Strategy Of Conquest Research Articles

The strategy of conquest

This paper develops a theoretical framework for the study of war and conquest. The analysis highlights the role of three factors – the technology of war, resources, and contiguity network – in shaping the dynamics of appropriation and the formation of empires.

SALT AND SOVEREIGNTY IN COLONIAL BURMA

AbstractAcross monsoon Asia, salt is of such vital necessity that controlling its production or supply has historically been connected to the establishment and expression of political authority. On the one hand, rulers maintained the allegiance of their subjects by ensuring their access to salt of suitable price and sufficient quantity. On the other hand, denying rebels their salt was a strategy of conquest and pacification, while the necessity of salt meant it could reliably be taxed to raise state finances. This article first sets out this connection of salt and sovereignty, then examining it in the context of colonial Burma, a province of British India from its annexation until its ‘divorce’ in 1935 (effected in 1937), and thus subject to the Government of India's salt monopoly. Focusing on salt brings into view two aspects of the state (while also permitting analysis of ‘Upper Burma’, which remains rather marginal in the scholarly literature). First, the everyday state and quotidian practices constitutive of its sovereignty, which was negotiated and contested where indigenes were able to exploit the chinks in the state's administrative capacity and its knowledge deficits. Second, in turn, the lumpy topography of state power. The state not only failed to restrict salt production to the extent it desired (with the intention that indigenes would rely on imported salt, whose supply was easier to control and thus tax), but conceded to a highly complex fiscal administration, the variegations in which reflected the uneven distribution in state power – thicker in the delta and thinnest in the uplands.

Fighting the invisible anaconda amidst a war of conquest: notes of a genocide

Abstract The conquest of indigenous territories and epidemic diseases have gone hand in hand throughout the history of Brazil. The current new coronavirus pandemic that is devastating indigenous communities follows this violent strategy of conquest. My argument is that structural racism that has led to the death of more than 200 indigenous people in the first months of the pandemic should be seen not as irresponsible acts of omission, but as acts of genocide.

Therapeutic Efficacy of a Herpes Simplex Virus With Radiation or Temozolomide for Intracranial Glioblastoma After Convection-enhanced Delivery

The herpes simplex virus-1 (HSV-1)-infected cell protein 0 (ICP0) is an E3 ubiquitin ligase implicated in cell cycle arrest and DNA repair inhibition. Convection-enhanced delivery (CED) of either the replication-defective, ICP0-producing HSV-1 mutant, d106, or the recombinant d109, devoid of all viral genome expression, was performed to determine the in vivo efficacy of ICP0 in combination with ionizing radiation (IR) or systemic temozolomide (TMZ) in the treatment of glioblastoma multiforme (GBM). Intracranial U87-MG xenografts were established in athymic nude mice. Animal survival was determined after mice underwent intracranial CED of either the replication-defective d106 or d109 viruses, or Hanks' balanced salt solution (HBSS), before a single session of whole-brain irradiation or TMZ treatment. Median survival for animals that underwent treatment with HBSS alone, d109 alone, d106 alone, HBSS + IR, HBSS + TMZ, d109 + IR, d106 + IR, and d106 + TMZ was 28, 35, 41, 39, 44, 39, 68 (P < 0.01), and 66 days (P < 0.01), respectively. Intracerebral d106 CED resulted in a significant increase in athymic nude mouse survival when combined with IR or TMZ. d106 CED allows for distribution of HSV-1 in human GBM xenografts and persistent viral infection.

ESTRATÉGIAS DAS TRANSNACIONAIS DA INDÚSTRIA DE ALIMENTOS: O PAPEL DAS MARCAS

This article discusses the role of the marks in the competitively strategies of the transnational food companies. In recent years, those companies have carried yours expansion process by means of mergers and acquisitions oriented by the search of strategic patrimony defined in form of technological and managerial capabilities and consolidated local marks. The main conclusion is that the marks can be seen as a link between the strategy of conquest of new markets and the differentiation of products as “competitively weapon” of producer company of food for final consumption.

Diaspora and Empire: Toward a New Synthesis?

Diasporas are usually minority social formations whose physical existence and cultures are often precarious. What would it mean to adapt diaspora theory to describe the culture of a majority population that had established itself in a new territory through an aggressive and continuing strategy of conquest and imperial expansion? Is it possible to think of the Anglo-Americans who parted company with the British Empire at the end of the eighteenth century and founded a new state as a diasporic population? In this essay, Leonard Tennenhouse’s provocative new book, The Importance of Feeling English, is explored as nothing short of an attempt to recast the story of American literary history by reading it through the lens of diaspora theory. Important questions are raised not only about the literature of the early United States but also about the power, range, and limitations of diaspora theory. Tennenhouse is shown to offer a new model for thinking about the cultural situation of Anglo-Americans in the early Republic; despite some limitations, the concept of “diaspora” goes a long way toward establishing a basis for conceptualizing how post-imperial, former British subjects began to imagine themselves in national terms as Americans.

Diaspora and Empire: Toward a New Synthesis?

Diasporas are usually minority social formations whose physical existence and cultures are often precarious. What would it mean to adapt diaspora theory to describe the culture of a majority population that had established itself in a new territory through an aggressive and continuing strategy of conquest and imperial expansion? Is it possible to think of the Anglo-Americans who parted company with the British Empire at the end of the eighteenth century and founded a new state as a diasporic population? In this essay, Leonard Tennenhouse's provocative new book, The Importance of Feeling English , is explored as nothing short of an attempt to recast the story of American literary history by reading it through the lens of diaspora theory. Important questions are raised not only about the literature of the early United States but also about the power, range, and limitations of diaspora theory. Tennenhouse is shown to offer a new model for thinking about the cultural situation of Anglo-Americans in the early Republic; despite some limitations, the concept of "diaspora" goes a long way toward establishing a basis for conceptualizing how post-imperial, former British subjects began to imagine themselves in national terms as Americans.

Role of ICP0 in the strategy of conquest of the host cell by herpes simplex virus 1.

Role of ICP0 in the strategy of conquest of the host cell by herpes simplex virus 1.

French military rule in Morocco: colonialism and its consequences

French Military Rule in Morocco: Colonialism and its Consequences, by Moshe Gershovich. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. xvii + 218 pages. Sel. bibl. to g. 230. Index to p. 238. $54.50. France's relationship with its Moroccan Protectorate (1912-25) has generally been regarded as a happy one, especially when compared with that of neighboring Algeria, for at least three reasons. First, France's Moroccan policies were skillfully guided by the flamboyant Resident General Hubert Lyautey, whose patient oil-spot strategy of conquest and methods of governing both avoided a bloody and divisive conquest and preserved much of Morocco's traditional political structure. Second, Moroccan soldiers acquired a reputation for ferocity and loyalty in two world wars that made them the Gurkas of the French army. Lastly, unlike Indochina and Algeria, the French retained the good sense to depart before they became totally engulfed in the tide of Moroccan nationalism, leaving behind a conservative government well disposed to France. Moshe Gershovich amplifies this vision of a Franco-Moroccan past. He argues that Lyautey was essentially a pragmatist whose policies were forced on him by opponents of colonial expansion in Paris, by a dearth of soldiers available to complete the conquest, and by his growing conviction that Moroccan independence was inevitable. While these arguments are generally convincing, it is nonetheless true that there had been a longstanding theoretical debate in France between proponents of assimilation and supporters of association. Lyautey arrived in with certain preconceived ideas, among them a preference, at least in public, for Gallieni's peaceful penetration methods of conquest, and the conviction that France's disastrous settlement policies in Algeria should not be replicated in Morocco. He also realized, from his earliest days in Tonkin, the entire raison d'etre of colonialism was to prepare the colonies for self-government. Gershovich provides an admirably succinct summary of the French side of the Rif War, the event that hastened Lyautey's departure. His contemporaries, including Charles de Gaulle, denounced Lyautey's removal and the subsequent Algerianization of Morocco as a coup orchestrated by military and colonial interests hostile to Lyautey's imaginative and successful methods. However, Gershovich argues that, by 1925, only the rhetoric of Lyautey's original vision of peaceful penetration and indirect rule survived. Indeed, one may ask if Lyautey's vision was ever anything more than propaganda calculated to seduce the French people, rather than reflect Moroccan realities. He overlooks Edmund Burke's point that Lyautey's oil-spot methods actually provoked much of the resistance to the advance of French rule, especially east of the Atlas. …

Strategy for Conquest

Review of The Colonizers' Model of the World by J. M. Blaut.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Lines of Uncertainty: The Frontiers of the North Caucasus

“The Caucasus may be likened to a mighty fortress, marvelously strong by nature, artificially protected by military works, and defended by a numerous garrison.” This oft-quoted line was written by General A.A. Veliaminov in 1828 in a memoir which advocated the use of powerful military force to subdue the tribes of the north Caucasus. To take this fortress, a wise commander must “lay his parallels; advance by gap and mine and so master the place.” The extension of a fortified line further and further towards the mountains, using it as a base for attacks, was essential to Veliaminov's strategy of conquest.

A Note on Kasanze and the Portuguese

(1972). A Note on Kasanze and the Portuguese. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des etudes africaines: Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 43-56.

Strategy for Conquest.

Strategy for Conquest.

The Soviet Union and the Middle East: "In the General Direction of the Persian Gulf". Part I

Writers on Soviet policy in the Middle have found most intriguing the conversations which Foreign Minister Molotov held with the German leaders in Berlin in November 1940. Here in very clear words, if we look at the documents which were drafted for discussion at those meetings or were proposed as a basis for agreement after their conclusion, appears to be stated the Soviet aim of a sphere of influence and control over the whole area we now know as the Middle East. It seems to explain what went before, in the years from the October Revolution until the Second World War, and what came after, in the period from the war to the present day. The picture generally drawn is one of a consistent strategy of conquest in which this region has had a critical place. Let us therefore first take a brief look backwards, then make a closer examination of the famous encounter in 1940, and finally take a longer look at what has happened since. The historical record may tell us at least something about what is happening now. From the very first manifesto to all Muslim toilers of Russia and the East in 1917, the peoples of the Middle were an object of the Soviet regime's attention. As the years went by, that attention was motivated by a variety of aims: to spread the revolution, to weaken the capitalist West by allying with colonial peoples, to nullify attempts of Russian emigres to organize counter-revolution from Middle countries, to prevent hostile powers acquiring footholds on the southern borders of the Soviet state, or to gain influence throughout the region. Much of the Western analysis of Soviet policy toward the Middle in the first two decades of Soviet rule concentrates on the duality of approach made by the Communist International on the one,

Strategy for Conquest: A Study of Communist Propaganda Techniques

Strategy for Conquest: A Study of Communist Propaganda Techniques

A Role of Soviet Diplomacy in Its Strategy of Conquest

A Role of Soviet Diplomacy in Its Strategy of Conquest

Limites de l'investissement global et potentiel d'investissement

A country cannot be asked for limitless effort of investment. Its limits are short run limits which economic analysis has clearly defined and permanent limits. Among the latters there are economic and non-economic limits that is to sny physical and sociological limits the latters known owing to insufficient sociological knowledge. The author gathers economic limits around three ideas first idea production and consumption borders- lines second idea economic development and economic saturation third idea strategy of conquest and defence Nature of investment for example building investment and inventories investment can be if really necessary studied from strict economic point of view although building investments are directly bound with population physical limits and customs rociological limits). On the other hand the problem of under-developped countries shows that economic limits inherent in the nature of the system or in its relations with foreign countries international investment are undissociable from sociological limits Then notion of economic space appears in its whole complexity Notion of economic horizon too It is excessive to reduce the latter to mero technical horizon As Schumpeter pointed it out invention is born to economic existence only by its transformation into innovation This transformation is usually slow at first uncertain It draws back the limits of possible investment The difference between the latter and the already realized investment taking into consideration the disposable factors of production of the system the incompressible consumption etc. is the investing potential of the system worthy politic of investment uses the margin but does not pass beyond it and thus avoids the inflationnist tensions that such passing provokes

China in Stalin's Grand Strategy

IN THE following pages I propose to study Stalin's grand strategy of conquest as it can be discerned in China? its stages of experimentation and modification, of successes and failures, and its victories after long failures. The story covers 25 years, from 1924 to 1949, and culminates in the recent and, I trust, temporary conquest of continental China by the over whelming military power of Communism. I propose to use the history of the long and bitter struggle between Nationalist China and Communism, between Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin, as source material for a new examination of that almost unbelievably successful strategy which has enabled Com munism to place under its domination immense areas of the earth and 800,000,000 of its population. Nearly two years ago, there was published in Foreign Affairs a learned and very remarkable essay entitled Stalin on Revolu tion, by an author who signed himself Histori?is.1 It is a study of Stalin's theory, program, strategy and tactics of world revolu tion, and is evidently based on careful research and documenta tion. The author's method is literary and documentary, relying mainly on the published works of Stalin. This method has serious limitations which the author himself fully admits: