Spinoza's Argument Research Articles

К проблеме единства «аффекта» и «интеллекта» в психологии деятельности (в продолжение дискуссии)

This text is a response to the article written by A.D. Maidansky (Siberian Journal of Psychology. 2020. 76) [2] and aims to update the discussion of controversial aspects of cultural and activity psychology, especially some of the provisions of the activity theory by A.N. Leontiev and his scientific school, which, in contrast to the creative heritage of L.S. Vygotsky, are now rarely considered in both foreign and domestic literature. The article analyses the solution of the problem of correlation between "affect" (motivational and emotional component of mental life) and "intellect" (cognitive processes) in this scientific school. It is shown that the definition of the mind as an orienting activity (A.N. Leontiev, P.Ya. Galperin, etc.) does not imply the reduction of mental processes to cognitive ones, since any orienting process is always affectively loaded. Sensations are not separated from affects already in the primary forms of sensitivity that arise in phylogeny. However, even at later stages of mental development, a similar unity is maintained, although the mental life (including emotional states) becomes more differentiated. It is shown that this unity of the subject's knowledge of the object and the subject's attitude to this object is best represented in A.N. Leontiev's scientific school in the definition of mental phenomena through the category of sense. Since affect (emotion in the broad sense of the word) is a subjective form of motivation, the problem of "mastering affects" is transformed in the school of A.N. Leontiev into the problem of awareness (comprehension) of the motives of a person's activity and possible restructuring of the hierarchy of motives, which is best represented in the situation of an act. The act as a responsible and free action of a personality is performed by choosing one of the meaningful motives, which acquires a new sense (and thus an additional motivating force) due to the inclusion of this motive in a higher system of values, in the limit - in universal values. And since, according to Leontiev's scientific school, in the activity of any person the "motivational-emotional" ("affect") and cognitive ("intellect") components are inseparable, they are usually proportional to each other: the higher forms of emotional regulation, overcoming the lower ones, correspond with the higher forms of knowledge of the world as a whole. The author sees a clear parallel of these ideas with B. Spinoza's arguments about "Amor Dei intellectualis". Thus, the formula of B. Spinoza - L. S. Vygotsky about free will as a reasonable mastery of affects discussed in the article by A. D. Maidansky is clarified and filled with concrete psychological content.

The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified by Lawrence Shapiro

Reviewed by: The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified by Lawrence Shapiro Glenn B. Siniscalchi lawrence shapiro, The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). Pp. xvii + 168. $27.95. One of the steps for establishing the credibility of a divine revelation consists in identifying the reality of miracles in a religiously charged context. If miracles have not accompanied the teachings of a self-proclaimed prophet, then his revelatory claims should be considered spurious. Although Lawrence Shapiro does not deny the possibility of miracles tout court, he reports that believing in them is unjustified: "My goal in this book is to convince you that no one has ever had or currently has good reasons for believing in miracles" (p. xiv). Shapiro's accessible and thought-provoking book will appeal to fundamental theologians, philosophers, and intelligent laypersons for establishing the epistemic warrants for believing in miracles. After explaining the differences between justification, explanation, knowledge, and belief, S. introduces the reader to the way in which an inference to the best explanation should be understood and formulated. When garnering the evidence for a purported event, one must test the available hypotheses that can account for the data. Hypotheses are strengthened or weakened by the assumptions that affect them. Because miracles should be understood as improbable "events that are the result of supernatural, typically divine, forces" (p. 18), naturalistic hypotheses should always be preferred over supernatural ones. Undoubtedly, S. has been influenced by David Hume's case against miracles. There are two weaknesses in the book, both of which relate to assessing the merits of competing hypotheses as they pertain to the evidence for Jesus's resurrection. The first is that S. does not consider the arguments and implications of natural theology. Contemporary defenders of miracles not only provide arguments for the existence of God; they also show why God is likely to communicate with humans in a publicly accessible way. It is fitting that God will reveal meaningful answers to questions about human origins, purpose, identity, morality, and destiny. S. sees the implications: "Well, of course, the existence of a god who wanted to resurrect Jesus would increase the probability of Jesus's resurrection. Indeed, if that god were omnipotent, I would say it raises the probability of the resurrection to one" (p. 84; cf. pp. 52, 55). Unless S. presents sound arguments for the existence of finite gods or the semipotent deity (pp. 46, 49), the prima facie conclusion is that theism strengthens the case for the resurrection. Instead of interacting with recent scholarship in natural theology, S. maintains that theism is epistemically equivalent to other worldviews: "But how do we verify [End Page 554] assumptions about god's characteristics and 'personality?' . . . We don't have in our possession the equivalent of a god baseball card on which god's stats are revealed" (p. 44; cf. pp. 47, 50-51, 56, etc.). Though S. describes miracles as "improbable events," natural theology allows us to conclude that miracles should be expected at one point or another in a theistic universe. The second weakness is that S. does not recognize the religious context in which Christianity emerged. Miracles do not occur in a vacuum but accompany claims and practices that supposedly come from God. Instead of taking the surrounding socioreligious context of miracle claims into consideration, Shapiro affirms that miracles should always be explained by natural causes that we do not currently understand: "If we take as a background assumption the idea that people don't understand everything that goes on in the natural world, . . . then the possibility that an unknown natural cause is responsible for the weeping statue [read: miracle] is no less compelling than the hypothesis that says something supernatural is the cause" (p. 51; cf. 56). This objection harks back to Baruch Spinoza's argument against miracles. Moreover, critical historians can provide clues about the past that coincidentally correspond with God's intentions in revealing the answers to the deep questions of human existence. In the case of early Christianity, the best tentative conclusions have been used to tip the scales in favor...

Restricting Spinoza's Causal Axiom

Spinoza's causal axiom is at the foundation of the Ethics. I motivate, develop and defend a new interpretation that I call the ‘causally restricted interpretation’. This interpretation solves several longstanding puzzles and helps us better understand Spinoza's arguments for some of his most famous doctrines, including his parallelism doctrine and his theory of sense perception. It also undermines a widespread view about the relationship between the three fundamental, undefined notions in Spinoza's metaphysics: causation, conception and inherence.

Does Spinoza Think the Bible Is Sacred?

Does Spinoza think the Bible is sacred? One does well at first to notice the obvious, that it is Spinoza himself who asks the question in what sense the terms "sacred" and "divine" should "be applied to Scripture and to any inanimate thing." Yet his reply is considerably less obvious. Readers of Spinoza know that he contests God's authorship of the Bible, seems to find indifferent much of its contents, disparages rabbinic and medieval Jewish philosophical interpretations, relegates biblical commandments to the ancient world, and locates the Bible among things inanimate. Yet he also argues that the Bible is divine, grounding this judgment in the hermeneutical principle that "nothing is sacred or profane or impure in an absolute sense apart from the mind, but only in relation to the mind." My paper considers the structure and implications of Spinoza's argument relating the divinity of a text, of this text, to the mind, taking seriously the multiple stakes involved in his day and in ours, as well as the sheer complexity of and tensions in Spinoza's view. While there are many dimensions to Spinoza's attitude towards Judaism, Jewish thought, religion, and the politics of religion, I claim that there is something fundamental about his concept of the Bible and his question concerning the sacred that grounds all of these regions of interest and that renders the Theologico-Political Treatise a single, complexly balanced work, albeit one whose measure we are still assessing.

Oppositional Ideas, Not Dichotomous Thinking: Reply to Rorty

It is an honor to reply to Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, especially given that her astute and creative interpretations of Spinoza have been an inspiration for my own work. Along with others, her work has shown me how to think not only about but with Spinoza. Such a practice of philosophy entails perhaps a greater measure of risk, since it aims not only to analyze Spinoza's arguments but to show what they can do, how they can transform our own ways of thinking and living. Rorty finds that my own appropriation of Spinoza toward a reconcep tion of ideology critique falls short, however, by (a) failing to take Spinoza's mind-body identity seriously and by (b) advocating a of ideas rather than an enlargement of perspective. She presents an illuminating analysis of how, according to Spinoza, dichotomies serve as blunt provisional tools that become counterproductive once understanding is reached. She suggests that I preserve certain distinctions to the detriment of my own liberation project, such as the distinction between the truth of an idea and its persuasive force. As part of criticism (a), she admonishes me for neglecting the importance of material conditions, and with criticism (b) she suggests that the imagery of battle misconstrues the project of becoming rational and the power of truth. Below I will try to show that we do not disagree about either the importance of material conditions for a project of political transformation or the identity of mind and body in substance. We do disagree, however, about the character of ideology critique. I will offer an example, in an attempt to demonstrate why it is neither a distortion of Spinoza nor strategically counterproductive to understand the project of thinking as an effort of what I call resistant recon struction within the attribute of thought.

The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World (review)

The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World, by Matthew Stewart. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006. 351 pp. $25.95. In The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World, Matthew Stewart paints a portrait of the relationship between Spinoza and Leibniz as the defining controversy of modernity, and one that persists as the core behind many of our disputes today. The differences between the two thinkers are so multitudinous that Stewart could have titled the book Leibniz is from Mars and Spinoza is from Venus. Leibniz, consumed by his pursuit of fame and fortune, was constantly ingratiating himself with the theological, political, and scientific elite of the day. As one of history's greatest polymaths, his corpus consists of tomes of correspondences in which he discusses the deepest issues in math, science, theology and philosophy-all in addition to his courtier career. Spinoza, by comparison, led a very sedate life. After his excommunication from the Jewish community, he earned a meager living grinding lenses, and pursued philosophy at night. Though he too had a group of correspondents and had written several books, his works, containing most notably his unpublished Ethics, fit neatly into one of the drawers of his desk. Leibniz and Spinoza, whose personal and social lives could hardly differ more, would differ in their philosophical opinions as well. Though rich in its depiction of the times and circumstances of Spinoza's and Leibniz's different lives and livelihoods, the nucleus of Stewart's book, at least for the philosopher or historian of ideas, is his characterization of the philosophical clash between these two bulwarks of modernity-one a protector of modernity's theological and medieval heritage, the other insuring the advancement of modernity's commitment to science and secularism. What is perhaps most opportune is that Spinoza and Leibniz both lived during the interface of these two conflicting world views, and more so that their acute defense of each may well account for the conflict that persists today. This is especially true since each embraces the modern commitment to reason; no matter how divergent their two views, Spinoza and Leibniz both understand their systems to uproot and expose the implications of a rational God. Leibniz became increasingly aware of Spinoza, as well as the threat he posed to Leibniz's theological aims and beliefs, with the firestorm of criticism that followed the publication of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Though perhaps unexceptional today, Spinoza's arguments shook the very pillars of the theocratic society in which he lived. His aim was to challenge the divine authorship of the Bible, to draw out the essentially human element, and thereby to overthrow the political system predicated on its authority. While theologians in the Netherlands and, eventually, across Europe reviled the work as, for instance, defecated erudition and [a] masticated critique, Leibniz was among the few who saw in it a considerable threat to the theology of the day, and was determined to respond with intellectual rather than ad hominen refutation. This was the impetus of Leibniz's flirtation with spinozism. Through his many intellectual circles Leibniz began to appreciate, and perhaps fear, the ideas of the atheist Jew, and eventually visited Spinoza personally in the Hague. What transpired during their time together remains concealed in history, but Stewart musters strong evidence that Leibniz was in fact greatly affected by Spinoza's philosophical ideas on God, substance, and individuality. So affected, in fact, that the fundamental claims of Leibniz's metaphysics can be traced, Stewart contends, to Leibniz's stated rejection of spinozism. Despite admitting to having once stood on the precipice of spinozism, Leibniz's position diverges sharply from Spinoza's at four major points. First, Leibniz rejects Spinoza's identification of God with nature, and argues instead that God must be an agent, i. …

Freedom of Speech and Philosophical Citizenship in Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise

In this essay, I challenge genealogies that anoint Baruch Spinoza the founder of liberal democracy and liberal individualism. Spinoza's departure from mainstream liberal individualism manifests most starkly in his argument for freedom of thought and expression–the argument invariably cited to prove Spinoza's liberal credentials. When Spinoza defends freedom of speech, in The Theologico Political Treatise, he endorses a mode of democratic citizenship, and an ethos of public discourse, devoid of the heroic self-display endorsed by theorists like John Stuart Mill. According to Spinoza, philosophy and democracy are mutually reinforcing: philosophers can pursue challenging lines of inquiry in a democracy that grants freedom of speech, and the democracy that welcomes philosophy proves more resilient than a tyranny that polices opinion. Philosophy enhances democracy because philosophers comport themselves in ways that expand egalitarian community: specifically, philosophers observe anonymous protocol. According to Spinoza, democratic philosophers should aspire to the role of courteous friend–not the role of celebrity, martyr, or disciple. Spinoza's argument for anonymity remains relevant for contemporary democratic theorists: Spinoza offers a compelling alternative to dominant modes of philosophical citizenship.

IDENTITY AND DISTINCTION IN SPINOZA'S ETHICS1

Abstract: In Ethics 1p5, Spinoza asserts that “In Nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute”. This claim serves as a crucial premise in Spinoza's argument for substance monism, yet Spinoza's demonstration of the 1p5 claim is surprisingly brief and appears to have obvious difficulties. This paper answers the principle difficulties that have been raised in response to Spinoza's argument for 1p5. The key to understanding the 1p5 argument lies in a proper understanding of the substance-attribute relationship and the principles of metaphysical individuation that Spinoza accepts.

Freedom and Free Will in Spinoza and Santayana

Baruch Spinoza is known for his powerful notion of freedom, which consists in a certain partial autonomy firmly situated within his natu ralism. He offers the view that individuals have freedom of action, in a measure, because they have a place in nature, and, within that locus, they may exert a real influence, although that influence is not absolute and indeed is severely limited. It is through this influence that freedom has its relevance and moral significance. Our salvation will come, if it comes at all, through following the dictates of reason?the unique path to freedom. Only confusion and error can arise when the matter is dis cussed in terms of a free will based on indeterminism. Spinoza has an earnest skepticism about the reliability of the will and the commonsense notion of how thought leads to action. Indeed, the will is not a cause of action, but an aspect of mind, and the function of mind is solely to think. On all these points, George Santayana adopts very similar positions; indeed, one might conjecture that he developed his notion of freedom with that of Spinoza as the basic starting point. This would be unsur prising, since he acknowledged Spinoza as his master in many aspects of his thought.1 Most basic here is their shared opinion that human beings are a part of the natural physical cosmos and derive their incom plete autonomy through participation in it, not through an intervention from something beyond nature. Santayana endorses Spinoza's argu ments that a free will that appeals to randomness and indetermination is completely at odds with the tight economy and single-mindedness required for genuine and effective self-determination. Both disavow the ories that take will to be the fundamental concept in the analysis of free dom. Instead, they stress the tendency of people to delude themselves, and they adopt a more classical account of freedom in terms of self

Shylock and the Jewish question

Much attention has been paid recently to the place of Shylock in the history of anti-Semitism. Most scholars have agreed with Harold Bloom that Shakespeare's famous villain is drawn with a murderous and that Shakespeare uncritically mirrors the rife anti-Semitism of his times. While others see only gross caricature in The Merchant of Venice, however, Martin Yaffe finds a subtle analysis of the Jew's place in a largely Christian society. In Shylock and the Jewish Question, Yaffe challenges the widespread assumption that Shakespeare is, in the final analysis, unfriendly to Jews. He finds that Shakespeare's consideration of Judaism in The Merchant of Venice provides an important contrast to Marlowe's virulent The Jew of Malta. In many ways, he argues, Shakespeare's play is even more accepting than Francis Bacon's notably inclusive New Atlantis or the Jewish philosopher Benedict Spinoza's argument for tolerance in the Theologico-Political Treatise. Emphasizing that The Merchant of Venice is a work of political philosophy as well as literature, Yaffe raises the intriguing possibility that Shakespeare presents Shylock not as a typical Jew, but as a bad one. Though the book focuses on the Jewish question, it has larger implications for our thinking in a number of areas: the rise of liberal democracy, the development of religious toleration, the relation of church and state, and the interrelation of politics, economics, and religion--in short, a whole range of issues basic to the conception of modernity. Highly recommended for all readers.--D. O. Dickerson, Judson College There is extraordinary virtue evident when scholars confront one of the great intellectual shibboleths of anti-Semitism in something like mortal combat and come out above the current fads. Was William Shakespeare anti-Semitic? [Yaffe] takes on this controversy with brilliant forthrightness and courage.--Baltimore Sun

Spinoza's infinite extension

My examination of Spinoza's arguments for the infinity of extended substance (physical space) lead to a comparison of his views with the anti-Kantian arguments offered by Moritz Schlick, and finally to some general remarks concerning Spinoza's concept of infinite magnitude, and its limitations from a contemporary perspective.

Constitutive Free Speech Justifications: Spinoza's Arguments from Human Nature and Personal Merit

Constitutive Free Speech Justifications: Spinoza's Arguments from Human Nature and Personal Merit

On the Theological Roots of Spinoza's Argument for Monism

On the Theological Roots of Spinoza's Argument for Monism

Des passions et de la compétence politique

It is possible to find any consistency in Spinoza's heterogeneous argument leading to the abrupt conclusion (last page of his interrupted « Tractatus politicus ») that « women cannot rule ». A detour through Spinoza's « Ethics » where it is shown that Passions (here Jealousy) tend to interfere with the requirements implied by social agreement, is needed in order to understand the logic underlying Spinoza's argument. While, according to Real-Politik, it is impossible to hold absolute command over passions. It is clear that women are the cause of dissension between men, since they are objects of a contrary desire to social agreement and impossible to share. Thus the reason why women are not suited for government is not some intrinsic inability ; it is rather due to some indirect consequence : since neither desire nor objects of desire can be suppressed, the only way out is to make these objects harmless. Conjugal appropriation is the way found to abolish the real danger inherent to a « free thing ». Once a woman is « in the power of her husband », she does not fulfil the logical and legal conditions required by citizenship. Quod erat demonstrandum. Women are thus expelled out of the political field where they would otherwise be cause of desire, therefore of discord.

The Identity of Thought and Object in Spinoza

The Identity of Thought and Object in Spinoza RICHARD E. AQUILA Two LINES OF THOUGHT converge in Spinoza's doctrine of the identity of thought and its object. Only one of them is contained in the "official" presentation of Spinoza's argument. It lies in the general conception he offers of the relationship among the various attributes of reality. Despite Spinoza's claims, however, the latter conception does not require acceptance of the doctrine in question. Furthermore, Spinoza's own response to objections concerning that doctrine's compatibility with his general conception of the attributes shows that the relation between thought and its object cannot be regarded as an instance of the "identity" obtaining among the attributes generally. Nevertheless, it is possible to see why Spinoza's doctrines led him to see an "identity" in both cases. Thus we may also see how two distinct lines of reasoning became blurred into one in his thought, to the inevitable advantage of the official presentation. The second--"unofficial"--motivation stems from a certain Cartesian assumption concerning the nature of thought and its object, combined with Spinoza's crucial departure from a doctrine essential to Descartes's own implementation of that assumption. The resulting conception, it will be interesting to see, anticipates a view elaborated in Sartre's Being and Nothingness. I. The Ethics 1 defends a remarkably original view concerning the relationship between bodily and mental events. Bodily events are (qua bodily) "modes" of the attribute extension; mental events are (qua mental) modes of thought. But substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that. Thus, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways.... therefore, whether we think of Nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought or under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes, that is to say, in every case the same sequence of things. (2, 7, note) Thus Spinoza defends a form of the "identity theory" with respect to mind and body. Since the human mind is a system of thoughts constituting an "idea" of the body (2, 10-13), a person's mental events are, regarded under the attribute of extension, the ' Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt,4 vols. (Heidelberg:CarlWinter, 1925),vol.2; trans. W. H. White (revisedby A. H. Stirling),ed. JamesGutmann(NewYork:Hafner PublishingCo., 1949).Referencesto Ethica appear parentheticallyby part number followedby propositionnumberin the text. [271] 272 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY very same events as those that constitute that person's body. However, Spinoza's view differs in two ways from some other forms of the identity theory. First, most recent defenses of that theory maintain that the concepts involved in a consideration of material events as mental are subject to a "topic-neutral" analysis. That is, what those concepts express concerning the events in question can be analyzed in terms that involve a conception neither of specifically mental nor of specifically material events. 2 On the other hand, the concepts involved in regarding those events in material terms cannot be analyzed solely in terms involving no specifically material concepts. To this extent there is, on such a view, a certain priority accorded to the material conception of the events in question. Spinoza's view rejects this priority: neither way of regarding events can be explained in more basic terms (1, 10). The second respect in which Spinoza 's version differs from other versions of the "identity theory" concerns Spinoza's claim that those events that, regarded materially, constitute a person's body are not simply the same events as those that, regarded mentalistically, constitute a person's mind. In addition, the events regarded in the former of these ways are the objects of the very ideas with which they are "identical": "a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways." Philosophers other than Spinoza have also espoused theories of mind-body identity embodying the first of these features...

Nature, number and individuals: Motive and method in Spinoza's philosophy

The paper is concerned with the problem of individuation in Spinoza. Spinoza's account of individuation leads to the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the view that substance (God or Nature) is simple, eternal, and infinite, and on the other, the claim that substance contains infinite differentiation ‐ determinate and finite modes, i.e. individuals. A reconstruction of Spinoza's argument is offered which accepts the reality of the contradiction and sees it as a consequence of Spinoza's way of posing the problem of individuation: it is argued that Spinoza's ontology is constructed on the basis of his methodology, rather than conversely. The contradiction appears in its acutest form in Spinoza's discussion of number. The paper explains the philosophical motivation behind Spinoza's Problematik and reflects on the historical context of the contradiction to which that Problematik gives rise.

Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism.

In this classic work the author undertakes to show how Spinoza's philosophical ideas, particularly his political ideas, were influenced by his underlying emotional responses to the conflicts of his time. It thus differs form most professional philosophical analyses of the philosophy of Spinoza. The author identifies and discusses three periods in the development of Spinoza's thought and shows how they were reactions to the religious, political and economic developments in the Netherlands at the time. In his first period, Spinoza reacted very strongly to the competitive capitalism of the Amsterdam Jews whose values were so thoroughly pervaded by an economic ethics that decrees the stock exchange approached in dignity the decrees of God, and of the ruling classes of Amsterdam, and was led out only to give up his business activities but also to throw in his lot with the Utopian groups of the day. In his second period, Spinoza developed serious doubts about the practicality of such idealistic movements and became a mature political partisan of Dutch liberal republicanism. The collapse of republicanism and the victory of the royalist party brought further disillusionment. Having become more reserved concerning democratic processes, and having decided that every form of government could be made consistent with the life of free men, Spinoza devoted his time and efforts to deciding what was essential to any form of government which would make such a life possible. In his carefully crafted introduction to this new edition, Lewis Feuer responds to his critics, and reviews Spinoza's worldview in the light of the work of later scientists sympathetic to this own basic standpoint. He reviews Spinoza's arguments for the ethical and political contributions of the principle of determinism, and examines how these have guided, and at times frustrated, students and scholars of the social and physical sciences who have sought to understand and advance these disciplines.