Spinoza's Concept Research Articles

The Influence of Spinoza's Concept of the Multitude on Debates about Populism and Representation in Democracies

The Influence of Spinoza's Concept of the Multitude on Debates about Populism and Representation in Democracies

LOVE AND ESSENCE IN SPINOZA'S ETHICS

Several questions regarding Spinoza's concept of essence have been the topic of recent scholarly debate. In this paper, I show that the connection between love, desire and essence is ubiquitous in the Ethics, as well as metaphysically and psychologically coherent; moreover, it provides the key to answer unresolved questions. Analyzing the notion of essence through Spinoza's theory of love shows that essence can be expressed in different ways, and be reflected through different objects of love. These objects of love, in turn, signify the extent to which the affected mind understands itself, God and things in the world. Each object is a different expression of the same single, unique essence of the individual, and therefore of the desire which defines them. This interpretation allows to solve some puzzles about essence, and also to establish the importance of love in Spinoza's philosophy as a whole-especially his epistemology and ethics.

Controversy and Growth Points in the Activity Theory in Psychology.

Activity theory is the most powerful and influential current of Russian psychology in the world today. It considers the psyche to be a special form or function of object-oriented activity. The level of psychical development of a living being is directly proportional to the variety and freedom of its activities. The aim of this article is to explore the key growth points in activity psychology through the analysis of arguments among its creators - S.L.Rubinstein, L.S.Vygotsky, A.N. Leontiev, and P.Ja. Galperin. Vygotsky dreamed of building a scientific psychology on the model of Marx's Das Kapital; his project is resumed in this article. The author traces how, due to Walter Cannon's experimental research, Vygotsky came to the activity concept of affect, in which he finds the primary "cell" of the psyche. The problem of the relationship between concept and affect became the central problem of his "acmeistic psychology." While Vygotsky focused on the affective reflection of activity in the subject, Leontiev focused on its cognitive side, directed toward the object. In the objective world, the psyche serves a person's material life-activity, performing a search-and-orientation function. Leontiev considered consciousness a structural projection of that activity, but Galperin argued that Leontiev never managed to overcome the dualism of consciousness and activity. A new path to the realization of Vygotsky's dream is outlined. The proposed solution is based on Spinoza's concept of affect and the idea of freedom, interpreted as "the affect in the concept." (Vygotsky).

Afekat i njegova slika u filozofiji Žila Deleza

There is no perception without affection. This necessity comes from the very fact that perception measures our possible action upon things, and thereby, the possible action of things upon us. For the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, affection occupies exactly this gap between the potentiality of action of the perceived objects and our virtual action upon them. This encounter between the affected body and the affecting body presumes the in-betweenness, an interval between a perception which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action. As opposed to emotion, which is directed toward a certain goal and demands actualization, affect precedes will, as a pre-personal intensity referring to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another. Influenced by Baruch Spinoza's concept of affect and Henri Bergson's thesis on movement that he considers the essence of cinema's movement-image, Deleuze creates his own theory of affect that finds its most obvious manifestation in the works of art. The artist creates affects, gives them to us, draws us into the compound, and makes us become with them. Deleuze's aesthetics produces the spectator's movement in-place through sensation. Through shapes and colours, the canvas vibrates, clenches or cracks open because it is the bearer of glimpsed forces. Like with Edward Munch's The Scream or Francis Bacon's Portrait of Pope Innocent X, the invisible forces become visible in themselves and thus the sensation becomes materialized right there on the canvas surface. In cinema, this materialization of sensation Deleuze recognized in the affection-image, abstracted from the causal and spatio-temporal relations to the images that surround it, and therefore open to a spiritual dimension. As power-quality, the affect gains its independence from the thing that expresses it and becomes an entity, a potentiality considered to itself.

Being oneself and being self-conscious. Spinoza's concept of freedom

Being oneself and being self-conscious. Spinoza's concept of freedom

Deep Ecology and Nature: Naess, Spinoza, Schelling

In this article I will critically engage with Arne Naess's Deep Ecological appropriation of Spinoza's concept of Nature. I will argue that Naess falsely opposes the creative and created aspects of Nature, rather than thinking these two in concord. Because of this, his concept of Nature falls apart into two realms, which makes it impossible to think of Nature as one united whole. I will discuss the problems this leads to then propose that Schelling's philosophy of Nature is more apt as a Deep Ecological philosophy. Schelling's concept of Nature explicitly defines Nature as the identity of productivity and product, so that the rift in Naess's conception is overcome.

CoPSE: A methodological intervention towards gentle more‐than‐human relations

AbstractOne meaning of “gentle” is consideration for others. However, as Derrida has illustrated, it is impossible for one individual to consider all such others. Here I demonstrate that this impasse arises from the reproduction of self–other binaries. In the case of food, framing eating as consumption co‐produces eater and eaten as different kinds of things. Within this framing, even as the eater endeavours to be considerate to eaten others, there are limits to their hospitality. Yet pertinent to this is a second connotation of gentle, that of being easily controlled. Relating and caring with and for others are always negotiated with and in the trajectories we have become implicated in. Recreating otherwise necessitates shifts in the ways in which others are encountered in the here and now. To this end, in this paper I introduce the methodological intervention of “CoPSE.” CoPSE draws on three principles: Collective doings, Playful practices, and prefigurative Strange Encounters, and on Spinoza's concept of the composite individual. Here, I outline how CoPSE was used to gently disrupt situated norms, momentarily making space for embodied investigations of the world‐making of self–other relations. I demonstrate that such practices are micro‐resistances to social norms that in reproducing self–other binaries co‐create hierarchies of care. I argue that through rehearsal, through repetition and difference, such micro‐resistances have the chance to become generative micro‐refrains that prefigure embodied relations of more‐than‐human subjectivities and outlive the moment in ways that might just take hold.

Human Power and Ecological Flourishing: Refiguring Right and Advantage with Spinoza

This paper argues for an interpretation of Spinoza's concept of human power that is conducive to ecological flourishing. Acknowledging the elements in Spinoza that authorize human exceptionalism, I argue for a countervailing conception of human power as ecologically interdependent. This model accounts for an amoral natural order, while simultaneously offering practical normative guidelines for calibrating human power in accordance with the ecological flourishing in which human existence is embedded. Hence, the normativity of this ethical model derives from the striving that, for Spinoza, is inscribed at the heart of earthly existence.

‘코나투스’ㆍ‘몸[身]’ㆍ‘살[肉]’ㆍ‘알[卵]’ 에 대한 문화-생태학적 독해 - 스피노자의 ‘코나투스’를 중심으로 -

Spinoza has three names. Bento built by Portuguese Jewish parents, Baruch called by friends of Jewish community, and Benetictus named himself after being expelled from a 24-year-old Jewish church. Although he lived a short life, he was as diverse as the three names. He lived with various identities as a minority Jew. He lived as minority among the minorities. His life as a minority is intermingled with his Ethica line. This article is a cultural-ecological reading of his life and ideas in Ethica. Of course, Spinoza does not comment specifically on culture itself. However, there is a critical reflection on the political and cultural hegemony of the time in Ethica. In particular, I try to read cultural ecology based on Spinoza's concept of Conatus. The reason why this article attempts a cultural ecology approach is to take a deep look at Spinoza, who is both modern and post-modern. He accuses the barbarity of dichotomy accelerated by Descartes with monism of 'deus siva natrura'. Spinoza considers the dualistic model, which became the philosophical foundation of cultural hegemony of the time, by converting it into an ecological paradigm. I look forward to meeting Spinoza from the cultural ecology perspective, who guide the path of freedom from emotional prejudice against other cultures.

El papel político de la superstición y el deseo en Spinoza. Consideraciones actuales sobre el capitalismo

Se analiza el concepto de superstición de Spinoza como dispositivo político de alteración de la lógica afectiva y, por ende, del deseo, instituyendo determinadas formas de acción y pensamiento. En virtud de lo anterior, se propone una lectura sobre su devenir conceptual, considerando las nociones de fetichismo en Marx, religión capitalista en Benjamin, espectáculo en Debord y discurso moral en Coccia, de esta manera se pone en evidencia la actualidad del funcionamiento de la superstición en la época del capitalismo.

Theodicy of Benedictus Spinoza

This article examines Baruch Benedictus Spinoza conceptual understanding of the proofs for the existence of God. It traces the evolution of this theme pursuant to the metaphysical studies of Moderns Philosophy. Тhe concept of God the philosophy of Spinoza is considered by exploring the nature of the relations between the transcendent sphere of God and the spiritual world of the human person. Spinoza argues from the possibility of God's existence to God's necessary existence. God is an absolutely infinite substance, necessarily exists, qua Natura Naturans is immutable. God or Nature. The universe is an expression of God's nature, qua Natura Naturata - God is its immanent cause. Spinoza's God is synonymous with Nature. Substance is defined as in itself. Spinoza understands a substance to be something that is self-caused and self-explained. The transcendence is understood as an ontological category, being discussed connection with the key themes of Christian philosophy (Anry Bergson, Moris Blondel and Wladimir Soloviev), such as time and eternity, person and history, creation and God etc. Spinoza's concept of God is referring to the God of the monotheistic religions, God as One Substance, pertains to a concept of the oneness of God, is transcendent and therefore unknowable. Spinoza's definition of God found on the first page of the Ethics: Being absolutely infinite. From the point of view of historiography, the role of the book Ehtics by Spinoza is highlighted.

Autonomia oporu – Marks, Spinoza i akumulacja pierwotna.

This article is an attempt at a simultaneous reading of Marx and Spinoza. We venture to show that the immanentistic ontology and the political anthropology of the latter enriches the critique of capitalism with a better understanding of a subjectivity’s function in the process of creating dominance. At the same time we view this process as incomplete. This view is enabled by the use of Spinoza's concept of imagination, which is crucial to our endeavour. Imagination is understood as an ambivalent conductor of affects, which, according to the communicated desires, can work to the effect of both subjectification and emancipation. To prove its usefulness we inspect Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation, as presented in the history below, in which we highlight the visions of equal order and their relevance to the protoproletarian resistance against emerging capitalism. Consequently, we show Spinoza as an author who proves helpful in the task of re reading capital, not from the transcendental point of view, but from the autonomistic one. This type of lecture focuses on the productivity of resistance, seen as an inherent element of capitalism, existing in-beyond-and-against it.

Spinoza e o Direito de Resistência

Este trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar o conceito de direito de resistencia formulado por Spinoza. Para atingir tal objetivo, desenvolve-se, de inicio, neste trabalho analise sobre as circunstâncias teoricas e historicas em meio as quais Spinoza construiu seu conceito de direito de resistencia. Em seguida, realiza-se investigacao sobre determinadas categorias do pensamento politico-juridico spinozano pertinentes ao conceito de direito de resistencia, como as nocoes de direito natural, a relacao entre obediencia politica e resistencia e os modos de expressao politica e institucional do direito de resistencia propostos por Spinoza.

How is Interiority Constructed from External Impacts?: Cartesian Collision Rules and Spinoza's Concept of Affectio

How is Interiority Constructed from External Impacts?: Cartesian Collision Rules and Spinoza's Concept of Affectio

Spinoza's concept of Historia and its ethical function

Spinoza's concept of Historia and its ethical function

The affective turn: The ambivalence of biopolitics within modern labour and management

This paper confronts biopolitics with modern labour addressing questions of ‘governmentality’, ‘self-management’ and ‘social innovation’. It argues that the new modes of production within immaterial labour involve a new complex relation between on the one hand the ‘Art of Governance’ (Governmentality) related to different forms of control, and on the other hand new modes of existences connected to co-operation, social innovation and experimental projects. The paper then argues for a more positive conception of biopolitics using self-management as a strategy since it is through self-management that human individuation ties together modes of productions with affects and emotions. Introducing Spinoza's concept of ‘affect’, and Gilles Deleuze's reading of Spinoza's ethics focusing on the ‘affective turn’ in relation to the new economy and society, the paper argues for a more positive notion of biopolitics that surpasses that of governmentality. The affective self-relation is used as a research tool to analyse the creation of social and economic values in our new modes of productions, for instance, within free labour of the cultural industry. The movie The Five Obstructions is used to show how organizing good affective encounters based on limitations enhance and facilitate the performative dimension of self-management. Finally, the paper addresses the problem of critique confronting self-relation with Spinoza's ethics as an ethical difference of power.

Spinoza's Concept of Substance and Attribute: A Reading of the Short Treatise

The first part of this paper will solve a textual problem in Spinoza's early work Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being. Several passages in this work treat substances and attributes as equ...

Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (review)

Reviewed by: Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy Stephan Blatti Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, and Pauliina Remes, editors. Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 4. Dordrecht: Springer2007. Pp. xii + 366. Cloth, $199.00. Anthologies themselves rarely advance substantive theses, but according to its editors, this wide-ranging collection "argues that, even though our predecessors did not formulate their philosophical queries in terms of consciousness, they have much to offer to our current disputes concerning its central features," and "demonstrates that consciousness is not just an issue in the philosophy of mind, but is bound to ontology, epistemology, and moral theory" (1; emphasis added). While some of the fourteen papers included here bear out these aims better than others, it must be admitted that their cumulative effect makes for a pretty convincing case. In their substantial introduction, the editors begin by articulating the volume's guiding methodology. The concept of consciousness, they write, is neither "diachronically fixed [nor] synchronically clear-cut," and yet "the diversity of terms and multiplicity of usages should not be taken to imply that the concept is useless or merely a transient cultural formation" (5–6). Consequently, we must "reach beyond the terms to what they name," and the phenomena named include "phenomenality, aboutness, reflexivity, reflection, unconsciousness, attention, selfhood, ownness, subjectivity and objectivity, and synchronic and diachronic unity" (ibid.). Following an etymological discussion of the word 'consciousness'—while being the first to use the English term in a technical philosophical sense, Ralph Cudworth seems to have appropriated the Greek 'sunaisthêsis' from Plotinus—the remainder of the introduction offers a thematic overview of the volume's contents in terms of the three most prominent aspects of conscious experience: intentionality, subjectivity, and reflexivity (10). Given this set-up—a topical introduction to a volume whose raison d'être is to illuminate contemporary discussions of the problems of consciousness—it is puzzling to find the papers themselves organized not thematically, but chronologically. Part one, "Ancient and Arabic Philosophy," includes contributions from Amber Carpenter ("On Plato's Lack of Consciousness"), Juha Sihvola ("The Problem of Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology"), Pauliina Remes ("Ownness of Conscious Experience in Ancient Philosophy"), and Jari Kaukua and Taneli Kukkonen ("Sense-Perception and Self-Awareness: Before and After Avicenna"). Part two, "Medieval Philosophy and Early Modern Thought," consists of articles by Joël Biard ("Intention and Presence: The Notion of Presentialitas in the Fourteenth Century"), Mikko Yrjönsuuri ("The Structure of Self-Consciousness: A Fourteenth-Century Debate"), Deborah Brown ("Augustine and Descartes on the Function of Attention in Perceptual Awareness"), Vili Lähteenmäki ("Orders of Consciousness and Forms of Reflexivity in Descartes"), and Jon Miller ("The Status of Consciousness in Spinoza's Concept of Mind"). The third and final part, "From Kant to Contemporary Discussions," features the work of Kenneth Westphal ("Human Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant's Anti-Cartesian Revolt"), Susanna Lindberg ("The Living Consciousness of the German Idealists"), Dan Zahavi ("The Heidelberg School and the Limits of Reflection"), Neil Manson ("Contemporary Naturalism and the Concept of Consciousness"), and Sara Heinämaa ("Selfhood, Consciousness, and Embodiment: A Husserlian Approach"). The volume concludes with a bibliography of primary and secondary sources, as well as name and subject indices. [End Page 463] As will be apparent from the titles listed above, the contributions to this volume vary considerably in scope, with some focused on single figures, others concerned with pairs and groups of figures, and still others taking on whole periods and schools. While the scholarship in all cases is impeccable, on the whole, I found this last group of contributions the most philosophically stimulating. At least in part, this is because several of the articles dedicated to single figures emphasize what divides their subjects from contemporary concerns. Carpenter, for instance, concludes that Plato's commitment to the soul "creates a great barrier for us in adopting" his lessons on the nature of perception (48). And Miller defends the view that "Spinoza lacked robust views on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to mind" (219). By contrast, for example, Remes' masterly survey of ancient...

Abraham Cohen Herrera

In this paper, I argue that Herrera's discussion of the emanative process in his Gate of Heaven is a plausible source for Spinoza's concept of the attributes as developed in Ethics. While Herrera's influence on the development of Spinoza's thought has been discussed, I argue that previous interpretations have not captured the nature of this influence. I will first offer an overview of Herrera's discussion of the relationship between the One and the sefirot. I will then criticize a recent discussion of Herrera's influence on Spinoza by Giuseppa Saccaro Del Buffa, and offer a summary of my interpretation of the concept of attribute in Spinoza. Finally, I will show that Herrera's discussion of the sefirot, the first emanations, as divine activities, rather than created things, inspired Spinoza's concept of the divine attributes.

Spinozas doppelter Dualismus

Two types of dualism characterize Spinoza's mature philosophy. The first is the Cartesian dualism of attributes. Although Spinoza's radicalized version of this dualism officially rules out any interaction between matter and mind, his Ethics nevertheless retains a theory of causal precedence between the mental and the physical. In the production of ideas, it is sometimes the mind, sometimes the physical environment that has causal priority. A second, non-Cartesian, type of dualism is to be found in Spinoza's metaphysics of substance. Spinoza's concept of substance resumes the Platonico-Aristotelian idea that agency-causation is limited to what has real being and must be distinguished from the modifications that are its effects. The first, horizontal, dualism of Cartesian attributes eliminates from Spinoza's psychology any account of behavioral change, and forces him to fall back on the classic idea that we are agents only in so far as we direct our thoughts. The second, vertical, dualism concerning the ontology of causation, enables Spinoza to introduce a non-arbitrary notion of God, who has a causal role to play that may be distinguished from the workings of the universal clockwork itself. In both cases, rather than expressions of a modern-type naturalism, Spinoza's dualistic positions are motivated by a concern to meet the demands of a Renaissance philosophy of morals, according to which the liberation of the mind and the love of God are crucial elements in the quest for beatitude.