Spring Countries Research Articles

Post-Revolutionary Islamism and the Future of Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt

From the backwaters of stagnation in democratization, the Arab Spring countries carried the day and became trailblazers to be replicated by activists all over the world. A couple of seasons after the initial revolution/revolt, Egyptians had transformed their political system, written themselves a constitution, and apparently destroyed the same constitution. While all sectors of society played a role in shaping the revolution, the latter has also affected society. Egypt’s 2012 constitution, one of the outcomes of the revolution, captures a moment in the process and also reflects an attempt to install an Islamist ideology in a constitutional democratic form. The constitution’s attempt to negotiate between Shari‘ah and democracy and its outline of a human rights regime make the future of democracy and human rights ambiguous, as the Islamist stance promulgated has yet to be tested in the real world of politics. As it stands today, the constitution is too ambiguous to allow one to draw a clear picture of the future of constitutional practice. What is clear, however, is that the revolution and subsequent constitution have affected the Islamist discourse about democracy and human rights.

The Arising Uncertainties from Democratization Process in Arab Spring Countries

After one or two years of the remarkable transformations in the Arab world which toppled some of the most resilient authoritarian regimes in the world however, the democratic transition process seems gloomy, uncertain, unstable, and chaotic in some cases (Yemen, Egypt, Libya). This study aims to explore the supposed multiple futures of the Arab Spring without the exclusion of failure scenario, in lights of the following assumptions: First: is that the existence of uncertainties are the key elements to the possibility of successful democratic transition; Second: the transition process assumed to be elite led, or even under the presence of repressive elite that has interests to liberalize and democratize during transition period. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2013.v4n10p443

Tracking the “Arab Spring”: Libya Starts from Scratch

Abstract: Libya is building a new state and political order in the context of unique and difficult legacies compared to other Arab Spring countries. The primary challenge faced by Libya’s leaders is that of statelessness—the fatal weakness of central state institutions—that is a legacy of the Qadhafi regime, and before that the post–World War II kingdom. Challenges of statelessness cut across chronic problem areas in Libya’s transition, including reining in militias outside of state control, justice-sector reform, constitution making, and economic development. Such an institutional void reinforces already low levels of social trust and negatively impacts the legitimacy of the central government and the democratization process more generally. It also empowers Islamism and other illiberal ideologies as the potential bases on which to build a new Libyan identity.

Post-Revolutionary Islamism and the Future of Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt

From the backwaters of stagnation in democratization, the Arab Spring countries carried the day and became trailblazers to be replicated by activists all over the world. A couple of seasons after the initial revolution/revolt, Egyptians had transformed their political system, written themselves a constitution, and apparently destroyed the same constitution. While all sectors of society played a role in shaping the revolution, the latter has also affected society. Egypt’s 2012 constitution, one of the outcomes of the revolution, captures a moment in the process and also reflects an attempt to install an Islamist ideology in a constitutional democratic form. The constitution’s attempt to negotiate between Shari‘ah and democracy and its outline of a human rights regime make the future of democracy and human rights ambiguous, as the Islamist stance promulgated has yet to be tested in the real world of politics. As it stands today, the constitution is too ambiguous to allow one to draw a clear picture of the future of constitutional practice. What is clear, however, is that the revolution and subsequent constitution have affected the Islamist discourse about democracy and human rights.

Assessing (In)security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Yemen

In January 2011, youth and civil society activists, inspired by protests in Tunisia, took to Yemen's streets calling for regime change. As in other Arab Spring countries, conditions were ripe for mobilization as large sections of the population had become increasingly frustrated with corruption, dwindling economic prospects, and a concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the ruling clique. Following Hosni Mubarak's resignation in Egypt, protests mounted across Yemen, and, although President Ali Abdullah Saleh promised reform, it was too little, too late, to satisfy the demonstrators (see ICG 2011a). After proregime gunmen fired on unarmed protesters in Sanaa on March 18, 2011—killing more than 50 demonstrators—a series of high-level defections began, including long-time regime insider and powerful military commander, Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.

Democracy, Like Revolution, is Unattainable Without Women

Contrary to popular media coverage, the Arab Spring was not the first time Arab women took on leadership roles in populist uprisings. As far back as the 1919 Egyptian revolution against the British occupation, women in the Middle East have played pivotal roles in both political movements and mass protests. Indeed, women constituted a significant proportion of street protesters during the 1960s Algerian revolution, the Iranian revolution of 1979, and in Palestine during the First Intifada. This article posits that the biggest challenge facing women in Arab Spring countries is transforming their leadership and attendant influence during the revolutions into high level governance positions, both elected and appointed, after the revolutions. Despite their involvement in past revolutions, whether against native dictators or foreign occupiers, women in the Middle East have yet to attain the degree of political representation that reflects the scope of their contributions in deposing regimes. As soon as the conflicts end and the revolutionary fervor is over, society reverts back to traditional gender roles wherein women are expected to stay out of the political process beyond exercising any voting rights they may have. Their social and political positions remain largely unaffected notwithstanding their sacrifices. Without women’s participation in social and political institutions, nations are unable to develop healthy and sustainable democracies. And as a result, democracy repeatedly eludes the nations of the Middle East. What will differentiate the Arab Spring revolutions from past ones is the degree to which the political revolution triggers a social revolution wherein women have meaningful access to and representation in political institutions. Notwithstanding their increased participation in the public sphere as workers, women’s interests have been woefully underrepresented in the political process. Thus, women’s participation in the formal workforce, albeit at disproportionately lower rates than men, should not be mistaken for political representation and equal treatment before the law. Accordingly, those concerned with achieving substantive equality, as opposed to mere formal equality on paper, should focus on the following three key objectives: 1) amend election laws to increase the proportion of women represented in local, state, and national politics; 2) increase access to high level employment opportunities for women; and 3) reform public education curriculums to highlight the role of women in the revolutions and the various professions to counter perceptions of women’s inability or disinterest in roles outside of the home and to communicate to the youth how sustainable democracies depend on equal participation by women. In combination, these objectives increase the likelihood of a more equitable society wherein women are sufficiently empowered to minimize gender disparities and meaningfully contribute towards the nation’s progress.

Post-Political Transitions in Arab Spring Countries: The Challenges

This paper aims at examining the impact of political transitions on democracy, corruption and growth in countries which knew democratic changes. The results of our study indicate that these changes positively affect implementation of democratic principles, the struggle against corruption and economic growth. We examined also the case of the Arab spring countries focusing on the main political and socio-economic challenges and most importantly the religious challenge which is a characteristic of these countries. Indeed, religion may be considered as a relevant variable in these transitions and consequently it is very difficult to claim short-term or long-term triumph of these transitions as Arabs are now in a political boiling phase where religion may gather unexpected results.

An approach to quantifying social justice in selected developing countries

PurposeThe objective of this paper is to prove that any attempt to implement social justice in its present undefined form is unattainable, and to successfully achieve social justice, the term should be quantified by an appropriate index; accordingly, the first objective of this paper is to make an attempt to construct an appropriate social justice index. The second objective is to quantify this index for a number of developing countries so that a government with low value of social justice index can make policy for achieving an appropriate level of social justice.Design/methodology/approachThe paper constructs a new composite index for social justice for 40 mostly developing countries by selecting six subindicators, each of which represents one aspect or dimension of social justice. The values of the subindicators are then normalized and the final composite index is formed from the weighted average of the subindicators.FindingsThe study quantified the levels of social justice in developing countries through a new social justice index and compared the ranking of some developing countries using the new index. The index also helped in identifying areas of social justice that need improvement and hence can improve the developing countries' scores in the social justice index.Originality/valueThe paper is valuable to policy makers in developing countries especially the Arab Spring countries in their pursuit for achieving social justice. Quantifying social justice clarifies exactly where such countries stand and the dimensions of social justice that need urgent action to improve their performance and thus their index scores.

Middle East and North Africa - Economic Outlook and Key Challenges - Deauville Partnership Ministerial Meeting

Historic transitions in the Arab Spring countries are coming under increasing strain frommacroeconomic pressures and unmet social demands. Domestic uncertainty over the countries' future course, compounded by the global slowdown and rising oil prices, took a toll on growth during 2011. The outlook for 2012 and 2013 is equally challenging. The protracted political transition, lower global growth, and euro zone weakness are likely to result in a slow and drawn-out economic recovery, with unemployment at best stabilizing at high levels. Maintaining macroeconomic stability in this environment will be challenging, not least since policy buffers were reduced during 2011. Indeed, gross external and fiscal financing needs of MENA oilimporters are projected at about $93 and $103 billion, respectively, in 2012-13. With capital markets expected to provide only a small part of these funds, official financial support will be essential to allow countries to continue on their path toward economic transformation. But at the same time, countries need to make tangible progress on that path. This requires bold reform and modernization agendas that command broad consensus and are embedded in a sustainable medium-term macroeconomic policy framework to build confidence, anchor expectations, and pave the way for sustained and inclusive growth.

Autocrats Beat Anarchy

Autocrats Beat Anarchy Nic Wondra (bio) While Serhiy Kudelia presents an important analysis of the Slavic Autocracies of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus with implications of increased repression, he omits a crucial recognition of the role autocracies play in these three states. In some sense, the three countries have already had their revolution in the form of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, both Russia and Ukraine have already seen large protests, after which the states have continued to function. The defining question then is not whether there is enough pressure for these states to change through some kind of revolution, but to assess the medium-term aftermath of an already-completed revolution. From this perspective, the Slavic Autocracies are not a region where revolutions are ripe, but a region where we should be assessing state cohesion twenty years on. Kudelia’s analysis is correct in that authoritarianism has set Russia, Ukraine, and most notably Belarus apart from other European post-Soviet states. However, this overwhelmingly negative analysis leaves out certain gains in governance and economic development in the former Soviet Union. Especially when compared with the recent Arab Spring-affected states of the Middle East, the combined post-revolutionary economic and political situations in the Slavic Autocracies were far more dire than their Middle Eastern counterparts. In this context, autocracy should not be viewed as a negative factor, but a stabilizing one. The Arab Spring as a Benchmark While the Arab Spring revolutions’ speed and success may have been tumultuous, their occurrence is not comparable to the full-scale economic collapse or severe security risks presented by the fall of the Soviet Union. In many ways, this is a poor juxtaposition because broadly comparing Middle Eastern countries with post-Soviet countries is inappropriate, but also because the dual nature of transition must not be ignored here: the return to normalcy in domestic affairs was no simple task in Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus. That we observe today in Russia and Ukraine relatively stable systems with much [End Page 163] more openness and public participation should be viewed as an achievement. Incomes, too, have risen back and largely fulfilled expectations. Never has the modern state system been so shaken on such large a scale. In its place today is a system that is overwhelmingly stable, and has survived elections as well as protests. If we take the Arab Spring events in Tunisia and Egypt as a benchmark, there are notable differences that make the current (and by several indicators, poor) governance situations in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus exemplary. The institutions of governance in Arab Spring countries were left largely intact. The military, police, court systems, and bureaucracy were all left in place through the Arab Spring revolutions. This is not to argue that the states were not shaken, or were not the target of public criticism—they were—but the institutions were granted license to remain in existence and continue to play their pre-Arab Spring roles, even today. This institutional constancy was not present in the post-Soviet state transformations. The collapse meant that bureaucrats largely stopped coming to work and were no longer paid salaries. The military and its hardware, in many cases, were fragmented among the successor states, and its personnel took part in conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia as mercenaries. The former center of policy creation and indeed governance norms, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was all but outlawed and the systems reverted to nepotism, patrimonialism, and a whole range of -isms not befitting modern states. The post-Soviet collapse was worse than the Arab Spring collapse by an order of magnitude—to go from such stability with clearly defined institutional roles to anarchy in such a short time is unprecedented in recent history outside the context of inter-state war. The Governance Issues in Slavic Autocracies Are Not as Dire as Stated We should be cautious in wishing for a shake-up in the Slavic Autocracies. Firstly, because gains made in economic policy and governance are in danger of being reversed, and secondly, because the alternatives to status quo governance are few. The economic collapse mentioned above is well-documented, and with...

Failing and Rising States in International Politics

The year 2011 will be remembered as one of unprecedented change and difficult economic circumstances. On the one hand, the ‘Arab Spring’ has become an Arab autumn and is on its way to becoming an Arab winter, with new uprisings continuing to expand to other countries, old autocratic leaders being overthrown and the first democratic elections taking place in best-in-class countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. On the other hand, Europe is taking bold decisions, making political compromises and applying painful but nonetheless necessary measures to address the economic and financial crisis. In the midst of these challenging times, it is crucial to keep an eye on the evolution of geopolitics, which is currently characterised by the emergence of new regional powers and by the inability of other states to self-govern. International relations must now be understood in the context of globalisation, interdependence and multipolarity. Nation states are no longer selfsufficient, making regional integration necessary in order to tackle common challenges. In this sense, some countries are emerging (or at least have the potential to do so) as new regional powers. Turkey is sometimes regarded as an inspirational case for some, especially post–Arab Spring countries in a new Middle East and North Africa region, and as an example of how to combine tradition with global modernity. In the meantime, the BRIC(S) countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China, with the possible addition of South Africa) are presenting themselves as alternative leading forces given their demographic, territorial and trade potential. Indonesia, too, has emerged as a rising leader in South-East Asia. In contrast, there are, unfortunately, states that are finding it difficult to perform as prosperous and well-functioning democracies. A state is traditionally defined by three characteristics: territory, population and the presence of