Strategic Perception Research Articles

Egypto-centrism in Israeli Strategic Planning: The "Peace for Galilee" Operation

EGYPTO-CENTRISM IN ISRAELI_____ STRATEGIC PLANNING: THE "PEACE FOR GALILEE" OPERATION David Wurmser At is crucial to understand the strategic motives behind Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon before onejudges it a success or failure. The "Peace for Galilee" operation has been interpreted by some as a war designed solely to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (plo), concluding that the price paid was greater than the benefits reaped.1 Others have maintained the view that the 1982 war had an internal focus as well: to subdue the West Bank and to bring peace to Galilee.2 The latter was a very important consideration in going to war, but the former, though still a factor, appears to have been important only to a few in the Israeli government. In fact, the Israeli government is inclined to overestimate the plo's threat to its hold on the West Bank. Yet another interpretation ofthe 1982 invasion contends that "Peace for Galilee" grew out of Israel's strategic perceptions of Lebanon.3 Nevertheless, there is ample reason to conclude that the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was an application of comprehensive Israeli security concerns extant since the State of Israel's creation in 1948 and, therefore, should not be viewed as a limited application in Lebanon. Furthermore, the 1982 invasion was a result of doctrine dictated by those same concerns that began to affect Lebanon directly as early as 1963. Israeli-Egyptian relations have always been at the core of Israeli strategic thinking. Consequently, Israeli strategy toward Lebanon has been a function of these southern-oriented considerations. The strategic 1.Anthony Cordesman, "Syrian-Israeli C3I: The West's Third Front," Armed Forces Journal International (March 1984): 87. 2.Fouad Ajami, "The Shadows of Hell," Foreign Policy 48 (Fall 1982): 98. 3.Avner Yaniv and Robert Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," International Security 8 (Fall 1983): 117-42. David Wurmser is a Ph.D. candidate at SAIS. 65 66 SAIS REVIEW perception of Lebanon from 1963 to 1977 was that Lebanon could serve as a possible vehicle with which Egypt could surround Israel by creating one long strategic front from Rosh Haniqra in the north to Gaza in the south. Then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic trip toJerusalem did not mitigate the priority of this focus, plo activity in Lebanon was seen as an obstacle to the peace process with Egypt. And after 1981 Lebanon continued to be the locus for Israeli strategic projections, by virtue of Syria's position and power, and obstructed Israel's attempts to construct a defense perimeter—a security zone extending approximately forty kilometers north of the Israeli border whereby Israel would be able to withstand any conglomeration of attacking forces. The evolution of Israel strategic thinking on Lebanon, spanning from 1963 to the present, is a direct result of Israeli conceptions about the state of Israeli-Egyptian relations and Israeli strategic perception about Egypt. In 1963 the Israelis initiated a new irrigation program that included diverting the main course of the Jordan River. Under Egypt's leadership, the Arab League reacted to the program by threatening to divert all of the sources of the Jordan River, thereby depriving Israel of much of its water. Because some of these water sources originate in Lebanon, Lebanon expressed concern that such action would provoke an Israeli invasion, whereupon Egypt offered military assistance. But Lebanon feared that by accepting Egypt's offer, Lebanese sovereignty would be undermined and that the Israelis would be provoked rather than deterred. Under these considerations, Lebanon's president rejected this proposal. Moreover, because a political union had been attempted earlier by Egypt and Syria, Lebanon's president feared that Egypt's involvement would include Syrian troops, which might present Syrian claims and desires for the reincorporation of Lebanon into Syria. The diversion of the Jordan River was reconsidered in the 1964 Arab summit meeting, although attention, was focused more on the question of stationing Egyptian troops in Lebanon than on the Jordan River diversion plan. In Nasser's mind, Lebanon's territory was important for constructing the infrastructure needed to contemplate the option of war with Israel. At the time, Nasser was...

The “Islamic Bomb” and India's National Security

The periodic “bomb” debate has again been launched in India, predictably, as always, spearheaded by a section of sophisticated military-strategists. As in the mid-sixties, this time again the debate has been triggered off by a strategic perception of external threat: earlier, as a fall-out of the Lop Nor explosion, and now of the anticipated “Islamic Bomb”. This paper attempts, firstly, to question the adequacy of the military-strategic approach to provide the basis for a viable concept of national security; it argues the case for the primacy of the political and economic component of any concept of national security for meaningful policy-prescriptions, especially for underdeveloped post-colonial societies. It also pleads for the importance of political and diplomatic responses to meet any such threats to India's national security as may be posed by the “Islamic Bomb.”

Tactical and negotiations game for analysis of decision integration across decision areas.

An experimental simulation is described as a method for measurement of integration and response patterning in group decision making and strategic perception The method employs a simulated game including tactical, negotiation, economic, intelligence, and other potential components. Similarities to a previously described game as well as the advantages over that game are discussed.