State Common Law Research Articles

Regulatory Takings and Property Rights Confront Sea Level Rise: How Do They Roll?

Under the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, the State of Florida is authorized to conduct extraordinarily expensive beach renourishment projects to restore damaged coastal properties. The statute advances the State’s interest in repairing the damage to the coastal ecosystem and economy caused by hurricanes, high winds, and storm surges. The effect of a renourishment project conducted under the statute is to fix the legal boundary of the littoral property owner at an Erosion Control Line. Plaintiffs in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. claimed that the statute took their common law property rights to their boundary, which would, but for the Act, move gradually landward or seaward, maintaining contact with the water. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection to determine whether the state court reinterpreted Florida’s common law as a pretext for upholding the statute against the plaintiffs’ taking claim and, if so, whether that reinterpretation constituted a “judicial taking.” The Court ultimately decided that the Florida court’s interpretation was correct and that there was no regulatory taking. A majority of the Court could not agree as to whether a state court’s interpretation of state common law could constitute a “judicial taking.” This article discusses greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, sea level rise, and the ferocity of coastal storms associated with climate change. It explores the tension between these movements in nature and the policy of the State of Florida to fix property boundaries, which under common law would move landward as sea level rises. The property rights and title to land of littoral landowners are described and the effect of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act on them discussed. The article contrasts the Florida coastal policy regarding beach and shore protection with the policies and programs of federal, state, and local governments that use other approaches such as accommodating rolling easements, prohibiting shoreline armoring, requiring removal of buildings, purchasing development rights or the land itself, and imposing moratoria on rebuilding after storm events. These may be less expensive and more realistic approaches to long-term coastal erosion and avulsive events and the inevitability of sea level rise as the climate warms and worsens. The article concludes with a recommendation that the framework for federal, state, and local cooperation in coastal management be revisited and strengthened so that the critical resources and knowledge are brought to bear on this critical issue. It suggests that strengthening those ties, rather than radically restructuring the relationship between state and federal courts, is a more productive method of meeting the needs of a changing society.

The Right to Remain Anonymous: Anonymous Speakers, Confidential Sources and the Public Good

In the digital age, the news media gives voice to anonymous speakers in two ways: reporters may extend confidentiality to sources in exchange for newsworthy information, or a news website may host an online comment function that allows readers to post their reactions to content pseudonymously. Of these two groups of anonymous speakers, only online posters enjoy certain First Amendment protection against a subpoena seeking disclosure of their identities. The reporter’s privilege has always been legally defined as the professional privilege of a reporter to maintain the confidentiality of his sources. Yet as with all evidentiary privileges, the reporter’s privilege serves both private and public ends. Historically, state statutes and state common law have protected the private arrangement that enables sources to disclose information without fear of reprisal, and journalists to gain newsworthy content, because this relationship furthers the free flow of information to the public. By contrast, protection for anonymous

U.S. Supreme Court Eliminates Federal Nuisance Law as a Vehicle to Force Greenhouse Gas Reductions, but Sets Stage for Further Debate as to Viability of State Nuisance Law Claims

The Supreme Court's long-awaited decision in American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut did not firmly close the door on future greenhouse gas litigation. Rather, it set the stage for what will likely be a far more complex debate over the role of state common law in the future regulation of GHG emissions. The focus is now turned to state law, and whether Congress has, in promulgating the Clean Air Act, preempted state nuisance claims.

The Nelson Amendment (E.702.1)

Wildlife management in Vermont has been the focus of significant public and political debate in the last few years. In 2009, “Pete the Moose,” a young moose calf living within a privately-owned, 700-acre captive game facility in Irasburg, VT, became the central figure in a debate over whether a private party could possess any ownership interest in wildlife animals. Pete was the focus of a grassroots campaign to prevent his allegedly imminent destruction (along with other moose and white-tailed deer living within the facility’s fences) by Vermont Fish and Wildlife Department officials. The campaign received extensive local and national media. This position paper, submitted as public record in the February, 2011 House of Representatives Fish & Wildlife Committee Debate, is about the Vermont legislature’s 2010 election-year response to the “Save Pete the Moose” campaign. The fight to save Pete and the subsequent legislation invoke important traditional and contemporary issues of property rights, hunting rights, and animal rights, including the privatization and domestication of wildlife, the importation of big game into Vermont, and the ethics of allowing such facilities to operate in this state. This legislation, known as the “Nelson Amendment,” was enacted, without discussion, as part of the fiscal year 2011 Joint Appropriations Act. The Amendment may have “stayed” Pete’s demise, but it eroded fundamental principles of wildlife management and hunting regulations by effectively rewarding a private landowner’s continued attempts to thwart wildlife regulations and illegally entrap wild animals on his property. The facility where Pete lives and the Amendment threaten the health of wildlife in Vermont and the state’s authority to manage and regulate that wildlife. This paper contextualizes the current debate about wildlife management, including the history of Vermont captive hunting legislation and the legal backdrop prior to the Nelson Amendment. Next, it addresses state common law and constitutional doctrines with respect to wildlife management, hunting rights, and wildlife ownership, followed by a discussion of several legal and policy issues invoked by the Amendment, and issues the legislature should consider in reviewing the current bill to repeal the Nelson Amendment (H.91).ADDENDUM (June 22, 2011) On May 31, 2011, Governor Shumlin signed H.91 into law, amending 10 V.S.A. section 4081. In addition to repealing the Nelson Amendment, section 4018 codified the public trust doctrine Vermont. In relevant part: Section 4081. POLICY(a) It is the policy of the state that the (1) As provided by Chapter II, section 67of the Constitution of the State of Vermont, the fish and wildlife of Vermont are held in trust by the state for the benefit of the citizens of Vermont and shall not be reduced to private ownership. The state of Vermont, in its sovereign capacity as a trustee for the citizens of the state, shall have ownership, jurisdiction, and control of all of the fish and wildlife of Vermont.

Abolishing State Trademark Registrations

State trademark registration laws fly under the radar. All fifty states have a state trademark registration system that operates in parallel with — or more accurately, beneath — the federal registration system.1 In all but one state, a state registration is needed to support a state statutory claim of trademark infringement, but these statutory claims coexist with parallel state common law trademark rights in the vast majority of states. This Article examines the role and substantive protection of the several states’ registration systems by a comparative analysis with the roles of and substantive protections afforded by state common law, state unfair competition law, and federal statutory law. My focus is on the judicial enforcement of trademark rights through civil litigation, but I also address the effect an individual state registration may have on a second user’s search and trademark selection process. The heart of my inquiry is whether state registrations have real, effective value (as opposed to stated or theoretical value) for individual owners. A secondary analysis I pursue includes the systemic costs and benefits of state registration schemes at both the state and federal levels.The analysis in this article demonstrates that state trademark registrations do not add significant value for most trademark owners when compared to other civil enforcement options available. Under the law of forty-five states, registrations provide registrants with no significant, enforceable substantive rights beyond those awarded under state common law or under the federal statute protecting unregistered common law trademarks. In five states certain substantive rights can accrue to an owner through state registration, although those rights are limited by competing rights held by certain common law owners or federal registrants. Further, registrants in the forty-five low-value states may rely on these almost-to-completely valueless state registrations to their very great detriment, which can seriously disadvantage a legally unsophisticated trademark owner. Both high-value and low-value state registrations create unnecessary complications in the web of state and federal trademark rights and impose unwarranted costs upon new market entrants. In addition, most state registration systems (both high- and low-value) almost certainly demand more public dollars than the system returns to the state in the form of either private or public benefit. The practical value of state registrations is so low, as a whole, that the costs outweigh the benefits. As a result, I advocate for the complete abolition of all current state trademark registration systems.In support of my argument that trademark law and trademark owners, as well as the public, would be better served by the abolition of state trademark registrations than by their perpetuation, this Article proceeds as follows. First, I briefly survey the history and interaction of state and federal trademark law and review the major statutory benefits of federal trademark registrations. Second, I analyze and critique the trademark statutes of all fifty states, with an emphasis on what rights, if any, a state registration provides that are not otherwise available under state common law or the Lanham Act. Third, I explain some of the private and public costs of state trademark registrations. The analysis leads to my conclusion, set forth in the final portion of the article, that trademark owners and the trademark “universe” in the United States would be better off if states abolished their current registration systems.

Stop the Stop the Beach Pluarlity

approach threatens a breathtaking general expansion of regulatory takings doctrine beyond fact-sensitive, fairness-based approach canonized in Penn Central.64 Third, assuming that one can identify property rights, how would U.S. Supreme Court determine whether a state supreme court has an right? Whether property rights are established or eliminated are novel legal inquiries likely to be shaped by ideological inclinations of Supreme Court justices. In these cases, as in Stop Beach, state court will have denied that it has acted beyond its authority or changed law. Common law judges have long interpreted their precedents to create space for adaptation to new circumstances.65 The Proctor court, for example, extensively reviewed conflicting precedents on when a plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction for an encroachment, grounding its approach in a long tradition of equitable weighing of propriety of an injunction. It recognized the evolution of property law in Washington away from rigid adherence to an injunction rule and toward a more reasoned, flexible approach.66 The court concluded: Nothing in our holding today undermines fundamental property rights: it remains true that a landowner may generally obtain an injunction to eject trespassers. 67 Four justices dissented, however, feeling that majority had overruled a key precedent, dissolving [that decision's] strong protection of private property rights. 68 What justification could there be for U.S. Supreme Court to reinterpret state court's own precedents after nine state justices chosen by that state's political process have argued over proper meaning of state law to determine both contours of existing law and permissible freedom of interpretation? Surely good-faith differences of legal interpretation by judges trained in their state's common law and charged by their state constitutions with its preservation and adaptation do not give rise to federal constitutional objections. The Stop Beach plurality may be concerned about bad faith, such as deceptive decisions that do not employ ordinary legal reasoning (judicial decree) that other state institutions cannot remedy. But such concerns sound in due process because judicial decisions of that nature depart from rule of law and work an injustice regardless of interests deprived. The Court has long make an independent determination about what state rule is when there is doubt about its existence.

Boldly (Not Going) Where We Have Gone Before: The Principles of the Law of Software Contracts

The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Software Contracts (“Principles”) is the latest in a long line of attempts to regularize contract law in the irregular subject matter of software and software contracts. Neither federal courts by applying state law nor state courts have been able to fix the law governing software contracting into any stable regime of contract law so courts have had to inconsistently apply the state common law of contracts, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), either directly or by analogy, in whole or in part. This article contends that the Principles may be one of the founding documents for an eventual federal common law or statutory law of software contracting. Unfortunately as articulated, the Principles would largely be state law, so the Principles cannot authoritatively define its relationship as a body of contract law with federal law intellectual property law in order to meet the needs of both consumers and the software industry. There is no reason that the jurisdiction that eventually adopts the Principles needs to be either a state legislature or a state court. If the goal of the Principles is to establish a comprehensive rubric to inform and guide the orderly development of the contract law governing software transactions then either the federal courts must abjure the legal fiction that they are merely applying existing state contract law and then to openly develop a federal common law of contract governing software or in deference to Erie retain the fig leaf of being mere scriveners of state law interpretation, and then confront thorny issues of federal preemption and inconsistent state laws governing commercial or consumer transactions for intellectual property rights that are theoretically supposed to be uniform in all fifty states.

The Evolution of the Term “Beneficial Ownership” in Relation to International Taxation over the Past 45 Years

This article reviews the evolution of the term “beneficial ownership” in tax treaties since its first inception 45 years ago, with special focus on whether or not the meaning has evolved away from that in the domestic law of the common law states and the implications of the recent decisions in Indofood and Prévost.

Art of Mediation in the Engineering and Construction Industry

This essay includes a presentation on the art of mediation in the engineering and construction industry, It explains mediation as it applies to the engineering and construction industry in the United States and other common law legal systems and describes how mediation is viewed in Asian and Shari’s legal systems. In addition, this essay includes a review of the effectiveness of different types of mediation proceedings. The first section provides a discussion on what mediation is, how it is used, why it is used, and what mediators attempt to accomplish when they are dealing with disputing parties that are not able to reach an agreement. The second section provides a definition for Mediation/Arbitration, which an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) technique. The third section describes how mediation is viewed in other cultures, as contrasted with the information provided in the first two sections, which are related to mediation in the U.S. and other common law legal systems. The last section discusses the effectiveness of different types if mediation proceedings.

The Truth About Torts: Regulatory Preemption at the Federal Railroad Administration

During the Bush II Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the federal agency charged with overseeing railroad safety, aggressively asserted the preemptive authority of its regulations, continuing to write broad preemption language into the preambles to its rules asserting that injured parties have no ability to seek compensation for their injuries or loss of loved ones, and even ignoring Congress’ attempt to amend the Federal Railroad Safety Act, the statute that governs federal railroad safety, to clarify that regulations issued under the statute are not intended to preempt state tort law.The white paper argues that the FRA should discontinue its efforts to preempt state tort law, explaining that a complementary system of federal regulatory standards and state common law is the best way to achieve railroad safety for passengers and railroad employees. In brief, it argues that a complementary tort system should be retained because:1. The FRA is a resource-starved agency unable to prevent accidents: State common law provides a backstop for the failure of the agency to adequately investigate accidents or enforce its regulations. 2. The FRA is captured by industry: Because the agency has placed so much responsibility with industry to regulate itself, the tort system is needed to serve as an independent monitor of industry’s activities to ensure they are undertaken with safety in mind.3. The FRA is unable to hold railroads accountable for improving safety: The agency relies on the railroad industry as a partner in doing its job, which hinders its ability to spur the railroad industry into taking appropriate measures to prevent railway accidents.4. State common law preserves corrective and protective justice: A person’s right to seek redress for harm inflicted on him or her should never be obliterated by federal preemptive power.The white paper concludes by offering various recommendations for how the FRA and Congress can each promote the complementary roles that federal regulation and state common law can play in ensuring greater railroad safety.

Bonnieview v. Woodmont: Court Sorts out Environmental Liability between Homeowners and Developers

Bonnieview Homeowners Ass’n v. Woodmont Builders, LLC,—F. Supp. 2d—, No. Civ. A. 03CV4317(DRD), 2009 WL 2999355 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2009), was a suit brought by a homeowners’ association and its individual members against the developers of the property where their homes were located and the municipality. In a recent opinion, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey made several important rulings applying federal and state environmental statutes and common law. First, the developers were potentially liable to plaintiffs under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), where their soil grading and stockpiling activities distributed previously contaminated soil around the site, which had been used as a fruit orchard. Second, however, the court prohibited plaintiffs from recovering under CERCLA or New Jersey's Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act) because they had not incurred any environmental cleanup costs compensable under the two statutes. Third, plaintiffs were innocent purchasers not subject to CERCLA liability under a 2002 amendment to the statute. A negligence claim against the municipality failed, however, because the municipality owed no duty of care to plaintiffs. The court also assessed plaintiffs' other federal and state statutory and common law claims.

The Principles of the Law of Software Contracts: At Odds with Copyright, Consumers, and European Law?

This paper will describe the drafting history of the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, with particular attention to the extent of consumer and public-interest group representation in the process. The drafting process, I will argue, did not take adequate stock of problems identified in the late 1990s with proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, and then the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”), including provisions encouraging terms in violation of public policy, that constitute copyright or patent misuse by attempting to prohibit fair use or withdraw material from the public domain, or that are not properly disclosed before the purchase. The difference between the present situation and the 1990s, however, is the much greater importance today of European Community directives on the subject of consumer protection and electronic commerce, particularly given the explosion in e-commerce between the United States and Europe. This paper will analyze whether the Principles do enough to protect the interests of consumers and the public in four key areas: (1) consistency with U.S. federal and state statutory and common law, (2) clear and conspicuous disclosure of all relevant terms and conditions prior to the sale, (3) regulation and prevention of one-sided and unconscionable contract terms, and (4) consistency with European Community and domestic European law. My thesis is that the Principles and the comments thereto appear to sanction conduct that is in tension with the federal Copyright and Patent Acts, the common law of several U.S. states, and the European Community’s directives, especially those on the Legal Protection of Software Programs (1991), Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (1993), and Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts (1997). To that extent, the Principles seem to be an imperfect attempt to unify the law of software contracts, codify best practices, or develop the law in a desirable direction. Finally, the paper will discuss whether and when it is appropriate to harmonize U.S. and E.C. law and public policy.

Khat and Islamic Legal Perspectives: Issues for Consideration

The leaves of the Khat plant are chewed for their stimulatory effect by many people who live around the Red Sea. People from this area have migrated throughout the world, bringing the practice with them. Consequently many countries have needed to address the question whether khat should be regulated. We argue here that, because khat use is mainly associated with Muslim people, the Islamic law about khat is also an important consideration in this debate. Accordingly this article explores the position of khat under Islamic law. In addition to a study of sources of Islamic shari’a, we have conducted focus groups with Somali people who had settled in Australia, and participants’ views are considered.Across the Muslim world opinion is sharply divided amongst Islamic scholars and Muftis on the correct approach to khat. The three main positions on khat are that it is halal (permissible), makruh (detested or discouraged) or haram (forbidden). It may be shown that each view has some support in the scholarly literature of Islam. Each was accepted by some members of the focus groups. Most of those who participated in the focus groups had a strong view on the correct position pursuant to Islam and this view influenced their decision to support or reject prohibition and to chew or not to chew khat.This supports the claim that legal pluralism is a reality in Australia. In countries like Australia that purport to allow the free exercise of religion, prohibition of khat use may have implications for this freedom for some individuals. If khat is seen by some Muslims as an accepted part of cultural life and Muslim religious activity, targeting khat may then be seen as targeting these communities. Given that the overwhelming majority of khat users in Australia and other common law states are Muslim immigrants, the uncertain status of khat in Islam poses significant challenges to policy makers in immigrant receiving nations. As these communities’ cultural norms are, to a large extent, derived from the Islamic religion, any government response to the use of khat should take into consideration these religious and cultural norms.

Laws of Licensing: U.S. Computer Information Licensing Under the Common Law, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act

License agreements govern most transfers of electronic information that is protected by intellectual property law. This paper will describe some of the distinguishing legal characteristics of digital information licenses. Then the application to licenses of U.S. state common law of contracts and Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2 in the 1980s and 1990s will be explored, focusing on issues respecting which these sources of law seemed to not address adequately the needs of licensing parties. The history of UCITA, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, will be examined as an attempt to fashion a uniform statute customized to address the unique traits of license agreements. The paper will evaluate how well UCITA addresses licensing issues that are not adequately resolved by the UCC or the common law. Next, UCITA and Revised UCC Articles 1 and 2 will be compared. Finally, the future prospects for U.S. licensing law will be assessed.

The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822–1858: Partnerships Without Kinship

In 1822 New York became the first of many common law states to authorize the formation of limited partnerships. Little is known about the effects of these statutes. This article analyzes the use of the limited partnership in nineteenth-century New York City. We find that the form was adopted by a surprising number of firms, and that limited partnerships had more capital, failed at lower rates, and had fewer members with kinship ties, compared to ordinary partnerships. The results suggest that the introduction of the limited partnership facilitated investments that would not have occurred in the absence of the form.

The preemption war: when federal bureaucracies trump local juries

Most people are unaware of a quiet war that has been raging for the last decade in the courts, federal regulatory agencies, and Congress--a war over federal agency preemption of state common law claims. But the outcome of these battles will affect us all, says regulatory law expert Thomas O. McGarity, and consumers stand to be the biggest losers. In this comprehensive and balanced book, McGarity takes up for the first time this increasingly important subject. He shows how preemption affects the way citizens are protected from harm and companies are held accountable for damage they unlawfully cause. The book offers scholars and policymakers a full analysis of the legal and policy issues under debate, and it brings into sharp focus the impact of preemption on the lives of people involved in actual lawsuits. McGarity highlights the arguments for and against preemption and suggests guidelines for resolving difficult issues in a variety of contexts.

A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrine: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Environmental Public Trust

This companion Article to the fall 2007 A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines explores the state public trust doctrines— emphasis on the plural—in the nineteen western states. In so doing, this Article seeks to make the larger point that, while the broad contours of the public trust doctrine have a federal law basis, especially regarding state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the details of how public trust principles actually apply vary considerably from state to state. Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law. Moreover, as with other forms of common law, states have evolved their public trust doctrines in light of the particular histories and the perceived needs and problems of each state. This Article observes that, in the West, four factors have been most important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines: (1) the severing of water rights from real property ownership and the riparian rights doctrine; (2) subsequent state declarations of public ownership of fresh water; (3) clear and explicit perceptions of the scarcity of water and the importance of submerged lands and environmental amenities; and (4) a willingness to consider water and other environmental issues to be of constitutional importance and/or to incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes. From these factors, two important trends in western states’ public trust doctrines have emerged: (1) the extension of public rights based on states’ ownership of the water itself; and (2) an increasing, and still cutting-edge, expansion of public trust concepts into ecological public trust doctrines that are increasingly protecting species, ecosystems, and the public values that they provide.

Legal Systems and Variance in the Design of Commitments to the International Court of Justice

This paper explores the relationship between domestic legal systems and the design of commitments to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Empirical analyses demonstrate that civil law states are more willing to recognize the compulsory and compromissory jurisdiction of the World Court than common law or Islamic law states. Common law states place the highest number of reservations on their optional clause declarations, with the majority of those restrictions relating to specific areas of international law. Civil law states typically embed compromissory clauses in multilateral treaties, while common and Islamic law states prefer recognition of the ICJ's jurisdiction through bilateral treaties.

Reply to ‘The Other Abortion Myth—The Failure of the Common Law’

My experience with academic lawyers when it comes to the law of abortion is that if there are five in a room, you’ll have six different opinions about what the law says. Invite those who advise abortion service-providers working in clinics or public hospitals, and you’ll get an even greater diversity of views. So it is with wry amusement that I respond to the certainty of Kate Gleeson that my understanding of the law—that it is unclear and in need of reform—is wrong. Gleeson asserts that that the common law regime operating in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland is clear, certain and preferable to other regulatory regimes. The Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) disagrees. On page 16 of its 2008 Final Report on the Law of Abortion it notes that, “The law of abortion in Victoria is unclear.” It notes further that, “it is not possible to describe the current state of Victorian law with reasonable precision.” The report states that the law in both NSW and Queensland, the other common law states, is “broadly similar to the current Victorian law” and so, presumably, equally unclear and imprecise. Gleeson dismisses the occasional prosecution of the increasingly few doctors willing to perform the procedure in this country as non-indicative of a need to improve the current common law regime. I wonder if she has ever spoken to any of these providers? I have and so I know that even the threat of prosecution, still less the occasional charge or successful prosecution as has happened in Queensland in 1986, Victoria in 1987, West Australia in 1998 and New South Wales in 2006, is enough to stigmatise the procedure and drive doctors away from providing it. This has left a shortage of skilled providers across the country that makes insistent claims by academics that abortion is lawful, empty. Gleeson says I am wrong to suggest that the absence of prosecution results from those in key positions of authority turning a blind eye. Again, I would refer her to the facts, this time the period leading up to reform of the law in WA, which was a presumed common law state. In 1998 in West Australia, several surprise decisions by members of the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) saw a doctor charged with violating S199 of the Criminal Code. In response, and led by Federal MP and former West Australian Premier Carmen Lawrence, a group of fourteen female parliamentarians sent a letter to the DPP John McKechnie, the Commissioner of Police, the Attorney General and the Minister for Health. The letter registered their “vehement objection” to the possible prosecution. The DPP, after announcing that abortion was only legal in West Australia if a woman’s life was at risk, Bioethical Inquiry DOI 10.1007/s11673-008-9125-2

The International Contracting Practices Survey Project: an Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nations Convention On the International Sale Of Goods (Cisg) and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts to Practitione

In an era of globalization it is perplexing that so many U.S. practitioners, jurists, and legal academics continue to view contract issues as governed exclusively by state common law and the Uniform Commercial Code. In essence, a significant number of lawyers may be defaulting to the wrong law, in the absence of an effective choice of law clause, when trying to determine the rights and responsibilities arising out of international commercial transactions. The object of the International Commercial Contracting Practices Survey Project was to learn more about how and why this occurs.