Status Quo Power Research Articles

Trickle‑ down Hegemony? China´ s “ Peaceful Rise” and Dam Building on the Mekong

Introduction After its rise, will China display restrained or self-interest maximizing behaviour toward its neighbours? This question is at heart of propaganda line that was espoused by Chinese leadership from 2003 until mid-2004: theory of China's (helping jueqi). The government, anxious that smaller states on its periphery will react negatively to growing Chinese economic and military power, built a new line out of old themes, stressing that China's rise will not turn it into an aggressive hegemon who uses its power strictly to maximize its own interests. Instead, all nations will benefit in win-win situation created by Middle Kingdom's new power. While actual term appears to have been shelved, basic themes it encompasses have not: China continues to portray itself as a status quo power whose increasing stature will not negatively affect those around it. Nor does apparent disappearance of term itself diminish importance of analytical question: namely, how will China act towards its neighbours as it gains more power? This article asks: how can we know whether Chinese protestations of its are more than just empty words? How can we know whether China will help its neighbours, or is actually a wolf in sheep's clothing, luring its neighbours into complacency or working them into relationships in which China is principal beneficiary (playing possum, in words of one China expert)? This article suggests a framework for evaluating Chinese behaviour. Clearly, there is a need to look not only at Chinese words, but also at their actions. But which actions? This essay argues that some issue areas will prove more illuminating about future Chinese behaviour than others. After laying out framework, it focuses on one under-studied issue in China's multilateral relationship with ASEAN countries: agreements (or lack thereof) to manage Mekong's water resources. China's relationship with Southeast Asia is chosen principally because some analysts have asserted that China's new multilateral diplomacy and charm offensive (see Medeiros and Fravel 2003; Beeson 2003; Stubbs 2002) are succeeding in drawing Southeast Asia into a proto-Chinese sphere of influence. Therefore, purpose of this article is to lay out a framework for assessing Chinese actions as well as to call attention to an important issue often below radar of Western experts on Asian security. The Theory of Peaceful Rise From 2003-2004, Chinese government officials, academics, and press promoted a new propaganda term: China's rise. The theory was formulated explicitly to reassure countries, particularly smaller ones on its periphery, that China's increasing economic and military power will not pose a threat to them. Zheng Bijian, dean of influential Central Party School, agreed with an interviewer's assessment that the concept of a 'peaceful rise' initiated by China has forcefully addresses [sic] 'the China threat theory' and 'China collapse theory' and also allows China's neighbouring countries and various countries in world to feel more relief. (1) While term itself is apparently no longer in vogue, basic ideas it encompasses continue to reflect image China wants to project to its neighbours. Indeed, theory itself was not particularly new, but rather a slightly extended version of Deng Xiaoping's and line, The theory has three key points. The first point amounts to not much more than a restatement of standard and line. Zheng Bijian writes that China is both striving for a peaceful international environment in which to develop ... and also to safeguard world peace through China's development. (2) The key problems China faces are domestic, and answer to these problems is development of economy. …

Suits and Uniforms

Philip Robins contends that Turkish foreign policy has faced four challengesin four distinct periods of its history: (1) consolidating the emergentTurkish Republic through external recognition (1930s), (2) remainingneutral during the Second World War (1940s), (3) confronting thechallenge of Soviet expansionism (the cold war era), and (4) respondingto the end of bipolarity (post-cold war era). Robins examines these foreignpolicy issues in the last period.The main thesis of this work is threefold: First, Turkey is a status quopower in the way that its foreign policy elites have fastened their thinkingand practice to the framework of “the sanctity of borders, of states, ofmultilateral institutions and of norms of conduct, even when it becameclear that systemic changes had rendered some of these continuities nolonger tenable” (p. 6). Second, Turkey continues to be firmly orientedwestwards in terms of its foreign relations, which are characterized by itsstrong commitment to NATO as well as its desire to join the EuropeanUnion (EU). Finally, Turkish foreign policy has been characterized moreby “caution than daring,” quoting Malik Mufti. Despite the increase in itspower relative to its neighbors, Turkey has avoided an interventionist foreignpolicy by emphasizing the formation of multilateral frameworks forconflict resolution.Robins defends these arguments by analyzing the international systemicand domestic politics context in which Turkish foreign policy is ...

The reluctant hegemon: India's self-perception and the South Asian strategic environment

This article argues that the hiatus between India's self-perception as a status quo power and its perception by the neighbouring states as a regional bully is a main cause of stalemate in the South Asian security environment. This main argument is analysed in terms of the appurtenances of Indian power, the pronouncements of its statesmen, the perception of its voters and strategists, and the institutional arrangement of its security apparatus. Greater cohesion in the country's strategic perception will enhance the transformation of India's potential strength into an effective role in South Asian security.

Is China a Status Quo Power?

of China (PRC) is more integrated into, and more cooperative within, regional and global political and economic systems than ever in its history. Yet there is growing uneasiness in the United States and the Asia-Paciac region about the implications of China’s increasing economic and military power. Characterizations of Chinese diplomacy in the policy and scholarly worlds are, if anything, less optimistic of late about China’s adherence to regional and international norms. In the 1980s there was little discussion in the United States and elsewhere about whether China was or was not part of something called “the international community.” Since the early 1990s, however, scholars and practitioners alike have argued increasingly that China has not demonstrated sufaciently that it will play by so-called international rules and that somehow it must be brought into this community. The subtext is a fairly sharp othering of China that includes a civilizing discourse (China is not yet a civilized state) or perhaps a sports discourse (China is a cheater). Many of the most vigorous policy debates in the United States in recent years have been over whether it is even possible to socialize a dictatorial, nationalistic, and dissatisaed China within this putative international community. Engagers argue that China is becoming socialized, though mainly in the sphere of economic norms (e.g., free trade and domestic marketization). Skeptics either conclude that this is not the case, due to the nature of the regime (for some, China is still Red China; for more sophisticated skeptics, China is oirting with fascism), or that it could not possibly happen because China as a rising power, by deanition, is dissatisaed with the U.S.-dominated global order (a power-transition realpolitik argument). A logical conclusion is that both groups view the problem of China’s rising power as the primary Is China a Status Quo Power?

The Widening Gap between Education and Schooling in the Post 9/11 Era

Mwalimu J. Shujaa likens the educational tensions of the post 9/11 era to those of the Viet Nam period. He argues that is a process of culture and identity transmission while is intended to ensure that status quo power relationships are maintained. For persons of African descent, education, unlike schooling, means consciously developing knowledge bases grounded in the culture and history of the African world and concomitantly interpreting reality through those knowledge bases. In the post 9/11 era, educators who take the moral initiative to interrogate the interests of the powerful and evaluate these in the interest of the African world are at risk of being attacked as subversives. My thoughts about the of people of African ancestry in the United States in the era following September 11, 2001, have drawn me spiritually to Martin Luther King, Jr. and the courageous stance he took in opposition to the United States' against Viet Nam. The speech he delivered called A Time to Break Silence continues to pervade my consciousness. Here is some of what King said at Riverside Church in New York City on April 4, 1967, exactly one year to the day before he was assassinated: Even when pressed by the demands of inner truth, men do not easily assume the task of opposing their government's policy, especially in time of war. Nor does the human spirit move without great difficulty against all the apathy of conformist thought within one's own bosom and in the surrounding world. (1967/1986, p. 231) The war on terror that U.S. President George W. Bush has declared is a context in which conformist thought is given sanction under the banner of patriotism. King's words and actions in the Viet Nam War era are sources of inspiration and guidance. In this post 9/11 era, we face similar challenges in speaking truth to power and, more to the point, speaking among ourselves about power and how we are affected by its uses and abuses. The incredible technologies of surveillance and near absolute authority to use them produce a climate that is unfriendly to dissent. It is a time when those who control the media of mass communication have circled their wagons against dissenting voices. Fearing ostracism, many find it prudent to speak softly about the social contradictions that limit the life chances of people of African ancestry. In times such as these, when those with the power to do so spin and distort truth to suit their interests, can be perceived as subversive. In the post 9/11 era, an honest discussion about the of people of African ancestry must address the manipulation of to create conformist thinking and the role of such thinking in maintaining existing power relationships. The tendency of conformist thinking is toward inaction when action is needed. It produces resignation to the status quo when change is needed. I contend that education and schooling are different processes and that, while it is possible for them to overlap, most people of African descent in the United States receive more than education, (see Shujaa, 1994). GROUNDING ASSUMPTIONS My thinking about post-9/11 is grounded in four assumptions about the social order that exists in the United States. First, the United States is a nation-state in which multiple and differing cultural orientations exist among the members of its society. Second, unequal power relations exist among the culture groups within the society. Third, the elite members of the politically dominant culture strategically impose their knowledge and worldview priorities. Fourth, despite incredible efforts to manage information and produce mass thought and predictable behavior in the United States, there is no perfect form of cultural imposition. Throughout human history, truly educated, critically conscious people emerge who demonstrate the capacity to see through nonsense, grow in wisdom, and share knowledge with others. …

Formulating Canada's Grand Strategy in Asia

Canada will have to escape the mire of the mid-Atlantic mindset and develop a comprehensive economic and political strategy for the Asia Pacific. Daryl Copeland, 1999(f.1)SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, Canada has made important contributions to the peaceful development of Asia's security environment, largely in ways that reflect what might be called a liberal internationalist approach, with stress on such things as building international institutions, international law, and multilateral co-operation. Canada's impact can be seen, for example, in the growing number of multilateral security dialogues or 'track-two diplomacy,'(f.2) which it helped to initiate with the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue in 1990. Non-traditional concepts of co-operative security and human security have become a part of policy language spoken by security specialists in those multilateral forums, and Canada has been a leading promoter of these policy ideas.(f.3) It could be argued, however, that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, track-two diplomacy has run out of steam in the Asia-Pacific. Although a degree of trust among Asian nations has been built up under the auspices of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the Regional Forum (ARF) of ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations),(f.4) it remains to be seen whether that will translate into concrete and meaningful agreements on preventive diplomacy which can then be implemented.(f.5) This problem is compounded by the fact that traditional security problems involving military weapons and threats linger on in northeast and south Asia, with which the multilateral dialogue exercise is ill-equipped to deal.Canada now has an opportunity to reassess its national interest in Asian security affairs. To do so, it should step back from the liberal internationalist approach that it has pursued thus far.(f.6) What, then, might Canada's long-term strategy look like through an alternative, realpolitik framework of security analysis? The exercise can help to clarify Canadian interests and the challenges Canada must face if it is to maintain its liberal internationalist approach in Asia. Only by clearly understanding where Canada stands in the Asian geostrategic environment, in other words, can an effective strategy be formulated to promote further the non-traditional concepts of security in that environment.(f.7)Canada needs to articulate the geopolitical logic of its Asia policy for another reason: it has not yet fully succeeded in persuading Asians (particularly northeast Asians), who typically employ the realpolitik frame of reference in understanding their regional security affairs, why it is in Canada's strategic interest to get involved in Asian security affairs. Canada's 'physical remoteness, negligible military capability, and relatively minor stake in the region (compared with that of virtually everyone else), mean that other Pacific Basin states naturally have difficulty thinking of Canada as a player.'(f.8) Canada aggravates this situation by using the language of liberal internationalism to describe its interests in Asian security affairs, which merely reinforces the existing Asian view that Canada does not have 'true' (that is, geostrategic) reasons to be involved in Asian security affairs.Let us start by frankly acknowledging that Canada is a status-quo power, enjoying the world order established by the victors in the Second World War and the cold war, and that its liberal internationalist approach to global security affairs has worked, in the final analysis, to sustain that world order. Canadians may want to see themselves as honest brokers or as problem solvers with clean hands, neutral in the power struggle between the defenders and the challengers of the world order. But the truth is that Canada is in the middle of the power struggle, and Asia is one of the theatres where the struggle is taking place. Canada's global strategic goal is to maintain the current world order dominated by the Anglo-American powers, the core victors in the Second World War and the cold war, by co-opting potential challengers and by consolidating its coalition with other status-quo powers within and beyond the Anglo-American circle. …

Madness in our methods: nursing research, scientific epistemology.

This paper is a critique of some research methods evident in contemporary nursing literature. The arguments derive from critical-feminist, humanist and ethical perspectives. As a consequence of investigating specific aspects of scientific method, an approach to research that is congruent with values intrinsic to an holistic approach to nursing practice is articulated. Such methodologies also render problematic with status quo power relations between nurses and other health professionals, as well as between nurses and patients. The central themes in this paper are: the absence of overt conceptual frameworks; an avoidance of complex social contexts within which research subjects live; an apparent lack of empathy; and an apolitical articulation of research problems and data analyses. All four of these difficulties may be traced to scientific methodology by many researchers. Most nurse researchers may not actually adhere to this technique, but I propose that they have been informed by belief systems associated with scientific methodology and that these have dire consequences for the discipline of nursing. A key argument is that the apparent lack of conceptual frameworks in the majority of nursing research is due to the epistemology, which therefore provides a pre-existing, non-declared conceptual framework, that is incorporated into the research by drawing upon scientific methodology. A further argument is that scientific, or scientistic, ways of approaching situations are antithetical to nursing values and to constructive social change for the benefit of patients, nursing and nurses.

Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers

This book examines a question generally neglected in the study of international relations: why does a militarily and economically less powerful state initiate conflict against a relatively strong state? T. V. Paul analyses this phenomenon by focusing on the strategic and political considerations, domestic and international, which influence a weaker state to initiate war against a more powerful adversary. The key argument of deterrence theory is that the military superiority of the status quo power, coupled with a credible retaliatory threat, will prevent attack by challengers. The author challenges this assumption by examining six twentieth-century asymmetric wars, from the Japanese offensive against Russia in 1904 to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. The book's findings have wide implications for the study of war, power, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, strategy, arms races, and alliances.

Is United States Foreign Policy “Imperialist” or “Imperial”?

For most of postwar period dominant scholarly consensus on United States role in international politics closely paralleled image that policy makers themselves held: United States was a defensive, status-quo power seeking to contain revolutionary or simply imperialist expansionism of Soviet-led communism. The dominant critique of United States foreign policy operated well within this framework of assumptions; one common argument was that United States had a tendency to overreach itself, to undertake commitments that excessively taxed its military and economic capabilities. The focus was on limits of American power; critics never tired of quoting Sir Denis Brogan on the illusions of American omnipotence.

Soviet Foreign Policy and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia: A Theory and a Case Study

Understanding the process of Soviet foreign policy-making can sometimes be a frustrating challenge. The impatient observer who prefers generalizations or polemics to the painstaking and often dull task of analyzing policy will not readily find the answers he is seeking. Those who seek a handy typecast explaining Soviet foreign policy as that of a classic imperialist nation (or, conversely, that of a satiated, status-quo power) will suffer from a misconception born of oversimplification. Those who attempt to explain the USSR's policy as a direct product of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology will only confuse motivation with rationalization. There is no simple approach which will immediately enlighten the policy-making process. Soviet foreign policy, like that of most other nation-states, is a product of both domestic and external factors; it is based on rational, calculated motives to an indeterminate degree and on nonrational, often spontaneous, motives to a similarly indeterminate degree; it is neither totally predictable nor hopelessly whimsical, neither perfectly constant nor endlessly fluctuating.