External intervention and the politics of state formation: China, Indonesia and Thailand, 1893-1952 By JA IAN CHONG Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. x+293. Maps, Tables, Figures, Bibliography, Index. doi: 10.1017/S0022463413000684 Given the recent examples of United States' involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, this is a timely look at the effect of external influence on state-building in non-Western societies. Chong's analysis begins with the question of how polities outside the modern European state came to organise themselves as sovereign states by the mid-twentieth century. While acknowledging the merits of explanations involving nationalism, institutional commitment, and capital accumulation, the book argues that scholars have overlooked the relationship between external intervention and sovereign statehood. Contrary to accepted notions that foreign involvement in the affairs of weak governments will lead to either subjugation or political fragmentation, Chong asserts that such outside interference can also lead to the creation of a modern independent state. According to Chong, foreign powers intervene in the affairs of peripheral countries to increase their own access to local resources and/or deny similar access to rivals. The book contains tables that present foreign policy as the product of net cost analysis, but the emphasis lies on the effect of collective outside meddling on the development of the state. If imperialist governments mutually anticipate that the costs of intervention will be low, the polity in question will likely disintegrate under combined pressure; if the perceived cost is high, external actors pursue the development of a cooperative local interest that can ensure access to all parties. If there is no consensus on opportunity costs, the divergent approaches to intervention can generate 'cross-cutting forces' that lead to feudalisation. External intervention purports to study state formation in China, Indonesia, and Thailand--three case studies he describes as 'least likely' to support his argument (although precisely why they are 'least likely' is unclear). Although the title refers to three case scenarios, this book is a study of state formation in China. Paradoxically, Chong credits external intervention for both China's period of feudalisation (1893-1922) and its later period of slow but steady centralisation (1922-52). During the first period, the high reward/low cost dynamic enticed many imperialist powers to interfere in China's affairs. …