The years 1990 and 1991 marked the beginning of a sea change in this particular area of the functioning of the Polish state. The following phenomena were analyzed: Over three decades on from the restitution of the Polish democratic state, how have the focal issues of key intelligence oversight institutions been addressed? How successful was the political transition in the area of intelligence services? The article is composed of four main parts. The first part provides a discussion of the “special services” concept, which determines the Polish institutional framework for intelligence oversight and accountability. Subsequent sections focus on particular forms of intelligence oversight: executive control, parliamentary oversight, and independent oversight. Our focus is on the institutional dimension of state security. The article is intended as an overview of the issue and relies on traditional historical and institutionalist approaches. Our proposal is to conduct a detailed case study to present the current situation in a country in East Central Europe, with the aim of generating general findings that could be used to guide reform efforts.