State Intermediate Appellate Research Articles

"On Behalf of His Race and the Lemmon Slaves": Louis Napoleon, Northern Black Legal Culture, and the Politics of Sectional Crisis

"On Behalf of His Race and the Lemmon Slaves"Louis Napoleon, Northern Black Legal Culture, and the Politics of Sectional Crisis Sarah L. H. Gronningsater (bio) In the fall of 1852, a free black New Yorker named Louis Napoleon upended the plans of a Virginia couple, Jonathan and Juliet Lemmon, who were hoping to move to Texas with their seven children and eight slaves. The household had sailed to New York City in order to make a steamship connection to New Orleans—at the time, this was one of the fastest routes to the Southwest. Their itinerary, however, presented a problem: New York was technically free soil. The state legislature had made this assertion of territorial sovereignty explicit in an 1841 statute. A strict reading of this law forbade the Lemmons from holding slaves within New York's borders, even for a few hours. Napoleon, a black laborer, wanted a local court to free the Lemmon slaves in accordance with the statute's emancipatory implications.1 The morning after the Lemmons' ship docked in New York, Napoleon petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from Judge Elijah Paine of the city's Superior Court. Paine granted the request, summoning Jonathan Lemmon and the eight slaves to his bench. Three days later, a contentious trial was underway. The slaves were represented by Napoleon's long-time ally, the prominent abolitionist John Jay, grandson of the founding father, and Erastus D. Culver, a former Whig congressman. As Jay and Culver sparred with opposing counsel, dozens of black men, women, and children gathered in the courtroom to watch. On November 13—a week after the Lemmons' arrival—Paine discharged the slaves. "The laws of the State of New York," he explained, "render it impossible that such property should exist within those limits."2 The black audience was elated. The New-York Tribune reported that "the eight persons were placed in coaches by Louis Napoleon" and "driven off amid great cheering." In December, with the quiet assistance of regional abolitionists, the freed slaves moved to Canada. Members of New York's merchant community raised $5,000 to compensate the Lemmons for their lost property, which the couple accepted.3 [End Page 206] Widely publicized, the Lemmon case quickly achieved national significance. When the Lemmons appealed Paine's decision to the First District of New York's Supreme Court—the state's intermediate appellate court—Virginia governor Joseph Johnson convinced his legislature to fund the costs. New York's legislature responded in kind, asserting the state's right to determine the status of people on its soil.4 In 1857, the First District reviewed the case. The timing was fraught: not only was Bleeding Kansas fresh in the public's mind, but the U.S. Supreme Court had just issued its ruling in Dred Scott, a decision that bolstered the rights of slaveholders and injured those of black Americans. The Lemmons' lawyers, eager to exploit the connections between the cases, argued that slaves were property protected by "the federal constitution" and that the doctrines of Dred Scott "must be maintained."5 The First District disagreed, affirming the original ruling. The Lemmons, with Virginia's support, appealed again, hoping that New York's highest court—the Court of Appeals—would concede a master's constitutional right to travel nationally with his slaves.6 By petitioning for the writ of habeas corpus, Napoleon had triggered the emancipation of eight slaves, precipitated a series of controversial court cases, and provoked interstate political battles. Yet by the winter of 1857–58, Napoleon agreed with Jay that it was in the best interest of the antislavery movement to shut Lemmon down; the two allies wanted the Court of Appeals to dismiss the case. In January, Jay sent New York's Republican governor, John A. King, a petition he had written in Napoleon's name, titled "The Memorial of Louis Napoleon." Jay explained in a cover letter why both he and his client were so anxious for New York to cease backing the Lemmon case; they feared it would ultimately land in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Dred Scott majority might then seize on Lemmon as a chance to reintroduce...

No Pass, No Drive?

IN 1990 Kentucky's legislature passed what is commonly called pass, no drive law. More specifically, the statute provides for suspension of the driver's license of any 16- or 17-year-old student who either drops out of school or is declared academically deficient. The statute defines dropping out having nine or more unexcused absences, including days of suspension, during semester. Academic deficiency is defined not receiving passing grades in at least four courses at the end of the semester. The statute provides for the following steps: 1) each semester the building administrator notifies the superintendent of the students who qualify for the suspension of their licenses; 2) within 10 days, the superintendent reports the name and social security number of any such student to the state transportation agency; 3) as soon possible thereafter, the agency notifies the student of the revocation and of the right to hearing for license reinstatement; and 4) within 15 days, state court hearing (with the right to appellate review) is held, if requested, for reinstating the license based on certain specified grounds, such undue economic hardship to the student's family or an erroneous factual finding of academic deficiency. The statute allows license revocation only if the school district has state-approved alternative education program to meet the academic needs of students who cannot succeed in the regular program. Finally, the student may reapply for driver's license after semester of having corrected the dropout or deficiency status. On 28 February 1995, group of affected students filed class action suit challenging the statute. They based their suit on seven grounds, including the due process and equal protection provisions of the Kentucky and federal constitutions. On 12 November 1998, the state trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff students on five grounds, but for the school district and state defendants on the remaining two. Both parties appealed. On 22 June 2001, the state's intermediate appellate court upheld the statute on all of the disputed grounds except one: whether it violated the federal Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).1 First, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff students' argument that the reinstatement hearing and appeal provisions of the statute deny meaningful review in terms of procedural due process because the court will not affirmatively examine the background behind student's attendance records or grades. Citing the tradition of deference to school officials in academic matters, the court relegated issues of grades and attendance to direct discussion with the student's teacher. Thus the court affirmed that judicial review should be limited to whether clerical error was made. Second, the court also made short shrift of the plaintiffs' alternative argument that the lack of pre-suspension hearing violated the plaintiff students' right to procedural due process. Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent upholding the constitutionality of other license-revocation statutes, the appeals court pointed out that the student's interest is a legitimately regulated privilege, not fundamental right. Moreover, the various steps of the statute provide sufficient opportunities to correct the situation before and after revocation so to limit the probability and effects of an erroneous deprivation, whereas requiring pre-revocation hearing would place an unreasonable fiscal and administrative burden on the government. Third, the appellate court rejected the argument that the statute violated substantive due process. Specifically, the court concluded that the statute had rational relationship to the legitimate objective of encouraging 16- and 17-year-old students to stay in school and get good grades based on the incentive effect of this much- anticipated privilege. …