The reception of Kantian ideas in Russian religious philosophy was predominantly negative, the reason for which was the German philosopher's skeptical position on the proofs of the existence of God and his advocacy of the impossibility of theology as a rigorous science. Against this background V. D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov took an ambiguous position with regard to Kant. On the one hand, the Russian philosopher criticizes a number of statements of Kant's theoretical philosophy with the aim of apologizing for theology as a science, and on the other hand, adopts a number of Kantian intuitions in his views on empirical and rational cognition. At the same time, the question of Kant's influence on Kudryavtsev-Platonov's concept of ideal cognition, which is essentially a rational explanation of theological cognition as apodictic knowledge of God, remains unattended in the history of philosophy. Was there such an influence, and if so, in what did it manifest itself? The study has shown that the positions of Kant and Kudryavtsev-Platonov regarding theology as apodictic knowledge of God are diametrically opposed. For the German philosopher, theology as knowledge by means of transcendental ideas alone is impossible, while at the same time ethicotheology based on the postulates of practical reason is allowed. Kudryavtsev-Platonov, for his part, endeavors to substantiate the apodictic validity of the cognition of God by justifying the objective significance of the idea of God, extending the scope of application of categories of understanding to supersensible objects, and postulating the reality of supersensible sensations. Nevertheless, a comparison of Kudryavtsev-Platonov 's concept of ideal cognition with the crucial intuitions of the Kantian epistemology shows that the Russian philosopher relies on modifications of the Kantian concepts of apriorism and empirical synthesis in his attempts to substantiate the possibility of rational cognition of God.
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