Spinoza's Views Research Articles

From A Swedish Point of View

92 Reviews FROM A SWEDISH POINT OF VIEW STEFAN ANDERSSON Bredgaran 17B 222 21 Lund, Sweden SANDERSS@CHASS.UTORONTO.CA Gunnar Fredriksson. Wittgenstein. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Forlag, 1993. Pp. 274. 60 kronor. Svante N?rdin. Fi~osofernas Krig [The Philosopher's War: European Philosophy dunng the FIrst World War]. Nora: Bokforlaget Nya Doxa, 1998. Pp. 265. 170 kronor. Bertrand Rus~ell pl.ays an i:npor~ant ~art in. Gunnar Fredriksson's book about LudWIg Wlttgenstem; thIS reVIew w111 concentrate on what the author has to say about their relationship. Fredriksson wrote a book about Ru~sell i~ 1984 called Bertrand Russell,' en intellektuell i politiken, which I re~Iewed l.n Russell (n.s. 5 [1985]). In it he showed that he is no stranger to phl1osophlcal thought. Fredriksson studied philosophy at Lund University and at Oxford in the early '60S, when he met Russell and had an interview with him. Instead of pursuing an academic career, Fredriksson went into journalism.. ~e wrote a book in 1962 called Det politiska spraket [The Language of PolltIcs] that has become something of a minor classic in its field in Sweden. Twenty years later he wrote a book about Joseph Conrad, and after the book about Wittgenstein one about Arthur Schopenhauer. Fredriksson is a rare phenomenon in Swedish cultural journalism. His book about Wittgenst~inshows that he is capable ofexplaining complicated philosophical problems In a way that a non-specialist can understand. Reviews 93 Fredriksson keeps emphasizing that much of what Wittgenstein wrote should be considered as mystical poetry rather than as attempts to solve philosophical problems in the traditional sense. In Wittgenstein's thinking there is an important connection between logic, ethics and mysticism; what they amount to cannot be said--it can only show itself Fredriksson claims that Russell never really understood the importance of this distinction between what can be said about the world and what can only be shown. I think Russell understood what Wittgenstein was trying to say. He realized that if Wittgenstein was right, much of what he himself had written was an attempt to say the unsayable. Instead of allowing different hierarchies of language and thus opening up the possibility of an infinite progress, Wittgenstein outlawed all levels of metalanguages. Russell preferred some kind of type theory and meta-talk to silence and did not think that Wittgenstein's solution to the problem of the relationship between language and reality was valid. He thought there was something paradoxical in Wittgenstein's theory, since he had succeeded in saying quite a lot about what cannot be talked about. When they met after the First World War Russell thought,that Wittgenstein had turned into a "complete mystic". It's hard to say exactly what Russell had in mind when he referred to Wittgenstein as "a mystic", but it must have been a somewhat different kind of mysticism than the one Russell had outlined in his essay "Mysticism and Logic", where he gives it four defining characteristics (a special way of knowing, the unity of the world, the unreality of time and of evil) that in parts fit well with his chosen examples of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, Spinoza, Hegel and Bergson, but would not fit well with Wittgenstein except for some parallels with Spinoza's views. I have written about the difference between Wittgenstein and Russell's mysticism earlier (Russell, n.s. 18 [1998]) and will not repeat that discussion except by emphasizing some similarities in their different approaches. Neither of them saw traditional Christian mysticism as an answer to their questions about God and the meaning of life, but neither of them could totally free himself from the anthropomorphism of Christian theology. The major difference was that while Wittgenstein kept struggling with religious and existential questions, trying to find ways of somehow expressing his deepest insights, Russell did not have much more to say about his mysticism after 1914 and instead did what he could to create a more peacefUl and loving world. Mysticism and the importance of seeing Wittgenstein as a literary writer, a poet and a mystic rather than a traditional philosopher, run through Fredriksson's book. He has many interesting comments to make. The...

Spinoza and the Netherlanders: An Inquiry into the Early Reception of His Philosophy of Religion (review)

308 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:2 APRIL 1991 in Locke. Lastly, despite the gloomy title, Spellman's treatment is not without occasional humor, especially in the later chapters dealing with Locke's critics. GERARD REEDy, S.J. Fordham University H.J. Siebrand. Spinoza and the Netherlanders: An Inquiry into the Early Reception of His Philosophy of Religion. Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1988. Pp. x + 239. DFL 69.50. This is an ambitious book. In many ways, it is a strange book, owing to Siebrand's goal of appealing to a mixed audience of philosophers, historians of philosophy, and church historians. Such an interdisciplinary enterprise can be fruitful, but it also has many difficulties and dangers. Because of his previous studies in the field, H.J. Siebrand is well-known among modern-day Spinoza scholars. In this book, he focuses primarily upon the reception of Spinoza's views among those Dutch ("Netherlanders" sounds just a bit odd) who became interested in his thought in the later decades of the seventeenth century. The primary study of Dutch Spinozism is the older work by K. O. Meinsma, Spinoza en zijn kring (t896), which was translated into French as Spinoza et son cerclein 1985, with an introduction by Richard H. Popkin. Meinsma's work is entirely historical in its approach and does not pay much attention to the philosophical details of the reception of Spinoza's thought. Siebrand wishes to treat simultaneously contextual, historical issues and systematically philosophical issues in Dutch Spinozism. The book is accordingly divided into two parts. In Part t, by far the larger (3-173), Siebrand examines Spinoza's work within the historical context of his seventeenth-century readers. In Part 2, Siebrand systematically examines the theoretical and philosophical aspects of such "reception." The main problem with this structure is that Siebrand does not adhere to it, which makes it difficult for the reader to follow either the historical exposition or the philosophical inquiry. Thus, although in Part 1 Siebrand does in fact trace the historical context of Spinoza's Dutch readers, who they were, why they were interested, what precisely interested them about Spinoza's philosophy, etc., the thread of this narrative is often broken by expositions of a purely systematic nature. However interesting these excursions may sometimes be, they make it difficult to follow the development of the historical context. In Part 2, on the other hand, where Siebrand intends specifically to examine in a systematic fashion the theoretical aspects of "reception," the reader is immediately confronted with a long historical discussion of Dutch Cartesianism and Spinozism. Siebrand here repeats rather elaborately several parts of the historical treatment of Part l, while what he presents as the dominant systematic theme of Part 2 is given rather short shrift (x92-~ 1o). Besides the unclearness of Siebrand's structuring of the book,-the reader is often annoyed by the didactic tone which Siebrand adopts--as if he were lecturing to young pupils. In spite of these caveats, Siebrand raises many interesting and important issues. BOOK REVIEWS 309 This is especially true in Part i where, for the first time, a valuable survey is given of the views of both pro- and anti-Spinozists within the historical context in which they read Spinoza. Those who became interested in Spinoza's thought took from their master what they liked and left out what they disagreed with. It therefore becomes clear why it is so difficult to label any particular Dutch thinker as a "Spinozist," a point clearly made in Siebrand's analysis of the thought of Adriaan Koerbagh, usually classified as a "Spinozist" but who differs from Spinoza on some fundamental issues. There are other cases of "Spinozists" about whom one wonders whether the differences are not greater than the similarities. Probably there were many more "Spinozists" than the better-known figures such as Pieter Bailing, Jarig Jelles, and Abraham Cuffeler, but, because they had to conceal their views for fear of being labelled atheists, we will never know about them. Indeed "Spinozism," regarded as a religionless system, soon came to to be identified with atheism and, within a short time, anything that smacked of heterodoxy was labelled "Spinozism...

Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's "Ethics", and: The Form of Man: Human Essence in Spinoza's "Ethic" (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 135 curious twist of reasoning, saw prae-Adamism not merely as a critical or scientific solution to the difficulties of Biblical history but as the key to history's denouement: Only if humanity at large could understand that Israel had once been chosen, would be recalled and ultimately united with an intellectually reformed Christendom, could the age of peace begin on earth. A second twist could make a weapon of racism out of what La Peyr6re called his Copernican hypothesis, his simple shift of perspective that changed nothing but seemed in his eyes to make sense of everything. L. E. GOODMAN University of Hawaii at Manoa Edwin Curley. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's "Ethics." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. xxi + 175. Cloth, $25.oo. Paper, $9.95. Lucia Lermond. The Form of Man: Human Essence in Spinoza's "Ethic." Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, Vol. 11. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988. Pp. 86. $24.oo. Behind the Geometrical Method is a revised version of E. M. Curley's Jerusalem Spinoza Lectures, originally given at Hebrew University in May, 1984. Like the original lectures , the book is aimed at a dual audience: Spinoza scholars and persons with less knowledge of, but interest in, Spinoza. Although Curley is apologetic regarding his efforts to make Spinoza intelligible to the latter, he has achieved success in this respect without sacrificing interest to scholars. The title alludes to his strategy, which is to show how Spinoza might have arrived at his system through critical reflection on the work of his important predecessors, Hobbes and Descartes, an origin which is largely concealed by the geometric mode of presentation. The first two chapters deal with metaphysical topics, chiefly Spinoza's substance monism, his theory of human nature, and the relation of mind and body. The third chapter focuses on the psychology and ethical doctrine. In Chapter 1 Curley attempts to show that Spinoza has "a powerful argument, from principles Descartes would have had difficulty rejecting, to the most uncartesian conclusion that there is only one substance, God" (3o). The argument he refers to is that given by Spinoza in the demonstration of E 1. 14, which cites def. 6 and props. 5 and 11 of Ethics 1. On Curley's view the most problematic of these premises for Descartes would have been E 1. 5: "In nature there cannot be two substances of the same nature or attribute." Descartes must have rejected this, since he held there could be a plurality of thinking substances. Curley, however, cites solid textual evidence and makes a strong argument that Descartes was in fact committed to the identification of substance and attribute and other principles which underlie the demonstration of E 1.5. Thus Spinoza correctly saw that on Descartes's premises numerically different substances must have different attributes. In Chapter 2 Curley defends an interpretation of Spinoza's view of the mind-body relation first put forward by Stuart Hampshire, and again attempts to show how Spinoza could have come to that view of the mind and body through reflection on the 136 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:1 JANUARY ~991 Cartesian view? Like another recent commentator, Jonathan Bennett, Curley is struck by those passages in which Spinoza says that a mode of extension and its idea, or mind and body, are one and the same (E 2.7, sch.; 2.2 l, sch.).~But Curley rejects Bennett's theory of the transattribute differentiae as a way of explaining these passages, saying that he finds the theory incredible since the transattribute differentiae cannot be grasped by the intellect (156). On Curley's interpretation those passages which attribute identity to mind and body are best understood as expressing Spinoza's affinity with materialism. The materialism which Curley attributes to Spinoza is not reductive materialism; he does not attempt to trivialize or explain away the conceptual independence of the order of thought and the order of extension in Spinoza's system. Rather, he emphasizes two other aspects of Spinoza's theory which seem to justify calling it materialist. These are that the essential nature of the mind is to be the idea...

The Intellect, the Will, and the Passions: Spinoza's Critique of Descartes

The Intellect, the Will, and the Passions: Spinoza's Critique of Descartes JOHN G. COTTINGHAM THIS PAPERexamines (in Section 1) Descartes' theory of judgment and (in Section 9) Spinoza's well-known criticisms of it. I argue (in section 3) that despite some important differences, there are many ways in which Spinoza's views, so far from being anti-Cartesian, can be seen as a natural development of those of Descartes. I then go on to argue (in Section 4) that Spinoza's general critique of the Cartesian theory of the will does not take sufficient account of what Descartes actually claimed, and that if the Cartesian concept of freedom is properly understood, Spinoza is closer to it than he himself recognized. Finally (in Section 5) I say a brief word about the relation between the will and the passions, and suggest that here again Spinoza tended to misinterpret Descartes' true position, and as a result exaggerated the difference between his own views and those of Descartes. I hope that it will emerge by the end of the paper that for all Spinoza's anti-Cartesian flourishes, his views on the will are much closer to those of Descartes than is often supposed. 1. DESCARTES' THEORY OF JUDGMENT Within the general category of conscious thought (cogitatio), one may, according to Descartes, distinguish two principal modes of operation: perception, or the operation of the intellect (comprising sensing, imagining and pure intellection ), and volition, or the operation of the will (comprising desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt (Principles, 1:3~). This distinction is important for many reasons. In the Passions de l'ame, for example, it is suggested that perception is a passive faculty of the mind, while volition is active, and this notion [~39] 24~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY a6:a APRIL i988 seems to have influenced many later thinkers. 1 But in Descartes, the most important application of the distinction concerns the diagnosis of error in our judgments. Descartes sees the problem of error as a theological problem, rather like the traditional problem of evil. Instead of having to explain away moral or metaphysical evil, Descartes feels himself called upon to explain away intellectual error; but the reasons why an explanation seems called for are closely parallel. Just as, if God is good and the omnipotent creator of all, it seems odd that there should be evil in the world, similarly, if God is good and the source of all truth, it seems odd that there should be error. More specifically, if God created me and gave me a mind which is, in principle, a reliable instrument for the perception of truth,, how does it happen that I often go astray in my judgments? A standard theological move in coping with the problem of evil was to put the blame on man's exercise of his free will; and Descartes makes the selfsame move in explaining away error. His first premise is that judgment is an act which involves the will as well as the intellect: "In order to make a judgement, the intellect is of course required [since otherwise nothing would be perceived --there would be no content to the judgment] ... but the will is also required so that, when something is perceived, our assent may then be given" (Principles 1:34). Descartes' second premise is the celebrated Cartesian thesis that the will extends further than the intellect: latius patet voluntas quam intellectus. "The perception of the intellect extends only to the few objects presented to it and is always extremely limited. The will on the other hand can in a certain sense be called infinite, since we observe that its scope extends to anything" (Principles 1:35 ). Given these two premises, the explanation for error is quite straightforward: "It is easy for us to extend our will beyond what we clearly perceive; and when we do this it is no wonder that we may happen to go wrong" (Ibid). To complete the theodicy, Descartes adds some further considerations (the most detailed presentation is in the Fourth Meditation). God cannot be blamed for giving us an infinitely extended will; in this he has allowed men to share...

A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SPATIAL SYSTEMS;I. The Relational Representation of Measurable Attributes

In this, the First part of a two part work, a general model of spatial organization is introduced. Following a brief synopsis of some of Spinoza's and Leibniz's views regarding natural structure, an extension of the Spinozian model is presented in which the attribute spatial extension is portrayed as a relational system that implicitly underlies the differentiation of sensible space into “modifications” (“natural systems”) and the latter's subdifferentiation into “modes” On the basis of this model, all instances of modal differentiation are understood to take place in a manner explained by this relational structure, the existence (but not the specific characteristics) of which is initially assumed. The nature of the structure is then deduced according to a “most-probable-state” kind of logic; next, it is demonstrated via simulation that the resulting aspatial model of internal relations has a corresponding spatial interpretation (and therefore, in theory, that sensible space structures can be supported by...

The four equals: Analyzing Spinoza's idea of equality

Spinoza's defense of political democracy has long been celebrated. And Spinoza's effort to apply the geometric method to philosophy is well known. But no one, to my knowledge, has examined Spinoza's treatment of equality, which cuts across both his metaphysics and political theory 1 Analysis of Spinoza's use of equality 2 reveals that it plays four distinct roles in his philosophy. The sum of its four functions, however, is greater than the parts, for equality operates throughout by way of analogy to provide coherence to Spinoza's world view.

Leibniz and Relationality

Abstract

Freedom, Emotion, and Self-subsistence: The Structure of a Central part of Spinoza's "Ethics" (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 345 Arne Naess. Freedom, Emotion, and Self-subsistence: The Structure of a Central part of Spinoza's "'Ethics. '" Filosofiske Problemer, no. 42. Oslo-Bergen-Tromsr Universitetsforlaget , 1976. Distributed in the U.S. by Humanities Press. Pp. 122. $7.50. As the subtitle of this work indicates, Professor Naess here attempts to elucidate the structure of a portion of Spinoza's Ethics. Each major section of the book contains an informal statement of theorems, along with explanatory comments and discussion, followed by a symbolic representation of the theorems. The book does not attempt to provide a complete characterization of the structure of the Ethics (which would be an enormous undertaking), but it is concerned with almost all of the key notions employed in that work. (Among these are the notions of being in and being conceived through, causation, cognition, action, joy, sadness, good and evil, self-preservation, self-satisfaction, and virtue.) Although Naess frequently cites and discusses the Ethics, his main concern is not with historical or textual questions. This is partly because, in light of the many divergent (and, he holds, well-documented) interpretations of the text, he is inclined to be skeptical that one can pin down Spinoza's views "on anything at all" (p. 85). The aim of the book is thus to provide not a description but a reconstruction of Spinoza's main work (p. 85)--a reconstruction that, it seems, will help to bring out what in Spinoza is of use to us. (See the preface and the introduction , p. 11.) I will not here undertake an evaluation of the degree to which the reconstruction offered achieves this latter goal, nor does Naess devote much attention to this. But I will concentrate on some of the issues of interpretation with which he deals, and on the reconstruction itself. The most interesting, but quite problematic, feature of the reconstruction is that (after an initial treatment to the contrary) it is maintained that there are degrees of being in and being conceived through something. Everything, it is held (SD2, p. 73), is in itself to some degree, and nothing is completely in another (SD3, p. 73). And as one would expect, given this thesis, there is exactly one thing that is completely in itself (SDII and SDIIa, p. 74). The question of representation is handled by introducing a one-place predicate "d," to be read as "is a "ES . . . . . . . . degree," and defining predicates such as • >0tx) and ES 0 & ES, (x)" and "(3y).'d0') & d 0 & ES, (x)); use a two-sorted predicated calculus to the same effect. (Quantification over entia rationis would presumably be accepted by Spinoza, but only quantenus sunt modi cogitandi. Neither Naess's formalization, nor any other of which I am aware, attempts to provide a systematic representation of Spinoza's use of quatenus, which appears to be a non-truth-functionaloperator.) At least as important as this technical problem of bringing the representation in line with Spinoza's ontology is the question whether Spinoza did maintain, even implicitly, that things are in themselves or in others in different degrees. The main direct textual support cited (p. 59) for the grading of "is in itself" is E. 111,vi,' where Spinoza writes, "Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur" (literally: "Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persevere in its own being" [G. I1, ' "E. I11,vi" denotes prop. vi, pt. I11 of the Ethics. I use "d" for "demonstration" and "s" for "scholium." When "E" is omitted, reference to the Ethics is assumed. 346 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 146, 7-8].~ But an examination of the demonstration of this proposition shows that Spinoza is not here using the locution in se in its technical sense (i.e., the sense employed in I, def. iii). For the qualifying phrase "quantum in se est" is found in this proposition because of the use ofE. III, iv in E. Ill, vi, d. The relevant part of the proof of III, vi is as follows: "Nor does any thing have something in itself [neque ulla res aliquid in se habet] by which it can be destroyed, or which may take away its...

Spinoza and Ethical Subjectivism*

A puzzling feature of Spinoza's discussion of the good is that it takes place on two different levels whose compatibility seems uncertain. He advances a view of the nature of ascriptions of “good” to certain individual things, but he also devotes a large part of the Ethics to recommending a particular conception of the good person. The first theory appears to undermine the force of the second. For Spinoza's view of ascriptions of “good” to any objects apparently leads in the direction of subjectivism; what is good from one person's viewpoint may be bad for another's, and no viewpoint is privileged. Yet a subjectivist view of ascriptions of good would mix poorly with Spinoza's own presentation of a standard for human conduct; he himself voices a view of human good which he takes to be more than just another sound in the chorus of ethical opinions. Professor E.M. Curley expresses concern with such a difficulty in his recent article “Spinoza's Moral Philosophy: “The greater portion of Spinoza's ethical theory is devoted not to metaethics, but to normative athics. not to the analysis of ethical judgments, but to the making of ethical judgments.

Death and destruction in Spinoza'sethics

An exposition of Spinoza's views of the cause and cure of death. He holds death to be disruption of mind/body which need not involve becoming a corpse; amnesia counts. It follows that his criterion of personal identity includes memory, so Spinozistic immortality is impersonal. The cause of death is always something external, for nothing can destroy itself. (This principle, however, is not universally true; Spinoza was led to it by mistaken physics.) Suicide is irrational. Fear of death is to be overcome by realization that since adequate ideas are eternal, to the extent that they consitute our minds we are eternal also. (But if so, isn't suicide rational after all? And since language depends on memory, the eternal understanding of adequate ideas is non‐linguistic and non‐symbolic; what then can it be?)

Spinoza's Epistemological Views

I propose, in this paper, to offer a simple, even perhaps a simplified, version of Spinoza's metaphysical views, and to show how these views sometimes affected his epistemological views.When they did affect his epistemological views the effect was always a bad one, since Spinoza's metaphysical system is quite unworkable. It is helpful, and sometimes even inspiring, but it is wrong. In the end, with the epistemology as with the metaphysics, nothing of substance will be salvageable, but Spinoza's new and even radical perspective is worth observing for its own sake, and there are points of detail along the way, ranging from inspired falsehoods to cloudy truths, that still deserve the effort to untangle them.

Spinoza's Epistemological Views

I propose, in this paper, to offer a simple, even perhaps a simplified, version of Spinoza's metaphysical views, and to show how these views sometimes affected his epistemological views.When they did affect his epistemological views the effect was always a bad one, since Spinoza's metaphysical system is quite unworkable. It is helpful, and sometimes even inspiring, but it is wrong. In the end, with the epistemology as with the metaphysics, nothing of substance will be salvageable, but Spinoza's new and even radical perspective is worth observing for its own sake, and there are points of detail along the way, ranging from inspired falsehoods to cloudy truths, that still deserve the effort to untangle them.

The knower and the known

This paper is a presentation and discussion of Spinoza's view on the knower, or the mind, as an agent. The knower is on his view to be regarded as an active or generative complex cognitive experience. Imagination, reason and intuition are the cognitive principles. On account of their intrinsic relation to “the first law of nature”, that of selfpreservation, together with the thesis of the mind as constituted by ideas or knowledge, these principles function at the same time as moral principles. Consequently, it makes sense to speak of an individual's moral attitude toward everything be knows. A discussion of imagination, reason and intuition mainly as cognitive principles is followed by some concluding remarks on the cognitive and moral relation between human beings: To know another human being is to know his knowledge. The moral attitude of individuals to each other is a function of their mutual knowledge of knowledge.

Language and knowledge in Spinoza

This paper argues against the thesis of Professor Savan, that Spinoza's views about words and about the imagination are such that he could not consistently say, and indeed did not think, that philosophical truths can be expressed adequately in language. The evidence for this thesis is examined in detail, and it is argued that Spinoza should have distinguished between two types of imagination, corresponding roughly to Kant's transcendental and empirical imagination. Finally, it is suggested that the bulk of the argument of the Ethics is conducted on the level of the ‘second kind of knowledge’, reason, but that it also contains examples of the use of the first and third kinds of knowledge.

Newton and Spinoza

WITH regard to the new biography of Isaac Newton by Prof. More and to the review in NATURE of January 5 (p. 3), the following considerations may be of interest. Brought up in a family devoted to the Royalist cause, Newton became a staunch Whig. As a fellow of Trinity College he is said to have been influenced by the Platonists, but in spite of this, Newton became a man of science who is far from Henry More's mystical Paracelsic ideas. We must ask how this astonishing development took place, even if we suppose that Newton's genius was essentially responsible for it. I believe that no biographer has yet pointed out the possibility of Spinoza's views having influenced Newton, for this great Dutch-Jewish philosopher was the only one among the philosophers of the seventeenth century who may be ranked with Newton. Oldenburg, secretary to the Royal Society, visited Spinoza at his residence at Rhynsburg in 1661 and was in correspondence with him from 1661 until 1665 and afterwards, 16757ndash;76, concerning scientific, philosophical and theological problems. It is known that Boyle was interested in Spinoza's view, and it is most probable that Newton too had some knowledge of Spinoza and his works. The “Theological-Political Treatise” (1670) greatly influenced English metaphysicians, for example, Locke. It might have influenced Newton's political and theological views as well.