Food for Communist China: A U.S. Policy Dilemma, 1961―1963

Abstract

In January 1961, Kennedy administration encountered many for eign policy issues that required a wide range of abilities and expertise from president and his advisers. While primary attention was focused on immediate and critical issues such as Bay of Pigs, Cuban missile crisis, renewed antagonisms with Soviet Union over status of Berlin, and negotiations for a nuclear disarmament treaty, relations with China could not be ignored, especially since specula tion grew regarding future course of America's policy from both domestic and international circles. Anticipation surrounding pros pect of change was fueled by images of young John F. Kennedy and his cabinet as new frontiersmen. The administration promised to liberate United States from past policies and offer innovative solutions to problems confronting nation worldwide. In A Thou sand Days, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. described Kennedy as the first representative in White House of a distinctive generation, gen eration which was born during First World War, came of age dur ing depression, fought in Second World War and began its public career in atomic age.1 Thus, while members of Kennedy team, with profound expectations and sensibilities of a different generation, pronounced their intent to reconsider past policies, whether they could alter course of Sino-American relations remained to be determined by subsequent interactions with, and resulting per ceptions of, government of Republic of China (GRC) and People's Republic of China (PRC). Despite administration's proposed departure from past poli cies, Kennedy and his advisers could not easily dismiss recent events, especially those shaping images of Chinese Communists, who had gained control of mainland in 1949, and Chinese National ists who fled to Taiwan. Intervention in Korean War from 1950 to 1953, two offshore island crisis of 1954-55 and 1958, and support