplar for understanding how volitional actions emerged from reflexes, we studied the relationship between an ancient reflexive gaze stabilization mechanism (optokinetic nystagmus [OKN]) and purposeful eye movements (saccades) that target an object. Traditionally, these have been considered distinct (except in the kinematics of their execution) and have been studied independently. We find that the fast-phases of OKN clearly show properties associated with saccade planning: (a) They are characteristically delayed by irrelevant distractors in an indistinguishable way to saccades (the saccadic inhibition effect), and (b) horizontal OKN fast-phases produce curvature in vertical targeting saccades, just like a competing saccade plan. Thus, we argue that the saccade planning network plays a role in the production of OKN fast-phases, and we question the need for a strict distinction between eye movements that appear to be automatic or volitional. We discuss whether our understanding might benefit from shifting perspective and considering the entire "saccade" system to have developed from an increasingly sophisticated OKN system.

Review of Allan Moore,Song Means: Analyzing and Interpreting Recorded Popular Song(Ashgate, 2012)

[1] Allan Moore takes little time getting to central point of Song Means, presenting in second paragraph two questions book attempts to answer: What meanings can experiencing have, and does [the song] create meanings? (1). Moore focuses not on itself, but rather experience of song. Rather than center around supposedly inherent meaning of or within (the what), he examines how [songs] mean and means by which they mean [sic] (1). He focuses throughout discussion on tools we can use and process by which we arrive at conclusions regarding personal interpretations of recorded popular songs.[2] Interpretive analyses of music-popular or otherwise-often concentrate on meaning of piece of music. These theories are developed to find answers to questions. That is not Moore's immediate concern here, however. Rather than present theory proper, he presents methodology for determining meaning, process he describes as interrogative, with purpose of accruing a bank of questions to employ during of (9). We, listeners, determine songs' meanings for ourselves by asking questions of or by investigating questions that presents to us. This book describes process of discovering connections between elements of and listener's personal experiences. (This, to me, is reminiscent of mathematics, where the work is just as important as answer itself.) Ultimately, by employing this methodology and accumulating these questions, we not only learn more about song, but we also learn about ourselves. This is point to which I will return at end of this review.[3] In introductory chapter, Methodology, Moore offers his reasons for writing book, along with an overview of its structure. The order in which he summarizes chapters is out of sequence (2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 7, 9, 5); I find this interesting because order in which chapters are organized makes logical sense in terms of Moore's reasonably strict distinction between analysis and interpretation (7). To use Moore's vocabulary, Chapters 2-6 make up Means half of book (analysis), and Chapters 7-10 comprise How section (interpretation).[4] For Moore, is particular amalgamation of lyrics, harmonic progression, metric structure, and melody. A is different in that it is collection of details (instrumentation, tone, tempo, style) regarding execution or delivery of in general. A is specific or recording of particular song. If we think of these three in terms of Venn diagram, song and performance would be independent circles and track would be section of overlap between two. Moore compares four versions of Along Watchtower in Chapter 1-Bob Dylan's original, as well as covers by Jimi Hendrix, U2, and Richie Havens-in order to illustrate clearly what is and it is different conceptually from and track. All four versions share approximately same melody, lyrics, chord structure, and metrical organization. This is we know we are listening to Along Watchtower. The details, however, vary from to track. Each delivers differently, using unique combinations of vocal timbre, guitar tone, tempo, and instrumentation.[5] The explicit definition of song and its differentiation from performance and track is one of book's key theoretical takeaways. Based on Moore's criteria, song takes on much broader meaning: It becomes general conceptual framework of musical ideas involving singer and lyrics instead of merely specific collection of notes and words in particular context. This definition of song generalizes it by taking out considerations of performer, genre, and style. This provides less specific analytical starting point, which thereby affords listener better opportunity to focus on process of listening instead of only eventual interpretive outcome. …

Alternative ways of representing Zapotec and Cuicatec folk classification of birds: a multidimensional model and its implications for culturally-informed conservation in Oaxaca, México

BackgroundWe report on a comparative ethno-ornithological study of Zapotec and Cuicatec communities in Northern Oaxaca, Mexico that provided a challenge to some existing descriptions of folk classification. Our default model was the taxonomic system of ranks developed by Brent Berlin.MethodsFieldwork was conducted in the Zapotec village of San Miguel Tiltepec and in the Cuicatec village of San Juan Teponaxtla, using a combination of ethnographic interviews and pile-sorting tests. Post-fieldwork, Principal Component Analysis using NTSYSpc V. 2.11f was applied to obtain pattern variation for the answers from different participants.Results and conclusionUsing language and pile-sorting data analysed through Principal Component Analysis, we show how both Zapotec and Cuicatec subjects place a particular emphasis on an intermediate level of classification. These categories group birds with non-birds using ecological and behavioral criteria, and violate a strict distinction between symbolic and mundane (or ‘natural’), and between ‘general-purpose’ and ‘single-purpose’ schemes. We suggest that shared classificatory knowledge embodying everyday schemes for apprehending the world of birds might be better reflected in a multidimensional model that would also provide a more realistic basis for developing culturally-informed conservation strategies.

Children and Adults with Intellectual Disability in Antiquity and Modernity: Toward a Biblical and Sociological Model

Children and Adults with Intellectual Disability in Antiquity and Modernity: Toward a Biblical and Sociological Model Edgar Kellenberger The following research is based on biblical source material that is relatively limited regarding this topic. Ancient texts mention intellectual disability less than physical disabilities, and it is more often related to adults than to children. Therefore, the method here employed is based upon cross‐cultural investigation. In undertaking that approach, one must be aware of the risk of easily overlooking cultural differences. This risk is increased by the fact that this research, by posing a modern question to ancient cultures, is based upon modern experience which is not altogether identical with the ancients' experience. There is a second difficulty. The scientific terminology employed in this field often lacks precision and coherence. The same terms may designate an intelligent person acting misguidedly, or a person with an intellectual disability, or one with a psychological illness. This is especially true of ancient descriptive words and metaphoric terms. Analogous ambiguities can be observed as well in modern languages. While in German “geistige Behinderung” designates an intellectual deficit, the English term “mental disability” usually designates psychological disorders, in contrast with “intellectual disability.” Modern medicine, of course, employs a strict distinction between intellectual (mental) impairment and psychological dysfunction. An argument might even be made for the suggestion that the terminology of modern medicine might be too rigid in its distinctions in this regard. Intellectual disability often has a manifold character that involves various forms of psychological dysfunction as a secondary facet of the disorder. The first part of this contribution discusses the topic including the medical perspectives in the ancient and modern world. This investigation produces a very limited amount of solid data. The second part, that follows a sociological perspective, puts more meat on the bone, so to speak. The third and last part of this treatise discusses some consequences for biblical exegesis and theology. Medical‐historical steps with the help of the terminology employed Terminology Terms designating a person with an intellectual disability are found in the Ancient Near East and in antiquity. Most common are: Akkadian lillu, Hebrew kĕsîl and petî, Mishnaic Hebrew šôṭê, Greek mōros, Latin morio and fatuus. In the majority of cases, these terms designate intelligent people with cognitive dysfunction. But in all these ancient cultures we find also deliberate formulations like “born fools” (physei mōroi / naturaliter fatui / engendering or bearing a lillu or a kesîl), both in medical and non‐medical texts. The term “fool” in these cases differs radically from the modern English use of “fool.” In current English usage the term “fool” means someone who is foolish, reckless, unwise, or irresponsible, while having the cognitive capacity to know better and behave more sensibly. The ancient usage of the word “fool” describes a person who is cognitively impaired and cannot make sense and cannot function with normal thoughtful reflection, and so behaves unwisely, lacking the ability to know better or do better. These ancient formulations point strikingly toward an innate intellectual disability. Such terminology is used rather seldom in ancient literature. Apparently it was not obligatory to designate such people in this manner. The formulations “born” and “by nature” appear in the ancient literature but are surprising because the number of incurable intellectual (and psychic) anomalies derived from birth (ek geneēs etc.) are relatively limited in ancient literature and modern experience. Conspicously, the ancient texts seem to be silent about healing an intellectual disability. It is impossible to find any hint in the ancient sources of such healing in the numerous narratives of a miraculous healing, in the extensive magical literature, and in the medical texts. This negative observation confirms the apodictic decision of C.F. Goodey in his recent History of Intelligence and Intellectual Disability: “Greek doctors denied that intellectual inferiority was the province of medicine; their mythical patron Asclepios made the blind see and the lame walk but, it was said, could not make a fool wise.” Admittedly, the stem mōr(os) is used on occasion by the physicians, for instance by Galen (ca. 40 items). But predominantly it is used as depreciation of other physicians contradicting Galen...

Cerebrospinal fluid τ protein in differential diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease and vascular dementia in Chinese population: a meta-analysis.

To assess whether biomarker τ protein could differentiate between Alzheimer's disease (AD) and vascular dementia (VaD). We conducted a comprehensive search to identify studies on τ protein, patients with AD, and patients with VaD. Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) τ protein levels were compared to discriminate among patients with AD, healthy controls, and patients with VaD by a meta-analysis. Patients with AD exhibit significantly higher CSF τ protein levels than healthy controls or patients with VaD in the Chinese population. Our findings suggested that CSF τ protein levels were found to be significantly associated with AD in the Chinese population. Measurement of τ protein could help in attenuating the strict distinction between AD and VaD.

Rethinking ‘IT/IS use in a technological mature society’ from the actuality point of view: critical learning in reflection on SSM meeting about ‘IT/IS use’

The history of the human-centered system movement (Gill in AI Soc 10(2), 1996) tells us that information technology (referred to as IT below) has come to dominate our life-world or societal functions. Since from 1990s, its streaming influence could be called ‘abnormal.’ Since entering the twenty-first century, the IT system has been on automatic acceleration and has been spreading more and more rapidly to many facets of our lives. In many sectors, this ubiquitous streaming of IT is seen to be central to societal development, and in a Japanese sense, IT could be seen as a resource to realizing technologically a mature society. This trend of IT seems to be unstoppable. In this sense, IT dominance can be regarded as abnormal to the point that IT-centered information systems (referred to as IS below) fall far short of the deep appreciation of the complex and diverse life needs of people and societies, and this leads to the implementation of IT/IS from technological perspective, with a belief that everything, which we can do could be and should be, done now by IT/IS. However, as IT/IS have become to be embedded in many facets of societies and are influencing over our everyday life, we need to examine them not from the point of ‘capability’ but ‘allowability,’ in other words, not from the perspective of technology (cognition), but from the prospective of intuition and feeling of actual life (action). We term reality as seen in the narrow sense of cognition and actuality as seen in terms of action (Uchiyama in Theory and practice of actuality, Daito Bunka University, Tokyo, 2003). We draw a distinction between the two classes of ‘IT/IS’ systems, those which belong to the ‘reality’ and those which belong to the ‘actuality.’ To appreciate this distinction, we propose that this requires not only an understanding of the design of these IT systems but of the methodology of their use and their evaluation. To carry out the process of evaluation of IT/IS systems, we need to develop a new ‘appreciation’ methodology which enables us to rethink ‘IT/IS’ as ‘A system to use IT/IS.’ This idea is similar to the idea of Beck’s (World risk society theory (trans: Shimamura K), Chikuma Scholastic Collection (in Japanese), 2010) reflecting the modern. So, we propose a strict distinction between the two systems classes of ‘IT/IS’ which we call belonging to the ‘reality’ and ‘A system to use IT/IS’ which we call belonging to the ‘actuality.’ The methodology to deal with ‘actuality’ has not yet been developed, but Checkland and Poulter’s (Learning for action, Wiley, New York, 2006) soft systems methodology (referred to as SSM below) intends to deal with this kind of class of systems, that is, ‘human activity systems.’ He uses the key concept of ‘accommodation’ which means ‘to live with different individual world views based on sharing of actuality,’ and thus, he proposes to overcome the idea of consensus which is the agreement with the ‘reality’ level. In this paper, we adopt a methodology based on the SSM’s accommodation and not based on the consensus on the ‘reality’ level. By using such a methodological thinking, we reconsider the problem of evolving technologically a mature society which can be seen as a problem relevant to ‘A system using IT/IS’ rather than the problem of IT/IS itself. In doing so, we could draw some innovative orientations in the field of IT/IS which by traditional methodology could not be drawn. It is not certain whether our attempt could make a difference to the runaway of IT/IS. We illustrate this purpose by studying a workshop process which highlights that even participating experts of IT/IS themselves felt apprehensive about the more and more focus on the implementation of IT/IS solutions both in the present and the future. We believe that the first step toward this purpose is to explore the new orientation of IT/IS use. The aim of this first step is to make a difference to the ‘abnormal’ situation and hope to create a foothold for the reorientation of ‘A system to use IT/IS.’

Comment on ‘Causal inference, probability theory, and graphical insights’ by Stuart G. Baker.

Forthcoming, Statistics in Medicine, Volume 32, Number 25, November 2013. TECHNICAL REPORT R-412 June 2013 Comment on “Causal inference, probability theory, and graphical insights” by Stuart G. Baker Judea Pearl University of California, Los Angeles Computer Science Department Los Angeles, CA, 90095-1596, USA judea@cs.ucla.edu Modern causal inference owes much of its progress to a strict and crisp distinction between probabilistic and causal information. This distinction recognizes that prob- ability theory is insufficient for posing causal questions, let alone answering them, and dictates that every exercise in causal inference must commence with some extra knowledge that cannot be expressed in probability alone. 1 The paper by Baker at- tempts to overturn this distinction and argues that “probability theory is a desirable and sufficient basis for many topics in causal inference.” My comments will disprove Baker’s claim, in the hope of convincing readers of the importance of keeping the boundaries between probabilistic and causal concepts crisp and visible. Baker’s argument begins with: “...besides explaining such causal graph topics as M -bias (adjusting for a collider) and bias amplification and attenuation (when adjusting for instrumental variable), probability theory is also the foundation of the paired availability design for historical control” (abstract). While I am not versed in the intricacies of “paired availability design” (Google Scholar lists only a handful of entries in this category), I doubt it can be based solely on probabilities. Indeed, Baker himself resorts to counterfactuals and other non-probabilistic notions 2 in explaining the research questions a “paired availability design” attempts to answer. I am quite familiar however with the concepts of “M -bias,” “bias,” “Simpson’s paradox,” and “instrumental variable” which I will show to have no interpretation in probability theory alone. I will start with the concept of “instrumental variable” which should be familiar to most readers, and which is often mistaken to have probabilistic definition (see [2, pp. Cartwright [1] summarized this limitation in a well-known slogan: “no causes in, no causes out.” By “non-probabilistic notions” I mean relations or parameters that cannot be defined in terms of joint distributions of observed variables. The restriction to observed variable is important for, otherwise, everything would become probabilistic, including Cinderella’s age, horoscopic predictions, counterfactuals, latent variables, the answers to our research questions, and so on; we need merely hypothesize a distribution over such variables and turn every problem probabilistic. The distinction between causal in probability information would then lose its meaning and usefulness.

The Research-Clinical Practice Distinction, Learning Health Systems, and Relationships

A special report of The Hastings Center and the Association of American Medical Colleges addressed the ethical oversight of learning health systems, which seek to combine high-quality patient care with routine data collection aimed at improving patient outcomes. The report contained two position papers, authored by a number of distinguished bioethicists, and several commentaries. The position papers urged two changes. First, they urged a rethinking of our approach to the regulation of human subjects research, so as to make it easier in the future for learning health systems to function well. Second, they argued that the rethinking required dispensing with a strict distinction between research and therapy, which has been a major tenet of bioethics since the Belmont Report, which explicated basic ethical principles governing human subjects research. We fully support the objectives of the authors, and we agree that the learning health system is an important advance that serves patients well. Unnecessary regulatory burden ought not impede this progress. We disagree, however, that the best way to bring about these needed changes in the regulatory environment is to reject the basic distinction between research and treatment. Unfortunately, we find the arguments in favor of that strategy to be, in places, reminiscent of what we take to be basic conceptual errors that hampered the ethical understanding of human subjects research prior to adoption of the Belmont Report. To see why one need not reject the research-treatment distinction in order to promote learning health systems, we first investigate in some detail the arguments offered for eliminating the distinction. We next turn to an issue not addressed by those authors, namely, the relationship between the physician or investigator and the patient or subject, to illustrate why the distinction is important and what is lost if it is jettisoned.

Eugen Ehrlich – State Law and Law Enforcement in Societal Systems

In this article, the author examines the socio-legal conception of Eugen Ehrlich and its relation to state law and judicial law enforcement. Analyzing the criticism raised against Ehrlich’s conception, the author emphasizes that this thinker stood on a scientific platform which did not necessitate any strict distinction between the factual and the normative – between Is and Ought – considering any attempt to draw a net distinction between societal phenomena as pointless. Ehrlich critically assesses both the state-centrist ideology of the doctrinal law and the metaphysic speculations about law, arguing that correct law enforcement needs to rely on sociological analysis. The judge should take advantage of methods of sociological research, which allows stating the actual trends of justice in society and comparing these trends with those existing at the time the applicable legal rules were adopted. This comparison leads to a correct balancing of the conflicting interests with a view to the values protected by the legal order. At the same time, the sociological data help the judge to reveal the will of the lawmaker who would protect the conflicting interests in the same manner as those which were protected when the lawmaker adopted the legal rules in question.

Sensory imagination and narrative perspective: Explaining perceptual focalization

I argue that we can clarify an important form of focalization or narrative perspective by the structure of perspective in sensory imagination. Understanding focalization in this way enables us to see why one particular form of focalization has to do with the representation of perceptual perspective in the narrative world, and to explain why there is a strict functional distinction between voice and perceptual focalization, why all forms of perceptual focalization are internal to the world of the narrated events, and why this does not prevent the narrator from “seeing” what is happening in the narrated world. Explaining perceptual focalization as a material counterpart of the perspective in sensory imagination enables us to see the role played by the narrative representation of perspective in the reader's understanding of in the narrative as well as the reader's emotional response to the narrative.

DSM-5 Changes in Diagnostic Criteria of Sexual Dysfunctions

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) criteria proved to be in a constant of evolution [1]. The first edition of the DSM, in 1952, catalogued 60 categories of abnormal behavior. By 1994, the fourth edition (DSM-IV) listed 297 separate disorders and over 400 specific psychiatric diagnoses [2]. As with other disorders, DSM criteria for sexual dysfunctions reflect the prevailing psychiatric thinking of the time of publication; they have thus evolved throughout the years, reflecting advancements in the understanding of sexual disorders. For instance, in the first edition of the DSM, in 1952, impotence” and “frigidity were listed under “psychophysiological autonomic and visceral disorders” [3]. Likewise, diagnostic categories of female sexual interest as described in the DSM IV 1994 [4] were based on the model of human sexual response proposed by Masters and Johnson [5], and further developed by Kaplan [6]. However, recent research has put into question the validity of that model; both the strict distinction between different phases of arousal and the linear model of sexual response were found to inadequately explain sexual behavior, particularly in women [7-9]. This has in turn led to several proposed changes in sexual dysfunction diagnostic criteria [1,10].