Abstract This paper considers growing Soviet efforts to undermine political, military, and economic connections between the United States and its friends and allies in the Pacific, and how naval forces could help counter Soviet policy. Basically, Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok on 28 July 1986 represents an historic shift in Soviet attention from Western Europe and NATO towards the Asia‐Pacific region. Of course, Soviet policy in the region did not change overnight. The Soviets have been increasing their military capabilities in the region since the mid‐1960s, out of a fear of China, and especially since the mid‐ to late 1970s, out of concern for a two‐front war. This heightened interest in the region reflects growing realization of its economic, technological, scientific, and therefore military importance in a protracted conventional war. Gorbachev also implicitly acknowledged the Soviets’ sense of vulnerability, especially economic, in the area. In fact, the Soviet military buildup and adventurism in the region have driven Japan, China, ASEAN, South Korea, etc., to strengthen their own military capabilities as well as their strategic connections with the United States. In addition to the challenge concerning SDI, Moscow also fears the gradual erosion of its military position in the region. As a result, Gorbachev offered various concessions at Vladivostok to the Asian‐Pacific nations, especially China and Japan, in the hope of shifting the “terms of the debate” away from the Soviet military buildup and adventurism towards naval arms limitation talks with the United States. In making these one‐sided proposals, the Soviets hope to pose as “peacemakers” and to undermine popular support in the various Asian‐Pacific countries to respond to the Soviet military threat, to sow doubts in these countries (and perhaps in the United States as well) concerning the desirability of U.S. naval presence in the region; and to deflect attention away from the Soviet military buildup and Soviet interventionism in the region. At some point the Soviets hope that Gorbachev's Asian Security Conference will be held, which would legitimize Soviet power in the region, give Moscow a voice in Asian security matters, and settle the territorial issues that divide the Kremlin and its clients from other Asian‐Pacific nations. To this point these target nations have remained wary of Gorbachev's overtures. Since the Vladivostok speech, the Soviets have continued to mix concessions with intimidation. Soviet Pacific Fleet (SOVPACFLT) exercises have been a conspicuous part of Soviet efforts in this regard. Even so, we should not underestimate the possible toll a change in the Soviet style could take on our position in the region over time. Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok represents a major Soviet effort to gain entry in the Far Eastern game. Although the Soviets have cards to play in this game, the United States has better ones, but must play them carefully. The United States should be prepared to exploit the Soviet sense of vulnerability while countering Moscow's overtures to our friends and allies in the Pacific. In this effort, the U.S. Navy, Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), can make a significant contribution.