Stage Of Economic Reform Research Articles

Reading Memories in the Drizzle

This vignette presents Yu Hua´s novel from 1991 and analyses two different interpretations of the novel with fifteen years between them written by the same prominent critic, Chen Xiaoming. The first interpretation was written in 1992 when China was in the early stages of economic reform. The second was written in 2007 when deep-going social changes had affected the life of the individual. By comparing these two essays, I aim to show how a literary text may act as a catalyst for bringing out existential issues at stake at a particular point in time.

Evolution of the canadian banking system and features of its regulation at different stages of economic reform

Evolution of the canadian banking system and features of its regulation at different stages of economic reform

REGIONAL FACTORS IN BOOSTING THE EFFICIENCY OF INVITING INVESTMENTS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY

This article is devoted to analyze the current condition of elaboration of regional investment projects at the present-day stage of economic reforms being led in Uzbekistan. Article sets forward proposals on working out prospective and present-day programs on inviting international financial institutions, foreign financial and insurance organizations and donor countries in order to implement with them investment projects of high importance for Uzbekistan. Practical recommendations on working out the mechanisms for implementation and efficiency assessment of investment projects, investment projects portfolio revolving to choose high priority investments were also suggested.

GENDER EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN URBAN CHINA, 1988–97

Gender earnings differentials in urban China by region and their changes during the first decade of economic reform are examined. It is found that the female–male earnings ratio increased during the early stage of reform. The male earnings premium, overall, showed an increasing trend in the later stage of reform. Decomposition of the gender earnings differential reveals that a relatively lower percentage of the differential could be explained by gender differences in productive characteristics in the fast growing regions and in regions with a rapid pace of reform. The cross‐sectional results highlight the possible existence of gender discrimination, particularly in the later stages of economic reform and development. Both market competition and the effects of wage decentralization play a role in shaping the gender earnings differentials. Gender earnings differentials varied by region and over time, generally in tandem with the pace of economic reform and development. The decomposition of the over time changes in the earnings gap indicated that improvement in the productive characteristics of females during the reform period constantly enhanced the earnings of females relative to those of males. The changes over time in the return to female characteristics, however, work to counter any narrowing of the gender earnings gap.

Legislatures and Budget Oversight in Latin America

Reforming budgetary institutions for effective government is a critical task for emerging economies. Strengthening the role of parliament in the budget process is an integral part of the restoration of democracy throughout Latin America, which requires a re-equilibration of executive and legislative prerogatives in public policy. The role of legislatures in public budgeting and public finance management has nevertheless been largely overlooked in the first stage of economic reform. This is starting to change, as the contribution of legislatures to the budgetary process is currently being re-evaluated, both in developed and, more recently, in developing countries.1 It is increasingly being recognised that parliaments have a critical role to play to strengthen economic governance, improve transparency in public finances and ensure government accountability. Enhancing legislative scrutiny of the budget and oversight of its execution is increasingly considered as a means to strengthen government accountability and curb corruption (OECD, 2002; G8, 2003).2 The international financial institutions are particularly keen to promote greater transparency in public finance management and to improve governmental financial information systems in emerging economies...

Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ?

<titre>For Better or for Worse&#160;? The Role of Parliament in the Budgetary Process of Developing Countries</titre> Can parliaments contribute efficiently to budgetary processes while preserving fiscal discipline&#160;? Greater budgetary transparency and a stable taxation system are crucial challenges for emerging economies concerned with the efficient management of public finance and the fight against corruption. Considerably neglected during the first stage of economic reforms, legislative budgetary institutions reappeared with the second wave of reforms in financial administrations. However, due to the predominance of their executive r&#244;le as well as their own lack of knowledge on the subject, parliaments often have little to do with budgetary matters. Although they possess a wide range of powers in budgetary affairs, only rarely do they manage to make efficient and responsible use of them. The article examines the contribution of parliaments to budgetary processes in developing countries with both presidential regimes and centralized budgetary systems, and evaluates the conditions and constraints of a greater parliamentary role in budgetary matters. It analyses the political economy of budgetary processes in Latin America, underlining the risks of insufficient government participation in budget management and the advantages of parliamentary control of public finances. It argues that in Latin America as elsewhere, the main challenge of parliamentary participation in the budgetary process consists in preserving the advantage of a strong executive authority able to ensure fiscal discipline, while at the same time procuring the restraint and institutional counterbalance that guarantee financial responsibility, the rendering of accounts and democratic control. Good fiscal governance is the fruit of a harmonious blend of government prerogatives and parliamentary control.

Parliaments and Budgeting: Understanding the Politics of the Budget

Can parliaments make an effective contribution to the budget process while preserving fiscal discipline? Increasing budget transparency and anchoring fiscal responsibility are critical tasks for emerging economies seeking to enhance fiscal governance and curb corruption. Largely neglected in the first stage of economic reform, legislative budget institutions are being re-discovered as part of a second wave of reform in governmental financial administration, in particular as it pertains to their role in overseeing public finances and enforcing government accountability. Nevertheless, parliaments' role in the governance of the budget is often subdued and dysfunctional, partly as a result of executive predominance, but also because of their own deficiencies. While they possess a wide range of formal budgetary powers, they often fail to exercise them effectively or responsibly, lacking the necessary institutional capacities and individual incentives. This article explores the contribution of parliaments to the budget process in presidential systems of government with highly centralized budgetary systems. It offers a political economy perspective on the budget process in Latin America to assess the constraints to and conditions for enhancing the role of parliaments in public budgeting. It underscores the risks of excessive executive discretion and potential benefits of increased external scrutiny and legislative oversight. It argues that a greater role for parliaments in the budget could improve transparency and accountability in public finances. Ultimately, the governance of the budget reflects a delicate balance between executive prerogatives and legislative oversight. The key challenge of legislative budgeting in Latin American is how to retain the advantages of strong executive authority required to ensure fiscal discipline while providing the institutional checks and balances that guarantee effective accountability.

Budget Institutions and Fiscal Responsibility: Parliaments and the Political Economy of the Budget Process

Can parliaments make an effective contribution to the budget process while preserving fiscal discipline? Reforming budget institutions represents a critical task for emerging economies seeking to strengthen transparency and curb corruption in the management of public finances. Political institutions and institutional arrangements have a decisive influence on economic performance and fiscal responsibility. Parliaments' role in the governance of the budget is nevertheless subdued and often dysfunctional, partly as a result of executive predominance, but also because of legislatures' own deficiencies. Parliaments do possess a wide range of budgetary powers, but often fail to exercise them effectively or responsibly. Legislative oversight of the budget remains inhibited by technical and institutional constraints, both internal and external to legislative organisation. Largely neglected in the first stage of economic reform, legislative budget institutions are now being re-discovered as part of a second wave of reform in governmental financial administration. This essay explores the contribution of parliaments to the budget process in presidential systems of government with highly centralised budgetary systems. It offers a political economy perspective on the budget process in Latin America and reveals increased legislative budget activism since the restoration of democracy. It assesses the constraints to and conditions for enhancing the role of parliaments in public budgeting in a framework of fiscal responsibility. It underscores the risks of excessive executive discretion, when executive prerogatives are not adequately balanced by mechanisms of internal restraint and external scrutiny. It argues that a more purposeful contribution of parliaments to the oversight of the budget might help countries seeking greater accountability in the management of public finances. Ultimately, the governance of the budget reflects a delicate balance between executive power and legislative oversight. The key challenge of legislative budgeting in Latin American is how to retain the advantages of strong executive authority required to ensure fiscal discipline while providing the institutional checks and balances that guarantee effective accountability.

Macroeconomic Stabilization and "Black Holes" in the Russian Economy

The paper analyzes Russia's present economic condition and shows how it has changed from the 1992-94 period. It shows that all ambitious intentions to stabilize the economy have failed to some extent due to the fact that part of revenues, which could be used for social projects, investment and other needs, disapp.eared from the economy. Such a performance contributed to the concentration of money in some sectors of the economy and social groups increasing social inequality. Nevertheless, one more time the Russian government proclaimed a new stage of economic reform in fall 1994, claiming that more rigorous fiscal and monetary policies were necessary to reduce infiation. Budgetary spendings were reduced, however it has not resulted in the targeted slow<iown of inflation. The main result of such policy was a deep fall in domestic demand. Budget shortages caused a deep fall in wages of state employees. Real disposable incomes decreased by 12 percent in January-September of 1 995. Low domestic demand may contribute to the continue of the recession period. Several attempts to achieve macroeconomic stabilization have failed in Russia since 1992. Russian economic performance of 1992-1994 has been well examined in the literature. Critical analysis of the failure of the stabilization policies has been presented in a number of studies. At the same time it seems in 1 995 as if the country is really closer to macroeconomic stabilization than ever before. Is it real of seeming signs of the stabization? What price should society pay

Linkages Between Politics and Economics

Joan M. Nelson is senior associate at the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C. The editor most recently of A Precarious Balance: Democracy and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and A Precarious Balance: Democracy and Economic Reforms in Latin America (two-volume set, 1994), she consults for various international organizations on problems of governance and the politics of economic adjustment. In the past dozen years, new elected governments in much of Latin America and (more recently) all of Eastern Europe have confronted urgent problems associated with economic reform. In both of these regions, the collapse of prior military or communist regimes was partly a result of long-festering economic difficulties. In both, the adoption and the implementation of programs to stabilize and more fundamentally reform economies have posed formidable political challenges. And in both, the ultimate success or failure of those programs is widely viewed as having a significant influence on the fate of democratic political systems. This essay examines some of the major interactions between political opening and economic reform in countries where these have occurred more or less simultaneously. 1 It argues that the economic reform agenda changes significantly between the launch phase and later phases. The character of politics, moreover, also tends to change in partly predictable ways as the early posttransition period yields to more structured (but not necessarily more democratic) patterns. As both economic and political reforms evolve over the course of the posttransition period, the interactions between them change. The essay begins with a discussion of the various aspects of democratic transitions and the immediate posttransition period that either encourage or impede the launching of economic reforms. The focus then changes to the later stages of economic reform, with an examination of

The Path to Privatization Our Problems and Foreign Experience

The problem of reforming and destatizing property acquires special urgency on the threshold of the transition to a regulated market. The effectiveness of our economy's future development depends largely on its solution on a strategic plane. It is not by chance that privatization has become one of the main economic problems in all East European countries not only in the framework of the new stage of economic reforms but also in the differentiation of social forces into political parties.

Vertical integration in Poland

The first stage of economic reform in Poland occurred during 1981–1983. This article is a report on market conditions during the time of the reform, specifically on the effect on the distribution system of Poland. Market conditions resulting from the reform and from companies' reactions to the conditions are discussed.