The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World (review)

Abstract

The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World, by Matthew Stewart. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006. 351 pp. $25.95. In The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World, Matthew Stewart paints a portrait of the relationship between Spinoza and Leibniz as the defining controversy of modernity, and one that persists as the core behind many of our disputes today. The differences between the two thinkers are so multitudinous that Stewart could have titled the book Leibniz is from Mars and Spinoza is from Venus. Leibniz, consumed by his pursuit of fame and fortune, was constantly ingratiating himself with the theological, political, and scientific elite of the day. As one of history's greatest polymaths, his corpus consists of tomes of correspondences in which he discusses the deepest issues in math, science, theology and philosophy-all in addition to his courtier career. Spinoza, by comparison, led a very sedate life. After his excommunication from the Jewish community, he earned a meager living grinding lenses, and pursued philosophy at night. Though he too had a group of correspondents and had written several books, his works, containing most notably his unpublished Ethics, fit neatly into one of the drawers of his desk. Leibniz and Spinoza, whose personal and social lives could hardly differ more, would differ in their philosophical opinions as well. Though rich in its depiction of the times and circumstances of Spinoza's and Leibniz's different lives and livelihoods, the nucleus of Stewart's book, at least for the philosopher or historian of ideas, is his characterization of the philosophical clash between these two bulwarks of modernity-one a protector of modernity's theological and medieval heritage, the other insuring the advancement of modernity's commitment to science and secularism. What is perhaps most opportune is that Spinoza and Leibniz both lived during the interface of these two conflicting world views, and more so that their acute defense of each may well account for the conflict that persists today. This is especially true since each embraces the modern commitment to reason; no matter how divergent their two views, Spinoza and Leibniz both understand their systems to uproot and expose the implications of a rational God. Leibniz became increasingly aware of Spinoza, as well as the threat he posed to Leibniz's theological aims and beliefs, with the firestorm of criticism that followed the publication of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Though perhaps unexceptional today, Spinoza's arguments shook the very pillars of the theocratic society in which he lived. His aim was to challenge the divine authorship of the Bible, to draw out the essentially human element, and thereby to overthrow the political system predicated on its authority. While theologians in the Netherlands and, eventually, across Europe reviled the work as, for instance, defecated erudition and [a] masticated critique, Leibniz was among the few who saw in it a considerable threat to the theology of the day, and was determined to respond with intellectual rather than ad hominen refutation. This was the impetus of Leibniz's flirtation with spinozism. Through his many intellectual circles Leibniz began to appreciate, and perhaps fear, the ideas of the atheist Jew, and eventually visited Spinoza personally in the Hague. What transpired during their time together remains concealed in history, but Stewart musters strong evidence that Leibniz was in fact greatly affected by Spinoza's philosophical ideas on God, substance, and individuality. So affected, in fact, that the fundamental claims of Leibniz's metaphysics can be traced, Stewart contends, to Leibniz's stated rejection of spinozism. Despite admitting to having once stood on the precipice of spinozism, Leibniz's position diverges sharply from Spinoza's at four major points. First, Leibniz rejects Spinoza's identification of God with nature, and argues instead that God must be an agent, i. …