Stability Of Strategic Alliance Research Articles

The Influence of Corporate Social Relations on the Stability of Strategic Alliances

Our study aims to verify the effects of social relations, opportunistic behavior and trust among partners on the stability of strategic alliance. In order to test the hypotheses, 221 valid questionnaires collected from top managers of 50 strategic alliances in China. Moreover, the results also indicate that contractual governance can moderate the influence of high-level social relations on opportunistic behavior and trust between partners. It is found that the social relationship of senior managers cannot directly affect the stability of the alliance but can negatively affect the opportunistic behavior and positively affect the trust between partners. Opportunistic behavior and trust among alliance partners affect the stability of strategic alliance negatively and positively, respectively. Contract governance can enhance the influence of senior managers' social relationships on opportunistic behavior. In addition, contract governance shows the inverted U-shaped moderating effects on the relationship between senior managers' social relations and trust. Keywords: social relations, alliance stability, opportunistic behaviour, trust, contract governance DOI: 10.7176/EJBM/12-6-11 Publication date: February 29 th 2020

Research on Stability of Strategic Alliance in Heilongjiang Soybean Processing Industry: an Empirical Study based on AHP and FCE Method

In recent years, as the economic continuous development, market competition has been dramatically increasing. In order to maintain competition advantage, enterprises have to seek for more cooperation. As a new model of cooperation, industry strategic alliance is a significant method for cooperation to get competitive advantage, also increasing the rate of innovation. However, due to a variety of factors, part of the alliance is not stable, failure rate is very high. Heilongjiang province soybean processing industry strategic alliance as one of the best agricultural strategic alliance in China, it is also disturbed by it. In order to ensure the healthy and stable development of the alliance, in this paper, we will draw on relevant literature and expert advice, also field visits to the alliance, finding out the factors affecting the stability of the alliance. Then, AHP and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method are combined to identify high impact factors, and puts forward specific comments based on the factors identified, thereby enhancing the long-term stable development of the alliance. At the same time, it also laid the foundation for the healthy development of other alliances.

Reentrant phase transitions and defensive alliances in social dilemmas with informed strategies

Knowing the strategy of an opponent in a competitive environment conveys obvious evolutionary advantages. But this information is costly, and the benefit of being informed may not necessarily offset the additional cost. Here we introduce social dilemmas with informed strategies, and we show that this gives rise to two cyclically dominant triplets that form defensive alliances. The stability of these two alliances is determined by the rotation velocity of the strategies within each triplet. A weaker strategy in a faster rotating triplet can thus overcome an individually stronger competitor. Fascinating spatial patterns favor the dominance of a single defensive alliance, but enable also the stable coexistence of both defensive alliances in very narrow regions of the parameter space. A continuous reentrant phase transition reveals before unseen complexity behind the stability of strategic alliances in evolutionary social dilemmas.

A stochastic evolutionary game perspective on the stability of strategic alliances against external opportunism

This paper applies stochastic evolutionary game theory to analyzing the stability of cooperation among members against external opportunism in a multi-firm alliance. The authors first review the pros and cons of pertinent traditional models, and then a stochastic game model on decisions is proposed, where a coordination parameter, a time variable, a punishment effect and bounded rationality are considered. The Gauss white noise is introduced to reflect the random disturbance in the process. Several sufficient criteria on stability are developed, which enable us to investigate “if-then”type scenarios and project the impact of different strategies.

The Formation of the Conflicts Management Models of the Strategic Alliances under the Conditions of the Globalization

The processes of globalization led to the fact that the world markets began to create new business forms actively, one of which is a strategic alliance. The conditions of the strategic alliances functioning uncertainty associated with a complex system of management and organization, conflicts arising from the work dissatisfaction and high uncertainty of possible outcomes. Conflicts may lead to the dissolution of the alliance at any stage of its formation and development. The influence of conflict can be minimized by choosing the most stable forms of corporations’ interaction. Objective: to develop and substantiate models which allow managing conflicts of strategic alliances on conditions of uncertainty of the current globalization state stage. The result of this study is to construct two basic models of conflict management as a factor of the strategic alliances’ stability: the state model allows identifying and eliminating the causes of the dissolution of strategic alliances in the conflict environment and forecasting model of variant forms of the corporations’ interaction, leading to a stable development. For the formation and stability of the models a systematic approach is used as well as factor analysis and methods of the decisions’ making. To control the conflicts, is to control the stability of strategic alliances: to predict the result of the activities, plan the development, to eliminate the problem quickly. The models, formed within the work allow predicting the result of the strategic alliances’ activities: a stable development, consolidation or merger, dissolution.

Performance and Stability of Strategic Alliances: A Test of Efficacy of Social Exchanges in Different Alliance Contexts

Strategic alliances are considered significant corporate strategy for reducing the investment risk, transferring competence and resources, and entering global markets. Despite their widespread use, alliances are reported to be risky and ineffective. Extant research suggests that legal and contractual controls are inadequate for managing the alliances because of the complex industry and global contexts that affect the alliances. Thus, it is critical to study the role of relational dynamics such as trust in the success of alliances, and examine whether the relationships between partners can withstand the contesting alliance contexts. Employing the relational exchange perspective, this study systematically examines the influence of trust between partners on the alliance performance, and further tests whether the alliance relationships are strengthened or restrained by the national differences, governance mode, and rivalry and power dynamics between the partners. This study, based on data collected from the managers of 179 strategic alliances, revealed that trust between partners is related to alliance performance, and found evidence that this relationship is moderated by alliance contexts such as international scope, alliance governance mode, and rivalry between partners.

How Trust, Dependence and Priorties Influence the Stability of Alliances

This paper presents a theoretical framework for understanding the stability of strategic alliances. Based on combinations of different levels of changes in the initial alliance conditions and different levels of alliances' adaptation capabilities, this study proposes a typology of alliance stability: sustaining stability, flexible stability, rigid stability and transient stability/instability. Subsequently, the critical roles of trust, dependence, and prior ties in the stability of alliances have been analysed by drawing on an inter-partner relationship perspective. From this discussion, a number of propositions have been developed to facilitate future empirical testing of our conceptual model.

Analysis on stability of strategic alliance: A game theory perspective

Strategic alliance has suffered much instabilities since its first implementation. Scholars have carried out many embedded, precise and comprehensive researches from both theory and empiricism. Here we try to find certain stable solutions by employing game theory, in an attempt to construct theoretical bases for strategic alliance, which people called “one of the most important organizational innovation in the end of the 20th century” (Shi, 2001), to exploit its advantages in the process of globalization. Finally, this article puts forward some advices for its success.