Abstract
This article analyses state formation in Botswana and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the light of general theories of state formation. It seeks to explain why Botswana became a strong state, while state power in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe has eroded. Three main arguments are made. First, Zimbabwe’s experience shows that security threats and compulsion to collect revenue are not sufficient conditions for establishing a strong state. Second, the Botswana case indicates that the formation of a strong state may be possible even in the absence of such compulsions. Third, both cases reveal that patterns of state formation ultimately depend on the interests of ruling regimes, and on their ability to promote those interests. The creation of a strong state requires that regimes must have an interest in a strong state as well as the power to carry out a project of state building. This depends on the relationship between regimes and their constituencies. The article concludes by pointing out the need for expanding the framework described by security-based and fiscal theories, to include considerations about how state formation is related to the underlying social forces on which state power is based.
Published Version
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