State Law And Order Restoration Council Research Articles

India-Myanmar Relations: From Idealpolitik To Realpolitik

India's relations with Myanmar was generally cordial and close prior to 1960s. Myanmar Prime Minister U Nu believed it as 'firm Indo-Burmese friendship'. This excellent bilateral relationship between the two countries was generated by political and economic cooperation, plus good personal friendship between U Nu and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Although there were several hiccups along with the relationship of the two countries in the 1960s and 1970s, the bilateral relations were still good. However, after the failed 1988 major demonstration by the Burmese pro-democracy movement against the military rule, the bilateral relations between India and Myanmar was disrupted. India started to criticise strongly the new Burma's military junta - the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). India offered shelters for anti-SLORC dissidents and pro-democracy activists. India criticised strongly Myanmar's poor human rights record and advocated for Myanmar's return to democracy. India gave permission for Myanmar's opposition - the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) to open its office in New Delhi in 1992. During this time, it is clear that India's foreign policy towards Myanmar was to champion democratic ideals, urging and pushing Myanmar to return to democracy. Myanmar saw this as interference in its domestic affairs, but Myanmar lacked a trump card in forcing India to reconsider its stance, prompting Myanmar to turn to China for support. By 1993, India shifted its stances towards Myanmar from advocating democratic ideals to a more realistic policy based on namely the China factor, the economic and strategic interests, and Myanmar's image and international legitimacy, and India's ambition in Southeast Asia.

Reading “Saturn”: Interpretive Practice under Censorship in Burma

Each lett er of the alphabet is a pagoda. — A Burmese proverb 2 In this article, I present a sustained analysis of a single Burmese short story, called Saturn, writt en by Win Sithu and published in Burma in 1992. The story in translation appears in its entirety in the appendix. Saturn is a good example of a creative literary work produced under conditions of harsh and restrictive censor- ship. One of my goals here is to show how the story can be interpreted in relation to the social and political context in which it was writt en and initially received. Saturn provides a glimpse into the concerns of the author and, one infers, the reading public at a critical moment in Burma's recent history: the early 1990s, shortly aft er the assumption of power by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) authorities.

Understanding Recent Political Changes in Myanmar

On 30 March 2011, Myanmar's ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), handed power to a new government led by President Thein Sein that had come into being in the wake of elections held in November 2010. Because all administrative and legislative bodies--both at the central and local levels--were controlled by members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), political activists and Myanmar watchers did not expect more than superficial changes under the new government. Although President Thein Sein mentioned his plan to introduce administrative and economic reforms and to launch an anti-corruption campaign in his inaugural speech doubts remained that the president would actually be able to deliver on his promises. However, on 19 August 2011, to the surprise of many people, President Thein Sein met Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), at his official residence. Two days earlier, the President had invited exiled activists to return to the country. Aung San Suu Kyi publicly stated that she was very encouraged by her meeting with Thein Sein and that she had trust in his determination to bring about positive political change to the country. (1) The United States and some members of the European Union (EU) welcomed the meeting. On the other hand, several exiled activists had reservations about the sincerity of the President, with some going so far as to say that what Thein Sein had done was little more than a publicity stunt and that there was little difference between the new government and its predecessor. This article, drawing on interviews with serving and retired government officials, and political activists including leading NLD members, argues that since the new government has taken office a new era of political openness has begun in Myanmar. It goes on to illustrate that in order to understand recent political changes, one should pay attention to shifts in the internal power structure of the government. However, it is not a given that Myanmar will become a full-fledged democracy any time soon. Indeed this article suggests that the country is at a critical juncture, and that the expansion of political openness in the country will depend on whether liberals within the government and those from the pro-democracy movement can work together to further political changes without prompting the country's armed forces, the tatmadaw, to stage a coup. The Power Structure and Political Change in the SLORC/SPDC Government The military government that ruled Myanmar between late 1988 and early 2011 was formed in response to the nation-wide pro-democracy movement against the military-dominated socialist government led by General Ne Win. Although the junta, which was initially known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and later renamed the SPDC, held multi-party elections in 1990, it refused to transfer power to the NLD even after the latter had won a landslide victory. Instead, the junta convened a decade long National Convention (NC) to adopt guidelines for a new constitution. Although opposition groups and the international community called for the transfer of power to the NLD, the SLORC ignored these calls. In fact, after the 1990 elections Myanmar's military leaders decided to defer political change for as long as possible. Political activists, on the other hand, continued to campaign for swift political change. As Huntington and many others have pointed out, democratization under an authoritarian regime might take place under the following conditions: when the regime is toppled by a social movement or seriously weakened by a crisis; when reformers from within the regime and liberals from the movement find a way to work together; or when the regime feels that it cannot survive without initiating political reform. (2) Some activists had hoped for a split in the government and tried to identify liberal officials they could work with. …

Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups

In the early 1990s, Unocal’s fourth-tier subsidiary allegedly engaged in a joint venture with the government of Myanmar to build a gas line across the country’s Tenasserim region in a now-infamous project called the Yadana Pipeline. At the time, as now, a military junta known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) controlled the country. Myanmar Oil, a state-owned company designed to manage the country’s natural gas and oil

Japan and the Myanmar Stalemate: Regional Power and Resolution of a Regional Problem

For years Myanmar has been caught in a political stalemate generated both by deadlock between the military government and the democratic opposition, and by polar differences between China and the United States. In searching for ways forward, analysts might therefore want to look beyond these dominant actors. This article considers the contribution that a regional power, Japan, could make to political change. It examines first political stalemate in Myanmar, second Japan as a regional power, third Japanese engagement with Myanmar, fourth Japan and resolution of the Myanmar problem, and fifth future possibilities. The argument is that strong historical ties and good relations inside and outside Myanmar put Japan in a pivotal position. As part of its reassurance diplomacy in East Asia, Japan should take the lead in tackling this regional problem.Since a May 1990 general election that saw the National League for Democracy (NLD) secure a landslide victory and the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) respond by reinforcing its dictatorship, Myanmar has been in political stasis. Although progress has been made on some fronts, notably in relations between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the military junta is now known, and the insurgent rebel armies with which it long fought civil wars, the uneasy political deadlock that settled on the country some 15 years ago has not been broken. Furthermore, within a complex internal context, the standoff between the two major protagonists from 1990 remains critical. Now, as then, the NLD, brandishing democratic legitimacy, charismatic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and latent popular support, confronts the military junta, wielding guns, power, and fear.

Myanmar and China: A Special Relationship?

Introduction: Myanmar and Its Foreign Policy The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which assumed power after a military coup on 18 September 1988 in response to a widespread breakdown of government authority, changed the country's name from Burma to the Union of Myanmar on 18 June 1989. SLORC was reconstituted as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997 and the latter currently rules Myanmar by decree. Myanmar is the second largest country (after Indonesia) among the ten states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to which it was admitted in July 1997. Situated within continental Southeast Asia, Myanmar has a 1,385 miles-long coastline and shares land borders with five neighbouring states as depicted in Table 1.

The National Reconciliation Process in Myanmar

Introduction On 6 May 2002, State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government lifted a restriction on movement of Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of National League for Democracy (NLD) and released her from house arrest. The government stated that release would mark start of a new page for people of Myanmar and international (1) The official statement noted further: shall recommit ourselves to allowing all our citizens to participate freely in life of our political process while giving precedence to national unity, peace and stability of country as well as region. (2) Colonel Hla Min, a government spokesman, said that the era of confrontation is over and era of co-operation has arrived. (3) At press conference held a few hours after her release, Aung San Suu Kyi also stated that the phase of confidence-building [between government and her] was over and [looked] forward to moving ahead, [and that there would] be another phase in dialog ue or national reconciliation process [which] could begin to tackle policy issues. (4) article will provide an overview of national reconciliation process in Myanmar. The Process of National Reconciliation In late 1998, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, appointed Alvaro de Soto, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, as his special envoy to Myanmar to break political deadlock between government and political opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. That deadlock had more or less been in place since establishment of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988, predecessor of current SPDC. The issue of deadlock became more acute when Myanmar Government failed to install an elected government after general elections in May 1990. The government took harsh measures in restoring law and order in Myanmar, while political opposition, particularly NLD, pursued a policy of confrontation with government. The situation eventually became irreconcilable and completely deadlocked. It was then that United Nations became involved in attempts to resolve issue. When Alvaro de Soto paid his first visit to Yangon in October 1998, ther e was a proposal that United Nations and World Bank would reward Myanmar Government with up to US$1 billion in financial and humanitarian aid if latter would enter into a meaningful dialogue with Aung San Sun Kyi. (5) The Myanmar Government was not happy at all since it viewed such a proposal as an insult. Myanmar Foreign Minister U Win Aung told press: This is like offering a banana to a monkey and asking it to We are not monkeys. We won't dance. (6) Soon after another fruifless visit to Yangon in October 1999, Alvaro de Soto lost his enthusiasm in trying to resolve political deadlock. However, Myanmar Government was to welcome appointment of Razali Ismail as United Nations' special envoy to Myanmar in April 2000, to facilitate national reconciliation process. In late June 2000, Razali went to Yangon to explore situation and to promote political dialogue between SPDC government and Aung San Suu Kyi. By time he paid his second visit in October, Suu Kyi was already under house arrest. During his four-day visit, Razali held a series of discussions with Myanmar authorities, including Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of SPDC. He also held separate discussions with Suu Kyi. In meetings, Razali underlined necessity for national reconciliation in Myanmar and urged both sides to initiate political dialogue as soon as possible. It appeared that two protagonists took Razali's advice seriously and began to engage in dialogue. When Razali returned to Yangon for a third time in January 2001, Myanmar Government informed him of progress and allowed him to break news of national reconciliation process to international community. …

Cambodia´s International Rehabilitation, 1977–2000

This article offers a historical analysis of Cambodia's recent three-year crisis of international legitimacy, provoked by the brief civil war in July 1997, and finally settled between November 1998 and mid-2000. Overwhelming international condemnation of Hun Sen's government after the July 1997 fighting seriously delayed national reconciliation and a return to stable government. However, the origins of Cambodia's complex 1997 crisis go back to UNTAC and before. This article argues that from 1993 onwards and especially during the 1997-98 crisis, Cambodia's national sovereignty came under serious challenge from increasingly powerful ideas about international peace enforcement and the imposition of international norms of behaviour on small or weak states. Cambodia fought off such pressures: it found a new domestic political equilibrium, and in so doing succeeded in reclaiming its sovereignty and international legitimacy. Introduction For some sixteen months, from the outbreak of military conflict in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, between the two coalition parties sharing government (the CPP and Funcinpec) on 5 July 1997 until a new coalition government was formed in November 1998, Cambodia's international legitimacy was suspended. Cambodia's leading politician, Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), was comprehensively and routinely condemned in the world's press. [1] The credentials of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)) to occupy its United Nations seat were rejected by the latter in August 1997 (even though these credentials were co-signed by Hun Sen and his then co-Prime Minister, Funcinpec's Ung Huot, and endorsed by King Sihanouk). Cambodia was not able to resume its seat in the United Nations until December 1998, following the formation of a new CPP-Funcinpec coalition government. Cambodia's bid for ASEAN membership, which had been within a few days of taking effect in July 1997, was suspended by ASEAN, pending normalization of Cambodia's political crisis. Ironically, Myanmar, led by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime was admitted into ASEAN in 1997 along with Vietnam and Laos, while a disgraced Cambodia had to wait another year-and-a-half, until early 1999. [2] The restoration of the U.N. seat and the acceptance into ASEAN were the key markers in rebuilding Cambodia's international legitimacy. A third key marker -- annual aid consultations with major donors, which provide about half of Cambodia's annual government budgetary revenue -- also resumed in April 1999, after a 22-month gap. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank resumed their normal programme relationships with Cambodia in early 1999. Since then, there has been a progressive and now virtually complete restoration of Cambodia's international standing. The legitimacy of Cambodia's government is still being contested, but by a shrinking band of opponents (and not by any government). One outstanding issue still in contention until recently -- agreement on procedures for the United Nations and the RGC to jointly conduct Khmer Rouge trials -- continued to sour Cambodia's international image throughout 1999 and the first half of 2000; but finally, with the help of constructive mediation by the United States, it now seems to be on the point of implementation. [3] The past three years have been a hard road for the RGC. The immediate and blanket condemnation by virtually the entire international community of the July 1997 conflict as a Hun Sen-led coup precipitated a three-year political crisis that carried serious costs for all Cambodians. [4] The first cost was in the quality of governance. Much of the RGC's political energy and leadership focus, from the fighting in July 1997 till the settlement with the United Nations in July 2000 on the issue of the Khmer Rouge trials, needed to be directed to the search for political solutions and to the defence of Cambodia's national sovereignty and international standing under hostile international pressure. …

Ten Years of Chaos in Burma: Foreign Investment and Economic Liberalization under the SLORC-SPDC, 1988 to 1998

O N 8 SEPTEMBER 1988, a military coup, led by General Saw Maung, under the direction of the retired former leader, General Ne Win, ended a fourteen-year period of constitutional military rule in Burma. A nineteen-member State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) placed Burma once again under direct military rule by assuming comprehensive executive, legislative andjudicial powers. Upon seizing power in 1988, the Burmese military rulers attempted a series of superficial reforms aimed at achieving a measure of political legitimacy by encouraging economic liberalization and development. Having declared martial law, SLORC issued orders having the effect of law until they were withdrawn. One such order was The Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law, which came into effect on 30 November 1988. In accordance with SLORC's new policy to transform the Burmese economy from a planned socialist system to a private-enterpriseled market economy, this law provided some attractive incentives for foreign investors. Over the ten years since the passing of the Foreign Investment Law, a steady stream of private companies and governments have made commitments to Burma. Many have already departed, while others, having made discoveries in oil and gas, await a change in the political climate, or at least for some form of partial acceptance or recognition of the military regime by the international community, before proceeding any further. This paper will examine the nature and main features of the Foreign Investment Law, its procedures and incentives aimed at attracting foreign investment, and discuss the peculiar problems facing foreign investors in Burma. Along with investigating the kind of foreign investment that SLORC has encouraged, both the arguments offered in favor of foreign investment and the pressures facing investors over the past decade will be reviewed. The consequences of the imposition of U.S. sanctions on new investment in 1997 and the ramifications of the Asian economic crisis, or the Asian contagion, will also be discussed.

Social Sector Development in Myanmar: The Role of the State

The current policy of the Government of Myanmar emphasizes the role of the state in the social sector. On the other hand, the government announced its commitment to promote private sector development and less government intervention in the market. Although expenditure in the social sector is increasing in absolute terms, it accounts for less than one per cent of GDP. This may be because the Minister for Health and the Minister for Education are usually the least powerful among the ministers and, therefore, are in no position to fight for a bigger share of budgetary expenditure. Also, domestic policy generally tends to favour physical infrastructure over social infrastructure. While the need for physical infrastructure cannot be denied, the budget allocation for it by far outstrips that for the social sector. It is suggested that the neglect of the social sectors will cost the country dearly in the near future. I. Introduction Soon after the military took over civil power as a self-declared caretaker government of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988, it adopted a market-oriented policy. Later on in March 1989, the 1965 Law of Establishment of the Socialist Economic System was formally revoked and proper evolution of a market-oriented economic system was officially declared as one of the four economic objectives of the State. Moreover, the need to uplift health, fitness and education standards of the entire nation was also declared as one of the four social objectives of the State. Taken together, these two objectives imply on the one hand, promotion of private sector development and less government intervention in the market, and on the other, continued government involvement in the development of the social sector. Given the low per capita income of the Myanmar people, commitment by the government to improve the health, education and living standards of the people is only natural and as expected. However, given also the likely expansion of private sector activities in both the health and education sectors, the two objectives also indicate an awareness on the part of the government to take on a more effective management and regulatory role. Needless to say, both of the above mentioned interdependent objectives are extremely important for sustainable development of the economy. The success enjoyed by the newly industralizing economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore in the past three or four decades clearly confirms the importance of having a sound and healthy market-oriented economic system. Then again, according to most scholars, resources in the NIEs in terms of skills, work motivation, adaptability and `trainability' have played a crucial role in their industrial success.1 Section II of this article presents the human resource development (HRD) status of Myanmar in the perspective of ASEAN and East Asia Pacific region. Section III, describes the efforts by the government to promote the health sector. Section IV examines the role of government in the educational sector. Concluding comments are given in Section V. 11. HRD in Myanmar and the Asia-Pacific Region Table 1 shows the human development index (HDI) in ASEAN. It may be seen from this table that Myanmar's HDI value in 1997 was higher than that of Cambodia and Laos because of Myanmar's better performance in life expectancy index and / or education index. Both Cambodia and Laos have a higher GDP index than Myanmar. Apart from the above, the level of social development in six original member ASEAN countries plus Vietnam is well correlated with their overall economic performance. In other words, the higher the GDP index, the higher will be the life expectancy index and / or education index. This is further attested by Table 2 which shows selected social indicators of Myanmar and the Asia-Pacific (AP) region. As may be seen from Table 2, economies in East Asia and Pacific with a higher level of economic development than Myanmar, also outperform the latter economy in most aspects of social development. …

Myanmar's Present Development and Future Options

Despite the attempts of many governments and others in the international community over the past decade to bring about a shift in the government and policies of the Union of Myanmar (hereinafter Myanmar), there has been little change in the overall policies and control of the nation by the ruling State Protection and Development Council (SPDC). Many of these efforts have focused particularly on the issue of recognition of the legitimately elected but unseated government of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its leader, General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Burma's independence hero General Aung San. Despite this, the SPDC, formerly known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), has been resistant. Prior to 1998, the SPDC had been quite successful in both attracting foreign investment into the country and implementing several major development projects, particularly in the energy and mineral sectors. However, beginning in 1998 the effect of the Asian economic crises, and to a lesser extent international sanctions on Myanmar by Australia, the U.S., and various member states of the European Union, resulted in a dramatic reduction in the growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) and a virtual halt to foreign investment. Although the present slowdown in Myanmar's economic growth could conceivably result in the social unrest and a change in government that such conditions had produced elsewhere in the region (e.g., Thailand, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea), the government has a number of options with respect to development that should allow it to weather the impacts of the economic crises, sanctions, and a domestic slowdown. What these development options are is the main thesis of this article.

Burma/Myanmar and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy

Prologue Burma/Myanmar(1) presents problems - problems of analysis and even data. Statistics are often whimsical, events are sometimes opaque, the complexity of the past clouds our thinking, information is filtered through skewed political lenses, propaganda is rife, and the future presents conundrums even for participants in the drama, let alone observers on the periphery. Burma/Myanmar is still, in spite of some openings, closed and secretive, where knowledge and information are power and are not readily shared, and where to understand these dynamics expatriate Burmese and foreigners are often reduced to reading the Yangon tea leaves, much as old China-watchers in Hong Kong or those Kremlinologists of yore were reduced to doing. The dangers of analysis are obvious; this is art, not science, not even social science. And as we all know, art is in the eyes of the beholder, so disagreement with any interpretation is inevitable because we all know what we like in art even though we cannot define it. However murky our crystal ball may be, the importance of attempting to predict the future becomes critical so that present policies may deal with future realities. Dante Alighieri in the Divine Comedy, however, consigns soothsayers and their ilk to one of the lower circles of hell, although political predictions today are a growth industry. The future of Burma/Myanmar may not equate to the present, but the present will endow the future with detritus that the poor, damned prognosticator ignores at his or her peril. History may not repeat itself but it often rhymes, as Mark Twain quipped.(2) Introduction The past year has been a gestation period of continuing, intensified confrontations between the Myanmar military authorities (now known as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC), and Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD). What may be born from this heightened, painful labour is problematic. It is over a decade since the March 1988 student demonstrations began, for completely apolitical reasons, a dispute between students and a teashop owner that descended into violence. The ensuing upheaval, reflecting the intense and pent-up economic and political frustration of much of the population, soon spread to the general urban populations and continued for months, with loss of life estimated in the thousands until the coup of 18 September 1988, which brutally suppressed dissent. What we have witnessed in the past year is but a continuation of this prolonged struggle, albeit in somewhat different contexts, but no less potentially bloody and critical. If the foreign observer is frustrated by the political stasis and the paucity of balanced and nuanced information that seem all too evident in and about Myanmar, consider for a moment what all those involved must feel in relation to the current situation. The State Peace and Development Council which was formed in November 1997, the reincarnation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), must also be frustrated. In spite of joining ASEAN in July 1997 and the very modest additional legitimacy that derived from that membership, a legitimacy that the regime evidently sought and that the United States strove to deny, the military's primary objective in seeking affiliation was likely the expected inflow of foreign investment from member states. This has been denied to it, not because the ASEAN states would not take advantage of the opportunities in Myanmar if they could, but because of the unfortunate timing of the Asian financial crisis that has undercut the capacity of businesses in those states to invest.(3) Myanmar, probably unexpectedly to its delegation, was the obvious target of a liberalized Thai Foreign Ministry resolution, through ASEAN, to explore the internal affairs of member states, a heretofore inappropriate ASEAN consideration. The SPDC must also be frustrated by the reluctance of the multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to provide badly needed assistance; they have been prompted to withhold support in large part by the United States, whose sanctions on new investments are probably more of a moral than an economic force. …

The Burma Road to Nowhere: The Failure of the Developmental State in Myanmar

Abstract The prospects for peaceful change in Burma are bleak. Since the Burmese military “recaptured” the state in 1988, they have ruled the country with the aim of solidifying their monopoly on power. The cosmetic transformation from the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997 witnessed little change but a renewed impulse to hold on to power. This has seen a resurgent attack on the domestic opposition forces in the country, the downwardwardly spiraling economy due to corruption and poor management, and the degradation of civil society in terms of health, education, and human rights. This paper argues that the need for effective dialogue between opposing forces is becoming increasingly urgent to arrest the slide toward a new depth of chaos and poverty. The regime's inability to construct greater state-society synergy is the key reason that their reform process has failed. Recent events have reinforced the necessity for greater societal participation. The tone of this paper is not positive that this will be forthcoming, and trends indicate a more repressive government line, with nationwide deleterious effects.

The Burma navy under the SLORC

Before the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988, the Burma Navy was small, ill-equipped and crippled by its dependence on foreign logistics. As a consequence, it was confined to patrolling Burma's inland waterways and coastal fringes. Also, the navy held only a token position in the military regime which, under various guises, had run the country since the 1962 coup. Yet the navy has always been, and remains, an important factor in Burma's internal security. The dramatic growth of the Burma Navy under the SLORC suggests that the new generation of military leaders in Rangoon shares this view. The regime also seems to envisage a greatly expanded external defence role for this arm of the armed forces. Since 1988 the fleet has almost doubled, with the addition of at least 20 new warships from China. More are on order. If the SLORC's ambitious naval modernisation program is successful, then in a few years Burma could have a blue water capability for the first time in its history.

The North Wind and the Sun: Japan's Response To The Political Crisis in Burma, 1988-1998

Japan's response to the political crisis in Burma after the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988 reflected the interests of powerful constituencies within the Japanese political system, especially business interests, to which were added other constituencies such as domestic supporters of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's struggle for democracy and those who wished to pursue 'Sun Diplomacy,' using positive incentives to encourage democratization and economic reform. Policymakers in Tokyo, however, approached the Burma crisis seeking to take minimal risks—a "maximin strategy"—which limited their effectiveness in influencing the junta. This was evident in the February 1989 "normalization" of Tokyo's ties with SLORC. During 1989-1998, Japanese business leaders pushed hard to promote economic engagement, but "Sun Diplomacy" made little progress in the face of the junta's increasing repression of the democratic opposition.

Myanmar: Regional Relationships and Internal Concerns

To the military State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)1 on 15 November, 1997 was probably viewed as a year of significant achievements even as it encountered some set-backs. Internationally, Myanmar2 entered the Association of South east Asian Nations (ASEAN), much to the chagrin of the regime's internal and external opposition, thereby conferring on the government an important added degree of international legitimacy it badly wanted and needed. Ethnic insur gencies continued to decline, removing a serious military drain on, if not threat to, the Yangon regime; only the Karen rebellion remained active, but it also was in increasing disarray. In these two areas SLORC was significantly strengthened. Yet there were serious internal and external problems that were exacer bated during this same period. A monetary crisis occurred when the exchange rate temporarily collapsed by almost one-half in June-July, but whether this reflected the general financial crisis in Southeast Asia or incessant internal economic anomalies, or both, is a matter of some dispute. This was followed by a devastating flood in lower Myanmar that was said to be the worst in fifty years and that destroyed a significant portion, some estimates say up to 20 per cent, of the total national rice crop. Rice in Myanmar is not simply the staple and a major traditional source of foreign exchange; its price is a critical indi cator of political stability or crisis. SLORC internally seemed to underplay the severity of the losses, apparently for this reason. Although urban economic expansion was evident, the opposition claimed that the economy was in an emergency. The government asserted that foreign investment of over US$6.3 billion had been approved, but only perhaps one third had actually been invested. Political stasis seemed evident internally, with the military-mandated Constitutional Convention in recess from approving the principles of a new Constitution mandated by the military, and no dia logue between SLORC and the leader of the opposition National League for

Economic Reforms and Agricultural Development in Myanmar

This article examines the impact of economic reforms on the development of the agricultural sector in Myanmar It begins with a brief presentation of the major elements of economic reforms since 1987, and examines the agricultural sector in the light of these policy reform measures as well as of other more direct measures undertaken by the state. The authors also present some of the issues which need to be reviewed in order for the agricultural sector to have rapid but sustainable and equitable growth. I. Introduction Myanmar is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia. The total land area of the country is 676,577 square kilometres and its population in 1994 was about 44 million. Although Myanmar is situated in the monsoon region of Asia, its climate is greatly modified by geographical position and topography. The coastal regions receive annually about 5,000 mm of rain, while the delta regions receive nearly 2,500 mm of rain. In the Dry Zone, average rainfall is less than 1,000 mm (40 in) and in some places as low as 500 mm (20 in) resulting in significant soil moisture deficiency throughout those areas. For an agricultural country like Myanmar which relies rather heavily on the monsoon rains, climatic changes and the economic environment affecting agriculture are very important since agriculture is the major source of income and employment for the majority of its population. The agricultural sector accounts for nearly 54 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and provides employment to about 65 per cent of the labour force. While it is often noted that only about half of its cultivable land area of 45 million acres is under cultivation, what is often left unobserved is that perhaps as much as a third of rural households mainly engaged in agriculture have neither land nor livestock. This article will examine the impact of economic reforms on the development of agriculture sector in Myanmar. It will begin with a brief presentation of the major elements of economic reform since 1987. The development of the agricultural sector will then be examined in the light of these policy reform measures as well as of other more direct measures undertaken by the state which, according to its objectives, is promoting the development of the agricultural sector. Before concluding, we will consider some of the key issues which need to be reviewed in order for the agricultural sector to have a rapid but sustainable and equitable growth. II. Economic Reforms in Myanmar Reform measures in Myanmar may be said to have taken off with the liftting of the twenty-one year old restrictions on the procurement and domestic trade of rice and eight other crops such as wheat, maize, pulses, cotton, rubber, and sugarcane in September 1987. After the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took over the reins of government in September 1988, one reform measure quickly followed another, as shown in Table 1 below. Of the many policy reform measures mentioned above, the decontrol of prices of major agricultural products, the removal of restrictions on private sector participation in domestic and foreign trade and regularization of border trade have, more than any other, changed the way the agricultural sector operates. Unlike in the past and except on paddy land, farmers can now freely choose the crops they grow and can also process them and sell them freely. Distribution of farm inputs like chemical fertilizer, pesticides and seeds, formerly handled solely by the Myanmar Agriculture Service (MAS), is also being gradually transferred to the private sector, and subsidies on farm inputs such as fertilizer are being scaled down. Finally, except for rice and some industrial crops, private exports of agricultural produce have also been permitted. Thus, the modus operandi in the agricultural sector has certainly changed. But, it is as yet neither fish nor fowl. On the one hand, market mechanism and the price signals would determine many of the decisions made by individual farmers. …

The Myanmar Air Force Since 1988: Expansion and Modernization

Before the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988, the Burma Air Force was small, ill equipped and crippled by its dependence on foreign logistics. It was hard-pressed to keep its aircraft flying, and could only perform a limited role in support of the army's counter insurgency operations. Yet, the air force has always been, and remains, an important factor in Myanmar's security. The dramatic growth of the (renamed) Myanmar Air Force (MAF) under the SLORC suggests that the new generation of military leaders in Yangon shares this view. In addition to strengthen ing the MAF's internal security role, the SLORC (and now its successor, the State Peace and Development Council) seems to envisage a significant external defence role for this element of the armed forces. If this ambitious modernization pro gramme is successful, then in a few years time Myanmar will have a credible air defence capability for the first time in its history.

Burma in 1997: From Empire to ASEAN

Research Article| February 01 1998 Burma in 1997: From Empire to ASEAN James Guyot James Guyot Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1998) 38 (2): 190–195. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645678 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation James Guyot; Burma in 1997: From Empire to ASEAN. Asian Survey 1 February 1998; 38 (2): 190–195. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2645678 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1998 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Thailand and Myanmar: The perils of ‘constructive engagement’

Thailand has pursued a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards Myanmar since Chatichai Chunawan's government, which was in office from August 1988 until February 1991. While the international community has condemned Myanmar's military leadership for human rights violations Thailand has promoted closer relations with the ruling regime in Myanmar, or the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) utilizing the idea of ‘constructive engagement’ as a justification. Chatichai gave expression to this policy of closer relations with Myanmar when he outlined a vision of Thailand as an economic centre on mainland Southeast Asia, which would embrace neighbours Laos and Cambodia as well as Myanmar. The term ‘constructive engagement’ was used subsequently to characterize this policy when it came under international criticism. According to successive Thai governments the benefits of ‘constructive engagement’ included enhanced border security and increased trade since, as it was argued, Thailand could not afford to coexist with a hostile neighbour. This policy, however, has reached its limits as the costs are likely to outweigh the benefits in a way that will be explored in this article.