State Ought Research Articles

FREEDOM AS A POLITICAL IDEAL

I shall assume that a well-ordered state is one that promotes the freedom of its subjects. My question is what is the kind of freedom that the state ought to promote? This question is different from the question of what freedom is. It might be thought, for example, that freedom consists in the autonomous pursuit of valuable goals and projects, but that the state cannot directly promote this freedom. On this view, the state would not be able to make its citizens free. However, it might be able to do things that make it easier or more likely for them to be free. The freedom that the state promotes might be merely an aspect of or a condition for the freedom that really matters.

Legitimating Official Brutality: Can the War against Terror Justify Torture?

In the aftermath of September 11, United States is confronted with dilemmas fundamental to any democratic regime faced with hostile terrorist attacks - dilemmas concerning the appropriate balance between human rights and national security. One such dilemma has to do with the method of interrogation of terror suspects. Detainees suspected of links with the Al-Qaeda network refused to answer questions and reveal information. Their silence led to a debate in the media about the possible need for torture. Following a similar debate in Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled (in 1999) that the coercive methods of interrogation used by the security services are illegal. That ruling serves as a starting point for the discussion. The article offers a distinction between official empowerment and justifications applied to officials. It argues that the State ought never to empower officials to use force in interrogations. The absence of such power will prevent the use of force as a matter of routine. In exceptional situations a criminal law justification may apply, requiring that the individual interrogator deliberate, before acting, on whether the circumstances are so powerful to justify the use of interrogational force. A criminal law defense analogous to self-defense provides a possible justification for the use of force in interrogation. As in self-defense, the use of force will only be justified when needed to prevent an imminent concrete threat. It should, therefore, be limited to ticking bomb situations, where the person under interrogation knows of the location of a bomb set to imminently explode and refuses to reveal the information. In such situations the use of force may only be justified in an attempt to coerce the terrorist who has planted the bomb to reveal the information necessary to defuse the bomb; it should never be justified in the case of bystanders who happen to know of the location of a bomb.

Public Trust in a Military Force

The purpose of this paper is to portray the nature of public trust in a military force within a democratic state and explain its importance. On grounds of a general conception of 'profession' and 'professional ethics', it is argued that a military force in a democratic state ought to nurture genuine public trust in itself, to take the form of a commonly or at least very broadly held presumption of proper functioning in all professional respects, including effectiveness, improvement and ethics. It is also argued that external inquiry commissions, sometimes appointed to investigate a recent failure, within the framework of a military force, are counterproductive as attempts to enhance the required public trust.

Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort Liability and No-Fault Compensation

Hassan El Menayawi seeks to briefly describe the characteristics of two legal regimes: the no-fault compensation and tort liability. No-fault compensation is primarily characterized by the compensation of any person who experiences personal injury without having to demonstrate that it is caused by the fault of another person. On the other hand, in tort liability, the decision whether to compensate a plaintiff is determined primarily on the basis of whether the defendant committed a fault. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of each regime, he seeks to demonstrate that it is possible to combine the advantages of no-fault compensation and tort liability in an alternative, third regime that he calls "public tort liability". Public tort liability is premised on the idea that the state ought to compensate all victims of injury regardless of whether they committed a fault, but also pursue those who committed a wrong in order to hold them accountable.

Chinua Achebe and an Archaeology of the Postcolonial African State

Patrick Chabal, noted scientist, should certainly have included non-African of Africa too when he argues perceptively in his book, Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation, that African writers did more to reveal reality of postcolonial Africa than most African scholars (8). After all, non-African of Africa actually dominate both production and dissemination of myriad of explanations that have been employed to understand and supposedly ameliorate crisis of postcolonial state in Africa. To extent that explanations have a concrete materiality to them?that is, in their ultimate transformation to (basis of) social actions?the crisis of African state ought to be considered as much social as epistemological. Canonical social science exegeses have always taken current dominant African sociopo? litical institutions as given. But these dominant institutions of politics, eco? nomies, and and administration are completely of colonial origin. Where they are questioned at all, it is with regard to their improper management by African actors. It is partly for recalcitrant blindness in explanations that Chabal himself calls them paradigms lost (11-32). Rarely was it pondered that problem might be primarily a crisis of institutions in their entirety in relation to context, not simply of their performance. Here then is source ofthe comparative superiority of fictional investigations of African writers: they have always foregrounded foundational issue of institutions and their legitimacy, and few with greater perspicacity and subtlety than Chinua Achebe. Let us briefly revisit Achebe's old and famous text, Arrow ofGod (1964), for its unusually prescient and canny foreshadowing of crisis of legiti? macy facing postcolonial African states today. Unlike Achebe's other texts we all know and use in our classes for their deep examinations of African state, Arrow is not specifically about postcolonial state. It is set at turn of twentieth-century Igboland, Nigeria, and dramatizes penetration and ultimate consolidation of British colonial authority over indigenous societies. In other words, it is set about seven or so decades before independence, decades described by historian as Basil Davidson as wasted in terms of crucial political and structural development of continent (72). [I]n every crucial field of life, writes Davidson, the British had frozen indigenous institutions while at same time robbed colonized peoples of every scope and freedom for self-development (72). This arrest and devastation ofthe indigenous society's general capacity for self-directed evolution is drama enacted by Arrow of God, while resulting wasteland is central focus of later A Man ofthe People (1966), Achebe's now classic merciless excoriation of new post? colonial state.

Chinua Achebe and an Archaeology of the Postcolonial African State

Patrick Chabal, the noted political scientist, should certainly have included non-African scholars of Africa too when he argues perceptively in his book, Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation, that African writers "did more to reveal the reality of postcolonial Africa than most African scholars" (8). After all, non-African scholars of Africa actually dominate both the production and dissemination of the myriad of explanations that have been employed to understand and supposedly ameliorate the crisis of the postcolonial state in Africa. To the extent that explanations have a concrete materiality to them--that is, in their ultimate transformation to (basis of) social actions--the crisis of the African state ought to be considered as much social as epistemological. Canonical social science exegeses have always taken the current dominant African sociopolitical institutions as given. But these dominant institutions of politics, economics, and management and administration are completely of colonial origin. Where they are questioned at all, it is with regard to their "improper management" by African political actors. It is partly for the recalcitrant blindness in the explanations that Chabal himself calls them "paradigms lost" (11-32). Rarely was it pondered that the problem might be primarily a crisis of institutions in their entirety in relation to context, not simply of their performance. Here then is the source of the comparative superiority of the fictional investigations of African writers: they have always foregrounded the foundational issue of institutions and their legitimacy, and few with greater perspicacity and subtlety than Chinua Achebe.

When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance, and the Role of Government

Victims of horrific crimes, or those who survive those victims, often describe themselves as seeking closure, a way to go on with their lives in the aftermath of unimaginable pain and loss. This article is an attempt to examine the notion of closure in this highly charged context. Looking at the statements of the parents of murdered children in two well known cases - the case of the California Freeway Killer and the Matthew Shephard case - the article notes that different victims (or survivors) may seek closure in different ways. Both forgiveness and the desire for vengeance may play a role in the quest for closure, for example. The question of what victims and survivors need and deserve has a number of components: psychological, philosophical and moral; theoretical and empirical. This article suggests, first, that the notion of closure is complex, and that the needs of victims vary, and that, therefore, we ought to proceed carefully when making assertions about what victims need in order to achieve closure. Second, the article argues that the question of what victims need must be distinguished from the question with which it is often conflated, of what role the state ought to play in assisting victims and survivors in achieving closure.

10.1023/B:LAPH.0000015416.13155.ed

According to William Edmundson, a legitimatepolitical authority is one that claims tocreate in its subjects a general duty ofobedience to the law, and that succeeds increating in its subjects a duty to obey stateofficials when they apply the law in particularcases. His argument that legitimate politicalauthority does not require the state's claim tobe true rests on his analysis of legitimatetheoretical authority, and the assumption thattheoretical and practical authority are thesame in the relevant respects, both of whichare challenged here. In addition, Edmundsonfails to demonstrate that a general,content-independent, duty to obey officials whoadminister the law avoids the criticismsphilosophical anarchists pose to a general,content-independent duty to obey the law. Finally, Edmundson requires a legitimate stateto sincerely claim to create a generalduty to obey the law, yet he also argues thatin some cases the state ought to make literallyfalse claims regarding the particular dutiesincumbent upon its subjects. DespiteEdmundson's recent efforts to reconcile thesetwo claims, the conflict remains.

On Hate and Equality

Hate crime legislation has sparked substantial political controversy and scholarly discussion. Existing justifications for hate crime legislation proceed on the premise that the rationale supporting such legislation must be found either in the greater gravity of the wrongdoing involved or in the perpetrator's greater degree of culpability. This premise stems from a fundamental theory that dominates criminal law scholarship: the wrongfulness-culpability hypothesis. The wrongfulness-culpability hypothesis posits that the only two grounds that may justify disparate treatment of offenses are the greater wrongfulness of the act or the greater culpability of the perpetrator. Yet, all attempts to demonstrate that hate crimes are more wrongful or morally reprehensible than other crimes have failed to carry the day. This Article challenges the dominance of the wrongfulness-culpability hypothesis and proffers an alternative that supports bias crime legislation: the protection paradigm. The protection conceptualizes protection against crime as a good produced by criminal law and thus requires that it be distributed in an equal manner. Specifically, it imparts a duty on the state to equalize individuals' vulnerability to crime. An individual's vulnerability to crime can be defined as her expected harm from crime--that is, the probability of harm multiplied by its magnitude. A state may address the problem of vulnerable victims in one of two ways. First, it may impose harsher sanctions on those who commit crimes against vulnerable victims. Second, it may devote more resources to the identification and prosecution of individuals who attack such victims. When the latter tactic is unfeasible for some reason, equalizing protection against crime through the imposition of harsher sanctions may be the only way by which the state can provide vulnerable victims with greater protection and thus equalize their vulnerability to that of other potential victims. The distribution of protection does not require absolute equality in expected costs of crime to the victim. Vulnerability to crime is a function of myriad factors such as wealth, age, and attitude towards risk, life experience, and physical and intellectual prowess. Moreover, disparities in vulnerability to crime often depend on the precautions taken by the victim herself. The state cannot be reasonably expected to annul all disparities in the vulnerability of different potential victims of crime. This Article argues, however, that at a minimum the state ought to annul disparities that stem from certain personal characteristics of victims, such as race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation. This Article also shows that the explanatory power of the fair protection paradigm ranges far beyond the context of hate crimes. The protection can explain, for instance, why crimes directed against particularly vulnerable victims, such as the elderly and the disabled, are often punished more severely than crimes directed against less vulnerable ones. Properly understood, therefore, hate crime legislation is part of a larger scheme of providing protection against crime. Recognizing the right of victims to equal protection from crime makes it clear that hate crime legislation is consonant with the goals of criminal law. Hate crime legislation is merely one essential step towards a more egalitarian provision of protection against crime--a step which is congruous with the broader goals of the criminal law system.

Two Conceptions of Fairness

VEIT BADER' S RICH AND COMPLEX essay illustrates the virtues of a comparative and contextual approach to political theory. His references to the institutions and practices of many different liberal democratic states play a key role in his theoretical argument and provide a useful corrective to theories constructed with a more limited set of examples in mind. I applaud Bader's efforts to find a middle way between an abstract universalism that neglects the role of national identity and culture in realizing and reproducing any concrete liberal democratic political order and a complacent communitarianism that ignores the exclusionary effects of allowing political identities, institutions, and practices to be shaped unduly by the dominant culture in a particular state. In this brief response, I will try to clarify and extend Bader's analysis. My central claim is that Bader's discussion reflects a productive ambivalence between two different views of what requires with respect to national identity and culture: (1) an ideal of neutrality compatible only with thin forms of identity and culture and (2) an ideal of evenhandedness, compatible with much thicker versions of identity and culture. Since the appearance of A Theory of Justice, the phrase justice as has conjured up the idea that to treat people fairly, we must regard people abstractly, taking into account only generic human interests (such as primary goods) rather than particular identities and commitments. This conception of fairness is closely associated with the view that the liberal state ought to be neutral between competing conceptions of the good. There is another conception of as fairness, however, that is derived from the assumption that to treat people fairly, we must regard them concretely, with as much knowledge as we can obtain about who they are and what they care

Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral Reform in Canada: Differentiated Representation versus Voter Equality

AbstractArguments advancing the merits of Aboriginal Electoral Districts (AEDs) for Canada are informed by the view that the democratic integration of Aboriginal peoples into the institutions of the state ought to occur on the basis of their group-differentiated citizenship. This study advances the thesis that the attempt to fuse the conventional concern for democratic equality with a model of representation based on difference such as that offered by AEDs is to try to harmonize objectives that strain significantly against one another and thus are largely incompatible. AEDs are unsustainable as vehicles for the representation of Aboriginal peoples within Parliament because they are too tightly bound to a representational norm linked to a commitment to voter equality which, when measured against the normative thrust of differentiated representation, imposes a high degree of homogenization upon the citizenship of Aboriginal peoples.

Settlement Women and Bureau Men: Constructing a Usable Past for Public Administration

the conclusion to his early monograph on the history of public administration in the United States, John Gaus (1930) argued that the field needed a past: studies that would bring to light buried aspects of its history and enrich discussions of social policy with administrative knowledge. Gaus commented We make much of our newness; we can find materials for valuable civic standards and inspiration if we will assist by doing our share n the rewriting of our cultural history, richer by far than we permit our students to see (p. 138). More than 60 years later, Guy B. Adams (1992) noted a similar lack of historical consciousness in public administration. Just as Gaus took us to task for making much of our newness, Adams called the field enthralled with modernity. He argued for particular attention to the Progressive era, a time period that the public administration community had widely ignored despite the availability of extensive historical scholarship. Most often in the contemporary [public administration] literature, a ritual mention of [Woodrow] Wilson is followed by a jump to the present time with no historical analysis at all (Adams, 1992; 365). Why does the field of public administration need a usable past? I would like to offer one answer. Historical studies appear to support Adams' contention that the Progressive period is crucially important for public administration. Skowronek (1982), for example, maintained that the period from 1877 to 1920 marked the turning point from a national government structured around courts and parties, adequate to a polity that valued dispersed power and had little need for or interest in strategic action, to an administrative state capable of dealing with complex national, indeed global, challenges. Skowronek noted that the American state may be on the brink--or in the throes--of another transformation, in which the administrative state gives way to a new species, the outlines of which are only dimly seen at this point. It may be difficult for us to envision the administrative state as a dying behemoth, but then Tammany Hall in 1910 probably had as little awareness that its days of hegemony were numbered. order to understand and meet contemporary challenges to the administrative state such as the ones that have unfolded in the U.S. Congress and numerous state legislatures since the 1994 elections, we need a fuller sense of how a collection of perspectives and theories about bureaucracy and its role in governance coalesced and evolved into the field of public administration. The field did not spring full-blown from Woodrow Wilsoris (1887) brow. As Rosenbloom has observed, In some respects, `orthodox' public administration theory has been the political ideology of dominant political groups (1993; 1). We need to know more than we do about the sources of our ideas--about whom they (and we) serve. this article, I suggest that Progressive-movement ideas and practice (from which grew the academic field of public administration) separated substance (what the state ought to do) from procedure (how the state ought to do what it does). I also suggest that gender stereotypes of the time were at least partly responsible for this split, and that subsequently, the field took its shape based more on the procedural than the substantive, a move that has had important consequences. The Progressive reform movement was one in which both men and women played leading roles, as recent scholarship has made abundantly clear. The municipal housekeeping efforts of middle-class white women's clubs, the institution-building undertaken by black women's organizations especially in the South, the development of settlement houses, women's advocacy of legislation regulating working conditions, and setting up fledgling social welfare efforts-an outpouring of studies has documented these and other accomplishments (e.g., Frankel and Dye, 1991; McCarthy, 1990; Muncy, 1991; Skocpol, 1992). …

Evolving Socio-economic Conditions in Central and Eastern Europe: A Myrdalian View

Summary The debate about the effects of transformation policies will continue, given the impossibility of isolating their impact while holding constant other factors responsible for performance. However, one conclusion that can be drawn is that, using comparable performance indicators, trends in China, except for inflation and political democracy, are either similar to or more positive than corresponding results in CEE (Chai, 1992; Field, 1992; Harrold, 1993; Yeh, 1992). In nearly every year since 1978 China's actual performance has exceeded that planned, while in CEE the decline in economic activity following the implementation of transformation measures has consistently exceeded the most pessimistic forecasts of policy-makers and their foreign advisers. In consequence, the social and economic costs borne by the Chinese during their transformation have been much less than in CEE. Based upon his own goals and assessment of CEE policies and their expected and actual consequences (see Tables 1 and 2). Myrdal would evaluate the performance of CEE economies as relatively poor6 Negative assessments would be accorded to social and economic equalisation, rise in productivity, rise in living standards, and social discipline and rational planning. He would find both positive and negative aspects for each of the other four criteria.7 Overall, he would evaluate the ‘tendencies’ as unfavourable because of the absence of any clear positive trends throughout the region. This evaluation, combined with the comparison with China, calls into question the efficacy of CEE policies based upon the assumption that transformation requires rapid privatisation, elimination of subsidies to state-owned enterprises, and stabilisation measures prior to institutional reforms, or that the state ought to adopt a passive role concerning supply-side responses during the transformation process. As the consummate political economist, Myrdal would criticise CEE goals and policies and suggest alternatives consistent with his value premises and his theory of development.

Sex selection and reproductive freedom

The emergence of new technologies for determining the sex of children again brings to the forefront the disquieting preference for male offspring evidenced in most societies. After a brief discussion of the cultural underpinnings of this predilection, I examine three societies where the use of selective abortion is well documented: India, South Korea, and China. The relevance of these data for abortion policy in the United States is discussed. Following this is an evaluation of some of the biological, social, and psychological arguments for and against the use of sex selection. The paper then turns to the central question: whether or not the state ought to regulate sex selection, including both pre- and post-conception techniques. After reviewing the arguments in favor of regulation, the essay concludes that regulation would jeopardize the very rights it was designed to protect.

Basic Aspects of an Imaginary Debate

History has already passed by the debate that I will be discussing in what follows. What remains, hence, are a few questions questions which may perhaps lead to some clarification on one of the specters that haunt politics and political science: patriotism. The debate I am referring to concerned the question as to whether the GDR ought to join the Federal Republic as the sum of its state territories according to Article 23 of the Basic Law, or whether, via a constitutional debate under the auspices of Article 146 of the Basic Law, a new German state ought to be founded. I find this question interesting not for reasons of technical law or for political considerations, but rather because a number of West German intellectuals believed that they were duty-bound to stand up for a constitutional debate and a global revision of the Basic Law. At first glance the political fronts seem quite clear: leftist, liberal, and critical spirits were in favor of a constitutional debate, while almost the entire liberal/ conservative to conservative spectrum of political scientists favored the accession of the GDR to the Basic Law.

Trading Companies in South Korea and Taiwan: Two Policy Approaches

If Keynes is responsible for popularizing fiscal policy as the essential companion to monetary policy in the retinue of a government's tools for intervening in the economy, the experience of the late developing countries and the globalization of economic competition have assured industrial policy its place alongside the other two. Industrial policy is not new, however, nor are the late developing nations its exclusive employers. Pointing out that the Japanese actually learned of the notion from the West, Chalmers Johnson cites Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures written in 1791: Capital is wayward and timid in lending itself to new undertakings, and the State ought to excite the confidence of capitalists, who are ever cautious and sagacious, by aiding them overcome the obstacles that lie in the way of all experiments.' While the caution and sagacity of capitalists have perhaps changed little in the 200 years since Hamilton wrote, the obstacles are arguably greater, thus underscoring the perceived need by many, if not most governments to be concerned with the competitiveness and organization of their nations' industries. This article examines one such effort of industrial or, more accurately, commercial policy in two specific environments: the political economies of South Korea and Taiwan. Witnessing the success of Japan's version of the so-called general trading company, the Korean and Taiwan governments launched their own versions with great fanfare and expecta-

Business Regulation and Price Control in Talmudic Economics

Rulers from as long ago as ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia have tried to control various aspects of their economies, whether to ensure adequate supplies of basic commodities in times of war or famine, or to protect the power and incomes of the rulers themselves. There have been various ancient price edicts, which have had some effectiveness, at least during the lifetimes of their promulgators, principally because they referred to products which were largely produced under the direct control of the state. It was obvious even to the most ancient observers that radical changes in the equilibrium between buyers and sellers, such as those caused by sudden shortages in times of war or natural disaster and their attendant famines, gave opportunities to those in possession of goods necessary for the maintenance of life itself, to raise their prices and “profiteer” thereby. The same phenomenon was the reason for the frequent attempts to set ceilings on interest rates, which, in an era when almost all loans were for personal consumption rather than for commercial or investment purposes, had the effect of wiping out financially the borrowers who could not repay their loans in time, which in turn led to serfdom and slavery. Such crises were frequently the occasions for appeals to rulers to protect the population from such exploitation. It was undoubtedly against such a background that the Jews of Talmudic times interpreted the biblical rules against “oppression” to mean a total prohibition of the taking of interest, and limits on “overcharging”, as will be discussed below. In the Greco‐Roman world the idea of control of prices was a result partly of philosophical inquiry into general economic theory, and partly the desire of moralists to prevent the “injustice” of some people gaining “immoderate” profits at the expense of others. Plato saw the desire of merchants for “unbounded” gain rather than “reasonable” profit as a dangerous social evil resulting from the acquisitive nature of man. In his ideal conception, the state ought to set prices in accordance with the cost of production plus fair reward for the seller's efforts (i.e., profit), and to have these standards enforced by market overseers. Such officials, generally called agoranomoi, actually existed in a number of Greek states, but were more often concerned with regulating weights and measures and maintaining orderliness in the market place rather than with controlling prices.

The Organization and Administration of Adult Education

THE LITERATURE is reviewed for public schools, libraries, co-operative extension service, voluntary organizations, and university extension programs. Public Schools The last five years have seen a significant increase in the number of studies which examine in depth specific aspects of public-school adult education. Financial patterns were examined by Olds (51) under the auspices of the National Commission on Adult Education Finance. Olds found that in 17,000 districts $79 million was spent annually on adult education. However, this amounted to only 1.3 percent of total public-school expenditures in those districts. It was concluded that every state ought to provide specific financial aid to adult education as a part of its foundation program of assistance to public schools and essentially on the same basis as provision for elementary and secondary education. In support of this policy it was noted that in the 10 states with considerable aid three times as large a proportion of adults were enrolled as in 38 states with little or no aid. Fivefold increase of state aid in New York between 1944 and 1952 was accompanied by an increase in adult enrollment 15 times that prior to 1944. Olds found that the average cost of adult education is 46 cents an attendance hour, about 50 percent higher than the cost of elementary education. The study, however, included many small communities and programs with small classes. The unit cost drops substantially where a high enrollment and attendance is maintained in each class. The role of professional leadership was examined in several contexts. In a study of the adult education services of state departments of education Holden (33) examined patterns of professional leadership. His findings confirmed that both professional leadership and state aid are necessary for program growth. Hurlbut (35) reported that California districts employing a full-time administrator had twice the participation of the state average. Of 21 trends in public-school adult education identified by Graff and Edwards (29), the trend toward the appointment of local directors of adult education was the second most pronounced. In terms of historical perspective there has been a decline in state leadership. Holden pointed out (33) that 30 years ago 15 states had full269

The Origin of the Social Welfare State in Canada, 1867-1900

The welfare state—as a term of abuse or approval, depending on the point of view—is a phrase which has only recently come into common use, although contrasts between the so-called “negative” and “positive” state have been frequently drawn during the past two decades. The idea that the primary function of government is to make a good life possible, is, however, as old as Aristotle, and political theorists in democratic countries have long been agreed that the state exists for the well-being of its citizens, and not vice versa, although their views of what constitutes the welfare of the people have been markedly divergent. The expansion of government activities, which is conveniently summarized under the term “social welfare state,” in this country as in others is usually considered a twentieth-century phenomenon. Its origins in Canada, however, may be traced to the first thirty years after Confederation, when the proper function of government was a matter of general concern and wide debate. During this early period public opinion as to what the state ought to do for the social well-being of its citizens developed rapidly, and underwent a marked transformation.Present-day critics of the British North America Act are given to pointing out that, as a nineteenth-century document drawn up when laissez-faire theories were at their height, it has become increasingly ill-adapted to further social welfare by state action. Yet contemporary historians have shown that in both Great Britain and the United States, during the past century, the classical doctrine of laissez-faire, interpreted as government abstention from interference with individual or group action, was more honoured in theory than in practice. This contention is supported by illustrations of early factory, mines, public health, and education acts in England, and of such American intervention in economic affairs as tariffs and grants to individual industries. There is much evidence that similar developments took place in Canada, which lends support to similar conclusions concerning the mythical nature of laissez-faire.

The Role of Government in a Free Society: The Conception of Lester Frank Ward

G EORGE H. Sabine has asserted that .later liberalism has tended to disintegrate either in the direction of conservatism or in the direction of between which it has aspired to steer a middle course.' And after a survey of the development of liberal social thought, he is unable to .avoid the conclusion that it has been a diminishing force in modern political society.2 By way of bringing to focus the historic problem of liberal social thought Francis W. Coker cites the words of Edmund Burke as epitomizing most difficult of all the problems confronting social philosophers... .3 To Burke, the problem involved determining 'what the state ought to take upon itself to direct by public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual freedom.' 4 In other words, the crucial issue in the liberal tradition has emerged historically as involving the status of the individual relative to his society with its institutions. Herbert Spencer, certainly one of the most prominent of the later representatives of classical liberalism, tended to so minimize the role of institutions-particularly the state-as to move William A. Dunning to classify his political theory as anarchistic.5 To Sabine, Spencer's version of liberalism exhibited ..the most extreme faith in laissez-faire ever entertained by any thinker. In this respect he went even beyond the early liberals. He opposed not only every form of social legislation and industrial regulation but even public support for education.6 Talcott Parsons characterized Spencer's extreme individualism as .. .the exaggeration of a deep-rooted belief that.. .we have been blest with an automatic, self-regulating mechanism which operated so that the pursuit by each individual of his own selfinterest and private ends would result in the greatest possible satisfaction of the wants of all.7 But Parsons, agreeing with Crane Brinton, can ask: 'Who now reads Spencer? It is difficult for us to realize how great a stir he made in the world... .We have evolved beyond Spencer.' 8 The direction of this evolution, which to Sabine was toward socialism, finds tentative focus in the theories of Thomas Hill Green. It was Green's emphasis that ...a liberal government ought to legislate in any case where the law can remove an obstacle to the highest moral development of its citizens. . Therefore, Green could assume that liberal governmental policy would aim .to insure the conditions for at least a minimum of well-being-a standard of living, of education, and of security below which good policy requires that no considerable part of the population shall be allowed to fall.'0 But such a viewpoint 'George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Henry Holland Company, 1937), p. 680. 2lbid., p. 679. 3Francis W. Coker, Recent Political Thought (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1934), p. 35. 41bid. Quoted by Coker. 5William A. Dunning, A History of Political Theorics from Rousseau to Spencer (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920), p. 398. 6Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 672. 7Talcott Parsons, The St'ructure of Social Action (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937), p. 4. 8Ibid., p. 3. Quoted by Parsons. 9Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 676. ?IIbid.