Strands Of Argument Research Articles

A single strand of argument with unfounded conclusion

A single strand of argument with unfounded conclusion

The nuclear power debate after Fukushima: a text-mining analysis of Japanese newspapers

This paper analyzes the debate on nuclear power after the Fukushima accident by using a text-mining approach. Texts are taken from the editorial articles of five major Japanese newspapers, Asahi Shinbun, Mainichi Shinbun, Nikkei Shinbun, Sankei Shinbun and Yomiuri Shinbun. After elucidating their different views on nuclear power policy, including general issues such as radiation risks, renewable energy and lessons from the meltdown, the paper reveals two main strands of arguments. Newspapers in favor of denuclearization appeal to “democratic values.” They advocate public participation in decisions on future energy policy and criticize the closed-off administration of nuclear energy. Meanwhile, pro-nuclear newspapers adopt a “technological nationalistic” stance, claiming that denuclearization will weaken Japan’s superiority in the field of nuclear power technology. In other words, the debate about the nuclear power is not merely about energy supply, but also about the choices facing Japanese society over visions for the future after the events of Fukushima.

Fridtjof Nansen and the Aegean population exchange

This article examines Fridtjof Nansen’s role in elaborating the compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange of 1923–1924. Thrust into a spiralling crisis, the League’s High Commissioner took on humanitarian, representational and negotiating roles having long-term as well as immediate impact, while the Norwegian’s emergence at Lausanne as chief spokesman for an agreement widely considered reprehensible invites scrutiny of his interventions. Drawing on recent publications and key archival sources, the analysis presses four strands of argument. First, while Nansen helped articulate the exchange idea along with Greece’s Eleftherios Venizelos, he neither originated it nor provided the essential political impetus. Second, Nansen’s oft-cited ‘first mention’ of making it compulsory assigns him a misleadingly strong role in a solution chiefly engineered by Kemal’s Turkey. Third, his impact on the agreement’s scope, involving exemptions for minority populations in Western Thrace and Constantinople, was limited. Fourth, Nansen’s ultimate push for a lasting settlement blended pragmatism with strategic vision. Subsequent delays and wider political failure not of his making to secure equitable property exchange highlighted the harsher aspects of a deal all the main parties in fact favoured, Nansen recognized as necessary and which thwarted a still worse calamity.

Jack Russell Weinstein's Adam Smith's pluralism: rationality, education, and the moral sentiments. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2013, 360 pp.

Review of Jack Russell Weinstein's Adam Smith's pluralism: rationality, education, and moral sentiments. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2013, 360 pp.Jack Russell Weinstein's new book sets itself two major tasks: to argue that Adam Smith offers coherent philosophy of education that permeates his system (p. 216) and that Smith's thinking is interestingly attuned to very modern problem of pluralism. The first strand of argument seeks to provide a way of reading Smith that demystifies some of remaining ambiguity across his oeuvre. The second sees in Smith an anticipation of current debates about cultural diversity and pluralism.In seeking to apply Smithian ideas in a contemporary setting Weinstein rejects limiting over-emphasis on contextualism. His approach accepts importance of getting Smith 'right' through historically informed readings, but denies that this is where inquiry must cease. As Weinstein himself admits this is a difficult task (p. 9), but it is a potentially profitable approach and one which is proving increasingly attractive. Weinstein aims to examine Smith's potential contribution to contemporary debates on pluralism by offering the first full-length investigation of Smith's philosophy of education and his theory of (p. 15).Weinstein provides an interpretation of Smith that sees his writings as characterised by desire to provide an expansive account of human rationality. He points out Smith's attempts to distance himself from a dependence on formal logic and stresses Smith's interest in rhetoric and narrative notions of learning and rationality. The early chapters trace Smith's interaction with Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, suggesting that his dissatisfaction with elements of thought of each is combined with a facility for absorbing what is of use. There is a particularly interesting comparison of Smithian spectatorship and Shaftesbury's soliloquy (p. 44), which opens way into idea of rationality that runs through Weinstein's reading. Both Smith's impartial spectator and Shaftesbury's soliloquy involve dialogical self-division that results in need for rational adjudication between competing mental features in a given context (p. 44).The book has three significant contemporary interlocutors: Alasdair MacIntyre, Michel Foucault, and James Otteson. The account of rationality provided is clearly influenced by MacIntyre; in closing chapters Foucault is considered in terms of notion of progress in history and extent to which he may have failed to grasp Smith's views; Otteson on other hand appears as a foil in initial part of book. A great deal of time is spent establishing that Weinstein is offering an alternative to Otteson's (2002) use of metaphor of 'Marketplace' in his account of Smith's theory. The objection seems more than a little manufactured. As Weinstein admits, two agree on a large range of issues; disagreement as he sees it is that by using metaphor of marketplace Otteson might mislead readers into prioritising market-like interactions in reading The theory of moral sentiments [TMS] (p. 50) or into viewing market as Smith's sole organisational principle (p. 65). But disagreement seems to be less about their very similar accounts of unintended consequences and more about potential misreading and extensions of market into other areas (via homo economicus). This strikes me as a manufactured disagreement in that underlying similarities of two authors are ignored in favour of a rhetorical disagreement. Otteson's account of Smith does not depend on homo economicus, nor does it invite any but most superficial reader to see that as Smith's view. He uses market as a metaphor for more general spontaneous order accounts-including Smith's argument in TMS-while accepting that general model has important nuances in its application. …

A truth that’s told with bad intent

In recent years, a lively debate has emerged about the question of correctly defining lying. Two strands of argumentation have evolved in the philosophy of language: First, the idea that lying is not necessarily connected to an intention of the speaker to deceive the hearer (e.g., Carson 2010); second, the idea that there is a fundamental distinction between lying and mere misleading (e.g., Saul 2012). This paper deals with both assumptions from the vantage point of the semantics-pragmatics interface and relates them to the question of how it is possible to lie while drawing on implicit content of an utterance. It is argued that lying necessarily involves an intention to deceive and that many cases of misleading are either cases of misunderstanding or cases of untruthful implicature (Meibauer 2014a).

Scrutinizing thing knowledge

In his book Thing Knowledge Davis Baird argues that our accustomed understanding of knowledge as justified true beliefs is not enough to understand progress in science and technology. To be more accurate he argues that scientific instruments are to be seen as a form of “objective knowledge” in the sense of Karl Popper.I want to examine if this idea is plausible. In a first step I want to show that this proposal implies that nearly all man-made artifacts are materialized objective knowledge. I argue that this radical change in our concept of knowledge demands strong reasons and that Baird does not give them. I take a look at the strongest strand of arguments of Baird's book—the arguments from cognitive autonomy—and conclude that they do not suffice to make Baird's view of scientific instruments tenable.

Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence

When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence. After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive regime, I ask what Ashworth’s challenge consists in. It seems that there is broad disagreement over the meaning and requirements of the presumption of innocence. I thus survey the myriad possibilities and extract two claims that have potential bearing on preventive regimes. One claim is that of substantive priority—the criminal law comes first when assessing blame. This is the claim at the root of objections to pretrial detention based on consideration of the crime charged. The second strand of argument is one of procedural symmetry. This is the concern that with respect to citizen/state relations, certain procedures are required, including, for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offense or defense. Having extracted these claims, I then assess their applicability with respect to the preventive regime defended. I first conclude that the criminal law must share blame and censure with other fora, and thus, the criminal law only has substantive priority when criminal proceedings have been instituted. I then survey whether procedural symmetry is required, specifically assessing whether the preventive regime I defend requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My tentative conclusion is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is warranted.

Saxon Obsequies: the Early Medieval Archaeology of Richard Cornwallis Neville

This paper investigates the origins of British Anglo-Saxon archaeology by focusing on the work of one early Victorian archaeologist: Richard Cornwallis Neville. The seemingly descriptive and parochial nature of Neville’s archaeological pursuits, together with the attention he afforded to Romano-British remains, has impeded due recognition, and critical scrutiny, of his contributions to the development of early Medieval burial archaeology. Using his archaeological publications as source material, I will show how Neville’s interpretations of Saxon graves were a form of memory work, defining his personal, familial and martial identity in relation to the landscape and locality of his aristocratic home at Audley End, near Saffron Walden, Essex. Subsequently, I argue that Neville’s prehistoric and Romano-British discoveries reveal his repeated concern with the end of Roman Britain and its barbarian successors. Finally, embodied within Neville’s descriptions of early Medieval graves and their location we can identify a pervasive Anglo-Saxonism. Together these strands of argument combine to reveal how, for Neville, Saxon graves constituted a hitherto unwritten first chapter of English history that could be elucidated through material culture and landscape.

Regulation beyond growth

De-growth theses point to a renewal of critical thinking able to link intellectual research projects and social movements. This paper provides an overview of some of the strands of arguments that are mobilised to criticise the ‘growth obsession’, and explains why issues raised by de-growth proponents are at odds with the regulationist research strategy. Both approaches are then critiqued for missing the connection between crisis tendencies and capitalist social property. However, the Gramscian–regulationist inheritance of paying accurate attention to institutional forms in shaping macroeconomic dynamics is still much needed in order to explore transition paths beyond growth.

Who Is This Schiller Now? Essays on His Reception and Significance ed. by Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, Norbert Oellers (review)

Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, and Norbert Oellers, eds., Who Is This Now? Essays on His Reception and Significance. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2011.xviii + 494 pp.Drawn from the international conference of the same name, held at California State University, Long Beach, in September 2009, Who Is This Now? offers twenty-eight essays reexamining Schiller's work in categories ranging from drama and poetry, aesthetics and philosophy, and history and politics, to reception and, finally,Schiller Now.Full section titles (for example Schiller, Drama, and Poetry or Schiller Reception-Reception and Schiller) suggest that this collection aims to relieve studies of the generic and theoretical pressures to which they have been subjected, and to consider his legacy anew. Thus the title of the collection, prompted by Coleridge's excited letter of November 3,1794 to Robert Southey, upon reading Rauber, emerges as founding principle for the entire project: to consider what Schuler's work and thought mean in and for our present. Accordingly, as the editors point out in the foreword, contributions take to task common or previously reigning assumptions about the idealist, the Kantian, the classicist-the collection intends to break down barriers of classification and periodization, and reposition as forerunner of modernism, his work as world literature (xi-xu).Several contributions seek to revise our literary and phuosophical readings of Schuler. Four of the five essays in part 1 (Schuler, Drama, and Poetry) grapple with perceived misreadings or unrecognized influences (Hans H. Hiebel on Lenz's influence, for example, or Matthew Bell on melancholy in Schuler's drama). Essays in part 2 (Schuler, Aesthetics, and Phuosophy), part 3 (Schuler, History, and Politics), and beyond not only weigh in on the development and meaning of Schuler's phuosophical and aesthetic thought, but also examine the valence of religiosity in his drama and history (contributions by Elisabeth Krimmer and Wolfgang Riedel), and take up decidedly more sensitive questions of Schuler's political thought (Maria del Rosario Acosta Lopez on aesthetics and politics, Yvonne Nuges on democracy, and Henrik Sponsel on post-1945 criticism of Schuler).These contributions remind the reader that, even at basic textual level, Schuler's work still reveals secrets. The import of such revelations, on the other hand, is of rather mixed quality. The authors in part 1, for example, seem more content to reinterpret, whue paying decidedly less attention to the need for reinterpretation. Jennifer Driscoll Colosimo's essay and the Gothic is rare attempt to correct the record of literary history in its demonstration that played more influential role in the development of an international gothic genre than Germanistik has traditionally admitted. Likewise, Laura Anna Macor's Die Moralphuosophie des jungen Schuler is well-organized and readable refutation of the flight to Kant thesis, tracing the development of moral-phuosophical bent in that predates his reading of Kant.The pinnacle of this revisionist strand of argument is occupied by the very direct contributions of Peter Pabisch andT. J. Reed. Pabisch's passionate rhetoric on behalf of the German classics is stirring-unfortunately, he allows the stated subject of his contribution, Schuler's ballads, to be upstaged by routine arguments in favor of the salutary effects of literary study. Reed, on the other hand, makes admirably short shrift of Schuler's historian-critics by asserting that Schuler's perceived naive belief in progress and his recourse to Enlightenment humanism constitute progressive realism, a way of living in and with history. …

Gestational Ageism

Published guidelines for resuscitation of extremely premature infants emphasize the importance of the gestational age of the infant. However, some ethicists and pediatricians have questioned these guidelines, suggesting that this may represent a form of discrimination. A policy of nonresuscitation of elderly patients older than a certain age would constitute a form of ageism and would likely be unacceptable to the broader community. Are resuscitation decisions for premature newborn infants analogous to resuscitation of elderly patients? Are current neonatal resuscitation guidelines discriminatory? This article looks at the relationship between discrimination based on gestational age and chronological age. There are 2 levels of gestational ageism and 2 separate strands of argument against gestational age guidelines. I conclude that resuscitation decisions for premature infants share many features with those for elderly patients, although there are also some relevant differences. I propose the use of gestational age equivalence as an alternative framework for practice.

The Political, Cultural, and Economic Assault on Higher Education

This essay reviews nine books as part of the most recent wave of publications treating the “crisis” in higher education. It identifies three prominent strands of argument emerging from scholarly authors. The first set is premised on an acceptance of the crisis more or less at face value, adopting what we have termed a discourse of administrative realism in reshaping the future of higher education. The other sets offer critical readings: one subjects the crisis to a sustained economic and institutional critique; the other focuses on higher education as a battlefront in the broader “culture wars.” Following our review, we offer conclusions meant to spark conversation about how communication, as a discipline, might contribute to vital discourse about the future of higher education.

Privacy, Speech, and the Law

Part I will provide an overview of the moral foundations of privacy — while brief, the goal is to establish the claim that privacy more than a mere interest. Part II will consider several arguments — or strands of argument — purporting to justify free speech rights. While these arguments, taken together, establish that free speech is important, they do not support the view that speech should nearly always trump privacy. In Part III I will suggest a way to balance free speech and privacy claims in the law.

Power Matters: The Structural Sources of Brazilian Foreign Policy

Power Matters: The Structural Sources of Brazilian Foreign PolicyI beg your pardon: Octavio wrote a book on what?! For those familiar with previous publications and career path of Amorim Neto - and there are many in Brazil as well as abroad - nothing could be more surprising than him writing a book on policy. Domestic institutions such as presidents, cabinets and parliaments had always been at core of his research, and articles in World Politics, Comparative Political Studies, American Journal of Political Science, and Party Politics have earned him a reputation as a quantitative-oriented, comparative politics scholar. How - and why - could he possibly have transited from a solid terrain that he fully mastered to uncharted territories of another social science he had previously published? I think two reasons should be called forth to explain this gamble. First, it is not so infrequent for people to come back to their first love, and diplomatic history was among Amorim Neto's earliest and dearest interests - and remained a strong reason for his fondness for politics. Second, and partly as a consequence of above, he bought into idea that comparative politics and international relations were separate disciplines. Rather, as he once wrote that comparative politics was the politics of others (2010), he would most likely subscribe to Javier Solana's dictum that foreign policy is all about domestic policy of others, and thus that international relations is arena of interaction between both comparable and entangled units. In his understanding, all these fields of knowledge fall fully within sphere of power relations, which is to say that they belong to what political science - and political scientists - study. For such an open mindset, state borders are not stiffenough as to keep knowledge in watertight compartments or, to paraphrase Almond (1988), separate tables. So Amorim Neto decided to invest his methodological skills and comparatist training into a new, though related, venture: to find out determinants of contemporary policy of his home country.This book introduces three main innovations to preexisting analyses. They regard methods, time frame and theory. As to methods, this volume is first systematic attempt to test with empirical data whether it is domestic politics or international system that have influenced more decisively Brazilian policy. Thus far, discussions had mostly been held between arguments on continuity (accentuating professionalism of Itamaraty and above-politics strategies) versus change (focusing on leadership and epitomized in famous Lula's sentence, never before in history of this country). However, both strands of arguments were defended in an impressionistic rather than fact-based fashion and also, more often than not, ideologically biased and normatively oriented. To overcome these pitfalls, Amorim Neto made careful though risky decision to use a quantitative indicator to measure orientation of Brazilian policy, and so he resorted to a database that included every non unanimous vote in General Assembly of United Nations (Voeten e Merdzanovic 2008) to build dependent variable, i.e., policy alignment with United States. It measured degree of convergence in voting behavior between two countries over time and across issues, and showed that it decreased abruptly from over 80% in 1940s to around 10% in 2000s.As book shows, to consider policy alignment with United States as a proxy for Brazilian policy at large follows a methodological choice that is shared by virtually all scholars regardless of paradigmatic leaning. Yet, it also brings us to second innovation: time span. Unlike most of literature, Amorim Neto does not start his narrative either with Barao de Rio Branco or with preceding empire. This decision is made on methodological grounds, as there was no UN - and therefore no voting record - prior to 1945. …

The Structural Injustice of Forced Migration and the Failings of Normative Theory

AbstractI propose to criticize two strands of argument—contractarian and utilitarian—that liberals have put forth in defense of economic coercion, based on the notion of justifiable paternalism. To illustrate my argument, I appeal to the example of forced labor migration, driven by the exigencies of market forces. In particular, the forced migration of a special subset of unemployed workers lacking other means of subsistence (economic refugees) cannot be redeemed paternalistically as freedom or welfare enhancing in the long run. Further, contractarian and utilitarian approaches are normatively incapable of appreciating this fact because the kinds of reasons that they adduce for justifying the long-term freedom-enhancing consequences of forced migration are not ones that would be acceptable to the migrants themselves. I conclude that only a discourse ethical approach, which mandates direct, empathetic communication between would-be migrants and members of potential host communities, captures the full range of reasons that would be acceptable to both migrants and members of these communities. These reasons—appealing both to agency-enhancing communal attachments as well as to agency-enhancing freedom of choice—fully reveals the extent to which a global capitalist system composed of relatively closed national communities coerces the world’s poorest migrants.

Statutes in Common Law Courts

The Supreme Court teaches that federal courts, unlike their counterparts in the states, are not general common law courts. Nevertheless, a perennial point of contention among federal law scholars is whether and how a court’s common law powers affect its treatment of statutes. Textualists point to federal courts’ lack of common law powers to reject purposivist statutory interpretation. Critics of textualism challenge this characterization of federal courts’ powers, leveraging a more robust notion of the judicial power to support purposivist or dynamic interpretation. This disagreement has become more important in recent years with the emergence of a refreshing movement in the theory of statutory interpretation. While debate about federal statutory interpretation has settled into a holding pattern, scholars have begun to consider whether state courts should interpret statutes differently than federal courts and, if so, the implications of that fact for federal and general interpretation.This Article aspires to help theorize this emerging field as a whole while making progress on one of its most important parts, namely the question of the difference that common law powers make to statutory interpretation. This inquiry takes us beyond the familiar moves in federal debates on interpretation. In turn, it suggests an interpretive method that defies both orthodox textualism and purposivism in that it may permit courts to extend statutory rules and principles by analogy while prohibiting courts from narrowing the scope of statutes in the name of purpose or equity. Such a model accounts for state court practice at the intersection of statutes and common law that recent work on state court textualism neither confronts nor explains. This model also informs federal theorization, both by challenging received wisdom about the relationship between common law and statutes and by offering guidance to federal courts at the intersection of statutes and pockets of federal common law.The framework this Article constructs to approach the common law question can also help organize the fledgling field of state–federal comparison more generally. With this framework, we can begin to sort out the conflicting and overlapping strands of argument already in the literature while also having a template for future inquiries. At the same time, this framework can help us think about intersystemic interpretation with greater rigor — an advance that can aid state and federal jurisprudence alike.

A. D. Nuttall, Shakespeare the ThinkerShakespeare the Thinker. A. D.Nuttall. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2007. Pp. xi+428.

But this is precisely where Shakespeare the Thinker saves itself from trivializing Shakespeare. Yes, Nuttall thinks Shakespeare has lots of fascinating ideas about the way things are; and yes, he himself, as a brilliant and erudite scholar-teacher, quite obviously and properly cherishes wit and cleverness as characteristics of civilization. But civilization and refinement (as refined, civilized people often notice) can be overesteemed; and the cleverest and subtlest authors are not infrequently suspicious of these very attributes (think of James's picture of Osmond in The Portrait of a Lady [1880–81]). Nuttall believes Shakespeare disliked the unwholesomeness that often attends mere ingenuity and style: Troilus and Cressida shows us a world “sick with intelligence” (207); and in numerous places Nuttall notices how Shakespeare shows wit and “stylish language” can become “glittering cage[s]” that “act as a screen, cutting [characters] off from reality” (222, 225). He launches out on the highly speculative and deeply interesting thesis that Shakespeare himself was “oppressed” by his own astonishing “verbal facility” (94). And there is—isn't there?—occasionally something faintly nauseating (as well as magnificent, exhilarating, wondrous, and so on) about the unstoppable Shakespeare Language Machine. According to Nuttall, in the most fascinating strand of argument in the book, Shakespeare repeatedly shows himself to be on his guard against “premature articulateness” (99), “glittering, vacuous formalism” (109), and “glittering cleverness” (203). “Thought,” observes Nuttall, “is making Hamlet ill” (202). Shakespeare preferred reality to ideas (which preference, I suppose, is strictly speaking an idea, though not one we would need to go to an intellectual for; it is rather an intuition about what is important in life that many a nonthinker must have stumbled upon). What Nuttall's account suggests is that Shakespeare had an almost Dostoyevskian fear of thought unanchored in simple kindness, goodness, and feeling for reality. King Lear shows us what universal horror an intellectual revolution—such as that which occurs in those very clever persons Goneril, Regan, and Edmund—can result in when unconnected to ordinary fellow-feeling.

Is action research a contradiction in terms? Do communities of practice mean the end of educational research as we know it? Some remarks based on one recent example of religious education research

This article’s point of departure is that the nature and merits of both action research and communities of practice are contested: for example, Martyn Hammersley has argued that action research may be a contradiction in terms and that communities of practice may mean the end of educational research as a discrete discipline. In response to his claims, the epistemology and methodology of a religious education action research community of practice – the Warwick Religious Education, Dialogue and Conflict (REDCo) community of practice – are discussed. There are three strands of argument. Firstly, action research is not necessarily a contradiction in terms. Secondly, communities of practice are not necessarily the end of educational research as a discipline in its own right. Thirdly, however, Hammersley’s critique raises important issues about professional knowledge development, inviting interaction between propositional and workplace knowledge. The experience of the Warwick REDCo community of practice – including, importantly, its meta‐research – may be aligned to this invitation as an illustrative example.

Conclusion: Rethinking African Governance and Development

This article draws together the main strands of argument being developed by the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), as reflected in this IDS Bulletin. The central question is what kinds of governance arrangements work better to support the provision of the public goods that are essential to sustained and inclusive development in Africa. Evidence at local, sectoral and national levels is pointing to the overall conclusion that what works is often a ‘practical hybrid’, combining authoritative coordination with local problem‐solving and constructive borrowing from local cultural repertoires. Consistent with the general idea of ‘going with the grain’, we find that the most likely source of the necessary vertical discipline is a developmental form of neo‐patrimonialism, not ‘good governance’, as currently conceived. Similarly, local collective action to address bottlenecks in public goods provision is seldom enhanced by standard donor and NGO approaches to citizen or client empowerment.

A ‘Third Culture’ in Economics? An Essay on Smith, Confucius and the Rise of China

China’s rise drives a growing impact of China on economics. So far, this mainly works via the force of example, but there is also an emerging role of Chinese thinking in economics. This paper raises the question how far Chinese perspectives can affect certain foundational principles in economics, such as the assumptions on individualism and self-interest allegedly originating in Adam Smith. I embark on sketching a ‘third culture’ in economics, employing a notion from cross-cultural communication theory, which starts out from the observation that the Chinese model was already influential during the European enlightenment, especially on physiocracy, suggesting a particular conceptualization of the relation between good government and a liberal market economy. I relate this observation with the current revisionist view on China’s economic history which has revealed the strong role of markets in the context of informal institutions, and thereby explains the strong performance of the Chinese economy in pre-industrial times. I sketch the cultural legacy of this pattern for traditional Chinese conceptions of social interaction and behavior, which are still strong in rural society until today. These different strands of argument are woven together in a comparison between Confucian thinking and Adam Smith, especially with regard to the ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’, which ends up in identifying a number of conceptual family resemblances between the two. I conclude with sketching a ‘third culture’ in economics in which moral aspects of economic action loom large, as well as contextualized thinking in economic policies.