Sri Lanka's Peace Research Articles

'Damned if You Do, and Damned if You Don't': Nordic Involvement and Images of Third-Party Neutrality in Sri Lanka

AbstractThird-party actors who mediate or monitor peace often strive to uphold an image of neutrality. Yet, they commonly face accusations of partiality. The Nordic engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process is an illustration of this puzzle: despite the efforts to uphold an image of being neutral mediators and monitors, they have been seen as favoring one side or the other. This article suggests that part of the explanation for their failure to be seen as neutral lies in the fact that armed conflicts are characterized by certain asymmetries between the main antagonists – in capabilities, status and behavior. These imbalances pose particular challenges to the third party aspiring to act in a neutral manner. We suggest that third parties have two strategies available to deal with imbalances in the relationship between the contenders: 1) they can choose to disregard the asymmetrical relationship and act in an even-handed manner or 2) they can seek to counterbalance the lopsidedness. This article explores the dynamics of these strategies by analyzing the Nordic involvement in Sri Lanka's peace process that began in 2002.

“Sticking One's Neck Out”: Reducing Mistrust in Sri Lanka's Peace Negotiations

Lack of trust has been widely used as an explanation for the failure of peace negotiations. However, we know little about how mistrust can be reduced between belligerents involved in negotiating peace. Why are some confidence‐building strategies more successful than others? For theory‐building purposes, this article explores how a party can send conciliatory signals to the other party that increase trust by exposing itself to three different kinds of political risks. More specifically, it compares the variables that reduced mistrust — or failed to reduce mistrust — during two peace negotiations in Sri Lanka: in 1994–1995 and in 2002. Using a theoretical framework that combines social psychology and rational choice approaches, this article examines the communicative signaling process between the parties.In addition, by drawing out the implications from this argument, we offer some insight into why the peace process in Sri Lanka became politically stalemated in 2003. We also use our comparison of Sri Lanka's peace processes to develop general propositions about the dynamics that can reduce mistrust. The main proposition that remains to be tested empirically is whether obstacles to peace can be transformed into important catalysts for the reduction of mistrust.

A cybernetic diagnosis of Sri Lanka's 2002‐2003 peace negotiations

PurposeThis paper identifies meta‐level considerations long ignored in Sri Lanka's peace negotiations.Design/methodology/approachVariety absorption being at the heart of manoeuvres by the various parties of the negotiation, Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety informs the diagnosis. Also used are Beer's viable systems model, Maturana's structural coupling and Stokes sociological thinking on identity which encompasses the nature of identity, levels of identity, organisation of identity.FindingsWhilst in Sri Lanka's conflict resolution parlance, identity has been pivotally limited to race, in socio‐cybernetic terms it denotes much more. This leads to the recognition that relationships between structurally coupled entities change as negotiations progress thus calling upon them (and others) to dynamically adapt their identity in their endeavour to retain viability.Practical implicationsThe diagnosis shows the need to design negotiation processes capable of absorbing the variety needed to address the content of negotiations.Originality/valueLinking identity to viability explains why stakeholder relations move through emergent properties/relations and why negotiations between static protagonist, as done in all previous Sri Lankan peace negotiations, are doomed to failure. This work is useful for those who formulate the modalities of Sri Lanka's peace talks and for cyberneticians and people involved in conflict resolution – particularly those bedevilling sovereignty.

Sri Lanka's War Vacation: An Opportunity to Link Peace and Development

Sri Lanka has been in the grips of civil war since 1983. In 2002 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which set the terms and conditions of an indefinite ceasefire. This article looks at the donor policy of providing development assistance to the war affected areas in support of the peace process. This policy is in line with the current trend in international humanitarian assistance, where assistance is provided that attempts not only to address the humanitarian need, but to go further, addressing the root causes of the conflict. The article looks at the Sri Lankan District of Mannar, situated in the north-west of the country. Mannar has felt the full brunt of the island's war, with total destruction of the district's infrastructure, mass displacement and loss of life. The front-line bisects Mannar, with the north of the district administered by the LTTE and the south, by the GoSL. This article looks at the impact of donor assistance in the Mannar District and how it links to peace and the Sri Lankan peace process, and finds that assistance has helped to maintain support for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, despite the precariousness of Sri Lanka's peace process.

Sri Lanka in 2004: Enduring Political Decay and a Failing Peace Process

With a newly formed leftist alliance headed by President Kumaratunga seizing power, and with the separatist Tamil rebels factionalized, Sri Lanka's peace talks remained suspended. And with the president seeking to change the Constitution to extend her tenure as head of state and the opposition vowing to topple her government, the island appears poised to experience even more instability and chaos.

Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka

This article analyses the multiple forms of violence displayed in the Sri Lankan peace process 2002–2005. It starts from the premise that as peace processes begin violence does not immediately or automatically stop. Instead, violence continues – both along the same lines and in new forms. Three types of violence have been prominent in Sri Lanka's peace process: 1) violence between the LTTE and the government; 2) violence within the LTTE; and 3) violence between the LTTE and other Tamil groups. The case demonstrates that violence in peace processes is a complex phenomenon that requires analysis of both the actors and their motives. In order to gauge the influence of violence on the peace process, it is also important to understand how other actors in the negotiation process perceive acts of violence. The main conclusion is that violence has seriously questioned the legitimacy of the peace process and the intentions of – in particular – the LTTE in pursuing the peace effort.

Sri Lanka's peace process

Sri Lanka's third parliamentary election in three-and-a-half years, held on 2 April 2004, may have resolved the power struggle between the president and the prime minister - the issue that triggered the snap polls. But it has worsened prospects for peace with the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who are fighting for a Tamil homeland in the northeast of the country. With the Marxist Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a party that staunchly opposes concessions to the Tamils, now a coalition partner in President Chandrika Kumaratunga's newly-elected minority government, and given the ramifications of a violent split in the ranks of the LTTE itself, the fragile two-year old peace process appears in jeopardy.