Whether neoliberal or statist oriented, most social scientists concur that business-state relations are key variables in a developing country's economic performance.1 Recent studies of business-state relations in the developing world derive from analysis of the developmental Asian state and emphasize bureaucratic insulation and autonomy.2 Middle East comparativists have employed a similar top-down method that stresses the transformative effects exogenous state rents such as oil and aid have on the structural capacities of the state and relations with the private sector. Both approaches have generally ignored the institutional mediations between the private and public sectors. To construct more accurate models of business-state relations, scholars need to build on the statist approach by shifting focus to the institutional representation of business. In many developing countries the role of business in policy formation and implementation runs through business associations, yet we know little about how these associations, as variable institutions, affect that relationship.3 This issue is of particular importance in Arab and African countries, where business has come to occupy center stage as state officials struggle to balance revenue needs with the imperatives of economic growth. Moreover, a critical legacy of decades-long exogenous rent in these countries is the state's lack of extractive and information-gathering capabilities, institutional powers necessary for successful economic reform. Consequently, the role business associations play as providers of economic information and policy input is crucial. Faced with a decline in exogenous finance in the 1980s, most Arab states proclaimed a new openness to policy input from the private sector. Jordan and Kuwait were typical in this respect. However, the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) proved far better at advocating policy options and participating in policy implementation than its counterpart in Jordan, the Amman Chamber of Commerce (ACC). The comparison raises two questions. First, what conditions are conducive to policy capable associations that can lobby successfully and effectively participate with state officials to implement policy? Second, in Arab countries struggling with complex fiscal crises, what role do business associations play in the formulation and implementation of economic policy? Strong, effective business associations can compensate for weak state capacities in formulating and implementing economic reform in the developing world, and an often overlooked factor in the abil-