As part of a unifying theory of autism, Ben Shalom (2009) proposed that while procedural, perceptual and semantic memory functions are intact in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), the more integrative level of episodic memory is impaired. According to Ben Shalom, this reduced integration may be due to the reduced function of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which may also explain the reduced integration found in motor, sensory-perceptual and emotional processes in ASD. The present review examines this hypothesis, by focusing on evidence regarding autobiographical memory (AM) episodes in ASD—arguably the highest form of memory integration processes. Most research on memory in ASD thus far has focused on memory for experimentally-presented stimuli (Lind, 2010; Boucher et al., 2012). The present paper builds on this literature to examine the rich evidence that has recently accumulated from in-depth, systematic studies of AM in ASD—memories of personally-related events that are naturalistically accumulated over a person's lifetime. Of note, research on AM is limited in its focus on memories that cannot be as readily verified (but see Bruck et al., 2007), and in its reliance on high-functioning verbal individuals. Nonetheless, studies of AM provide us with an unparalleled perspective on the naturalistic process of memory integration in ASD. Specifically, this review aims to determine how well memory episodes are integrated in ASD; which elements become integrated and which do not; whether the ability to form integrated, episodic memories relates to other cognitive and emotional capacities; and how this pattern of integration changes over time. Semantic and episodic autobiographical memory (AM) The declarative memory system comprises semantic and episodic components. Semantic memories are memories of timeless, de-contextualized facts. Episodic memory refers to personal events recollected in the context of a particular time and place, with some reference to oneself as a participant in the episode (Tulving, 2002). Thus, episodic memories involve two functions: the ability to bind different perceptual elements; and, in humans, the ability to perceive of oneself within this context. On a neurobiological level, episodic memory storage and retrieval are thought to involve the interaction of cortical association areas, in which basic sensory information regarding what occurred and where is stored; the hippocampus, which binds these elements into cohesive memories of individual events; and the mPFC, which further contextualizes these events into schemas, such as the self (Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013). AM refers to memory for information pertaining to the self; and while it is often viewed as overlapping with episodic memory, the two are not synonymous (Gilboa, 2004). Episodic memory is a memory system, while AM is a type of content (Gardiner, 2008). Thus, episodic memory functions can encompass both AM and simple phenomena that do not necessarily represent self-relevant information (e.g., source memory). At the same time, AM in fact comprises of both semantic and episodic knowledge (e.g., semantic knowledge of one's date of birth, alongside an episodic memory of one's last birthday). In children with ASD, both semantic and episodic AM is reduced (Bruck et al., 2007; Bon et al., 2012; Goddard et al., 2014), though by adulthood, adults with ASD show a spared memory for semantic AM, alongside reduced episodic AM (Klein et al., 1999; Crane and Goddard, 2008). These studies suggest that as semantic AM may grow in ASD, episodic AM impairments are pervasive. These results fit with the general memory profile in ASD, viz., spared semantic memory alongside difficulties with episodic memory, which is found across experimental studies (Boucher and Bowler, 2008). The present review concerns itself primarily with episodic AM in ASD, though semantic memory will be discussed as it relates to the content of autobiographical narratives.