Spontaneous Inferences Research Articles

Investigating mechanisms of political polarization: Perceivers spontaneously infer ideological categories from other people's behavior

AbstractWhen observing others' behavior, people routinely infer personality traits from it. Research on the correspondence bias has shown that they draw these inferences even from behavior that is situationally constrained. Moreover, these inferences often happen spontaneously, that is, when people have no intention of forming an impression. The current research investigated whether the same applies for inferences of ideological categories, such as conservative, feminist, or climate change denier. We present a series of five preregistered experiments (N = 1012) employing both direct and indirect measures from the impression formation literature. In Experiments 1 and 2, we found that people deliberately, as well as spontaneously, inferred ideological categories from ideology‐implying behavioral descriptions. In Experiments 3, 4, and 5, we found these inferences to be very robust, in that they persist even when alternative reasons for the ideology‐implying behaviors are presented, suggesting that they are subject to the correspondence bias. We argue that to the extent that people attribute negative valence (affective polarization) or extreme attitudes (perceived issue polarization) to ideological categories, spontaneous inferences of these categories can serve as a precondition for a range of negative interpersonal outcomes related to political polarization.

Inferring Goals and Traits From Behaviors: The Role of Culture, Self-Construal, and Thinking Style

People make spontaneous inferences from others' behaviors, such as spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) and spontaneous situation inferences (SSIs). People's behaviors, however, are shaped by their goals as well, which are determined by their internal characteristics (e.g., traits) and by contextual factors (e.g., social roles). In three studies, we examined whether self-construal, culture, and holistic thinking were associated with spontaneous goal inferences (SGIs) and STIs. We found that the more people defined themselves interdependently and viewed the causality of events holistically, the more they made SGIs (Study 1). Moreover, Asian American participants (interdependent) made SGIs but no STIs from people's behaviors, whereas European American participants (independent) made both (Study 2). Finally, participants primed with interdependence made SGIs but no STIs, whereas those primed with independence made both (Study 3). This research is the first to examine SGIs in relation to self-construal, culture, and holistic thinking.

Availability of Moral Schemas as a Basis for Spontaneous Judgments about Moral Qualities

Basic ideas of socio-cognitive approach are considered. This approach explains the moral personality from the viewpoint of availability of cognitive schemas. The results of testing the experimental model of D. Narvaez, D. Lapsley, S. Hagele and B. Lasky on Russian sample are presented. Primary trait inference method was used to determine if people with availability of moral schemas were more likely to make spontaneous inferences about moral qualities than people with availability of other types of schemas. The obtained results of the study coincided with the results of D. Narvaez et al. in conclusion that availability of moral constructions affects the processing of social information. People with a greater availability of moral schemas were more likely to make spontaneous inferences about moral qualities than people more oriented on other cognitive schemas.

Spontaneous state inferences.

Perceivers routinely draw inferences about others from their behavior in an attempt to make sense of the world. Previous research has established that spontaneous inferences include stable characteristics such as traits and a number of variable person-related concepts such as goals, intentions, and motivations. The current research investigated the occurrence of more general spontaneous state inferences. In a series of four preregistered studies (N = 883), we adapted two established experimental paradigms frequently used in spontaneous social inference research to the investigation of spontaneous trait and state inferences. In Studies 1 and 2, we observed evidence for the occurrence of spontaneous state inferences from state-implying statements. In Studies 3 and 4, we observed the simultaneous occurrence of spontaneous trait and state inferences from statements that allowed for both inferences. In a fifth study (N = 97), we provide evidence that people represent states and traits as functionally different: Participants judged the likelihood of behavioral repetition higher when the same behavior was related to a trait-inference than a state-inference. The observation of multiple simultaneous spontaneous inferences in the current research suggests that further theory building regarding the underlying mechanisms and processes of spontaneous impression formation in person perception from behavior is warranted. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Spontaneous Inference of Personality Traits and Effects on Memory for Online Profiles

As users navigate online social spaces, they encounter numerous personal profiles, each displaying a unique constellation of attributes. How do users make sense of this information? In our first study, we provide evidence that users spontaneously make personality trait inferences about people from profiles they encounter online, and for certain profiles, preferentially remember this inferred trait content over actual profile content. Study 2 uses several measures of profile coherence to assess how the coherence of user profiles interacts with trait inferences to influence memory for profiles. Findings provide a better understanding of specific profile content that makes profiles memorable and the social-cognitive process utilized when extracting information from profiles.

Sharing Power in Read‐Alouds with Emergent Bilingual Students

AbstractThis article addresses a growing call for the use of more culturally relevant texts and pedagogy in classrooms. We present how a teacher sharing power with emergent bilingual (EB) students during read‐aloud discussions with culturally relevant texts supports EB students’ literacy opportunities. These opportunities include (1) initiating new topics in the discussions, (2) providing cognitive or linguistic supports for one another, (3) using multilingual abilities to identify vocabulary, and (4) using cultural knowledge to make spontaneous inferences. For each of these four opportunities, we discuss (a) how power is shared by the teacher with her EB students, (b) how sharing power opens learning opportunities for others, (c) how the culturally relevant text supports the learning opportunities, and (d) how students are positioned in the discussion. Finally, we present how teachers can share power, and choose culturally relevant texts that will facilitate these learning opportunities, in their own classrooms.

Difficult name, cold man: Chinese names, gender stereotypicality and trustworthiness.

Names can play an important role in forming first impressions. While much of the literature has demonstrated how alphabet-based names influence impression formation, little is known about how character-based names (e.g., Chinese names) affect interpersonal trust. Across six studies, we demonstrated that a difficult-to-recognise Chinese name with less frequently used characters activated masculine perception, which in turn decreased trust in the name holder. The masculine inferences from difficult names were replicated across within-subjects (Study 1a and 1b) and between-subjects judgements and maintained irrespective of normative knowledge about difficult names as male names (Study 1c). The mediation of gender stereotypicality was manifested in both measured spontaneous gender inference (Study 2a and Study 2b) and manipulated gender information (Study 2c). The effects of recognisability on masculine and trust perceptions were independent of pronunciationability (Study 2b). This research extends previous research by revealing the implications of character-based names and pictographic language on the feeling-as-information theory, also in terms of interpersonal contexts.

Easy to Make, Hard to Revise: Updating Spontaneous Trait Inferences in the Presence of Trait-Inconsistent Information

Previous research has shown that perceivers spontaneously form trait inferences from others' behaviors received at a single point in time. The present work examined the persistence of spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) in the presence of trait-inconsistent information about others. We hypothesized that STIs should be resistant to change over time and in the presence of new trait-inconsistent information due to perceivers forming and storing multiple STIs independently in memory. Consistently, Experiments 1a and 1b showed that initial STIs were not affected by new trait-inconsistent information. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that STIs were persistent over 48 hours. Two experiments also tested memory reconsolidation as a possible mechanism of updating first impressions. While STIs were not substantially affected, spontaneous goal inferences (SGIs) were elevated among those with a better explicit memory of behaviors after learning trait-inconsistent information following a memory reactivation procedure. Implications of these findings on impression formation and updating processes are discussed.

The effect of stereotype activation on spontaneous inferences

We adopted the probe recognition paradigm to examine the effect of stereotype activation on spontaneous inferences among Chinese undergraduates (N = 48). First, behavioral sentences involving trait-implying behavior and corresponding situational information were simultaneously presented. We then selected stereotype labels of the actor's behavior that were consistent or inconsistent with the behavior, and which were activated either supraliminally or subliminally. The results showed that whether a stereotype was activated supraliminally or subliminally, the influence on spontaneous inferences was the same. Specifically, when the stereotype was inconsistent with the actor's behavior, spontaneous situational inferences were facilitated, and when the stereotype was consistent with the actor's behavior, spontaneous trait inferences were not facilitated. As Chinese people may be more prone to spontaneous (vs. trait) inferences, this indicates that human inferences are deeply influenced by culture.

On the updating of spontaneous impressions.

A large body of work has shown that perceivers form spontaneous inferences about others' characteristics (e.g., mean, bad) as soon as they observe their behaviors. However, a question that has not been addressed by previous research is the integration of contingencies of those actions (e.g., perceivers' ultimate goals) that are typically learned over time into the initial spontaneous impressions of those others. Three experiments examined updating of spontaneously formed trait inferences (STIs) and evaluative inferences (SEIs) as a function of the contingency information that alters the meaning of the initial information. All three studies showed that perceivers update their SEIs (both positive and negative) immediately after learning about the contingencies (i.e., transforming information). STIs, however, were not updated, even when the contingency information was provided immediately after the initial behavior information (Experiment 3). Instead, in all three experiments participants formed multiple STIs; one from the behavior information before and one from the information after the contingency. It was only when participants had the opportunity to elaborate on their trait judgments within explicit measures that they revised their judgments and aligned them with the contingency information. The results and the implications of the findings are discussed in light of the theoretical models suggesting separate mechanisms of semantic and evaluative processing in person perception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Cultural differences in attention to person and situation when observing others’ behaviors: An eye-tracking study of spontaneous inferences

Cultural differences in attention to person and situation when observing others’ behaviors: An eye-tracking study of spontaneous inferences

Assessing the integrity of the cognitive processes involved in belief reasoning by means of two nonverbal tasks: Rationale, normative data collection and illustration with brain-damaged patients.

Every day, we engage in social interactions with other people which require understanding their as well as our own mental states. Such capacity is commonly referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). Disturbances of ToM are often reported in diverse pathologies which affect brain functioning and lead to problems in social interactions. Identifying ToM deficits is thus crucial to guide the clinicians in the establishment of adequate rehabilitation strategies for patients. Previous studies have demonstrated that ToM is not a unitary function yet currently there are very few standardized tests which allow identifying the type of cognitive processes affected when a patient exhibits a ToM deficit. In the current study, we present two belief reasoning tasks which have been used in previous research to disentangle two types of processes involved in belief reasoning: self-perspective inhibition and the spontaneous inference of another person’s belief. A three-step procedure was developed to provide clinicians with the tools to interpret the patients’ performances on the tasks. First, these tasks were standardized and normative data was collected on a sample of 124 healthy participants aged between 18 and 74. Data collected showed a decrease in performance as a function of age only in the task that loaded most in spontaneous other-perspective demands. There was however no effect of gender or educational level. Cut-off scores to identify deficits were then calculated for the different age groups separately. Secondly, the three-step procedure was applied to 21 brain-damaged patients and showed a large diversity of profiles, including selective deficits of the two targeted ToM processes. The diversity of profiles shows the importance to take into account the multiple facets of ToM during the diagnosis and rehabilitation of patients with suspected ToM deficits.

Determinants of spontaneous inferences in person perception from the perspective of construal level theory

Determinants of spontaneous inferences in person perception from the perspective of construal level theory

Capturing spontaneous trait inference with the modified free association paradigm

Spontaneous Trait Inference (STI) is a psychological phenomenon that allows people to infer personality traits from others' behaviors without any intention or awareness. This phenomenon helps us organize our complex social world and ultimately it shapes our interaction with others. The goal of this manuscript is 1) to conduct a systematic analysis of the different types of measures that are currently used to detect inferences, 2) to identify their main limitations and 3) to propose a new paradigm that overcomes most of these limitations. The new paradigm is based on the modified free association task that Hourihan and MacLeod (2007) proposed as a pure conceptual implicit memory measure. This new paradigm simultaneously overcomes the contamination problem of memory measures and the dependency on data-driven processing of the activation measures. In the presented experiments we use the modified free association paradigm to detect STIs and also to compare its results to the naming task and the modified Stroop task. We show that this measure is able to reliably detect STI and discuss why it is more appropriate to study inferences. Additionally, we show that it can be used to investigate the underlying processes responsible for STI and to distinguish it from similar but different phenomena like Spontaneous Trait Transference. This manuscript focuses on STIs, but the arguments presented here apply to any research field that investigates spontaneous inference making.

The Dorsal Medial Prefrontal Cortex Responds Preferentially to Social Interactions during Natural Viewing.

Humans display a strong tendency to make spontaneous inferences concerning the thoughts and intentions of others. Although this ability relies upon the concerted effort of multiple brain regions, the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) is most closely associated with the ability to reason about other people's mental states and form impressions of their character. Here, we investigated this region's putative social category preference using fMRI as 34 participants engaged in uninstructed viewing of a complex naturalistic stimulus. Using a data-driven "reverse correlation" approach, we characterize the DMPFC's stimulus response profile from ongoing neural responses to a dynamic movie stimulus. Results of this analysis demonstrate that the DMPFC's response profile is dominated by the presence of scenes involving social interactions between characters. Subsequent content analysis of video clips created from this response profile confirmed this finding. In contrast, regions of the inferotemporal and parietal cortex were selectively tuned to faces and actions, both features that often covary with social interaction but may be difficult to disentangle using standard event-related approaches. Together, these findings suggest that the DMPFC is finely tuned for processing social interaction above other categories and that this preference is maintained during unrestricted viewing of complex natural stimuli such as movies. Recently, studies have brought into question whether the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a region long associated with social cognition, is specialized for the processing of social information. We examine the response profile of this region during natural viewing of a reasonably naturalistic stimulus (i.e., a Hollywood movie) using a data-driven reverse correlation technique. Our findings demonstrate that, during natural viewing, the DMPFC is strongly tuned to the social features of the stimulus above other categories. Moreover, this response differs from other areas with previously well characterized response profiles such as the lateral and medial fusiform gyrus. These findings suggest that this region's dominant function in everyday situations is to support reasoning about the thoughts and intentions of conspecifics.

Gagasan Allah Kristianitas dalam Modernisme, Postmodernisme, dan 'Illative Sense' John Henry Newman

Modern worldview tends to explore everything, including the idea of God, grounded on reason and rational evidences. Postmodernism on the other hand tends to consider that the basic of epistemology of modernism fails to explain the experience and the existence of God, because modernism relies too much on the cognitive and empiric powers. John Henry Newman might be viewed as a constructive postmodernist for he chooses a different power for judging the truth about the concept and experience of God. Newman appears not to think in ‘either-or’ way like in the rationalism and empiricism worldview, but attempts to fuse and bridge the ways of thinking using ‘both-and’. He suggests that this power, i.e., the <em>illative sense</em>, is a faculty that help the believers judge the truth in comprehending the existence of God. With illative sense, people may decide and make spontaneous inferences on concrete issues naturally. In this line, postmodernism might be seen not as a threat or enemy, but companion to religion, for the postmodern epistemology tends to be sensorial, intuitive, and experiential. Illative sense, as a power that each believer has, is converging the particularities towards the existence of God in the context of religious epistemology.

An interactive activation and competition model of person knowledge, suggested by proactive interference by traits spontaneously inferred from behaviours.

People unconsciously and unintentionally make inferences about others' personality traits based on their behaviours. In this study, a classic memory phenomenon--proactive interference (PI)--is for the first time used to detect spontaneous trait inferences. PI should occur when lists of behaviour descriptions, all implying the same trait, are to be remembered. Switching to a new trait should produce 'release' from proactive interference (or RPI). Results from two experiments supported these predictions. PI and RPI effects are consistent with an interactive activation and competition model of person perception (e.g., McNeill & Burton, 2002, J. Exp. Psychol., 55A, 1141), which predicts categorical organization of social behaviours based on personality traits. Advantages of this model are discussed.

Sowing the seeds of stereotypes: Spontaneous inferences about groups.

Although dispositional inferences may be consciously drawn from the trait implications of observed behavior, abundant research has shown that people also spontaneously infer trait dispositions simply in the process of comprehending behavior. These spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) can occur without intention or awareness. All research on STIs has studied STIs based on behaviors of individual persons. Yet important aspects of social life occur in groups, and people regularly perceive groups engaging in coordinated action. We propose that perceivers make spontaneous trait inferences about groups (STIGs), parallel to the STIs formed about individuals. In 5 experiments we showed that (a) perceivers made STIGs comparable with STIs about individuals (based on the same behaviors), (b) a cognitive load manipulation did not affect the occurrence of STIGs, (c) STIGs occurred for groups varying in entitativity, (d) STIGs influenced perceivers' impression ratings of those groups, and (e) STIG-based group impressions generalized to new group members. These experiments provide the first evidence for STIGs, a process that may contribute to the formation of spontaneous group impressions. Implications for stereotype formation are discussed.

Dissociating animacy processing in high-functioning autism: Neural correlates of stimulus properties and subjective ratings

When movements indicate meaningful actions, even nonbiological objects induce the impression of “having a mind” or animacy. This basic social ability was investigated in adults with high-functioning autism (HFA, n = 13, and matched controls, n = 13) by systematically varying motion properties of simple geometric shapes. Critically, trial-by-trial variations of (1) motion complexity of stimuli, and of (2) participants’ individual animacy ratings were separately correlated with neural activity to dissociate cognitive strategies relying more closely on stimulus analysis vs. subjective experience. Increasing motion complexity did not yield any significant group differences, and in both groups, it correlated with neural activity in regions involved in perceptual and evaluative processing, including the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), superior temporal gyrus (STG) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). In contrast, although there were no significant behavioral differences between the groups, increasing animacy ratings correlated with neural activity in the insula, STG, amygdala, dorsal mPFC and PCC more strongly in controls than in HFA. These results indicate that in HFA the evaluation of stimulus properties cuing for animacy is intact, while increasing subjective ratings do not seem to be robustly related to social processing, including spontaneous mental state inferences and experience of salience.

Logic in pragmatics

Relevance Theory assumes that the deductive device for spontaneous inferences never uses the introduction rules for logical connectives, such as & introduction. Two motivations for this are (I) the overgeneration of propositions expressed and (II) non-terminating inferences, both of which are claimed to be caused by logical introduction rules. However, having both logical introduction rules and elimination rules is essential for the completeness of the inference system. Although a sound and complete inference system is not as strongly preferred in the theory of human reasoning as it is in proof theoretic logic, missing one of the two essential rules for the logical connectives leaves too many holes in the data coverage. Naturally, Relevance Theory has additional rules for covering some of these holes. However, without introduction rules, these additional rules are ⿿non-logical⿿ and therefore create other holes which would then require even more non-logical rules with no principled limit. Also, banning introduction rules to solve particular data problems without independent motivations is stipulative. Based on such considerations, this paper discusses a theory that deals with problems (I) and (II) above without banning introduction rules. After explaining the problems with the ban on introduction rules, I provide a pragmatic solution for the overgeneration problem. I then show that non-terminating inferences arise independently of introduction rules and therefore, removing introduction rules does not provide the right solution. Finally, I substantiate my arguments in the earlier sections by briefly showing that a sound and complete sequent calculus can be used as the deductive system with its performance pragmatically controlled in the way that has been discussed in the previous sections.