Status Of Berlin Research Articles

BIKINI ATOLL, NEVADA, MOSCOW. WASHINGTON’S LONG ROAD TO THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY (1958–1963)

The conclusion of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water is an important milestone in the history of the Cold War. It was preceded by long and complex negotiations between the USSR and the US. Measures to impose a moratorium on tests (August 1958 — August 1961) did not yield signifi cant results either in reducing harmful environmental consequences or in reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. In addition, the issue of at least partial test ban was closely linked to the political contradictions between the superpowers, in particular, regarding the status of Berlin. On 9 September 1961, the negotiations were stopped. In the fall, the USSR conducted a large series of explosions, and advances in weapons development required new tests. Moscow’s decision to withdraw from the moratorium was dictated by the desire to demonstrate to its opponents the readiness for any emergency. In 1962, the events around Cuba led not only to intensified testing by both powers, but also to the acute Cuban Missile Crisis in October, when the danger of using nuclear weapons became quite real. The August 1963 treaty was one of the immediate outcomes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, it is also important that the superpowers came to the signing of the Moscow Treaty only after their scientific and technological achievements (including, above all, the results of nuclear tests) had been able to ensure a confident strategic deterrence of each other. The tests of nuclear devices conducted by both powers in 1961 and 1962 allowed them to equip all types of carriers with warheads as part of their planned programs to renew strategic nuclear arsenals. At the same time, the Moscow Treaty created a basis for harmonizing the positions of the US and the USSR with regard to nuclear nonproliferation for many years to come.

Lessons of the Cold War

Lessons of the Cold War

Paradoxes ofOstpolitik: Revisiting the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, 1970

AbstractThis article reexamines the diplomacy of Willy Brandt’sOstpolitik, focusing on two landmark achievements in 1970: the Moscow Treaty in August, and the Warsaw Treaty in December. On the basis of declassified US and German documentation, it argues that envoy Egon Bahr’s unconventional approach resulted in a poorly negotiated treaty with the Soviet Union that failed to address vital problems such as the status of Berlin. The outcome deepened political polarization at home and proved disconcerting to many West German allies; it also forced the four World War II victors—Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union—to save Brandt’sOstpolitikby grinding out an agreement on access to Berlin. By contrast, West German negotiations in Warsaw yielded a treaty more in line with West German expectations, though the results proved sorely disappointing to the Polish leadership. Disagreements over restitution payments (repacked as government credits) and the emigration of ethnic Germans would bedevil German-Polish relations for years to come. Bonn’sOstpolitikthus had a harder edge than the famous image of Brandt kneeling in Warsaw would suggest.

Courting War over a Rubber Stamp

The establishment of the Berlin Wall was one of the seminal moments of the Cold War. Not only did the wall serve as the most powerful symbol of the protracted conflict, but its erection was one of the few occasions in which a hot war appeared imminent. Construction on the Berliner Mauer began on 13 August 1 961, marking the beginning of the indefinite period that has become known as the Berlin Wall crisis. Although Berlin was technically under the purview of the occupation powers, the other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries had a vested interest in the status of Berlin because of the strategic and symbolic significance of the divided city. Canada was no exception, as was demonstrated by the active and leading role the country played within the western alliance during the crisis, displaying a commitment to Cold War collective security.The Progressive Conservative government of John G. Diefenbaker set forth its policy in two major public addresses-a speech on ? September to the Canadian Bar Association and in the opening statement to the fall session of the house of commons on 7 September. It will be argued here that the Canadian government arrived at a firm, balanced, and constructive response to the crisis: a commitment to allied rights in Berlin and the resolve to use force to defend them if necessary-including an increase in Canada's military capabilities-while exhibiting a willingness to negotiate and involve the United Nations. Although this approach represented a blending of Diefenbaker's and the Department of External Affairs' views-with the input of Escott Reid, Canadian ambassador to West Germany-the final shape and tone of the policy was ultimately determined by Diefenbaker.This article will take the form of an in tra- govern mental deci s ion- making history, charting the evolution of Canadian policy from 13 August to 7 September 1 9 61. This requires examining the discussions within and between Diefenbaker's cabinet and the Department of External Affairs (DEA). The latter sought to chart a course emphasizing negotiations-what could be termed a more conciliatory response-while Diefenbaker favoured a response that underlined negotiations with an ability to respond militarily.The relevant sources are therefore the files of the Department of External Affairs, cabinet conclusions, and the Diefenbaker prime ministerial papers. Unfortunately, the Diefenbaker prime ministerial papers (including the personal and confidential series) reveal virtually nothing about Diefenbaker's rationale or discussions within the prime minister's office and the Progressive Conservative government. The cabinet conclusions, however, do provide some insight into the thought processes of the government, while the External Affairs papers reveal a great deal about that department's opinions.Diefenbaker's memoirs have little to say about the Berlin crisis, which is surprising given that it appears to be one of the highlights of his foreign policy record. The majority of secondary sources covering Canadian international activities in 19 61 either briefly mention the Berlin Wall crisis, or omit it entirely. Basil Robinson served as the liaison between the PMO and External Affairs, and his study of Diefenbaker's foreign policy, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs, is the most revealing secondary source concerning the 1961 crisis. Itis virtually the only source that delves into the evolution of the Canadian position to any extent. Peyton V Lyon's Canada in World Affairs, 19 61-19 63 ^s also useful, occupying a unique position as a qua si- primary source, since it was published in 1968, and the author interviewed a number of individuals involved. Both Lyon and Robinson identify the government's response as a positive one, and this study shares their assessment of the final policy. However, Lyon's contribution does not adequately explore the intra-governmental policy formulation process that took place in August, while Robinson's evaluation does not sufficiently credit Diefenbaker's role. …

Maintaining the Status Quo: U.S. Response to Chinese Nationalist Mainland Recovery Efforts, 1961–1963

When the Kennedy administration came to office, the president and his advisers confronted immediate and critical issues such as the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, renewed antagonisms with the Soviet Union over the status of Berlin, and negotiations for a nuclear disarmament treaty; still, they could not ignore China policy. Domestic and international circles burgeoned with speculation. John F. Kennedy and his cabinet projected images of “new frontiersmen” who promised to offer fresh and innovative solutions to problems around the world. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., special assistant to the president, described Kennedy as “the first representative in the White House of a distinctive generation, the generation which was born during the First World War, came of age during the depression, fought in the Second World War and began its public career in the atomic age.” But the course of Sino-American relations would be determined not by New Frontier intentions but by interactions with, and resulting perceptions of, the government of the Republic of China (GRC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Food for Communist China: A U.S. Policy Dilemma, 1961―1963

In January 1961, Kennedy administration encountered many for eign policy issues that required a wide range of abilities and expertise from president and his advisers. While primary attention was focused on immediate and critical issues such as Bay of Pigs, Cuban missile crisis, renewed antagonisms with Soviet Union over status of Berlin, and negotiations for a nuclear disarmament treaty, relations with China could not be ignored, especially since specula tion grew regarding future course of America's policy from both domestic and international circles. Anticipation surrounding pros pect of change was fueled by images of young John F. Kennedy and his cabinet as new frontiersmen. The administration promised to liberate United States from past policies and offer innovative solutions to problems confronting nation worldwide. In A Thou sand Days, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. described Kennedy as the first representative in White House of a distinctive generation, gen eration which was born during First World War, came of age dur ing depression, fought in Second World War and began its public career in atomic age.1 Thus, while members of Kennedy team, with profound expectations and sensibilities of a different generation, pronounced their intent to reconsider past policies, whether they could alter course of Sino-American relations remained to be determined by subsequent interactions with, and resulting per ceptions of, government of Republic of China (GRC) and People's Republic of China (PRC). Despite administration's proposed departure from past poli cies, Kennedy and his advisers could not easily dismiss recent events, especially those shaping images of Chinese Communists, who had gained control of mainland in 1949, and Chinese National ists who fled to Taiwan. Intervention in Korean War from 1950 to 1953, two offshore island crisis of 1954-55 and 1958, and support

Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971

The present legal status of Berlin after the conclusion on September 3, 1971 of the Quadripartite Agreement between France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States can only be understood in terms of its own historical development and the context of the international politics of the 1960s. Although any legal and political analysis of divided Germany and Berlin must take into account a period of history dating back to the 1940s, it is assumed here that the essential facts are sufficiently well known to serve as a background for the following analysis.

The Legal Status of Berlin

The world today is bipolarised with the two giants, and the camps they lead, confronting each other in the stances of the cold war along the entire length of the international frontier. At various points along this frontier, particularly in Asia, the cold war has ‘hotted up’ into a shooting war; but such outbreaks have been sporadic and after an initial outburst have quietened down. However in Europe, the centre of most major wars during the last century, there has been one continuing fester with Berlin as its core, and the relations of the Great Powers in that city have reflected the temperature of the cold war and the proximity of a shooting war. Every issue between States is conditioned by both political and legal considerations, and it is the purpose of this paper to examine the legal status of Berlin, ignoring in so far as that is possible the political factors governing the problem.

Other Legal Aspects of the Berlin Crisis

In his editorial comment, “Some Legal Aspects of the Berlin Crisis,” Professor Quincy Wright questions the legal soundness of the Western position with respect to the Four-Power status of Berlin.

Secretariat

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, in the introduction to his fourteenth annual report on the work of the Organization, June 16, 1958 to June 15, 1959 observed that the year had been characterized by intense diplomatic activities mainly outside the UN, although in some cases within its precincts or in informal contact with the Organization. The dual significance of this intense diplomatic and political activity, exemplified by the meetings in Geneva on a controlled cessation of nuclear tests and on die problem of the status of Berlin, as well as by die increasing number of exchanges of visits of leading statesmen, lay, on the one hand, in its indication that various international problems had been brought to a point where they called for renewed and urgent efforts to find a solution, and, on die other, in its introduction, through the broadening and deepening of personal contacts on different levels, of a new constructive element which might strengthen the hope that ways to reconciliation and to a reduction of tensions might be found. Although such negotiations were encouraged by the Charter of the UN, the Secretary-General continued, diere would be legitimate reason for concern if such developments outside the Organization were to reflect a neglect of the possibilities offered by the Organization, because of a lapse into bilateralism, disregarding third party interests. Likewise, the situation would be a reason for concern if it reflected a view that the Organization was unable to meet the demands which Member nations were entitled to put on it.