Welfare State Programs Research Articles

The Autocratic Welfare State: Old-Age Pensions, Credible Commitments, and Regime Survival

In this article, we argue that autocratic regimes are no less likely than democracies to adopt old-age pensions, although autocratic programs are less universal in their coverage. Our theoretical argument focuses on the strong incentives that autocratic regimes have for enacting and maintaining such programs to ensure regime survival. Autocratic pension programs can be considered club goods that (a) are targeted to critical supporting groups and (b) solve credible commitment problems on promises of future distribution, thereby mitigating probability of regime breakdown. We test three implications from the argument, drawing on a novel dataset on welfare state programs and including 140 countries with time series from the 1880s. First, we find that autocracies are no less likely than democracies to have old-age pension programs. But, second, autocracies have less universal pension programs than democracies. Third, pension programs effectively reduce the probability of autocratic breakdown.

Unearthing the Hidden Welfare State: Race, Political Attitudes, and Unforeseen Consequences

AbstractThis paper incorporates the role of race into our understanding of the hidden welfare state by exploring the implications of racialization of hidden welfare state programs for mass attitudes. We explain how traditional welfare programs have been racialized historically and the implications of that racialization on attitudes towards welfare programs. We then discuss how the same fate could befall hidden programs for the poor if “unearthed” as hidden welfare state scholars have suggested. Finally, we carry out an experiment racializing a hidden welfare state program in the same way that traditional welfare state programs have been racialized historically. Our analysis finds that only when the hidden welfare state program is described using traditional racial stereotypes, support for the program drops significantly among racially resentful. Our findings suggest that the inclusion of race into the hidden welfare state narrative alters our understanding of attitudes towards some of these programs.

Immigration and the welfare state: A cross-regional analysis of European welfare attitudes

A growing body of research connects diversity to anti-welfare attitudes and lower levels of social welfare expenditure, yet most evidence comes from analyses of US states or comparisons of the United States to Europe. Comparative analyses of European nation-states, however, yield little evidence that immigration – measured at the country-level – reduces support for national welfare state programs. This is not surprising, given that research suggests that the impact of diversity occurs at smaller, sub-national geographic units. Therefore, in this article, we test the hypothesis that immigration undermines welfare attitudes by assessing the impact of immigration measured at the regional-level on individual-level support for redistribution, a comprehensive welfare state, and immigrants’ social rights. To do this, we combine data from the European Social Survey with a unique regional dataset compiled from national censuses, Eurostat, and the European Election Database (13 countries, 114 regions, and 23,213 individuals). Utilizing multilevel modeling, we find a negative relationship between regional percent foreign-born and support for redistribution as well as between regional percent foreign-born and support for a comprehensive welfare state. Objective immigration, however, does not increase opposition to immigrants’ social rights (i.e. welfare chauvinism). We discuss the implications of these results and conclude that traditional welfare state attitudes and welfare chauvinism are distinct phenomena that should not be conflated in future research.

Donation Without Domination: Private Charity and Republican Liberty

Contemporary republicans have adopted a less-than-charitable attitude toward private beneficence, especially when it is directed to the poor, worrying that rich patrons may be in a position to exercise arbitrary power over their impoverished clients. These concerns have led them to support impartial public provision by way of state welfare programs, including an unconditional basic income (UBI). In contrast to this administrative model of public welfare, I will propose a competitive model in which the state regulates and subsidizes a decentralized and nonstatist provision of support for the poor. This model will fix the historically objectionable features of private provision by having the state prevent collusion among private charities, deliver information to recipients about alternative sources of assistance, and give substantial grants to charities as well as tax incentives and vouchers to donors. I will contend that such an approach would do a better job of minimizing domination of the poor than traditional welfare states and may prove more politically feasible than a UBI, at least in the near term in certain national contexts.

Constructing the need for retrenchment: disability benefits in the United States and Great Britain

Why are some welfare state programmes more susceptible to retrenchment than others? This article examines why the major disability benefit programme in the United States has proved resistant to austerity measures while the comparable disability benefit programme in Great Britain has been repeatedly scaled back. Using a most similar systems research design, it is argued that structural differences mattered a great deal, as did the portrayal of beneficiaries in Britain as undeserving, which proved critical for constructing the need for retrenchment. The article thus identifies the interaction between institutional and ideational factors as a driving force behind programmatic retrenchments.

Cost-Shifting in Multitiered Welfare States: Responding to Rising Welfare Caseloads in Germany and Switzerland

In this article, we analyze if and how different levels of government off-load clients onto other welfare state programs that are not under their financial responsibility. We hypothesize that the extent to which cost-shifting takes place in a multitiered welfare state depends on the degree of fiscal centralization, and we expect cost-shifting to be more prevalent in federal countries where the constituent units have strong fiscal autonomy. In order to empirically examine this claim, we compare Germany and Switzerland, two federal countries that differ considerably in matters of fiscal centralization. Empirically, we find that in fact cost-shifting occurred irrespective of the degree of fiscal centralization. However, there are differences in how the two countries reacted to cost-shifting practices. Fiscally centralized Germany has been more successful in limiting cost-shifting practices than decentralized Switzerland. By connecting the literature on social policy and fiscal federalism, the article contributes to a broader understanding of the functioning of multitiered welfare states.

Welfare States and Health Inequalities

While much research points to the importance of a range of welfare state policies to reduce inequalities in health, the growing literature in this field is full of mixed and contradictory results. In this paper, we provide a brief discussion about the different conceptual and methodological approaches used in comparative research on the relationship between welfare policies and health. Against a theoretical discussion of possible linkages among one central welfare policy, unemployment benefit schemes, and health, we also provide examples of findings on how two central dimensions of such schemes—coverage and replacement rates—are linked to health and health inequalities across Europe. These examples indicate not only that welfare state programs can contribute to smaller health inequalities but also that their effectiveness in this respect depends on their institutional set-up.

Cost-Shifting in Multitiered Welfare States: Responding to Rising Social Assistance Caseloads in Sweden, Germany and Switzerland

In this paper, we analyze if and how different levels of government offload clients onto other welfare state programmes that are not under their financial responsibility, focusing particularly on municipally-led social assistance schemes, the safety net of last resort. We start from the hypothesis that the extent to which cost shifting takes place in a multitiered welfare state depends on the degree of fiscal centralization, and we expect cost shifting to be more prevalent in federal countries were the constituent units have strong fiscal autonomy. In order to empirically examine this claim, we compare Germany and Switzerland, two federal countries that differ considerably in matters of fiscal centralisation. Empirically, we find that in fact cost-shifting occurred irrespective of the degree of fiscal centralisation. However, there are differences in how the two countries reacted to cost-shifting practices. Fiscally centralised Germany has been more successful in limiting cost shifting practices than decentralised Switzerland. By connecting the literature on social policy and fiscal federalism, the paper contributes to a broader understanding of the functioning of multitiered welfare states.

The politics of incremental change: institutional change in old-age pensions and health care in Germany

This paper analyzes policy shifts in two core welfare state programs in Germany: old-age pensions and health care. Both programs are prototypes of Bismarckian/conservative program design (benefits are based on occupational and family status; financing is based on payroll contributions, and administration is based on corporatist arrangements) and both have experienced tremendous cost pressures because of demographic change and rising non-wage labor costs. A series of reforms since the late 1980s has reduced the generosity of benefits and aims to change the governance structures of both programs. Although the reforms include substantial benefit cuts, key conservative principles concerning benefit entitlement and financing remain largely untouched. In both programs, derived rights based on family status remain strong, and occupational fragmentation continues to characterize the overall structure of both systems. The paper argues that this pattern of institutional change is not new, but is typical of the politics of muddling through that has characterized the German system since its inception. I emphasize the impact of German political institutions, the structure of electoral competition, and the legacies of conservative social policy to explain the contemporary pattern of policy development.

Self-interest, Perceptions of Transition and Welfare Preferences in the New Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus

This article studies public welfare preferences in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Generalised ordered logistic regression models and predicted probabilities are employed to analyse comparable attitudinal survey data. The results vary considerably among the countries, but age is the most important covariate of welfare preferences, followed by individuals’ socio-economic characteristics. The findings also indicate that popular perceptions of transition, notably in Ukraine and Moldova, are most strongly linked to preferences concerning the state's involvement in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor rather than to preferences regarding the main welfare state programmes such as pensions and healthcare.

Social Investment and Poverty Reduction: A Comparative Analysis across Fifteen European Countries

AbstractDespite the fact that employment rates have increased in many European countries since the beginning of the 2000s, poverty rates have stagnated and in some countries even increased. In the welfare state literature, it has been argued that these disappointing poverty trends may be partly attributable to the reforming of traditional welfare state programmes into social investment policies, because the latter are less redistributive. To date, there are only a few systematic comparative empirical analyses which focus on the outcomes of social investment policies. This paper contributes to the social investment literature by empirically analysing the distributional effects of shifts from traditional welfare state arrangements to social investment policies in fifteen European countries for the period 1997–2007. Our results suggest that the detrimental effect of social investment policies, described in some specific cases in the literature, cannot be generalised across a larger group of European countries. However, for European countries other than the Nordic countries, the results provide some evidence for a linkage between stagnating or increasing poverty trends and shifts in expenditures to new welfare state programmes.

Welfare State and Political Culture in Unified Germany

This paper addresses the assertion that preferences for a comprehensive welfare state hamper and delay the emergence of a liberal-democratic culture in East Germany. Two questions are explored: first, has the impact of welfare-state values on support of the German democratic regime declined in East Germany since re-unification and adapted to the lower levels observed in West Germany? Second, are attitudes towards different welfare-state programmes equally important for citizens’ approval of the German democratic regime? Empirical analyses on the basis of representative public opinion surveys conducted between 1991 and 2012 confirm that the effect of welfare-state values in East Germany has converged to the smaller effect size observed in West Germany. Furthermore, attitudes to welfare-state programmes aimed at reducing income inequalities turn out to be a significant determinant of regime support in both parts of Germany. It is the higher demand for inequality-reducing governmental activities which still restrains the approval of the liberal-democratic regime among citizens in East Germany.

More Equal than We Thought? Using Vote Validation to Better Understand Participation Inequality in the States

AbstractInequality in political participation is a well-known and often studied feature of American politics. An important study examining misreporting of voter turnout in opinion surveys, however, calls into question the true extent of participation inequality. Ansolabehere and Hersh's first-ever 50-state vote validation project shows that those with more political resources are more likely to misreport turnout. That is, those with higher incomes are more likely than others to report that they had voted when in fact they did not. These findings suggest that income disparities in participation are not as large as opinion surveys have led us to believe. Moreover, studies using differences between voters and nonvoters as a key political indicator may also be biased. This article presents the first assessment of whether vote misreporting creates systematic bias in measures of state participation inequality. An index of economic inequality in participation for the 50 states is developed using the Ansolabehere and Hersh validated vote data and compares the measure of political inequality with a similar measure using traditional (i.e., nonvalidated) survey data. These state indices are used to determine the extent of bias produced by misreporting and whether this bias has implications for studies using these measures of participation inequality. The latter is assessed by examining the influence of the self-reported and validated inequality measures on state welfare programs and minimum wage policy.

The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration

538 Feminist Studies 41, no. 3. © 2015 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Doreen J. Mattingly The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration In 1977 in the United States, Second Wave feminists were poised to make a meaningful impact on federal policy. Jimmy Carter’s successful 1976 presidential campaign had included an open wooing of feminist support : he had created a “51.3 Percent” committee to address women’s issues and he had told feminist audiences that he “wanted to be known as the President who achieved equal rights for women, just as President Johnson had won civil rights legislation for blacks.”1 Once elected, Carter appointed an unprecedented number of feminist women to high office, many of whom were committed to addressing the concerns of marginalized women and advancing policy on issues such as sexual violence and reproductive rights. These appointees were linked to a dense feminist organizational presence in Washington that was unprecedented in its size and diversity. Not surprisingly, many feminists had high expectations for the new administration. 1. Cynthia Harrison, “Creating a National Feminist Agenda: Coalition Building in the 1970s,” in Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States, ed. Stephanie Gilmore (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 30. See also John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993); and Sara Evans, Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century’s End (New York: Free Press, 2003). Doreen J. Mattingly 539 Despite these promising conditions, feminists made little headway on policy during the Carter administration (1977–1981). Federal funding for abortion was eliminated; no permanent offices that would have advocated for women’s issues were created; and bills supporting domestic violence shelters, support for “displaced homemakers,” and quotas for female-owned businesses were defeated or extremely diluted. In addition, no additional states ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and several states rescinded earlier ratification votes. Some of these failures can be attributed to the general loss of feminist momentum and the emergence of a conservative backlash in the late 1970s. Anti-ERA organizing fueled the rise of a conservative “family values” movement that would shape social policies for more than a generation, and neoliberal economic conservatives were challenging the welfare-state programs that feminists sought to expand. But in Washington, there was an addition challenge —the unreliable support of Carter himself. Despite his promises, Carter felt that by appointing women he had met his commitment to feminists and did little to support feminist policy goals that went beyond eliminating discrimination. This paper makes an important contribution to the history of feminist action by looking in detail at the efforts of Jimmy Carter’s feminist appointees to influence policy. In particular, it discusses the actions of the most visible feminist in the White House, Margaret “Midge” Costanza . Carter named Costanza director of the Office of Public Liaison, a department that was created to manage relations between the White House and citizens’ groups. Her position as the first woman to serve as Assistant to the President, in concert with her gregarious nature and strong support for women’s issues, made Costanza a very visible symbol of affirmative action for Carter. Yet Costanza, like many other high-level feminist appointees, met opposition within the White House when she tried to advance women’s issues. Her persistent advocacy contributed to her marginalization within the White House. Just twenty months into the administration she resigned in frustration.2 This paper begins with a discussion of the unique circumstances surrounding Carter’s feminist appointees, followed by a detailed exploration 2. For Costanza’s complete story, see Doreen J. Mattingly, A Feminist in the White House: Midge Costanza, the Carter Years, and America’s Culture Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 540 Doreen J. Mattingly oftwomeetingsheldbyCostanzainJuly1977.Thefirstwasanimpromptu meeting of roughly forty prochoice Carter appointees, all deeply troubled by a statement made by Carter in support of the Hyde Amendment banning federal funds for abortion. The same month, Costanza hosted a groundbreaking White House meeting about battered women, in which high-level bureaucrats heard testimonials from domestic violence victims and shelter advocates. While both meetings broke new...

The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration

538 Feminist Studies 41, no. 3. © 2015 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Doreen J. Mattingly The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration In 1977 in the United States, Second Wave feminists were poised to make a meaningful impact on federal policy. Jimmy Carter’s successful 1976 presidential campaign had included an open wooing of feminist support : he had created a “51.3 Percent” committee to address women’s issues and he had told feminist audiences that he “wanted to be known as the President who achieved equal rights for women, just as President Johnson had won civil rights legislation for blacks.”1 Once elected, Carter appointed an unprecedented number of feminist women to high office, many of whom were committed to addressing the concerns of marginalized women and advancing policy on issues such as sexual violence and reproductive rights. These appointees were linked to a dense feminist organizational presence in Washington that was unprecedented in its size and diversity. Not surprisingly, many feminists had high expectations for the new administration. 1. Cynthia Harrison, “Creating a National Feminist Agenda: Coalition Building in the 1970s,” in Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States, ed. Stephanie Gilmore (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 30. See also John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993); and Sara Evans, Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century’s End (New York: Free Press, 2003). Doreen J. Mattingly 539 Despite these promising conditions, feminists made little headway on policy during the Carter administration (1977–1981). Federal funding for abortion was eliminated; no permanent offices that would have advocated for women’s issues were created; and bills supporting domestic violence shelters, support for “displaced homemakers,” and quotas for female-owned businesses were defeated or extremely diluted. In addition, no additional states ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and several states rescinded earlier ratification votes. Some of these failures can be attributed to the general loss of feminist momentum and the emergence of a conservative backlash in the late 1970s. Anti-ERA organizing fueled the rise of a conservative “family values” movement that would shape social policies for more than a generation, and neoliberal economic conservatives were challenging the welfare-state programs that feminists sought to expand. But in Washington, there was an addition challenge —the unreliable support of Carter himself. Despite his promises, Carter felt that by appointing women he had met his commitment to feminists and did little to support feminist policy goals that went beyond eliminating discrimination. This paper makes an important contribution to the history of feminist action by looking in detail at the efforts of Jimmy Carter’s feminist appointees to influence policy. In particular, it discusses the actions of the most visible feminist in the White House, Margaret “Midge” Costanza . Carter named Costanza director of the Office of Public Liaison, a department that was created to manage relations between the White House and citizens’ groups. Her position as the first woman to serve as Assistant to the President, in concert with her gregarious nature and strong support for women’s issues, made Costanza a very visible symbol of affirmative action for Carter. Yet Costanza, like many other high-level feminist appointees, met opposition within the White House when she tried to advance women’s issues. Her persistent advocacy contributed to her marginalization within the White House. Just twenty months into the administration she resigned in frustration.2 This paper begins with a discussion of the unique circumstances surrounding Carter’s feminist appointees, followed by a detailed exploration 2. For Costanza’s complete story, see Doreen J. Mattingly, A Feminist in the White House: Midge Costanza, the Carter Years, and America’s Culture Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 540 Doreen J. Mattingly oftwomeetingsheldbyCostanzainJuly1977.Thefirstwasanimpromptu meeting of roughly forty prochoice Carter appointees, all deeply troubled by a statement made by Carter in support of the Hyde Amendment banning federal funds for abortion. The same month, Costanza hosted a groundbreaking White House meeting about battered women, in which high-level bureaucrats heard testimonials from domestic violence victims and shelter advocates. While both meetings broke new...

Getting more unequal: Rising labor market inequalities among low-skilled men in West Germany

During recent decades, earnings differentials between educational groups have risen in most advanced economies. While these trends are well-documented, much less is known about inequality trends within educational groups. To address this issue, we study changes in labor market inequalities among low-skilled men in West Germany. Using data from the German Socio-economic Panel, we show that both risks of labor market exclusion and earnings dispersion have grown dramatically since the mid-1980s. We consider possible explanations for these trends, drawing on an analytic distinction between compositional changes with respect to worker/job characteristics and changes in the effects of these characteristics on labor market outcomes. Using a reweighting strategy and regression models, we find that both compositional trends and changes in the effects of important characteristics have contributed to the observed increase in labor market inequalities. We discuss the likely influence of German welfare state programs, labor market regulation, and of recent changes in these domains, and sketch promising avenues for future research.

The Political Economy of Discretionary Spending: Evidence from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

We study in this paper the spatial allocation of expenditures in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), one of the largest discretionary funding bills in the history of the United States. Contrary to both evidence from previous fiscal stimulus programs and standard theories of legislative politics, we do not find evidence of substantial political targeting. The districts of party leaders did not receive more funds than those of rank-and-file legislators, nor did the districts of pivotal voters in the Senate or swing voters in the House receive more money. While Democratic districts overall received more per resident than Republican districts, this differential nearly disappears when we consider award per worker in each district or when we control for district poverty rate. Democratic states did receive modestly greater funds, but this is largely due to higher levels of funding going to places with more generous state welfare programs. At the same time, we find no relationship between the amount awarded and measures of the severity of the downturn in the local economy, while we do find more funds flowing to districts with higher levels of economic activity and greater incidence of poverty. The results are consistent with the discretionary component of ARRA being allocated through funding formulas or based on project characteristics other than countercyclical efficacy or political expediency, which stands in contrast to evidence from fiscal stimulus in the New Deal. One explanation suggests that over the past century, legislative norms have reduced the scope of discretion—with attendant benefits and costs.

State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation

To what extent does state intervention in the market condition how individuals subjectively experience the lives that they lead? Prevailing attempts to understand the relationship between state intervention and subjective well‐being have yielded mixed empirical results. However, these differences result from omitted variable biases, not different methodological choices. Drawing on insights from the new social risk and quality of governance literatures, this article contends that the policy orientation and administrative quality of welfare state programs jointly condition the effect of state intervention on life satisfaction. State intervention exerts a strong positive effect on perceived satisfaction with life when the quality of administrative institutions is high and policy interventions focus on insuring individuals against newer, post‐industrial forms of market risk. This main hypothesis is tested and confirmed against an empirical analysis of survey data taken from Wave 5 of the World Values Survey.Related Articles:Flavin,Patrick,AlexanderPacek, andBenjaminRadcliff.2011. “.”Politics & Policy39():251‐269.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2011.00290.x/abstractDekker,Fabian.2010. “.”Politics & Policy38():765‐788.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00257.x/abstractAriely,Gal.2011. “.”Politics & Policy39():997‐1019.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2011.00329.x/abstractRelated Media:Film Clips:.2009. “.”http://www.stiglitz‐sen‐fitoussi.fr/en/index.htmVeenhoven,Ruut.2013. “.”http://www1.eur.nl/fsw/happiness/

The Bitter Pill: Austerity, Debt, and the Attack on Europe's Welfare States

There is a general belief among may European policymakers that the current debt problem in some Eurozone countries is caused by the unsustainable levels of governmental spending required to maintain overly generous welfare state programs, a bloated public sector, overly generous pension levels, state subsidies, and low user fees for services. Their proposed solution lies in implementing stringent austerity measures designed to discipline debt-ridden governments by cutting public budgets, reducing the number of public sector workers, curbing social benefits, and sharply narrowing the scope of the welfare state. Based on a belief in ‘expansionary austerity,’ this approach repudiates a key Keynesian principle for dealing with a recession—namely, the use of government spending to pursue full employment. This paper will examine the austerity measures forced upon several heavily indebted European nations by the ‘Troika’— the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Also examined will be the introduction of components of the IMF and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) into the Eurozone context, and the resulting social and political instability.

Where Should the Money Go? A Six-country Comparison of Attitudes toward Spending on Public Pensions and Unemployment Programs

Using both country-level and individual-level theories and indicators, this paper examines attitudes toward government spending on unemployment and pensions, two of the most expensive welfare state programs. I use a basic form of multilevel modeling to test three theories: self-interest, political ideology, and Esping-Andersen’s regime typology. Specificlly, I examine how self-interest and political ideology shape respondents’ ideas about spending on welfare and how these ideas vary across six countries. Based on my results, I argue that attitudes toward unemployment and pensions are not the same and cannot be assumed to be. With that said, Esping-Andersen’s typology can, in fact, be applied to attitudes with minimal variation especially as it pertains to pensions. Self-interest and political ideology theories both impact individual-level differences in attitudes; while these theories measure different ideas of influence, they are both important in understanding peoples’ attitudes about social policies.