Debates on the distinction between religious experience and mental disorder tend to assume, rather than argue for, the existence of unique types of experience: the religious and the psychopathological. This paper interrogates this approach to the problem. It deconstructs the distinction by examining what the distinction is about beyond the terms in which it is presented and whether it matters who is trying to make it. A key idea is that one’s standpoint in the debate—that is, whether one adopts a religious or a secular standpoint—determines what they can say about the distinction. This leads to the central argument of the first part of the paper: The distinction between religious experience and mental disorder can only be invoked from a secular standpoint but can only be clarified from a religious standpoint. In other words, if you have the grounds to invoke it, you cannot have the tools to clarify it; and if you have the tools to clarify it, you do not have the grounds to invoke it. In the second part, the paper follows through the implications, from a secular standpoint, of accepting this argument. It appeals to the politics of difference and to mental health activism to argue against the binary view whereby mental distress is either illness and incapacity or a path to purpose and identity.