Metaphysical Status Research Articles

Hume on The Epistemological Status of Metaphysical Statements

Abstract My paper examines critically the widespread view that Hume confines meaningful propositions to those which are analytic (a priori), and those which are synthetic empirical, thereby rejecting synthetic a priori propositions as meaningful. What I show is that Hume does recognize certain metaphysical synthetic a priori propositions as meaningful, thereby dispelling the traditional view that Hume rejects all synthetic a priori as meaningful.

The Brothers Karamazov and the theology of suffering

This article offers a reflection upon The Brothers Karamazov, interpreted as a theological and philosophical contribution to the debate over humanity’s practical relationship to suffering and vulnerability. The relationship is practical insofar as the questions with which Dostoevsky struggles all relate to human agency: How should we live in the continual presence of suffering? The article reconstructs a theology of suffering in The Brothers Karamazov as a form of anti-theodicy. Further, the theology of suffering in The Brothers Karamazov is counterposed to Leo Tolstoy’s novella Hadji Murat. How does Dostoevsky’s “theology of suffering” fare in a comparison with one of the most perceptive portraits of power and powerlessness in world literature? In the proposed reading of the story, the elderly Tolstoy seeks to challenge the Christian theology that views responsibility for suffering and injustice primarily as an individual struggle with the metaphysical conditions of existence.

From the “logic of paradoxes” to dialectical logic (historical transformation of Spinozist methodology)

The article deals with the features of the transformation of the philosophical cognitive methodology in the heritage of B. Spinoza. The central concept of Spinozism is the concept of “substance”, which plays not only a meaningful, but also a formal role in his philosophy. An analysis of the interpretation of the term “substance” by Spinoza reveals its paradoxical nature. The paradox arises in the context of operating with extremely abstract and universal concepts, therefore, thinkers always try to give these concepts a natural-philosophical character, make them more meaningful and thereby reduce the level of their inconsistency. Spinoza’s idea of substantiality as a criterion of the absolute essence of God clearly proves this. Referring to God as an absolute and universal substantial criterion, Spinoza tried to restore in rights the religious status of ontology and metaphysics, which was questioned by the theory of innate ideas of Descartes and achieved the exact opposite result. On the one hand, the substantiality of God appeared to be consistent and universal; on the other hand, His substantial character was the basis for the denial of His absoluteness, because infinite substance seeks to self-determination and self-restraint. Thus, Spinoza became the author of the concept of an absolutely contradictory substantial God as the absolute foundation of a contradictory world and the contradictory nature of human knowledge. In this sense, the paradox manifests itself not only as an obstacle to objective historical knowledge, but also as a way of transforming philosophical ideas in the history of mankind. This is the only way to understand the essence of the transformation of the ideas of Spinozism in the philosophy of Hegelianism and Marxism: the adoption of the formal features of the metaphysical concept of “substance” became the basis for the transformation of the metaphysical logic of paradox to dialectical logic.

Reform or Euthanasia of Metaphysics?

Although the philosophical ideas of the English philosopher Robin George Collingwood on history and art have often been compared with those of the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, an in-depth comparison between their concepts of metaphysics was never made. Therefore, the focus in this article is on both authors’ concepts of metaphysics. It is shown that, despite the undeniable affinity, their views of the status of metaphysics differ substantially. Both Dilthey and Collingwood focus on an inherent antinomy in the project of metaphysics. On the one hand, there is the inescapable relativity of all time-bound ways of thinking and their results; on the other, there is the metaphysical search for objective and generally accepted knowledge of reality as a whole. For Dilthey, the awareness of its historical character reveals the impossibility for metaphysics to provide a foundation for natural and human sciences alike. Collingwood’s aim, by contrast, is to safeguard the possibility of metaphysics as a historical science to supply an enduring foundation of natural and human sciences. To clarify this radical difference with regard to the role of metaphysics, I make three steps. First, I situate Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics within the context of his work in order to present his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Second, I focus on the role of Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Finally, I relate the different status of their views of metaphysics to their divergent interpretations of human finitude.

Модальный структурализм и проблема интеграции

Modal structuralism attempts to solve the problems of Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. First, the paper presents the view that modal structuralism emerges out of Benacerraf’s arguments against Pla-tonism and set-theoretic reductionist realism. Putnam’s account is showed to be another source of influ-ence on modal structuralism. Second, the basic ideas of modal structuralism are reviewed, with special at-tention paid to how the translation of mathematical statements into modal sentences helps to avoid the set-theoretic grounding of such statements. However, since possible worlds are conceived as set-theoretic entities, the translation itself faces the problem of potential circular explanation. To solve the problem, Hellman suggests taking modalities as primitives, but his solution faces additional issues. Two of them are an unclear metaphysical status of the possible structures mathematicians make statements about and an obscure epistemic access mathematicians have to these structures. In order to avoid these issues, the paper suggests combining modal structuralism with modal normativism. According to the latter, modal statements are not about objects or facts but about linguistic rules. Since modal normativists interpret the possible structures as non-metaphysical entities, the problem of epistemic access to such structures trans-forms into the problem of the agent’s knowledge of the semantic rules of mathematical language. It is al-so pointed out that modal normativism might solve another set of structuralist problems, not specifically concerned with modalities, e.g., the problem of objects’ dependence on the structures in which they are embedded.

How Anti-Humeans Can Embrace a Thermodynamic Reduction of Time’s Causal Arrow

Some argue that time’s causal arrow is grounded in an underlying thermodynamic asymmetry. Often, this is tied to Humean skepticism that causes produce their effects, in any robust sense of ‘produce’. Conversely, those who advocate stronger notions of natural necessity often reject thermodynamic reductions of time’s causal arrow. Against these traditional pairings, I argue that ‘reduction-plus-production’ is coherent. Reductionists looking to invoke robust production can insist that there are metaphysical constraints on the signs of objects’ velocities in any state, given other—including far later—states’ properties. The Past Hypothesis may thus be a metaphysical condition, not a physical law.

A Platonic Kind-Based Account of Goodness

Robert Adams defends a platonic account of goodness, understood as excellence, claiming that there exists a platonic good that all other good things must resemble, identifying the Good with God. Mark Murphy agrees, but argues that this platonic account is in need of Aristotelian supplementation, as resemblance must take into account a thing’s kind-membership. While this article will accept something like Murphy’s account of goodness (but without claiming the platonic good is God), it will further develop its details and support. Without relying on theistic premises, I show that the metaphysical status of an individual’s goodness consists in resemblance with the platonic good. As for the distinct question of what that goodness holds in virtue of, I conclude it holds in virtue of exactly: the thing’s own properties, those properties being such as to satisfy its kind-based standards (K-standards), and those K-standards resembling the platonic good. I then develop an account of how K-standards resemble the platonic good: The K-standards resemble it firstly with respect to requiring activities, as the platonic good will be posited to be active, and must resemble it secondly also at the level of what teleology those activities are directed towards. I also motivate the need for a third respect of resemblance, to be developed in future work. The article ends with a discussion of the nature of the platonic good.

The introduction of the problem of personal identity in the university course of philosophy

The article considers the introduction of the problem of personal identity in the structure of the course of philosophy. The introduction of new material is the attempt to redesign the academic course of philosophy, simultaneously keeping its traditional structure. The problem of personal identity is a topical issue in analytic philosophy. However, it is not much learnt in Ukraine, where academic circles mostly orient to continental philosophy. The paper analyses the subject area of personal identity: its metaphysical status, the nature and conditions of personhood, the possible criteria, and the method of though-experiment. Then, it shows the steps of introducing personal identity in the course of philosophy. The novelty of the article is in the fact that the problem of personal identity is introduced for non-philosophy students for the first time at Ukrainian university course of philosophy.

Сложность моральной ответственности и ее степени

A simplified version of philosophical discussion on any problem could be summarised like this: to explain a phenomenon P theory A is developed, then in response to A theory B is developed, then these theories are modified and give rise to new argument, including ar­guments based on or inspired by some scientific findings and theories from other fields of philosophy. However, in moral responsibility discussion, it is complicated to distinguish one central conflict. Different philosophers write about moral responsibility as a problem of ethical evaluation of an action, and metaphysical conditions do moral responsibility, and criteria of moral agent, and possibility of several agents sharing responsibility for the same action, etc. In this paper, I discuss “Ethics and metaphysics of moral responsibility: that is a rigorous analysis of various theories of moral responsibility turned into in the original systematisation of the conceptual chaos in contemporary debates on moral re­sponsibility. The first part of the paper includes tackling the problem of moral responsibil­ity and a short review of the theories of moral responsibility. In the second part, there are conceptual clarifications of the term “appropriateness” that is the key term for interpreting conditions of moral responsibility. In the paper, I have two pursues. First, to highlight strong and less strong points of analysis of the problem of moral responsibility proposed by E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, A. Mertsalov and A. Iunusov. Second, to draw an attention to theoretical challenges of moral reactions when it is assumed that moral reactions come in degrees.

Big Nothing

Kant defends the logical consistency of metaphysical groundlessness from the objection that a groundless being would be grounded on nothing, and therefore, on something—a “Big Nothing.” Instead, what is groundless has non-being for its ground; logic yields a formal concept of non-being as the negation of all that exists. Heidegger goes further in giving a positive characterization of the nothing: the nothing “makes possible the manifestness of beings” and “belongs to their essential unfolding.” Our openness to beings reveals beings as distinct from the nothing. The internal structure of this openness (‘something and not nothing’) is revealed in fundamental attunements like anxiety. I consider objections to Heidegger’s account from Carnap and Wittgenstein and offer a Heideggerian response. I show that Wittgenstein’s final assessment of metaphysical statements is more ambivalent than Carnap’s. Where Carnap mocks Heidegger for expressing his feelings in the form of a theory, Wittgenstein recognizes the direction of Heidegger’s thought, and concludes that what Heidegger wants to express is—Schade!—inexpressible. There is a there there; it’s just that language isn’t capable of saying so. Heidegger’s response is that metaphysics neglects to ask about the condition (being/the nothing) that makes beings possible — it identifies being with presence. Ironically, the attempt to eliminate metaphysics through the logical regimentation of language terminates in metaphysics—a metaphysics of presence. This metaphysics flattens every attempt to think about the world into a consideration of beings without any room for consideration of being, as that which makes their manifestation possible. For Heidegger, by contrast, nothing is the ground of grounds, the reason for reasons. We find things intelligible because of the nothing that allows us to find ourselves in a world of beings.

The Metaphysics of Mathematical Explanation in Science

Debates between contemporary platonist and nominalist conceptions of the metaphysical status of mathematical objects have recently included discussions of explanations of physical phenomena in which mathematics plays an indispensable role, termed mathematical explanations in science (MES). I will argue that MES requires an ontology that can (1) ground claims about mathematical necessity as distinct from physical necessity and (2) explain how that mathematical necessity applies to the physical world. I contend that nominalism fails to meet the first criterion and platonism the second. I then articulate an alternative, Aristotelian approach to mathematical objects and defend such a view as meeting both criteria.

Odczarować zaklęciem? Uwagi na marginesie monografii Rafała Mańko o krytycznej filozofii orzekania

The reviewer claims that Rafał Mańko's monograph 'Towards a critical philosophy of adjudication. The political, ethics, legitimacy’ (Łódź, 2018) should be connected with the so called essentialist wing of postmodernism, which deals with the issues of traditional philosophy under the veil of cognitive skepticism. The review attempts to convince a reader that the author's authoritative metaphysical statements translate into too radical program in the field of adjudication. The reviewer do not deny the necessity to 'open' the traditional legal domain to external arguments, however, he claim that the proposal presented in this regard by Rafał Mańko is too far-reaching.

THE METAPHYSICAL NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE: ENLIGHTENING LIGHT

The article is devoted to the analysis of the knowledge phenomenon as a metaphysical basis for the being order. It is the semantic content of this word that retains the meaning of “the light of truth”, “reason”, “word”. This allows a human to see the world around him, that is, makes the world “manifested, clear, understandable”. We are talking about knowledge that reflects a purely spiritual nature, which means that this knowledge is directed to the very essence of the human soul. This is, in its essence, valuable knowledge that “heals”, that is, unites, makes all aspects of human nature (spiritual, physical) one whole. Therefore, this knowledge requires a special perception from a person, makes us feel, go deeper into what we know. As an “ether”, that is, an information environment that is able to fill, inspire a person, transform, connect, reproduce his connections with reality, spiritual knowledge leads to the correspondence of the individual to the ontological laws of joint existence. In other words, these are the principles that underlie the integrity of human existence – its development, the formation of the space of co-existence. That is, we are talking about the metaphysical foundations of the order of the universe. In this perspective, we are talking about the fact that the basis of human existence, its correspondence and correlation, is the need for spiritual knowledge. It is the latter that are that transcendental light, which is endowed with transformative potency. Knowing what corresponds to the nature of a person’s sensibility, the needs of his soul. So, the need to discover this knowledge for oneself is cognition, and is the potential force that moves a person in her life choices, builds the meaning and perspective of her life. If we understand human and the world around him as a coexistence, then we are talking about the relationship between the inner state of the individual (his existential attitude) and the world around him, which is a living, dynamic environment. Light is an ontological order et life condition. In its metaphysical status, light is the basis of being itself, and, therefore, that which fills us with life force, which is incompatible with any manifestation of darkness, ignorance, evil. That is why the ability to see the surrounding reality without distortion, that is, objectively, holistically, is revealed only to the person who is the bearer of this light.

The Shape of the Statue

Abstract This paper discusses the metaphysical status of artefacts and their forms in the ancient commentators on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Specifically, it examines the Peripatetic tradition and Alexander of Aphrodisias to then turn to the commentaries of the late Neoplatonist Asclepius of Tralles, and the Byzantine commentator Michael of Ephesus. It argues that Alexander is the pioneer of the interpretation of artefactual forms as qualities and artefacts as accidental beings. The fortune of this solution goes through Asclepius and Michael to influence Thomas Aquinas.

Why the Debate about the Metaphysics of Biological Species Should Not Be Deflated

Abstract Some philosophers of biology state that the metaphysical status of biological species is context determined by the use different branches of biology make of their corresponding proper names, so that one and the same biological species can be both an individual and a natural kind. In this paper, I aim to undermine the idea, often associated with the present thesis, according to which the debate about the metaphysical status of biological species should be deflated, since it would be possible to translate every sentence from natural-kind talk to individual-talk and vice versa. I offer a charitable interpretation of the principle grounding such an idea and show how it is in tension with independent theoretical biological notions.

A Complex Ultimate Reality: The Metaphysics of the Four Yogas

This essay will pose and seek to answer the following question: If, as Swami Vivekananda claims, the four yogas are independent and equally effective paths to God-realization and liberation from the cycle of rebirth, then what must reality be like? What ontology is implied by the claim that the four yogas are all equally effective paths to the supreme goal of religious life? What metaphysical conditions would enable this pluralistic assertion to be true? Swami Vivekananda’s worldview is frequently identified with Advaita Vedānta. We shall see that Vivekananda’s teaching is certainly Advaitic in what could be called a broad sense. As Anantanand Rambachan and others, however, have pointed out, it would be incorrect to identify Swami Vivekananda’s teachings in any rigid or dogmatic sense with the classical Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara; this is because Vivekananda’s teaching departs from that of Śaṅkara in some significant ways, not least in his assertion of the independent salvific efficacy of the four yogas. This essay will argue that Swami Vivekananda’s pluralism, based on the concept of the four yogas, is far more akin to the deep religious pluralism that is advocated by contemporary philosophers of religion in the Whiteheadian tradition of process thought like David Ray Griffin and John Cobb, the classical Jain doctrines of relativity (anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda), and, most especially, the Vijñāna Vedānta of Vivekananda’s guru, Sri Ramakrishna, than any of these approaches is to the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Advaita Vedānta, in Vivekananda’s pluralistic worldview, becomes one valid conceptual matrix among many that bear the ability to support an efficacious path to liberation. This essay is intended not as an historical reconstruction of Vivekananda’s thought, so much as a constructive philosophical contribution to the ongoing scholarly conversations about both religious (and, more broadly, worldview) pluralism and the religious and philosophical legacies of both Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda. The former conversation has arrived at something of an impasse (as recounted by Kenneth Rose), while the latter conversation has recently been revived, thanks to the work of Swami Medhananda (formerly Ayon Maharaj) and Arpita Mitra.

Can the Epistemic Value of Natural Kinds Be Explained Independently of Their Metaphysics?

The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separating the epistemic value of natural kinds from their underlying metaphysics. On that account, (i) the co-instantiation of any sub-cluster of the properties associated with a given natural kind raises the probability of the co-instantiation of the rest, and (ii) this clustering of property instantiation is invariant under all relevant counterfactual perturbations. We argue that it is not possible to evaluate the stability of a cluster of properties without taking stock of the metaphysical picture used to account for that stability. Thus, even on the stable property cluster account, the epistemic value of natural kinds remains partly grounded in their metaphysical status.

From Implausible Artificial Neurons to Idealized Cognitive Models: Rebooting Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence

There is a vast literature within philosophy of mind that focuses on artificial intelligence but hardly mentions methodological questions. There is also a growing body of work in philosophy of science about modeling methodology that hardly mentions examples from cognitive science. Here these discussions are connected. Insights developed in the philosophy of science literature about the importance of idealization provide a way of understanding the neural implausibility of connectionist networks. Insights from neurocognitive science illuminate how relevant similarities between models and targets are picked out, how modeling inferences are justified, and the metaphysical status of models.

Preserving Destruction: Philosophical Issues of Urban Geosites

AbstractThis article examines the philosophical issues that arise when preserving urban geological sites or urban geosites. These are preserved not only because of their geological value but also because of aesthetic, cultural, and economic reasons. To do so, it examines the geosite constituted by Olot and its surroundings, a city in Spain that extends amid four dormant volcanoes. It explores the metaphysical paradox that these geosites have become what they are due to the preservation of destruction: human-caused interventions, mostly extraction of materials and exploitation of the land, are precisely what made these geosites visible as sites worth preserving and determining their metaphysical status. It further explores the preservation criteria and shows how they have determined the status of the geosite. Second, it shows how in such urban geosites the collapse of two diametrically opposed conceptions of time – the geological eon and the lived human time – occurs. Lastly, it discusses aesthetic aspects of such geosites by considering aesthetic experience as a primarily cognitive endeavor and shows how metaphysical, epistemological, and aesthetic issues of preservation of geosites are inextricably linked.

The Tragicomic Philosophy of Waiting for Godot

Abstract Samuel Beckett’s interest in tragicomedy has been clear since he attached the subtitle A Tragicomedy in Two Acts to the English translation of Waiting for Godot. This article articulates what exactly Beckettian tragicomedy does. Godot, Beckett’s foremost tragicomedy, stages the interplay of his wide-ranging literary and philosophical influences. Drawing on figures such as Arthur Schopenhauer, Jean Racine, Henri Bergson, Arnold Geulincx, and Fritz Mauthner, the play bends toward tragedy but undercuts any sense of finality with its slow unrolling. More than a metaphysical statement, this temporal model of tragicomedy offers a Beckettian ethics insistent on both the resigned compassion of tragedy and comedy’s power to critique. In outlining Godot’s tragicomic philosophy, the essay charts Beckett’s deployment of the various figures who inspire his play but also shows how this tragicomic paradigm functions in the theater—and how it inspires future dramatists.