State Public Utility Research Articles

Conservancy district not a public utility

The Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that the power of a conservancy district to engage in rate fixing for the sale, lease, or disposition of its waters did not, by this authority alone, give it public utility status. The district was not subject to the rules, regulations, and supervision of the state Public Utility Commission.

The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners

ECONOMISTS increasingly have come to view the regulatory process as a device for transferring wealth among factions in society according to their political clout, but so far it is unclear whether the process has been dominated by the interests of regulated producers, consumers, or some combination of the two.' Relatively little attention has been given in this literature to the rewards that regulators themselves may obtain from the process. One obvious possibility would be for ex-officials to take jobs with firms that were formerly under their jurisdiction. This incentive would be especially strong for regulatory commissioners. Commissioners receive direct salaries that are not large, serve terms of office that are fixed by statute, and face uncertain prospects of reappointment-all of which lead them to take a shorter run view of their situation compared to that of their bureaucratic counterparts in civil service.2 A commission might be viewed as "captured" by regulated firms or related organizations if a large proportion of its membership either has experienced precommission employment or has accepted postcommission employment with such groups. The purpose of this paper is to discover how common this behavior has been.

How to make succession successful

The diagram illustrates the formal management staff tree of an Australian State public utility, slightly varied to pre‐serve anonymity. Some five years ago, while preparing its manpower plan, this utility became aware of the age imbalance in its management structure, and noticed specifically that within the next six years it would face:

The Energy Crisis and the New Breed of Regulators: A Study of State Public Utility Commissions

The Energy Crisis and the New Breed of Regulators: A Study of State Public Utility Commissions

Design Guidelines for Distribution Systems as Developed and Used by an Investor‐Owned Utility

The role of the investor‐owned water utility is exemplified by the experience of this multiunit utility in California that serves both residential as well as commercial users. Although in essence a private company, the utility is closely regulated by the state's Public Utilities Com.

Legal Liability of Utilities for Service

between publicly and privately owned utilities, because the author believes that the principles under consideration are applicable to both. Neither will any attempt be made to consider the jurisdiction or powers of state public utilities commissions or any special charter or statutory provisions regulating particular utilities. The paper is also limited, with minor exceptions, to a discussion of what the law appears to be as enunciated by California courts.

An Investigation of Economies of Large Size in Steam Stations

easier to analyze than the costs of other types of plants for two reasons: First, the product, electricity, is homogeneous in a physical sense, in contrast to the output of, say, a steel rolling mill. Second, the accounting records of steam stations approach comparability more closely than those of many types of plant owing to the uniform system of accounts prescribed by the Federal Power Commission and the several state public utility commissions. The present study was undertaken in the hope that with these advantages it would be possible to get some general notion, at least, of the relation between size of station and the cost of steam-generated power. It must be emphasized that this investigation is not a general study of the factors influencing the cost of power from steam stations. The rise in prices which has occurred in recent years, for example, is of interest only secondarily. The purpose of the investigation is specialized: it is to uncover the relation between size and cost, other things being equal. The work was undertaken with the fear that the results would be crude but in the

Recent Legislative Developments Affecting Mediation and Arbitration

Presents legislative updates relevant to mediation and arbitration in the United States as of May 1948. Progress of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947; State public utility legislation; Taft-Hartley bill. (Abstract copyright EBSCO.)

The Independence of State Utility Commissions, I

State public utility commissions are analogues of the Federal Government's independent regulatory commissions. Analysis of their experience should, therefore, throw some light upon the Federal problem. At the same time, state utility regulation is important in its own right, and the governmental arrangements for effective discharge of the function cannot be fully appraised by any touchstone of academic principles. The desirability of independence for a utility commission canInot be determined without some suggestion as to the effects such independence would have upon the efficiency with which the commission does its work. Because of the absence of reliable criteria of efficiency,' and because of the impossibility of satis-

Aspects of the Organization, Functions, and Financing of State Public Utility Commissions

Aspects of the Organization, Functions, and Financing of State Public Utility Commissions

Aspects of the Organization, Functions, and Financing of State Public Utility Commissions. By C. O. Ruggles. (Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration. 1937. Pp. vi, 90. $1.00.)

Aspects of the Organization, Functions, and Financing of State Public Utility Commissions. By C. O. Ruggles. (Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration. 1937. Pp. vi, 90. $1.00.)

State Legislation on Public Utilities in 1934–35

The trends in state public utilities legislation which were clearly discernible in 1933 continued in somewhat modified form in state legislation during the biennium 1934–35. Only a comparatively few out of the vast number of proposed utilities measures became law. The laws enacted, however, contain features which if adopted generally may have far-reaching effect upon the future of state regulation of public utilities. The intended effects of such features are: (1) to further the creation of public corporations empowered to furnish public utility services; (2) to establish a new method of utilities regulation in the form of contractual relations between the federal government or federal agencies on the one hand and public utilities corporations on the other; (3) to stimulate municipal ownership and operation of selected public utilities.

Constitutional Law: Judicial Review of Order of State Public Utility Commission

Constitutional Law: Judicial Review of Order of State Public Utility Commission

State Public Utilities Legislation in 1927

State Public Utilities Legislation in 1927

Shall the Interstate Commerce Commission and the State Public Utility Commissions Fix Wages on the Railroads and on Local Public Utilities?

It would be hard to over-estimate the theoretical importance of the suggestion that the to be paid by railroads and public service corporations shall be fixed by public authority. A number of fundamental questions of political and social economy are involved. Back of the proposition lies the assumption that a railroad or a public utility is essentially a monopoly and therefore has been taken out of the category of undertakings whose operations in so far as they affect the public can be regulated by free competition. The proposition assumes as an established fact the existence of public regulation of the rates and service of railroads and public utilities and also assumes that such regulation is theoretically appropriate. But the proposition goes much further. It assumes the theoretical correctness of Ricardo's iron law of wages and the practical necessity of collective bargaining in competitive industries in order to enable the workmen to escape from the unlimited competition of labor postulated by Ricardo, and thereby to secure for themselves a standard of living high enough to make them fit for citizenship in a democracy. The proposition makes still another assumption, namely, that the public interest in the continuity, safety and efficiency of railroad and public utility service is paramount to the interests both of the owners and of the employes. In fact, it is the preexistence of these assumptions that creates the problem for the solution of which the public regulation of is proposed. Therefore, in the discussion of this proposition we must first examine the several assumptions upon which it is based to see whether or not they should stand as they are, be subjected to certain modifications or be rejected entirely. First, as to the assumption of monopoly. President Wilson has been severely criticized for saying that the eight-hour day has 237

The Truth About State Regulation of Utilities in Wisconsin

In the May number of THE ANNALS, Mr. Stiles P. Jones, secretary of the Voters League of Minneapolis, has made an attack upon methods and results of state regulation of public utilities in Wisconsin which puts state control in a very bad light. Because of the importance of the subject and the seriousness of the charges made by Mr. Jones, it appears that the facts with regard to the situation should be presented as fully as possible. One significant fact with regard to the statements made by Mr. Jones is that his information has been drawn, as he states, from the files of the Minnesota Home Rule League, an organization which came into existence to perform a single function, to defeat Governor Eberhart's plan for a state public utilities commission. secretary of the league, who was actively in charge of its task of gathering information in opposition to Governor Eberhart's program had been campaign manager for the governor's opponent during the previous campaign. Whatever may have been the merits of the controversy in which the Home Rule League engaged with the governor's supporters, it seems that the circumstances under which the league did its work and the purpose for which it disseminated information were hardly such as would be likely to lead to a fair, impartial analysis of the situation in Wisconsin and to the presentation of the unbiased truth with regard to the activities of the Wisconsin commission. As Mr. Jones states, The league first proceeded to comb Wisconsin, but there is evidence that the combing was not done to find the truth, but was done to find every situation which might conceivably be turned against the commission. Unfortunately for those who have expected to find in Mr. Jones' paper an accurate r6sum6 of Wisconsin conditions, many of the acts and opinions of the Wisconsin commission have undergone marvel-