Straits Of Tiran Research Articles

The residence time of an active versus a passive tracer in the Gulf of Aqaba: A box model approach

A simple box model of the Gulf of Aqaba, northern Red Sea, was used in order to study the effects of large scale processes in the Gulf and Red Sea (e.g. changes in thermohaline circulation or heat input from the Red Sea) as well as the influence of human activities (e.g. tourism, urbanization and mariculture) on the nutrient budget of the Gulf. The model employs available data from the literature together with General Circulation Model output data for monthly average temperature and salinity in the upper 200 m of the northern Red Sea, and monthly average meteorological data from the northern Gulf of Aqaba for heat flux and evaporation calculations. The model was shown to be most sensitive to changes in the thermohaline flux of Red Sea water through the Tiran Strait. Simulations of temperature and salinity best agreed with measurements when an annually varying thermohaline flux (0.045 Sv in January and 0.005 Sv in July) with decoupling of the thermohaline flow from the intermediate boxes during the summer (April–October) was employed. Additionally, periodic decrease of heat input from the Red Sea associated with regional weather patterns caused prolonged vertical mixing periods during the winters and shortening the residence time of phosphate in the Gulf. Hence, warming of Red Sea water would result in shorter periods of vertical mixing in the Gulf during the winter and accumulation of phosphate in the deep reservoir. The increase in deep reservoir phosphate can also be caused by an increase in the export flux of particulate organic matter to the deep reservoir. Hence, even a small increase in net primary production perhaps resulting from external nutrient input to the Gulf will result in nutrient accumulation in the deep reservoir. According to our model a return to pre-perturbation levels of phosphate in the Gulf would take on the order of 10 2 years.

Constraints and Adjustments in Portugal's Policy toward Israel

Throughout most of its existence the State of Israel had only a handful of friends and allies. However, even during the era of pan-Arabism, when Arab nationalism held sway over the Middle East, eng...

Tides and sea level in the Gulf of Aqaba (Eilat)

In this paper, we discuss observations of tidal variations in currents and elevation taken in the Gulf of Aqaba (Eilat) over the fringing coral reef at Eilat, Israel. Both currents and elevations appear to be strongly affected by conditions in the main body of the Red Sea. Tidal currents, which vary considerably in strength throughout the year, appear to be associated with internal waves generated at the Strait of Tiran where density‐driven exchanges between the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea take place. Water level also has significant annual and interannual variations; as seen in other studies of the Red Sea, these appear to be associated with corresponding variations in winds acting on the entire Red Sea.

Britain on the Eve of the Six Day War: The British Effort to End the Egyptian Blockade on the Straits of Tiran

After the Suez Campaign, Britain sought to preserve a measure of stability in the Middle East. Britain believed that only if the Middle East enjoyed a modicum of stability could it safeguard its own political and economic interests in the Arab world, as well as block any further Soviet penetration of the region. But in May 1967, following Nasser's decision to close the Straits to Israeli shipping, Britain recognized that unless something was done soon about the Straits, a war could erupt with catastrophic effects on British interests. To this end, it made strenuous efforts to promote the idea of an international naval task force, which, by lifting the blockade, would end the crisis. Unfortunately, Britain, hamstrung by its fear of undermining its interests in the Arab world, was unwilling to assume the lead in establishing the task force. It certainly did not want to risk the possibility of finding itself in a headlong military confrontation with the Arab states. The British venture came to nothing and de...

The seasonality of tidal circulation in the Gulf of Elat

Berman, T., Paldor, N., Brenner, S. 2003. The seasonality of tidal circulation in the Gulf of Elat. Isr. J. Earth Sci. 52: 11‐19. The Princeton Ocean Model is applied to simulate the tidal circulation in the Gulf of Elat under both summer and winter hydrographic conditions. The results of the simulation show that the circulation in the Gulf when both tidal- and wind-forcing are present has the same structure as that of the purely wind-driven pattern, namely, the circulation is made up of a series of gyres oriented along the Gulf’s main axis. The location and number of these gyres are determined primarily by the bathymetry, while the seasonally changing depth of the thermocline determines mainly their size. The simulations provide an explanation for the observed recurring disappearance of the semidiurnal peak in the spectrum of the longshore current component at 12 m depth along the Gulf’s west shore during winter. The model results show that the tidal flux is determined by the inflow at the mouth of the Gulf (Straits of Tiran), and throughout the whole Gulf this flux occupies the upper layer extending from the surface to the seasonal thermocline. During winter, when the seasonal thermocline’s depth exceeds 600 m, the velocity associated with this flux is much smaller than during summer when the same tidal flux occupies a thinner layer as the thermocline shoals to 150 m. In support of this scenario, our results also demonstrate that at depths between 150 and 600 m (i.e., the depths of the summer and winter thermoclines) the semidiurnal signal is stronger in winter than in summer.

Israel at 50: A Journalist's Perspective (review)

130 SHOFAR Summer 2000 Vol. 18, No.4 The [mal section of the volume focuses upon what Elazar and Sandler refer to as "The New Politics," andprimarily focuses upon the direct election ofthe prime minister and how the new political structures somehow "transformed" Israel politics at this time and in the future. Bernard Susser does a good job of explaining what the objectives were in the change to a direct election ofa prime minister, what criticisms were made ofthe new system, how we should interpret the new system, and how the output of the electoral structures (i.e., the election ofNetanyahu and strengthened religious parties) differed from what would likely have eventuated from the previous electoral system. In the final essay of the volume Michael Keren writes an extremely insightful essay about the "new politics" oflsraeli elections, and how the framework ofa "new politics" can be applied to the Israeli context. This latest edition to the Elections in Israel series will be a "must have" for students ofIsraeli politics who have a full collection of volumes on past Israeli elections. Even individuals who are not specialists in electoral behavior will want to own this volume as a very valuable "snapshot" ofwhich factors in Israeli politics proved to be crucial at one key point in time. We can only sit back and await the sequel! Gregory Mahler Provost Kalamazoo College Israel at 50: A Journalist's Perspective, by John Hohenberg. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998. 356 pp. $29.95. John Hohenberg is ajournalist who served as political and diplomatic correspondent in New York and Washington as well as at the U.N. He was Professor ofJournalism at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism from 1950 to 1976, and was administrator of the Pulitzer Prizes and Secretary of the Pulitzer Board from 1954 to 1976. He apparently visited Israel early and often, and interviewed a number of its leaders. These are impressive credentials. Unfortunately, the book which this highly experienced individual has produced, and which is published by a major university press, is a disappointment. For starters, neither the author nor his editor seem to have bothered to check many of the facts, resulting in frequent misstatements, errors, and hopeless muddles. There is also some evidence ofbias or at least major oversight. For example, the bibliography contains not a single work by or about Ben Gurion, although the great founding figure is mentioned frequently in the text. By contrast, books by Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, Shimon Peres, Leah and Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, and Ezer Weizman are included, as are no less than four titles by or about Menachem Begin. Uninitiated readers may gain a distorted impression ofthe role ofBegin in Israeli history, and may fail to fully Book Reviews 131 appreciate the contributions of Ben Gurion. Similarly, some readers will see an exaggerated role for a young Ariel Sharon as platoon leader during the 1948--49 independence war, with little or no mention ofthe exploits ofother more senior military officers ofthat time. This exaggeration is only slightly compensated for by the critical tone of Hohenberg's description of Sharon's fateful role in the Lebanese War of the early 1980s, by which time he had become Defense Minister. Factual errors are so numerous that even a selective list does not suffice. Perhaps the most serious one is an apparent confusion in Hohenberg's mind concerning the geography of the Sinai Peninsula and the Red Sea. He seems to believe that the Strait of Tiran, which provides access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the southern Israeli port of Eilat, also controls access to the Suez Canal. This confusion is compounded by the statement that the UN Emergency Force deployed in the Sinai in 1957 was to control the Canal, and that it "kept the Suez Canal open after ... 1957" (pp. 73, 74). If Hohenberg means that UNEF opened the Canal to Israeli shipping, he is dead wrong. UNEF had nothing whatsoever to do with the Canal, which remained closed to Israeli shipping throughout most of the existence of Israel. Other errors and distortions abound. Hohenberg suggests that the Hizbullah of Lebanon existed as early as 1967 (p. 33); in fact...

Israel Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30: Israel State Archives

Lyndon Johnson’s Meeting with Abba Eban, 26 May 1967:An Introduction Zaki Shalom As a military parade was marching through the streets of Jerusalem on 15 May 1967 during the celebration of the State of Israel’s nineteenth Independence Day, Israeli intelligence authorities received information about a massive Egyptian troop movement into the Sinai Peninsula. According to Egyptian spokesmen, the deployment was a tactical necessity in order to deter Israel from attacking Egypt’s chief ally, Syria. At this stage, Israeli officials still believed that Nasser’s maneuvering was merely a smokescreen to mask his primary goal: boosting his stature in the Arab world. They assumed he would then march his troops back into Egypt. However, in a matter of days, the crisis escalated ominously when the Egyptian government suddenly demanded the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) which had been stationed in Sinai as a buffer between Israel and Egypt since 1957. This resulted in a precarious standoff between the troops of the two sides. Under these circumstances, Israel’s assessment of Nasser’s intentions took a dramatic volte-face on May 19. The realization now hit the Israelis that the Egyptian President was seriously considering the feasibility of war with Israel even if he himself was not yet convinced that Egypt should be committed to hostilities. Four days later, on May 23, the crisis reached a boiling point with Nasser’s announcement that the Straits of Tiran (at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Eilat) would be closed to Israeli shipping. Egypt harbored no doubts that Israel would regard this declaration as an act of war. Over the years, Israel had made it clear that free navigation through the Straits was in her vital interest and any obstruction of her maritime rights would be viewed as a casus belli.1 On that same fateful day, under darkening war clouds, the Israeli cabinet convened to weigh the gravity of their response to the rapidly [End Page 221] unfolding events. Some Ministers believed that sooner or later a military operation against Egypt was unavoidable, while the majority retained hope in a diplomatic solution. The majority was also apprehensive of incurring a severe American response to any Israeli act of aggression. When the crisis broke, the United States urged Israel to demonstrate restraint in the face of Egyptian provocation. In his May 17 message to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, President Johnson had made it clear that he could “not accept responsibility for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted.”2 While the Israeli cabinet was in the midst of choosing which course of action to take, the U.S. ambassador, Walworth Barbour, delivered a message to Eshkol pledging that the United States and other nations would make moves to guarantee unimpeded Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. This message arrived none too late. Although it did not specify how the U.S. would ensure Israeli navigation rights, most Ministers interpreted the dispatch to mean that Israel could refrain from a military strike against Egypt without losing face. The Cabinet decided that the American “proposal” should be explored in depth by sending the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, on a short visit to the United States to examine the feasibility of the U.S. pledge. At the same time, however, the Cabinet was aware that great risks were involved in the Eban mission to Washington, and the decision was not an easy one. In the first place, Israel’s wide degree of freedom of action could be drastically reduced. There was also the possibility that Eban would learn that Johnson’s proposals were not feasible in the immediate future and that the American President would continue to urge Israel to exhibit restraint. In this scenario, Israel would be faced with a serious dilemma: to launch a preemptive strike and risk incurring a major crisis with its most important ally, the United States, or refrain from acting and lose both its credibility and deterrent power. Indications reveal that Eshkol was concerned over the choice of Abba Eban as the envoy to engage in the dialogue. It was felt that Eban’s...

Lyndon Johnson's Meeting with Abba Eban, 26 May 1967: Introduction and Protocol

AS A MILITARY PARADE WAS marching through the streets of Jerusalem on 15 May 1967 during the celebration of the State of Israel's nineteenth Independence Day, Israeli intelligence authorities received information about a massive Egyptian troop movement into the Sinai Peninsula. According to Egyptian spokesmen, the deployment was a tactical necessity in order to deter Israel from attacking Egypt's chief ally, Syria. At this stage, Israeli officials still believed that Nasser's maneuvering was merely a smokescreen to mask his primary goal: boosting his stature in the Arab world. They assumed he would then march his troops back into Egypt. However, in a matter of days, the crisis escalated ominously when the Egyptian government suddenly demanded the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) which had been stationed in Sinai as a buffer between Israel and Egypt since 1957. This resulted in a precarious standoff between the troops of the two sides. Under these circumstances, Israel's assessment of Nasser's intentions took a dramatic volte-face on May 19. The realization now hit the Israelis that the Egyptian President was seriously considering the feasibility of war with Israel even if he himself was not yet convinced that Egypt should be committed to hostilities. Four days later, on May 23, the crisis reached a boiling point with Nasser's announcement that the Straits of Tiran (at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Eilat) would be closed to Israeli shipping. Egypt harbored no doubts that Israel would regard this declaration as an act of war. Over the years, Israel had made it clear that free navigation through the Straits was in her vital interest and any obstruction of her maritime rights would be viewed as a casus belli.'

The historical place of the Czech‐Egyptian arms deal, Fall 1955

A virtual axiom of the literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict is that when the news was received, in late September 1955, of an arms deal on an unprecedented scale between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, key players on the Israeli side began thinking in terms of a preventive war. 'Against the background of the Czech-Egyptian deal, the growing threat from the south, and the blockade of the Straits of Tiran,' wrote Michael Bar-Zohar, 'Israel embarked upon a road that led to a preventive war.' Both Bar-Zohar and, afterward, Bar-On, emphasize that a sense of emergency and a feeling of dread gripped the public when the arms deal became public knowledge. The British historian K. Kyle also accepts this description. As evidence of the war fever that was whipped up in Israel in the wake of the arms deal, Kyle quotes a remark made by Israel's ambassador to the United States at that time, Abba Eban, to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: 'Let's not sit here like a rabbit waiting for the kill.' In the historiography of the period there is almost universal agreement on this point. Nevertheless, this 'axiomatic assumption' merits closer examination. The most important contribution to the historiography of the Sinai Campaign and its run-up is the articulate and comprehensive study by Mordechai Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza. Bar-On laid the research foundation for the argument that the Sinai Campaign should not be seen as 'the late realization of the proposal to launch a preventive war'. In other words, Israel had good reason for concern about events in Egypt even before the idea to initiate a war was conceived in Bar-On's view, following the Egyptian arms deal. Bar-On also explains why it took Israel a full year to launch a war after the deal's existence became known: Israel, he says, needed time to arrange a counter-deal of its own, and then the Suez crisis broke at a convenient time. Still, Bar-On's study rests on the conventional wisdom that the arms deal was what prompted Israel to think in terms of a preventive war. 'The Sinai Campaign,' he writes, 'was intended to deal with the motives for the Czech deal, that is, the causes of the tension and dispute between Israel and Egypt which had existed already at the beginning of the 1950s...' Bar-On, then, does not claim that the discord between the two countries was generated by the arms deal. His argument is that the deal was a watershed, a crucial

Tiran island: an internal block at the junction of the Red Sea rift and Dead Sea transform

Abstract Tiran Island and the Strait of Tiran are part of a compressional segment at the southern end of the Dead Sea transform. During the Late Oligocene and Miocene, the area was controlled by tensional tectonics; at that time the Tiran and Shadwan islands were internal blocks within the Red Sea rift, close to Safaga. The area came under a compressional regime during the last 14 to 5 m.y., after the Dead Sea transform became active. When this segment began to collide with the Sinai microplate, around 2.5 or 1.7 m.y. ago, Tiran Island began to be uplifted at an annual rate of 0.2–0.3 mm/yr and was probably rotated.

The strait surface outflow

A three‐dimensional, primitive equation model is used to simulate the flow through a narrow strait. The flow within a strait has a simple two‐layered structure with the interface located approximately at the middepth. However, the flow experiences a sharp transition at the strait's exit: the flow jumps from a subcritical velocity inside the strait to a supercritical velocity immediately outside the strait. Correspondingly, the density interface also slopes sharply upward to the surface. After exiting the strait the surface outflow tends to form an anticyclonic gyre to the right of the strait's exit. Most of the outflow water is trapped within the gyre, although some manages to escape through a narrow coastal current. These model results compare well with observations in the Tiran Strait and in the Gibraltar Strait and Alboran Sea. The model study indicates that the flow transition at the strait's exit and the formation of an anticyclonic gyre are unique features of the nonlinear self‐advection of the density current.

On the mean flow in the Tiran Strait in winter

On the mean flow in the Tiran Strait in winter

The Egyptian expedition to the Red Sea 1934/35

Six months after the return of the Egyptian Research Vessel ‘MABAHISS’ from its nine month voyage in the Indian Ocean with the John Murray Expedition, an Egyptian Expedition was sent to the Northern Red Sea from December 1934 to February 1935. During these two months, ‘MABAHISS’ carried out four cruises in order to collect samples and makk observations on the geology of small isolated islands, algae, coral reef formation, bottom fauna, bottom sediments, bathmetry, and physical and chemical oceanography. Using the newly developed echosounder, the ship made a detailed bathymetric survey of the Northern Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba, where the deepest spots, which became known as “Mabahiss Deep I” and “Mabahiss Deep II” respectively, were discovered in the two basins. ‘MABAHISS’ made 10 oceanographic sections and 103 stations of which 47 were oceanographic stations. Equipped with more accurrate equipment than the Austrian ‘POLA’ Expedition (1895–1896), the ‘MABAHISS’ investigations in physical and chemical oceanography revealed several major phenomena for the first time, such as the adiabatic increase of temperature in the Gulf of Aqaba, and the intermediate layer of minimum oxygen and the intermediate maximum of phosphate in the Red Sea. The exchange of water between the Red Sea and Gulf of Agaba in the Strait of Tiran, the formation of deep and bottom water in winter in the Northern Red Sea, and the circulation north of 24°N in the Red Sea, were described for the first time.

Control of Accretion Processes on Tiran Strait Sill by Evaporation-Driven Current Dynamics: ABSTRACT

The Strait of Tiran (~ 4.5 km, 2.8 mi, wide), linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, is characterized by 4 small, shallow carbonate platforms separated from the Sinai coast by the deep (^approx 280-m, 920-ft) Enterprise passage and from the Saudi Arabia coast by the shallow (^approx 75-m, 250-ft) Grafton passage. Intense evaporation (3.5-5.0 m/yr, 11.5-16.5 ft/yr) in the interior basin of the Gulf of Aqaba suggests the presence in the strait of an inverse stratified flow, similar to the Strait of Gibraltar. As no direct observations of currents existed, 12 current meters were deployed for 5 weeks across the 2 deep passages in winter 1982. Other physical data included salinity-temperature-depth (STD) transects and wind and tide measurements. The deeper Enterprise passage shows a remarkably steady, strongly developed 2-layered flow structure, with upper layer net inflows of 30-40 cm/sec (12-16 in./sec) and lower layer net outflows of 55-60 cm/sec (22-24 in./sec); the shallow Grafton passage is completely in the upper layer, with net flows of 30-40 cm/sec (12-16 in./sec) directed northerly into the Gulf against the wind. High-resolution seismic profiles, side-scan sonar data, echo-sounder profiles, and direct observations of the bottom indicate morphological responses in sill geometry and sedimentation patterns that reflect controlling dynamics. For example, morphological features associated with the shallow sill channels are controlled by the upper-layer gulfward flow. Current and salinity data in the deep passage suggest outflow-oriented features that are as yet unconfirmed by seismic profiles. Bottom samples suggest that sill accretion is accomplished primarily by the buildup of coralline algae, as well as stabilization of coarse bottom sediments by both organic and inorganic cements. Another striking feature is the occurrence of large and numerous patch reefs on the windward (northern) slope of th shallow platform margins. Storm wave forces on the platform front apparently dislodge carbonate blocks that function as substrates for thriving patch reefs. These processes are likely characteristics of entrances to tectonic troughs in early stages of ocean-basin formation. End_of_Article - Last_Page 511------------

The Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel

The July 1982 issue of this Journal (pp. 532-54) published an article written by Professor Mohamed ElBaradei, The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and Access to the GulfofAqaba: A New Legal Regime, in which he gives a contextual interpretation and evaluation of the regime laid down by Article V(2) of the Treaty of Peace. Article V(2) reads:The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the GulfofAqaba.

Gulfs of Northern Red Sea: Depositional Settings of Distinct Siliciclastic-Carbonate Interfaces: ABSTRACT

The two narrow gulfs of the northern Red Sea, Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Eilat (Aqaba), have had different tectonic histories, but both display active interfingering of siliciclastic and carbonate facies. In an early stage of rifting, these embryonic seas are flanked by rugged mountains (about 2,000 m, 6,500 ft) and narrow coastal plains built of fans composed of poorly sorted terrigenous debris. An arid setting promotes aperiodic transport of siliciclastic sediments as well as deposition of evaporites (coastal sabkhas) and carbonates (reefs and associated sediments). Gulf margins prograde by a combination of rapid fan deposition during flash floods and subsequent carbonate stabilization of terrigenous fans and cones during intervening periods. High-resolution seismic and s de-scan sonar data suggest that narrow pathways for sediment transport are continually active on these features and probably accommodate much of the sediment transport to deep water during small discharge events. Large flash floods may completely overwash carbonates at the distal ends of fans, requiring renewed reef development. Rapid siliciclastic deposition, coupled with biological and chemical binding of carbonates as well as their tendency toward vertical buildups, results in steep slopes along the gulf margins. The Gulf of Suez is shallow ( 12 km, 7.5 mi) and geometrically complicated strait separates it from the northern Red Sea. In contrast, the Gulf of Eilat is deep ( 50 cm/sec, 20 in./sec)--tend to streamline reefs and sediment bodies, creating spindle-shaped carbonate platforms. The Gulf of Eilat has no mid-gulf platforms, but a complex of reef-dominated carbonates exists on gulf-normal structural blocks at the Strait of Tiran. A cross section reduction of this already narrow strait by lowering of sea level, reef growth, and/or sedimentation could drasticall change the basin-filling process through restricted flow by eliminating reef growth and initiating salt deposition. End_of_Article - Last_Page 541------------

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and Access to the Gulf of Aqaba: A New Legal Regime

The Gulf of Aqaba is a long, narrow body of water on the eastern side of the Sinai Peninsula. The western shore is Egyptian, the eastern shore is Saudi Arabian, and the head of the Gulf is Israeli and Jordanian territory. The islands of Tiran and Sanafir front the entrance and have been under Egyptian occupation since 1950. Saudi Arabia, however, maintains the claim that the two islands are Saudi Arabian territory. The length of the Gulf is about 96 miles; the breadth at the entrance to the Gulf is 5¾ miles; at its widest the Gulf measures 14½ miles. The entrance to the Gulf is through the Strait of Tiran (about 3 miles wide), between Tiran Island and the Egyptian coast. There are two passages in the Strait; Enterprise Passage and Grafton Passage, 1,300 and 950 yards wide, respectively. Enterprise Passage, which lies close to the Sinai Peninsula coast, is the principal navigation channel into the Gulf, and the only channel that can be navigated safely by vessels of substantial size. On the coastline, Egypt and Saudi Arabia each have over 100 miles of territory; also Jordanian territory encompasses about 3½ miles and the territory of Israel about 6 miles.

Conceptual Models and Foreign Policy Decision Making

On June 5, 1967 the war erupted between the Arabs and Israel. It was the third war in twenty years. The hostility mounted after every war. A state of tension and alert have been and still exist between the Arabs and the Israelis.Needless to say, the real reasons and the seeds of the June 1967 war go back to the time of the creation of Israel and the first Arab Israeli war in 1948. In spite of this fact, the June war was initiated because of more specific reasons and conditions aroused in the first months of 1967 by the military clashes between Israel on one side and Syria and Jordan on the other side. This tension mounted by Israeli threats to attack Syria and reached its peak by Egypt's request for the United Nations Emergency Force withdrawal from its territories, and Nasser's decision to close the Straits of Tiran to the Israeli ships. Obviously, the closure of the Tiran Straits was the crucial element which led to the outbreak of war between Israel and the Arabs for the third time. Tracing the historical origins of the conflict is not within the scope of this study. Rather, it is concerned with the direct and immediate reasons which led Nasser to that decision. In this study of the reasons behind Nasser's decision the three models used by Graham T.

Late Quaternary Paleoceanography of the Gulf of Aqaba (Elat), Red Sea

The quantitative distribution of planktonic foraminifera, pteropods, and coccolithophorids, as well as oxygen-isotope variations were analyzed in four deep-sea cores from the Gulf of Aqaba (Elat) and the northernmost Red Sea. The core record covers about 150,000 yr. Detailed stratigraphic subdivision is facilitated by combining all calcareous plankton groups. Time-stratigraphic correlation and dating beyond the radiocarbon range are possible by comparison of the oxygen-isotope curves. During the glacial maximum salinity rose to more than 50‰, while winter temperature of the upper waters fell by at least 4°C compared to the present. The rise in salinity can be accounted for by sea-strait dynamics and lowering of sea level. The Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea were continuously connected through the Straits of Tiran, and there is no indication of desiccation during the glacial maximum.

Seasonal variations of temperature and salinity in the Gulf of Elat (Aqaba)

The distributions of temperatures, salinites, and their month-to-month variations in the upper 300 m in the Gulf of Elat (Aqaba) from 1974 to 1977 are described. Both temperature and salinity are high in summer ( ∼26° C, ∼41‰, at the surface ), and low in winter ( ∼21° C, ∼40.5‰ , at the surface). The summer transition of salinity occurs 2 to 3 months later (August, September) than that of temperature (May, June, July). The water column is stratified throughout the year but much less so in winter and less so in the north (far away from the straits) than in the south (near the straits). The winter stratification is mainly due to salt, while the summer stratification is mainly due to temperature. An attempt to estimate the temperature and salinity distributions at the Straits of Tiran from neighbouring stations was only partially satisfactory.