Status In India Research Articles

India's Emergence as a “Responsible” Nuclear Power

In 2005, and the United States announced a nuclear deal that would seek to clarify India's ambiguous status in the nuclear order. The sole superpower appeared to be recognizing India's status a nuclear-armed state by opening up the possibility of nuclear cooperation. This announcement represented the fruit of many years of careful Indian diplomacy aimed establishing its identity a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons and forging a closer alliance with the US. This article provides a concise description of the provisions of the 2005 India-US nuclear agreement, and analyzes its global, regional, and domestic implications.While the nuclear deal, like most events, was the product of a convergence of circumstances (such the ideological orientation of the administration in the White House and the recent revelations about nuclear transfers out of Pakistan), the main enabling condition was India's strategy constituting itself a responsible nuclear power. The paper highlights the power of the concept of responsibility, to which the Indian government has repeatedly made reference. It will conclude by comparing the policy options available to the Canadian government in responding to this deal.In July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh was welcomed to the White House with a state banquet, and 18 July 2005, a joint statement was issued by Singh and US President George W. Bush. The statement contains various expressions of common interest and pledges that the two governments will work together counterterrorism, economic, and environmental issues. It also declares, as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, should acquire the same benefits and advantages other such states. Many took this to mean that the US had accepted India's self-declared status a nuclear weapon state (NWS).Just over seven years earlier, Bush's predecessor President Bill Clinton had reacted to the news of India's nuclear tests with dismay. After ordering the explosion of five nuclear devices in the Rajasthan desert in the summer of 1998, then-Prime Minister Vajpayee had declared, India is now a nuclear weapon state. Clinton had described the tests putting on the wrong side of history and at odds with the international community that was working towards nuclear arms control.In 2005, however, it seemed that had emerged the right side of the nonproliferation regime. It had left its undefined and worrisome past behind and was now entering a new era with a validated nuclear identity. The next section will examine how managed to pull off this feat. I will briefly outline the features of the India-US nuclear cooperation agreement. section three deals with the incentives the part of the US, and section four discusses the global implications of the nuclear deal. sections five and six will include regional and domestic consequences, respectively. Lastly, I will discuss the policy alternatives available to Canada it reviews its nuclear policy towards India.THE INDIA-US AGREEMENTThe most significant part of the agreement, obviously, is the statement above by the US president that appears to acknowledge a de facto NWS. As per article ix of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), countries that exploded a nuclear device before e January 1967 are NWS and all other states are non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Thus, the US, the Soviet Union (Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China are the only legitimate NWS.India was the first country to test a nuclear device after the NPT's identification of a nuclear explosion the prerequisite for NWS status. However, since its 1974 explosion was presented to the world a peaceful one-unrelated to the development of weapons-this first test did not challenge the global nuclear order in the same way did the 1998 tests and the subsequent self-proclamation of NWS status. …

Protracted Contest: Sino–Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. By John W. Garver. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001. 447p. $50.00.

India's nuclear tests in May 1998 came as a surprise to many observers and proved all the more puzzling when Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee, in a letter to President Clinton, singled out China as the focal point of Indian security concerns. This statement and others led some, including Beijing's own foreign policy community, to view the tests as an effort to boost India's status internationally and to shore up domestic support for a new coalition government. John Garver's book challenges this domestic-driven interpretation of the tests by chronicling in detail a half-century of contentious relations between the world's two most populous states. Seen in historical perspective, India's nuclear tests were another episode in what Garver terms a “protracted conflict” (p. 3) between Beijing and Delhi. (The milder-sounding “protracted contest” serves as the book's title, but “protracted conflict,” a term Garver uses with some frequency, better captures the book's thesis.)

City-Hinterland Relations and the Development of a Regional Elite in Nineteenth Century Bombay

Historians of India often write as if India, at the end of the nineteenth century, had only four cities: Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and Poona. Several elements contribute to this perspective: Indian historians' own predominant interest in the development of nationalist politics in late nineteenth century India naturally leads them to concentrate on these four urban centers, the birthplaces of such politics1. But the structure of late nineteenth century politics in India itself mirrored more fundamental aspects of the administrative organization and social structure of the country. Administratively, the country was organized in a hierarchy of authorities of descending prestige and geographical scope, with authorities of greatest power centered in the three port cities, and authorities of least power, at thetalukaand village levels in the hinterlands. This structure decisively established the political predominance of the port cities and assured a flow of potential recruits for government service and the white collar professions out of the countryside and into the Presidency headquarters towns. At the same time, India's status as a raw-materials exporting colony of an industrial mother country, and the increasing penetration of the world market economy, required that business and industry be increasingly concentrated in and about the port cities.

The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective

Research Article| March 01 1967 The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective Sheldon W. Simon Sheldon W. Simon Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1938) 7 (3): 176–187. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642236 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Sheldon W. Simon; The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective. Far Eastern Survey 2 February 1938; 7 (3): 176–187. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2642236 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Soviet-Indian Relations-Neutralism and Communist China

frontiers last year, it has become increasingly evident that armed clashes in desolate Ladakh region have far greater international significance than local incidents that occurred in past in this strategically important area. As skirmishes between Indian and Chinese Communist forces developed into larger-scale military operations, it appeared that objectives of Chinese attacks in direction of Aksai Chin, the white desert, were not limited merely to securing a supply route designed to consolidate Chinese positions in Tibet. In addition to strengthening their military posture, Chinese Communists quite obviously expected to gain considerable psychological and diplomatic advantages from their Indian venture. The principal non-military objectives of their undertaking included humiliation of India and discrediting of neutralism, which over past years had remained principal element in shaping of Indian policies. The Chinese efforts to weaken India's prestige in uncommitted world, particularly in Southeast Asia, not only affected India's status as largest, and morally most influential, neutralist country; they also created a situation in which complex question of relations between a neutralist country, such as India, and great powers engaged in socalled cold war acquired a new, and considerably increased, significance. The question that arose in wake of Chinese

India Today and Tomorrow

THE outbreak of war caught India already moving rapidly toward a political crisis. The scheme for an All-India Fed eration, after having been before the Indian public since 1930, had been formally embodied in a statute since 1935. By the summer of 1939, however, the prospects of Federation had all but vanished under the combined opposition of the Princes, the Moslems and other minority communities. Then in September an even more fateful problem ? that of India's status in the British Commonwealth of Nations ? arose. For the All-India