Strategies Of Players Research Articles

A Visible Analysis Approach for Table Tennis Tactical Benefit.

Tactics are one of the winning factors in table tennis matches because they can reflect the technical strength and strategies of players. However, the current evaluation method of tactics is relatively simple, and it can be difficult to distinguish the pros and cons of different tactics. To solve these issues, this study used information from 60 matches played by top-25 men's right-handed shake-hand offensive players as samples and proposed a tactical benefit algorithm and a visible evaluation model to analyse tactical performance. The model could help coaches and players find meaningful tactics quickly and easily and make reasonable comparisons between them. The results showed that 1) the numbers of tactics based on the tactical association-mining model and the L-shaped curve were 37 in the first six strokes. Among them, there were 9 selected tactics in the first to third strokes, the third to fifth strokes, and the second to fourth strokes, respectively, and 10 selected tactics in the fourth to sixth strokes. 2) The visible evaluation model of tactical benefit can determine the difference between the frequency, scoring rate, and benefit of different tactics as mapped into the model as well as quickly and effectively discover the distribution of tactics and measure the advantages and disadvantages of tactics from multiple dimensions.

The Development Dilemma and Path Choice of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Education Based on Game Theory

Innovation and entrepreneurship education (IEE) is a powerful driving force to promote the transformation and development of college education and an effective way to broaden the employment channels. However, IEE has been used to train students in classrooms by college managers who do not systematically think of practical training for innovation and entrepreneurship talents. There are still many difficulties in the process of development of IEE that managers cannot ignore. The relevant models that could deeply analyze the connotation of IEE were established through the game theory that explained the game balance among government, universities, and students in the IEE process. A game theory model explained the external game behavior of universities and students and the internal game behavior between students. Another model analyzed the strategies of players pursuing maximum payoffs from the perspective of both sides of the game and the influences of these strategies on the players. The problems in the process of IEE development are concluded including imperfect management system, unscientific curriculum design, nonideal talent training and unprofessional teachers. Based on it, the development path of IEE is explored through the game concept. A scientific and leading system of management and evaluation is needed to put forward by strengthening the top-level design at the national level, and a win-win game situation between colleges and students will be achieved by the optimized education system.

Audio-visual industry and digital platforms in India: A contribution from political economy of communication

This article examines the role played by digital platforms in the transformation of the audio-visual industry in India. Are video-on-demand platforms contributing to India’s growing dependence on global players or are they asserting the diversification of domestic players and the progress of Indian capitalism in the cultural and digital industries? To answer, we analyse the strategies of competition and collaboration between historical audio-visual players versus communication players, the dynamics of foreign ownership and the content localisation strategies of global players. We conclude that the study of digital platforms offers an important insight into new forms of economic and cultural hegemony in the cultural industries.

Continuous Patrolling Games

Continuous Patrolling Sometimes it is necessary to have a Patroller (on foot, in a car, or maybe a drone) move around a network so as to prevent an intruder (the Attacker) from infiltrating or otherwise ruining the network operation. The “attack” could be, for example, removing a painting from the Louvre, crossing a border, or planting a bomb. The first possibility could take place at only a discrete set of points on the network, say, nodes. However, the last two types of attack could take place anywhere. The latter continuous problem has been modelled as a game by Steve Alpern, Thuy Bui, Thomas Lidbetter, and Katerina Papadaki in the article “Continuous Patrolling Games.” The Attacker decides when and where to attack (the duration of the attack is specified by the problem), whereas the Patroller chooses a unit speed path, possibly periodic. If the Patroller passes the attacked point while the attack is going on, he wins the game, as the attack is thwarted. Otherwise the attack is successful, and the Attacker wins the game. The authors determine optimal strategies for both players for many classes of networks and find good strategies that work on any network. These ideas could be adapted to real-life patrolling problems on networks.

Distributed Offloading for Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Under Heterogeneous Networks

With the rapid advancement of the Internet of Vehicles and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, the cooperative intelligent transportation system (C-ITS) has drawn great attention in recent years. To provide an ultra-reliable, low-latency computation experience of C-ITS, computation offloading is deemed indispensable by working with edge-cloud servers. In this paper, we first investigate a distributed dynamic computation offloading model for multi-access edge computing (MEC) enabled C-ITS under a heterogeneous road network, in which the multiple and heterogeneous computing power sources cooperatively provide computation offloading services for vehicles. Considering the autonomous offloading manner of the vehicles, we formulate the task offloading and computing power allocation as a distributed Stackelberg game, where the MEC servers as the leader to allocate computing resources and manage local energy, and the vehicles as the followers to offload local computation task. Since the observable states in the game is incomplete, the problem of resolving the optimal strategies for each game player is modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) to maximize the long-term cumulative reward. Then we develop a computation offloading algorithm using Stackelberg game-based multi-agent deep deterministic policy gradient (SG-MADDPG), which uses a centralized training and decentralized execution method to learn the optimal computing power allocation and computation offloading policies. Finally, extensive simulations are carried out and show the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach

New ideas and technologies adopted by a small number of individuals occasionally spread globally through a complex web of social ties. Here, we present a simple and general approximation method, namely, a message-passing approach, that allows us to describe the diffusion processes on (sparse) random networks in an almost exact manner. We consider two classes of binary-action games where the best pure strategies for individual players are characterized as variants of the threshold rule. We verify that the dynamics of diffusion observed on synthetic networks are accurately replicated by the message-passing equation, whose fixed point corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, while the conventional mean-field method tends to overestimate the size and frequency of diffusion. Generalized cascade conditions under which a global diffusion can occur are also provided. We extend the framework to analyze multiplex networks in which social interactions take place in multiple layers.

Strategic Planning of Oil and Gas Companies: The Decarbonization Transition

In the face of increasing climate concerns and the intensive development of the renewable energy sector, oil and gas companies need to develop strategies to not only comply with the new rules of the game, but to also benefit from them. This study includes prospects for development of the global energy system along with analysis of decarbonization strategies for the largest players in the oil and gas market, and defines conceptual directions to improve strategic planning systems of oil and gas companies in order to ensure sustainability in the context of a global energy transition. The theoretical background of this study is based on the fundamental concepts and methods of strategic planning, as well as modern approaches to strategic planning in the oil and gas industry. This study makes three contributions. First, we maintain that a broad, systematic understanding of the consequences of energy system transformation and defining its role in the new market should be the crucial task of players in the oil and gas industry, and we clarify the opportunities and threats of transitioning to decarbonization. Second, the study results contribute to the development of the design theory of strategic planning systems by improving well-known methods and approaches with reference to global energy transformation. Third, we offer proposals for the development of a climate adaptation strategy using the example of a Russian oil and gas company based on the company’s business capabilities.

DE‐RSTC: A rational secure two‐party computation protocol based on direction entropy

Rational secure multi-party computation means two or more rational parties complete a function on private inputs. Unfortunately, players sending false information can prevent the protocol from executing correctly, which will destroy the fairness of the protocol. To ensure the fairness of the protocol, the existing works on achieving fairness by specific utility functions. In this paper, we leverage game theory to propose the direction entropy-based solution. To this end, we utilize the direction entropy to examine the player's strategy uncertainty and quantify its strategy from different dimensions. Then, we provide mutual information to construct a new utility for the players. What's more, we measure the mutual information of players to appraise their strategies. By analyzing and proofing of protocol, we show that the protocol reaches a Nash equilibrium when players choose a cooperative strategy. Furthermore, we solve the fairness of the protocol. Compared to the previous approaches, our protocol is not required deposits and design-specific utility functions.

POLITIK ANGGARAN DAN RELASI AKTOR DALAM PENYUSUNAN ANGGARAN PENDAPATAN BELANJA DAERAH

The making of regional budgets involves several actors who have an interest in the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD). The relationship between each actor forms a structured and systematic network and arranges strategies to accommodate the interests of actors in the APBD. This article aims to explain how the relationship between actors and budget politics forms interests in the making of the APBD. The research method used is qualitative with a descriptive analysis type to describe the relationship of each actor by using actor-network theory and public policy. The results of the study found that the actors involved in the making of regional budgets were grouped into two, namely formal actors and informal actors. The main actors who dominate the making of regional budgets are the regional head as the highest decision holder and family relations as informal actors who influence decision making. Each actor forms a network to accommodate their interests in the APBD by strengthening their relationship with the highest decision-makers in regional budgeting. The strategy of actors in entering and guarding their interests in the APBD uses four political strategy frameworks, namely position strategy, power strategy, player strategy, and perception strategy. This article contributes to understanding that APBD budget politics cannot be separated from the role of formal actors and informal actors who have formed networks in guarding their respective interests.

Bi-level optimization based two-stage market clearing model considering guaranteed accommodation of renewable energy generation

The existing electricity market mechanisms designed to promote the consumption of renewable energy generation complicate network participation in market transactions owing to an unfair market competition environment, where the low cost renewable energy generation is not reflected in the high bidding price of high cost conventional energy generation. This study addresses this issue by proposing a bi-level optimization based two-stage market clearing model that considers the bidding strategies of market players, and guarantees the accommodation of renewable energy generation. The first stage implements a dual-market clearing mechanism that includes a unified market for trading the power generations of both renewable energy and conventional energy units, and a subsidy market reserved exclusively for conventional generation units. A re-adjustment clearing mechanism is then proposed in the second stage to accommodate the power generation of remaining renewable energy units after first stage energy allocations. Each stage of the proposed model is further described as a bi-level market equilibrium problem and is solved using a co-evolutionary algorithm. Finally, numerical results involving an improved IEEE 39-bus system demonstrate that the proposed two-stage model meets the basic requirements of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. It can facilitate the rational allocation of resources, promote the economical operation of electric power grids, and enhance social welfare.

Central Asia as a geo-strategic region in the modern geopolitical confrontation

The work reveals the geopolitical dynamics in Central Asia, the states of which, since gaining independence, have become a geostrategic factor in international relations. The countries of the region - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are located in the center of Eurasia and are a kind of "buffer zone" between East and West. They have significant energy and raw material potential and play the role of a transport corridor between the countries of East and Southeast Asia and the EU. Central Asia is a region of strategic importance for global international players, each of which seeks to create its own sphere of influence there. The subject of the research is the state of geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia at the present stage. The purpose of the publication is to trace the transformation of the foreign policy strategies of key international players (China, Russia, the USA, the EU and Turkey) in the Central Asian region, to present scenarios for the development of the region in the context of global geopolitical confrontation. Methods of general scientific analysis and international political research were used: geopolitical, historical and comparative, discourse analysis, analytical and prognostic, etc. The work is based on the theory of structural realism, the fundamental principles of the theory of regional security complexes (B. Buzan, O. Wever), in within which the international region acts as a universal category for considering contemporary international relations. It is concluded that the countries of Central Asia have left the monopoly sphere of Moscow's geopolitical influence and have become a vector of China's strategic influence. The Russian military invasion of Ukraine is said to have posed a threat to regional security and raised concerns among the political elites of Central Asia. Blocking the export of Kazakh oil to Europe as part of Russia's energy war against the EU requires new ways of supplying energy resources bypassing the Kremlin. This will create a unique opportunity for the US and EU to strengthen their involvement in the region, which will curb the revisionist aspirations of Moscow and Beijing and help promote democracy in the region.

Game Analysis and Simulation Study of Hydropower Development Interests

In China, hydropower development is an important strategic initiative for the structural reform of energy supply and the development of poor areas. With technology at a mature stage, hydropower development is now constrained by relocation issues. Building a mechanism to balance the interests of all the stakeholders is the key to realizing the shared benefits of hydropower development. This paper takes reservoir-displaced people, hydropower developers, and government departments as the research objects, combines the relationship between them, and constructs two evolutionary game models: “reservoir-displaced people versus hydropower developer” and “reservoir-displaced people versus hydropower developer versus government department.” We then analyze strategy selection and evolution for reservoir-displaced people and hydropower developers, as well as the changes in the evolutionarily stable strategies of both players under the government’s macro-control and determine the boundary conditions for stable behavior of each player. Based on the results of the evolutionary analysis, the initial willingness and parameters of the players can be input into a simulation, and the evolutionary paths under different scenarios are calculated in MATLAB to further verify and analyze the evolutionary results. According to the boundary conditions of the different strategies they adopt, the equilibrium point of benefits for the three players can be calculated, which provides a new research framework for the formulation of land acquisition compensation policy, and also provides an idea and scientific basis for the macro regulation of the distribution of the benefits of hydropower development.

Network Characteristic Control of Social Dilemmas in a Public Good Game: Numerical Simulation of Agent-Based Nonlinear Dynamics

This paper proposes a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioral structures by simulating a network–agent dynamic on an evolutionary public good game with available social .learning. The model considers a population with a fixed number of players. In each round, the chosen players may contribute part of their value to a common pool. Then, each player may imitate the strategy of another player based on relative payoffs (whoever has the lower payoff adopts the strategy of the other player) and change his or her strategy using different exploratory variables. Relative payoffs are subject to incentives, including participation costs, but may also be subject to mutation, whose rate is sensitized by the network characteristics (social ties). The process discussed in this report is interesting and relevant across a broad range of disciplines that use game theory, including cultural evolutionary dynamics.

The Big Match with a Clock and a Bit of Memory

The Big Match is a multistage two-player game. In each stage, player 1 hides one or two pebbles in his hand, and his opponent has to guess that number. Player 1 loses a point if player 2 is correct; otherwise, he wins a point. As soon as player 1 hides one pebble, the players cannot change their choices in any future stage. The undiscounted Big Match has been much-studied. Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) give an [Formula: see text]-optimal strategy for player 1 that hides, in each stage, one pebble with a probability that depends on the entire past history. Any strategy that depends on just the clock or just a finite memory is worthless (i.e., cannot guarantee strictly more than the least reward). The long-standing natural open problem has been whether every strategy that depends on just the clock and a finite memory is worthless. The present paper proves that there is such a strategy that is [Formula: see text]-optimal. In fact, we show that just two states of memory are sufficient.

Surveillance and Collision-Free Tracking of an Aggressive Evader With an Actuated Sensor Pursuer

This letter addresses a visibility-based pursuit-evasion game. The pursuer’s task is to maintain the evader’s visibility continuously. The evader’s objective is to avoid the pursuer’s surveillance. Some contributions of this work are the following: 1) We present a pursuer’s motion strategy that can avoid collisions with the evader. Thus, we have generalized the problem considering that hitting the pursuer produces an escape for the evader. 2) A general mathematical formulation is proposed based on a min-max approach to model the game. Utilizing that formulation, several alternatives for player strategies are presented that vary on which player takes the initiative to move first. Among these strategies, if the evader can escape, it searches for a trajectory that generates the escape in the shortest possible time. We present simulations considering challenging game scenarios. We also offer comparisons with surveillance strategies proposed in the literature, showing that our approach can deal with a broader range of situations. Additionally, previous approaches cannot deal with an aggressive evader, and most of them only provide a strategy for the pursuer. In contrast, this work provides strategies for both players. Furthermore, previous approaches do not consider who acts as a leader, namely, which player moves first.

Islamic Philantropy Adaptation Towards Financial Social Exclusion Among Independen Oil Palm Smallholder

Social exclusion among independent smallholders of the oil palm sector is a socioeconomic problem that is closely linked to the incidence of poverty and economic inequality. Although there are several Islamic banking institutions that provide micro credit to the farmers, but not received much response due to lack of attractiveness and non-competitive features especially to independent smallholder. Therefore, other channels like philanthropy are seen as an alternative for smallholder empowerment in the form of integration between zakat business capital, and business incubators as mechanisms to address these issues. The objective of this study is to examine the role of Islamic philanthropic instruments of zakat and waqf in addressing the problem. The methods used in this study are based on qualitative approach like research interviews, observations, written expert experiences, and research publications. The findings provide valuable insights for stakeholders into Islamic philanthropy role and the importance of exposure in improving ISH performance, which could help them in (re-) align their agricultural practices and formulating strategies for industry player’s guidance.JEL Classification: A13, G21, J24, Q02, Z12

A game theoretic approach to a problem in polymatroid maximization

We consider the problem of maximizing the minimum (weighted) value of all components of a vector over a polymatroid. This is a special case of the lexicographically optimal base problem introduced and solved by Fujishige. We give an alternative formulation of the problem as a zero-sum game between a maximizing player whose mixed strategy set is the base of the polymatroid and a minimizing player whose mixed strategy set is a simplex. We show that this game and three variations of it unify several problems in search, sequential testing and queuing. We give a new, short derivation of optimal strategies for both players and an expression for the value of the game. Furthermore, we give a characterization of the set of optimal strategies for the minimizing player and we consider special cases for which optimal strategies can be found particularly easily.

Two-player quantum games: When player strategies are via directional choices

We propose a scheme for a quantum game based on performing an EPR-type experiment and in which each player’s spatial directional choices are considered as their strategies. A classical mixed-strategy game is recovered by restricting the players’ choices to specific spatial trajectories. We show that for players’ directional choices for which the Bell-CHSH inequality is violated, the players’ payoffs in the quantum game have no mapping within the classical mixed-strategy game. The scheme provides a more direct link between classical and quantum games.

Evolutionary game analysis of water-saving behavior of energy enterprises and food producers from the perspective of water-energy-food nexus

Abstract Water resources are not only the essential natural resources for the national economy and people's livelihood but also are the strategic economic resources for the safe production of energy and food. However, the shortage of water resources caused by extreme climate is a great challenge to energy enterprises and food producers. According to the game theory and the theory of economic development stage, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for local governments, energy enterprises, and food producers. Further, it analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies of the game players at different development stages through simulations. The results indicate that: (1) the game players have different strategies of evolutionary stability at different development stages, while local governments adopting water-saving policies will promote the water-saving behavior of energy enterprises and food producers; (2) the choice of water-saving behavior of energy enterprises and food producers mainly depends on the water-saving costs; (3) the guidance of the government and the management of water-saving cost make the large water consumers realize the transformation from the ‘competition of water-consuming’ to the ‘cooperation of water-saving.’ According to the above analysis, many political recommendations are further put forward.

On the value of non-Markovian Dynkin games with partial and asymmetric information

We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general càdlàg measurable processes. As a by-product of our method of proof we also obtain existence of optimal strategies for both players. The main novelties are that we do not assume a Markovian nature of the game nor a particular structure of the information available to the players. This allows us to go beyond the variational methods (based on PDEs) developed in the literature on Dynkin games in continuous time with partial/asymmetric information. Instead, we focus on a probabilistic and functional analytic approach based on the general theory of stochastic processes and Sion’s min-max theorem (Pacific J. Math. 8 (1958) 171–176). Our framework encompasses examples found in the literature on continuous time Dynkin games with asymmetric information and we provide counterexamples to show that our assumptions cannot be further relaxed.