Stephen Darwall Research Articles

Tort Law Recovered? From Alan Brudner's Revised Case for Tort Law to the Ethical Underpinnings of Liberal Democracy

Engaging with Alan Brudner’s case for tort law, this paper explores how and why tort law is distinctly valuable to the liberal democratic state. In the new edition of The Unity of the Common Law, Brudner argues for "a duty on courts to administer a private-law (corrective justice) model of civil liability and a duty on legislatures to retain a private-law regime for rectifying wrongful losses alongside legislative schemes for no-fault social insurance". This paper shows that, contrary to first impressions, Brudner’s arguments underplay tort law’s intrinsically relational character, its fundamental connection to the facilitation and stabilisation of interpersonal obligations, including the social relations of which these form part. Drawing on the work of Stephen Darwall, I outline an alternative understanding of tort law, foregrounding its specifically relational character. This understanding, I contend, succeeds in uncovering tort law’s contribution to securing the social foundations of a legitimate political order.

Darwall on Second‐Personal Ethics

Stephen Darwall is rightly regarded as one of the most interesting ethicists writing today. In his 2006 book The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Darwall 2006), he introduced into the debate a new emphasis on what he called the second-personal character of ethics, which he defended with skill and care. In the newer books under review,1 which are collections of papers most of which were published previously, he expands and elaborates the position taken in his monograph. This includes engaging in debates with critics and opponents; following through various implications of his position in new ways; and adding depth and detail to some of the historical background of his view. Taken together, then, these three works represent a formidable articulation of a distinctive position in ethics, which is bound to continue to attract discussion and controversy. In what follows, I will begin by offering a brief sketch of Darwall’s basic outlook (§1), offer an overview of the themes of the papers in these collections (§2), and then present some critical responses of my own (§3).

LIVING WELL

What is living well? We describe two contrasting lives and ask whether one is better lived than the other. Many philosophers, among them Susan Wolf, Richard Kraut and Stephen Darwall would say so. We criticize their position, which views certain activities as intrinsically more worthy than others. Instead, we conclude that persons are living well if they act morally and find long-term satisfaction, regardless of the pursuits they choose.

SECOND-PERSONAL REASON-GIVING

David Enoch has recently objected to Stephen Darwall’s account of second-personal reason-giving that the phenomena that Darwall focuses on can be fully explained without resorting to second-personal reasons. In this paper, I shall argue, against Enoch, that second-personal reason-giving matters. My account of second-personal reason-giving differs from Darwall’s however, as it accepts that some of the phenomena Darwall focuses on can be reduced to the more standard form of reason-giving.

Darwall on Action and the Idea of a Second-Personal Reason

In his seminal book, The Second-Person Standpoint , Stephen Darwall argues that second-personal reasons can only occur within the realm of practical reason. In order to demonstrate this, Darwall builds on David Velleman’s distinction between substantive and formal aims of thought and action. I show that this distinction shapes Darwall’s conception of the nature of the difference between third-personal and second-personal reasons in such a way that the difference is conceived of as substantive rather than formal. As a consequence, Darwall is left without a satisfactory rendering of both the distinctions between third- and second-personal reasons and the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Conceiving of these distinctions as formal, however, would open up the possibility of second-personal forms of theoretical reason.

Metaética: algumas tendências

This is a review of the book Metaética: algumas tendências. The book contains papers of three important philosophers in this subject, Peter Railton, Allan Gibbard and Stephen Darwall. Since this book has been published, the study of metaethics has been improved in Brazil. In this review we describe the main aspects of the book, focusing on Railton’s ideas.

Second-Personal Reasons and Moral Obligations

Stephen Darwall (2006, 2010) argues that a conceptual connection exists between second-personal reasons (explained below) and moral obligations. In particular, he claims that, ‘‘moral obligation is an irreducibly second-personal concept. That an action would violate a moral obligation is...a second-personal reason not to do it.’’ A second-personal reason, according to him, is ‘‘a distinctive kind of (normative) reason for acting,’’ a reason made on one’s will and purportedly given by an authority’s demand or address. This paper argues that Darwall fails to establish the above conceptual connection between second-personal reasons and moral obligations. The failure of Darwall’s construal of the second-person standpoint does not imply that there is no conceptual connection between second-personal reasons and moral obligations at all, since another construal might work. However, given that his construal is probably the best version, its failure suggests the absence of any conceptual connection between second-personal reasons and moral obligations. The implication is that second-personal reasons at best account for only interpersonal morality, the morality that is captured by autonomy-based rights theories. In other words, the second-person standpoint might amount to an autonomy-based rights theory in the end.

Darwall, Habermas, and the Fluidity of Respect

AbstractWhat moral commitments do we manifest when we make claims upon one another? The practice of claiming is inescapable, and so any normative presuppositions of that practice are similarly inescapable (at least on pain of self‐contradiction). This inquiry thus promises an Archimedian point from which to address intractable moral disagreements in modern society. Whatever we happen to differ about, we can be shown to agree about these premises, and therefore to share commitment to whatever can be derived from these premises. The most prominent developer of this approach is Jürgen Habermas, who has sought to ground, inter alia, religious and cultural rights on this basis. I will argue that the strategy cannot resolve disagreement in the way Habermas hopes, and that this has been shown, perhaps inadvertently, by Stephen Darwall, who for very different reasons seeks to work out the premises of the practice of claiming (and who never discusses Habermas). Darwall has no apparent interest in finding a universally convincing basis for resolving moral controversies. He seeks to address, not the practical problems of a pluralistic society, but some specialized, albeit important, questions of metaethics, having to do with what kind of entity a moral claim is . Both Habermas and Darwall think that discourse presupposes a kind of respect among persons. Darwall, however, shows that respect is too fluid, and takes too many possible forms, to ground any but the most trivial specific moral claims.

Blameworthiness, Trustworthiness, and the Second-Personal Standpoint: Foundations for an Ethical Theory of Accountability

Abstract: In this paper I make the case for a theory of accountability. Moreover, I will make the case for an *ethical theory* of accountability, one that centers our subject in human relationships rather than mechanisms and institutions. The foundation for this effort involves adapting a “second-personal standpoint” elaborated by moral theorist Stephen Darwall, with specific attention to the role of blameworthiness and trustworthiness is establishing an aspirational standard that informs efforts to enhance accountable governance. I contend that efforts to improve or enhance the quality (and integrity) of governance arrangements are driven by a collective ambition to achieve moral accountability in the Darwallian sense.

CONTRACTUALISM, PERSONAL VALUES, AND WELL-BEING

AbstractScanlon's distinction between well-being and other personal values cannot be made out clearly if well-being is understood, as it commonly is, to consist in whatever is intrinsically good for a person. Two other accounts of well-being, however, might be able to explain this distinction. One is a version of the rational care view proposed by Stephen Darwall; another is a rational sympathy view suggested by some of Brad Hooker's work.

The procedural epistemic value of deliberation

AbstractCollective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements. I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relationships of mutual accountability that characterize appropriately conducted deliberation. I will argue that it only comes into view from the second-person standpoint. I shall explain what the second-person standpoint in the epistemic context entails and how it compares to Stephen Darwall’s interpretation of the second-person standpoint in ethics.

The Continuum companion to ethics

How to use this book 1. Introduction 2. Technical Terms and Concepts 3. Research Methods and Problems, Michael DePaul (University of Notre-Dame, USA) 4. Current Issues in Ethics i. Moral Realism, Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont, USA) ii. Moral Expressivism, Mark Timmons (University of Arizona, USA) iii. Morality and Practical Reason, Joshua Gert (Florida State University, USA) iv. Moraloty and Moral Psychology, R. Jay Wallace (University of California at Berkeley, USA) v. Morality and Religion, Mark C. Murphy (Georgetown University, USA) vi. Consequentialism, Brad Hooker (University of Reading, UK) vii. Kantian Normative Ethics, Onora O'Neill (Cambridge University, UK) viii. Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse (University of Auckland, New Zealand) ix. Care and Feminist Ethics, Rae Langton (MIT, USA). 5. New Directions in Ethics i. Moral Particularism, Jonathan Dancy (University of Reading, UK) ii. Experimental Ethics, Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona, USA) iii. Biology, Evolution and Ethics, William Fitzpatrick (Virginia Tech University, USA) 6. Historical Chronology of Ethics, Stephen Darwall (Yale University, USA) 7. Resources 8. Annotated Bibliography Index.

Adam Smith on Dignity and Equality

Where exactly should we place Adam Smith in the cannon of classical liberalism? Smith's advocacy of free market economics and defence of religious liberty in The Wealth of Nations suffice for including him somewhere in that tradition.1 The nature and extent of Smith's liberalism, however, remain up for debate. One recent trend has been to characterise Smith as a proponent of social liberalism. This includes those like Stephen Darwall, Samuel Fleischacker and Charles Griswold, who have drawn attention to a kind of descriptive moral egalitarianism in Smith.2 Humans, Smith seems to hold, are naturally disposed to valuing one another under a conception of equality. But that is not all these scholars suggest. They have also hinted at something more contentious – the idea that, according to Smith, we value one another in a way resonant with contemporary notions of human dignity, conceived as the inherent value of persons grounding certain rights to, or restrictions on, treatment by others.3 In saying so, these scholars have hit upon something remarkable. However, I also think their arguments in this respect are both indirect and incomplete. Consequently, the full import of Smith's view remains obscure. This essay aims to bring some clarity. 1I intend this historically. I grant there are good reasons to be sceptical about the ultimate fate of liberty in capitalist society (e.g. Marxist reasons and reasons based on various postmodern critiques of enlightenment ideology). Also, the designation ‘free market’ should be understood loosely, as most scholars now agree it is a mistake to identify Smith with thoroughgoing laissez-faire economics. 2Darwall, S., ‘Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 28 (1999) No. 2: 139–64; Fleischacker, S., A Third Concept of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Griswold, C., Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Other major commentators holding some version of this view might include Raphael, D. D. The Impartial Spectator (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994). 3See e.g. Fleischacker (2004), 205; Darwall at 142, 156 and Griswold at 235–239. However, one must read Fleischacker carefully, for he also uses the adjectival ‘dignified’ to express Smith's concern with what is ‘honourable’ or ‘respectable’ about persons, which use does not obviously match up with the notion of inherent value (see e.g. p. 207). Darwall's argument includes by far the most explicit discussion of ‘dignity’ as I've defined it. But as Darwall's article is ostensibly a book review (albeit a substantive one that addresses three books at once, including Griswold's), it cannot be called a direct inquiry. Griswold never explicitly puts his interpretation in terms of ‘dignity’, but that is clearly what he is after. Thus Darwall also reads him that way.

Second-personal reasons: why we need something like them, but why there are actually no such things

Stephen Darwall, in his book The Second-Person Standpoint (2006), has argued for an account of morality grounded in what he calls second-personal reasons. My first aim in this paper is to demonstrate the value of an account like Darwall’s; as I read it, it responds to the need for an account of morality as ‘intrinsic’ to the person. However, I go on to argue, as my second aim in this paper, that Darwall’s account is ultimately unsuccessful. I hope to achieve these aims by contrasting Darwall’s second-personal account with two other accounts, Hobbes’ and the neo-Kantians’. In the first case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account meets a need that the other accounts don’t in virtue of its differences from the other accounts; and in the second case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account ultimately fails in virtue of its residual similarities to at least one of them.

Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking

Of the many objections rationalists have raised against moral sentimentalism, none has been more long-lived and central than the claim that sentimentalism cannot accommodate the non-consequentialist aspects of our moral thinking. I examine how Stephen Darwall directs this criticism at Hume's account of moral judgment and argue that Darwall's criticism is based on an incorrect interpretation of Hume's view of motivation and the moral sentiments. Humean moral psychology is more nuanced than Darwall's objection in particular and rationalist criticisms more generally have assumed. Developing a clear picture of why Hume's account of moral judgment does not imply an implausible consequentialism reveals the strength of Hume's moral sentimentalism overall.

Three Conceptions of Practical Authority

Joseph Raz’s much discussed service conception of practical authority has recently come under attack from Stephen Darwall, who proposes that we instead adopt a second-personal conception of practical authority. 1 In sharp contrast to both Darwall and Raz, we believe that the best place to begin understanding practical authority is with a pared back conception of it, as simply a species of normative authority more generally, where this species is picked out merely by the fact that the normative authority in question is authority in relation to action, rather than belief. We call this the minimalist conception of practical authority. 2 We do not wish to deny that there might turn out to be substantive properties of practical authority that are peculiar to it (apart from the mere property of being the species of authority that is concerned with action), but, unlike both Raz and Darwall, we do not believe that such features play a fundamental role in defining or delimiting practical authority. We hope that this third conception of authority will appear particularly attractive coming, as it will, on the heels of a comparison of the alternatives. We begin, in section I, with a discussion of Darwall’s and Raz’s accounts of practical authority (readers who are already very familiar with the details of the debate between Darwall and Raz may wish to skip this section). Next, in section II, we consider what we take to be Darwall’s dialectically strongest criticism of Raz, concerning which we end up siding with Raz. Finally, in section III, we focus on the concept of authority afresh, and suggest that our alternative conception of practical authority provides a better starting place for future discussions of authority than either of the

The Dilemma of Authority

The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another requires a rule-governed institutional setting. To have authority is to have power, in the juridical sense of the term, and power can only be conferred by norms constituting it. Power conferring norms are essentially institutional, and the obligation to comply with a legitimate authority’s decree is, first and foremost, institutional in nature. Thus, the main argument presented in this essay is that an explanation of practical authorities is a two-stage affair: the special, practical import of an authority can only be explained on the background of an institutional setting which constitutes the authority’s power and the corresponding obligation to comply. However, this obligation is not an all things considered obligation, it is conditioned on reasons to participate in the relevant institution or practice. A complete account of the reasons to regard authoritative decisions as binding must also rely on the reasons for having the institution or practice in question and the kind of authoritative structure that it has. This argument is presented here on the background of a critique of two alternative accounts, Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority and Stephen Darwall’s second personal standpoint account.

Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value

This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing good for in a buck-passing fashion (§II). The second are the buck-passing analyses of good for proposed by John Skorupski (§III), Henry Sidgwick (§IV), and Stephen Darwall (§V). Along the way the paper shows that Michael Smith’s and Peter Railton’s analyses of other concepts—analyses that could be (and have been) taken to be analyses of good for—are similarly unsuitable as analyses of it. The paper concludes by suggesting that the fact that none of the buck-passing accounts of good for considered here is satisfactory, coupled with an appreciation of the various problems that a buck-passing analysis of good for would have to avoid, suggests that we should be sceptical about the prospects of finding such an analysis and should look for one of a different type.

Fichte's Voluntarism

Abstract: In recent work Stephen Darwall has attacked what he calls J. G. Fichte's ‘voluntarist’ thesis, the idea—on Darwall's reading—that I am bound by obligations of respect to another person by virtue of my choice to interact with him. Darwall argues that voluntary choice is incompatible with the normative force behind the concept of a person, which demands my respect non‐voluntarily. He in turn defends a ‘presuppositional’ thesis which claims that I am bound by obligations of respect simply by recognizing the other as a person. In this paper I argue Darwall has misidentified the voluntary element in Fichte's account (sections 4–5). This requires me first to explain what Fichte's voluntarism really consists in (sections 1–3), and I suggest an apparent ambiguity in Fichte's position is responsible for Darwall's misreading. Clarifying this ambiguity, however, exposes some limitations to Darwall's thesis, and I end by discussing what those limitations are and what we can learn from them (sections 6–8).

The Second-Person Standpoint and the Law

One of the most exciting and potentially fecund developments in contemporary moral philosophy is due to a recent line of thought developed by Stephen Darwall. In The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability, Darwall has defined a novel and interrelated set of concepts – which include those of the “second-person standpoint” and “second-personal reasons” – and has argued that these concepts shed new light on both the nature of moral obligation and the appropriate methods for justifying moral judgments. Because most traditional views of practical reason (including both Kantian and consequentialist views) are rooted in the first and third-person standpoints, Darwall’s work provides a fundamental challenge to a broad range of views in the literature. This article argues that – despite a number of important controversies surrounding Darwall’s underlying account of morality – there are special reasons to think that three of his core claims should have more powerful, more robust, and more uncontroversial applications to the law. Building on these three core claims, this article also develops a novel and highly integrated account of both legal authority and legal legitimacy, which helps to illuminate a number of the law’s otherwise puzzling features. The article also explains why, in light of these facts, there there are special reasons to apply contractualist (as opposed to consequentialist) standards to test for the legitimacy not only of public but also of private law. For those who are unfamiliar with these contemporary developments in moral philosophy, Section I introduces the concepts of the “second-person standpoint” and “second-personal reasons,” and locates them within the larger intellectual landscape in normative theory. Section II presents three core claims that Darwall makes about second-personal reasons, which are – in my view – most relevant to legal theory. Section III then develops a novel set of reasons for extending these core claims to the law, regardless of whether they apply to morality. Section III also develops a novel, and highly integrated, account of legal authority and legal legitimacy, and describes some of the potentially far-reaching applications that this account may have for legal theory. Section IV, finally, discusses some of the primary objections to Darwall’s views on morality – which arise from Korsgaard, James, Wallace, and Watson – as well as from the so-called “philosophical utilitarians.” It argues that these objections ultimately depend on special features of morality, which the law does not share, and that a close examination of these objections can therefore help explain just why these contemporary developments may have more powerful applications to law than to morality. Indeed, there are – in my view – special reasons for both Kantians and philosophical utilitarians (one branch of which includes many members of the law and economics movement) to think that the law is distinctive in ways that invite a fundamentally contractualist (rather than a fundamentally consequentialist) test for its its legitimacy, on distinctive grounds.