Election Spending Research Articles

Advertising competition in presidential elections

Presidential candidates purchase advertising based on each state’s potential to tip the election. The structure of the Electoral College concentrates spending in battleground states, such that a majority of voters are ignored. We estimate an equilibrium model of multimarket advertising competition between candidates that allows for endogenously determined budgets. In a Direct Vote counterfactual, we find advertising would be spread more evenly across states, but total spending levels can either decrease or increase depending on the contestability of the popular vote. Spending would increase by 13 % in the extremely narrow 2000 election, but would decrease by 54 % in 2004. These results suggest that the Electoral College greatly increases advertising spending in typical elections.

English

Savings as a tool for domestic capital accumulation in developing countries has come under serious consideration in economic and financial development. However, savings in Ghana is characterized by very low tendencies, irregular trend and unenthusiastic attitudes of citizens towards it at the micro and macro levels. This study examined the effect of economic factors, election spending and health financing scheme on aggregate savings in Ghana. Time series spanning from 1997 to 2012 was used. The Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS), Johansen Cointegration technique and Vector Error Correction method were used for data analysis. The study revealed that the financial (interest rate spread and Treasury bill), and real sectors (GDP growth and international investment) and health financing scheme had significant effect in influencing aggregate savings in the long run. In addition to past savings, 91-day Treasury bill, age dependency and health financing scheme were short-run determinants of aggregate savings in Ghana although these dynamics were not immediate. As such, policies to influence aggregate savings should consider not only the financial instruments but also deal with the socio-demographic and the real sector dynamics of the economy as a whole in the intermediate to long-run basis. Key words: Aggregate savings, socio-economic, election spending, cointegration, error correction, Ghana a.

The 'Brave Little State of Vermont' Can Overcome Citizens United All by Itself

Supreme Court decisions in Citizens United v. F.E.C. (2010) and McCutcheon v. F.E.C. (2014), and legislation passed by Congress in 2014 each drastically increased the amount of money in politics. Vermont can take action now to restrain the corrupting effects of money in elections without running afoul of Citizens United. With a result joined by all nine justices, in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, the Supreme Court distinguished from the First Amendment reasoning in Citizens United and approved legislative recusal as a method to prevent corruption. Recusal rules straightforwardly address the heart of the problem of corruption of democracy while entirely avoiding entanglement in the convoluted and mostly improvised First Amendment reasoning in the line of cases beginning with Buckley v. Valeo and continuing with Citizens United. Although outrage over Citizens United was initially directed toward advocacy of a constitutional amendment to permit restoration of election spending restrictions, the Supreme Court decision in Nevada Commission on Ethics means that updating our recusal rules provides a far easier and faster way for Vermont to begin to stamp out the corrupting influence of money on elections. A model updated recusal rule is presented.

Thou Shalt Not Electioneer: Religious Nonprofit Political Activity and the Threat “God PACs” Pose to Democracy and Religion

The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC invalidated a longstanding restriction on corporate and union campaign spending in federal elections, freeing entities with diverse political goals to spend unlimited amounts supporting candidates for federal office. Houses of worship and other religious nonprofits, however, remain strictly prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity as a condition of tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3). Absent this “electioneering prohibition,” religious nonprofits would be very attractive vehicles for political activity. These 501(c)(3) organizations can attract donors with the incentive of tax deductions for contributions. Moreover, houses of worship need not file with a government agency to begin operating and deriving tax benefits, and the IRS has shown reluctance to aggressively audit their activities. Two circuits have previously upheld the electioneering prohibition against legal challenges, but recent jurisprudential shifts expose the tax code provision to challenge under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which directs courts to apply strict scrutiny to facially neutral laws that substantially burden the free exercise of religion. First, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. greatly reduced the barriers to successful RFRA claims. Second, by lifting restrictions on political speech for many other types of organizations, Citizens United magnified the burden the electioneering prohibition imposes on religious organizations. The decision also rejected compelling state interests that might have previously shielded the law from invalidation. This Note is the first analysis of the electioneering prohibition’s vulnerability in this new legal climate. Despite these significant developments, this Note ultimately concludes that the electioneering prohibition can survive RFRA challenges because the prospect for widespread use of religious organizations as conduits for political activity undermines the values reflected in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

The Demand for Healthcare Regulation: The Effect of Political Pressure on Occupational Licensing Laws

Using data on political spending in state elections and information on occupational licensing laws, this study considers the role of political contributions by healthcare professional interest groups in states’ decisions to enact occupational licensing laws. These laws govern how different professions may operate in healthcare markets, and while they ostensibly exist to protect consumers, these laws can also insulate professionals from competition in healthcare markets. Higher political spending by physician interest groups increases the probability that a state maintains licensing laws restricting the practices of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs) — two professions that compete with physicians in healthcare markets. Conversely, increased spending by hospital interest groups increases the probability that a state allows NPs and PAs to practice with more autonomy. Groups directly associated with NPs and PAs have little effect on licensing laws. These results are consistent with the investment theory of political spending.

How Do Campaigns Matter?

A review of the evidence leaves no doubt election campaigns do matter in a variety of important ways. The serious questions concern when, where, why, how, for what, and for whom they matter. This essay reviews a selection of high-quality studies that address these questions, focusing on several distinct lines of research that have been particularly productive in recent years: on the effects of events and advertising in presidential elections; on the effects of campaign spending in elections for down-ballot offices; on the effects of mobilization campaigns on voting turnout; on campaign influences on the vote choice (with special attention to the effects of negative campaigns); and on the nature of persuadable voters. It also offers some suggestions of areas where additional research should be productive.

Donation and Spending Limits in Political Finance Law and their Compatibility with the AustralianConstitution

Events of 2014, particularly in New South Wales and Queensland, have sharpened focus on the relation between money and politics, with calls for increased regulation of donations to, and expenditure by, political parties. This is despite the existence of other features of our political system seeking to limit corruption, like disclosure laws, anti-corruption bodies, independent media, and Australia's standing as one of the least corrupt countries. This paper considers whether caps on political donations and limits on election spending are consistent with the Australian Constitution. The High Court has found that document requires freedom of political communication. This is subject to laws passed to further a legitimate objective, where their impact on the freedom is proportionate to a legitimate objective. Here, likely justifications for such restrictions are the need to reduce corruption and to create a level playing field. This article challenges both arguments, suggesting such restrictions are constitutionally invalid.

Third Party Election Spending in Canada and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract Both the United Kingdom and Canada recently implemented substantial revisions to their electoral laws, including policy measures designed to regulate third parties. Despite similar policy objectives, the limits placed on third parties vary significantly between the two countries, leaving the potential for significant differences in practice. Using an original dataset, this article undertakes a comparative study of recent national elections in each country (UK: 2005, 2010; Canada: 2004, 2006, 2008) to evaluate policy outcomes. Our analysis finds that while there are differences in both the number of third parties and the range of spending in Canada and the UK, one commonality is apparent: there is no “typical” third party in either country. As anticipated, given differences in spending limits, UK third parties outspent their Canadian counterparts; however, in both countries third parties rarely came close to spending to their limits. Rather, third parties are found to play a limited role, at least...

Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant: Public Disclosure of Electoral Advocacy in Union Member Communications

In United States v. CIO (1948), the Supreme Court held that the statutory ban on direct union spending in federal elections could not be applied to electoral advocacy by leaders of an organization to the members of that organization. As a result, federal and state laws now generally exempt such internal communications from the definition of expenditure under campaign finance laws. Then, in its landmark 2010 decision Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court declared the ban on direct corporate campaign spending itself unconstitutional. The Federal Election Commission soon thereafter announced the ruling would also apply to unions. There is now no doubt that an organization such as a union or a corporation may directly spend money on electoral advocacy. Given this framework, this Note argues that internal communications between the leaders of an organization – in particular, a union – and its members that directly advocate for or against the election of a particular candidate can and should be subject to mandated public disclosure.

The Effects of Increased Campaign Finance Disclosure: Evaluating Reform Proposals

Campaign disclosure requirements vary considerably across the United States. In some states, it is difficult to learn much about outside group spending in non-federal elections; other states have recently passed disclosure laws that go beyond federal requirements. This study builds upon a growing body of research on the impact of anonymous spending to address two questions about campaign finance disclosure: what types of disclosure information voters pay attention to and whether there are partisan differences in responsiveness to campaign finance data. We address these questions via an experiment in which people are randomly assigned to receive additional information about the donors to an outside group. We find some evidence that campaign finance information affected candidate evaluations and vote choice, but that subjects’ evaluations were particularly sensitive to whether they were told that out-of-state donors were behind the outside group. Further, we find little evidence that partisan identification conditioned these treatment effects; Republicans, Democrats, and Independents responded to our experimental stimuli in much the same way.

What's Money Got to Do with It? Fostering Productive Discussions about Campaign Finance

Schools throughout the United States provide instruction on democracy, voting, and major institutions of government, but often excluded from the curriculum is a central reality of our political system: the role of money in elections. This article provides background information and pedagogical strategies to help teachers foster productive discussions on this issue. First, we summarize recent increases in U.S. election spending and five schools of thought on how to address this trend. Then we present various classroom discussion and assessment strategies for supporting students’ learning about our current campaign finance system and its potential alternatives. These processes can facilitate students’ development of important civic knowledge and skills and also fulfill a variety of state and national standards.

Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure

In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court swept away long-standing limits on corporate spending in federal elections, but it also strongly affirmed the constitutionality of robust disclosure and disclaimer requirements. In the wake of that decision, many proponents of campaign finance regulation have turned their attention to disclosure as the best remaining mechanism by which to regulate money in elections. At the same time, opponents of campaign finance regulation — including the legal team behind Citizens United — have trained their sights on disclosure, filing new challenges to existing disclosure require- ments in a number of state or federal courts, although so far with only limited success.Relying on the Longitudinal Elite Contributor Database (LECD) — an original database developed by one of the authors to track the population of unique individual campaign contributors from 1980 through 2008 — this essay tests the Supreme Court’s rhetoric about disclosure, and some of the premises of our current policy debates about money in politics, against the realities of the FEC’s existing disclosure regime. In particular, we find that compliance with existing disclosure regulations is inconsistent and that the current regime fails to identify the most potentially influential players in the campaign finance system. In so doing, the current system fails to provide basic facts about how candidates (and committees) finance their campaigns. We suggest that much of what the Court and reformers assume about disclosure is wrong — that their views are premised on an effective and well-functioning disclosure regime that in fact bears scant resemblance to the system of disclosure maintained by the FEC. Correcting these misunderstandings will be critical to crafting better reform proposals. And the stakes could not be higher: disclosure may well be the only constitutionally viable and politically feasible method of regulating money in elections in a post-Citizens United world.

Independent Spending in State Elections, 2006–2010: Vertically Networked Political Parties Were the Real Story, Not Business

This article examines independent spending in state elections before and after the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC. We find that the decision did not have much of a direct effect on business spending, despite public expectations. Increases were higher in the aggregate in states that prohibited corporate spending before the decision. However, the major growth was not in the business or labor sectors, but in the network organiza- tions of political parties - and most particularly the national organizations of state elected and party officials. Contrary to some contemporary views, these developments cannot be understood as a displacement of within-state money from parties to interest groups. Instead, national party organizations were oper- ating across state lines, deciding whether to contribute to formal party com- mittees or their party allies as local circumstances might dictate. This complex movement of money belies any theorizing that would treat a decline in the pro- portional role of formal party spending as equivalent to a zero-sum increase in the non-party power of interest groups. Rather, we see the pattern of independ- ent spending as part of a larger story of change in American political parties. These changes now include vertically networked parties operating across levels of jurisdiction, alongside the horizontal networks receiving attention in recent scholarship.

The Determinants of Campaign Spending in Mayoral Elections

We examine why levels of campaign spending vary across U.S. mayoral elections. Although there has been debate about the extent to which spending is damaging or beneficial, few analyses have sought to understand the factors that inhibit or promote campaign spending. We focus on the impact of city-level attributes, political institutions, and contest-specific factors and find that a number of the variables we consider have important effects on campaign spending, including local government form, term length, scope of local government, an experienced candidate pool, and open seat and runoff elections. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for local policy makers.

The Big Split: Why Did Output Trajectories in the ASEAN-4 Diverge after the Global Financial Crisis?

The global financial crisis originated in advanced economies, but had a major impact on emerging markets. The impact, however, was not uniform. Even in a relatively homogenous group of countries such as ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), there were considerable differences both in terms of instantaneous impact of the crisis and in terms of output performance relative to trend. There are several main reasons for the divergence. First, trade shocks had a larger impact on more open economies (Malaysia and Thailand). Second, countercyclical fiscal stimulus in Indonesia and the Philippines was larger and was sustained longer. Third, idiosyncratic factors pushed output up in Indonesia and down in Thailand. Such factors include investment-friendly structural reforms and fortuitously timed election spending in Indonesia, as well as political instability and natural disasters in Thailand.

Second-Order Elections, but also ‘Low-Cost’ Campaigns? National Parties and Campaign Spending in European Elections: A Comparative Analysis

This article provides an innovative empirical contribution to the understudied question of party spending in EU election campaigns through a comparison between the cases of France and Spain between 1994 and 2009 (and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain and Ireland). It shows that mainstream parties have become increasingly more reliant on state funding in EU elections as compared with national campaigns. It also illustrates that mainstream parties have restricted or even limited the resources that they have been willing to mobilise in EU election campaigns, a trend that contrasts with minor parties and with the ever-increasing expenditure that characterises national elections. National parties have also limited the expenditure related to public communication activities in EU elections, while most spending has been devoted to routine administration costs. Overall, the weak and even sometimes declining financial mobilisations of the relevant party organisations in European campaigns can throw new light on the persistent ‘second-order’ national character of EU elections.

Foreign Influence in US Elections after Citizens United versus FEC: China as a Case Study

As a response to Citizens United v. FEC, the House of Representatives sought to base legislation limiting Citizens United’s impact on U.S. elections. Known as, “Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections,” Act (the DISCLOSE Act or H.R. 5175), the Committee on House Administration hosted a series of discussions regarding the efficacy of the DISCLOSE Act.This testimony concerns the potential influence of foreign governments, through whole-owned corporations with U.S. subsidiaries, on U.S. elections post-Citizens United. In particular, the testimony focuses on socialist and post-socialist countries, like Russia, Vietnam and China, where ties between business and government are particularly strong. Indeed, many of these countries’ most successful corporations are controlled outright by the government. For example, in the case of China, three of its most profitable global corporations, Haier, China Telecom and China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCE), all of which have U.S. subsidiaries incorporated in Delaware, are officially government-run. While the Chinese government does not meddle in the corporation’s daily affairs, it will exert its influence if it suits the government’s self-interest. At times, that self-interest could be buying influencing in U.S. elections. Citizens United now creates a loophole where such meddling could happen. The DISCLOSE Act sought to address this loophole created by Citizens United. However, it never passed Congress.

Political Equality and the Regulation of Election Spending by Parallel Campaigners

The regulation of political finance, including the funding of political parties and election campaigns, remains contentious in many democracies. A particular focus of debate has been the regulation of ‘parallel campaigners’– that is, non-candidate and non-party political actors – wanting to influence the election outcome by bringing to bear their economic resources. Drawing on both recent unsuccessful and current attempts at reforming the regulation of election spending by parallel campaigners in New Zealand, this paper explores the conflict between the democratic right to freedom of expression and the idea that all citizens should have a fair opportunity for effective political influence. It is argued that Joshua Cohen's principle of political equality, which entails the balancing of these two values, provides a justifiable framework for regulating political finance, including parallel campaign expenditures, in liberal democracies.

Campaign Spending, Diminishing Marginal Returns, and Campaign Finance Restrictions in Judicial Elections

For years, scholars of elections have argued about whether campaign finance limitations adversely affect electoral competition. In this article, we examine how the institutional campaign finance restrictions differentially affect the performance of incumbents and challengers. Using elections for the state high court bench between 1990 and 2004, we demonstrate that candidate spending in judicial elections has diminishing marginal returns, but that the returns to challenger spending diminish more slowly than incumbent spending. Since this is the case, campaign finance restrictions that limit candidate spending disproportionately harm challengers, increasing the incumbency advantage and decreasing electoral competition. More specifically, we show that states with more stringent contribution limits have lower levels of candidate spending, and these restrictions thus put challengers at a competitive disadvantage.

Campaign Spending, Diminishing Marginal Returns, and Campaign Finance Restrictions in Judicial Elections

For years, scholars of elections have argued about whether campaign finance limitations adversely affect electoral competition. In this article, we examine how the institutional campaign finance restrictions differentially affect the performance of incumbents and challengers. Using elections for the state high court bench between 1990-2004, we demonstrate that candidate spending in judicial elections has diminishing marginal returns, but that the returns to challenger spending diminish more slowly than incumbent spending. Since this is the case, campaign finance restrictions that limit candidate spending dispropor- tionately harm challengers, increasing the incumbency advantage and decreasing electoral competition. That is, states with more stringent contribution limits have lower levels of candidate spending, and the restrictions thus put challengers at a competitive disadvantage.