In this period of transition in the East, the automobile industry is very instructive as regards the problems that are arising: i.e., how and at what pace will industry be able to carve out a place for itself on the world market. This presupposes a radical reorientation in the domain of production, exchange, and cooperation. The CMEA is being dismantled, and Western industries, increasingly solicited, are tempted to include the East European market in a global European, if not world, strategy. After presenting a brief report on automobile production and the automobile stock, Nestorovic analyzes various new strategies being implemented. The production of private cars, buses, and utility vehicles is barely 3,233,152 units per year for a population of about 398 million (compared with 3,698,465 units in France); the total number of motor vehicles is about 41,397,000 units, with a very low rate of renewal. Production declined overall by 2.4 percent in 1988. The reasons have been known for some time: few investments or poorly placed investments, obsolete technologies, lack of foreign currency, and rigid national markets. Two series of debates are in process. The first concerns satisfying the internal market: only 40 percent of demand in the USSR is met. The waiting period is generally between two and twelve years depending on the country, prices are always exorbitant, and recourse to the black market is frequent. Under such conditions, should domestic production continue to be backed, should more be imported, or should cooperative ventures be established? The answers vary from country to country. The second topic of debate is modernization of production. East European manufacturers will have to become a capital-intensive rather than a labor-intensive industry, cut loose the equipment industries, and increase capacities and quality. But with what means and at what price? East European manufacturers have undertaken to cooperate more closely, which everywhere entails new legislation on foreign investments, the effective dismantling of the monopoly on foreign trade, and privatization of firms. This reality is attended by financial and commercial risks for the Eastern partners: how should the objectives of production be defined? What quotas should be set for reexporting, how should they sell on the internal market and at what price, since the buying power of the populations of the Eastern countries is difficult to ascertain? The strategies of Western groups will henceforth be dictated by purely economic motivations, unlike the past when the main objective was to anticipate a future market. This means comparative costs of production and the creation of a market by investment. With an eye to this new environment, the author analyzes the different German, French, and Japanese strategies with regard to the Eastern countries, cooperative industrial agreements or projects, and commercial approaches. A final comment by H. Gicquiau gives an estimate of the current Soviet stock of private cars, the number of which varies considerably depending on the source.