Regulation Of Speech Research Articles

The law applicable to cross-border defamation on social media: whose law governs free speech in ‘Facebookistan’?

In the past decade, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have gone from being a novelty to becoming an essential part of many people's personal and professional lives. Like previous changes in communications technology, social media poses a legal challenge. Can existing laws be applied or adapted to this new context, or does it pose new problems requiring new solutions? This article examines one aspect of this question through an analysis of the private international law issue of what law applies (or should be applied) to cross-border defamation claims on social media. Cross-border defamation raises a range of issues, including private international law questions regarding which courts should adjudicate claims and which substantive law should be applied. While the jurisdictional issues are important and have a significant impact on the issues of applicable law, there are distinct questions and concerns raised by the choice of law question for cross-border defamation on social media. Indeed, it is a topic which perhaps raises some of the most difficult issues in private international law, as well as having important broader consequences for media law and free speech regulation. At a general level, it concerns choice of law in defamation, which has proven a particularly challenging subject in practice and in proposed law reforms – at present it remains excluded from both UK and EU statutory rules concerning choice of law in tort. More specifically, it concerns defamation online, a context which might be grounds for suggesting that a further specialised rule is required – a view taken by the ECJ in relation to jurisdiction over online defamation. And finally, it concerns defamation online on social media, which raises challenging issues in terms of adapting the law to new media contexts, as well as identifying the relevant ‘public’ within which a reputation is established. These are not just difficult practical questions, arising with increasing frequency in litigation, but also problems of principle which have broader implications. As social media become increasingly important modes of socialisation and communication, greater attention will need to be paid to the question of whose law governs standards of free speech on social media platforms – an important part of the question of whose law rules ‘Facebookistan’.

Segmented Publics and the Regulation of Critical Speech in China

In contemporary China strict censorship coexists with significant freedom of expression and restrictions are enforced inconsistently. Yet certain principles underlie determinations of what is acceptable public speech, depending on the institutional location of the utterance, the identity of the speaker and the time of the event. What is allowed depends on the specific circumstances, but it results from patterns in the institutional practices of Chinese politics that involve constraining debate within “segmented publics”. This article analyses how formal and informal rules limit discussions of particular issues to specific segmented publics, and how varying degrees of debate are permitted within these institutional fields, based on the expertise of their members or, in the case of associations, their engagement in specific areas of policy implementation. Another dimension of variation relates to the personalised character of authority in the Chinese system of governance, which means that leaders set the tone for debate within institutional spheres they control. State control, however, is only part of the story: segmented publics are dynamic spaces where boundaries are permeable, often contested, and constantly in formation. The operation of segmented publics is explored here through case studies of activism in the legal field; on women’s rights in the associational field; at the grassroots in resident and villager committees; and in oppositional publics.

Функциональность косвенных высказываний в интерпретационном режиме обучения англоязычной речи

The article looks upon communicative functions of utterances. In the author’s
 point of view, rules of speech are dependent on the aim of communication,
 situation of speech, communicants’ statuses, properties of speech
 channel and supposition. These aspects of communication are reflected in
 the context of English language studies. Using the theory of dictema and
 factors of speech regulation as the basis for research the author analyses
 indirect utterances in publicistic texts read at English language lessons.
 Interpretation activities of students help to discover implicit properties of
 the indirect utterances and notional components of texts. The aims of utterances
 and communicative intention are seen as the basis of post suppositional
 research in reading and listening of English language texts. The
 author singles out the following functions of indirect utterances: linking and
 compression of information, escalation of information, communicative emphasis,
 expressing emotions and assessments, confirmation, imperative
 function, starter in a conversation, informational and emphatic assertion
 function, duality of opinion function and providing background knowledge.

Supreme Court Preview:Reed v. Town of Gilbertto Address Content Neutrality in Sign Regulation

AbstractFor the first time in two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled in the 2014–2015 term to review the thorny planning and legal subject of local government regulation of outdoor signs and billboards and the core First Amendment requirement that regulations of speech be ”content neutral“. In basic terms, the content‐neutrality doctrine prohibits the government from regulating a speaker's content or message–including messages on outdoor signs. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Court will be asked to decide whether Gilbert, Arizona's sign code, which distinguishes among several categories of signs, including religious, political, and ideological signs, meets the content neutrality requirement. In so doing, the Court may provide direction on how far local governments can go in regulating speech based on message, and the Court can resolve a longstanding division among the federal appellate courts over the meaning of content neutrality

Book Review: A Practical Guide to Media Law, by Ashley Messenger Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents, by Lisa Gitelman

Ashley Messenger A Practical Guide to Media Law. Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc., 2015. 3 16 pp. Lisa Gitelman Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014.210 pp.Two newly published books on media law and the history of documents, both written by proficient scholars, make excellent textbook resources for a media law or journal- ism history course. Many books on media law focus on the primary legal concepts of First Amendment, libel, slander, copyright, privacy, Internet, digitization and file sharing-all valid tenets of any media law curriculum. Understanding these concepts is a must for the journalism student. However, the student should also know how cases involving media law disputes proceed through the court system, and this necessary foundation often is lacking in some media law works. A Practical Guide to Media by Ashley Messenger covers this thoroughly.The legal arena, with its terms, procedures, and traditions, can be intimidating to a new journalism student. Ashley Messenger's book resolves this issue by introduc- ing the reader first to the judicial process before tackling media law in the subse- quent chapters. It is this aspect that makes this book stand a notch above other media law books. In the preface, Messenger-a practicing media lawyer and media law professor-begins with a calming message that her work is intended to help non- lawyers understand the legal issues involved in modern communications and jour- nalism (p. xiii). In addition, she states further in the preface, Law is not static; it is dynamic (p. xiii). Her words set an important tone. For the classroom, especially, this is paramount to understanding the complex web the court system spins. Grasping certain legal concepts can be challenging for the student-or even the instructor who might have limited knowledge of the law or little introduction to the system and is tasked to teach basic legal concepts in newswriting or other undergraduate journal- ism courses.The book has twenty-one chapters, grouped into five comprehensive sections, each thoroughly discussing an aspect of media law. Each chapter provides sidebar material, such as information boxes, examples, figures, and frequently asked questions. At the end of each chapter, practical conclusions, or the main points of the chapter, are emphasized. These will help the reader to digest the material more clearly.In section 1, introductory material is presented, including the basics of the U.S. court system and the First Amendment. The first chapter is crucial. Students need to know how the judicial system is organized with two court systems, federal and state. We as faculty sometimes begin discussions on media law-focusing immediately on libel, copyright, and privacy-without explaining first the court system. The question then becomes, How can we expect students to know about media law if we don't share with them how a court case runs its course? The logic makes sense.Section 2 focuses on civil claims and the ways people can be sued for what they publish. Specific legal concepts highlighted are libel, privacy, copyright, and trade- mark infringement. Each of these topics is covered meticulously in separate chapters. The chapters also discuss using photos and music, both important to the multimedia business.Section 3 organizes issues related to the newsgathering process, such as access to information or places and civil and criminal liabilities for newsgathering activities. Messenger acknowledges that each state has its own laws addressing various liabili- ties, such as libel and open government laws. However, chapter 11 provides an effec- tive general overview of these areas.Section 4 looks at the ways the government can interfere with speech or press. These include authority of the Federal Communications Commission, rules regarding search and subpoena power, prosecution based on protests and other public speech, attempts to restrict publication of sensitive topics, and the regulation of election speech and advertising. …

The Hate Speech Diversion

Hate mongers have found it strategically useful to present themselves as defenders of free speech. The shift from advocate of hate to defender of free speech fits well with the hate monger's self-understanding as a victim of state oppression and a defender of Western values against multiculturalism. More often, though, the opposition to hate speech regulation has a principled basis. There are many committed libertarians who regard hate speech as odious but are nevertheless prepared to defend the right of others to engage in it. Their opposition to the restriction of hate speech rests on a commitment to individual liberty sand a concern about the reach of state power. While I think the civil position is mistaken, it is not without merit. What is perplexing though is the extraordinary energy that these advocates of free speech put into the fight against hate speech regulation. They seem convinced that the integrity of the free speech edifice depends on holding the line here. Yet they seem indifferent to the more significant ways in which freedom of expression is being eroded in Western democracies. Whether by design or not, the obsessive opposition to hate speech regulation diverts our attention away from more fundamental free speech issues concerning the character and structure of public disclosure, and more particularly the domination of public disclosure by commercial messages and the advertising form. But, of course, these are not issues that can be addressed by the courts, except in indirect ways, and that may partly explain the lack of attention they receive.In recent years the critics of hate speech regulation in Canada have focused on human rights codes restrictions. Some critics are opposed not to hate speech regulation per se but only to this form of restriction. Their concern is that the human rights process is poorly suited to the regulation of hate speech. I count myself among this group. Other critics are opposed to any form of hate speech restriction and human rights code regulation is simply the battleground on which they have chosen to conduct their fight. But there is another dimension to the attack on human rights code regulation of hate speech. Much of the recent criticism of such regulation seems designed to undermine the entire human rights system. In their criticism of this regulation, they spend more time talking about the corruption and incompetence of human rights institutions than about the value of free speech. The logic of their (unfounded) claims of corruption is that these institutions have no legitimate role and should be abolished. Their claims are rooted in a more general libertarian view that state power is inherently oppressive and corrupt.In this chapter, I will say something about the current state of hate speech regulation in Canada, before looking more closely at the attack on human rights laws and institutions, and the resonance these attacks have had in the mainstream media.

How to Write a Constitutional 'Revenge Porn' Law

Most of the recently enacted revenge-porn laws are content-based regulations of speech. They are, as such, unconstitutional unless (as is unlikely) they can either (i) pass strict scrutiny or (ii) fit within one of the recognized categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. However, by paying closer attention to the constitutional precedents, a legislature should be able to write a law that addresses the primary harms of revenge porn without being subject to strict scrutiny as content discrimination. One approach, suggested here, is to frame the law so that it establishes an otherwise valid non-speech crime and has a burden on speech that is only “incidental.” Such law should be able to avoid the content-discrimination trap and thus survive constitutional scrutiny for the same reasons that the harassment prohibitions of Title VII do. There are, however, no guarantees. Any such a law would still represent, in the final analysis, an initiative by government to suppress speech that it does not favor, and the basic meaning of the First Amendment is to prohibit exactly that sort of thing.

Words and Deeds: Gender and the Language of Abuse in Elizabethan Norfolk

Research into the regulation of speech in early modern England has tended to focus on common scolds and thus on the control of disorderly women. Yet scolds accounted for only a minority of those prosecuted for speech offences in Elizabethan England. If the definition of abusive speech is broadened, then men were as likely to be charged as women. The 1551 Act against Fighting and Quarrelling in Church expanded significantly the ecclesiastical courts’ jurisdiction, contributing to a climate of control over speech. In the archdeaconry of Norwich, almost a thousand people were charged in the 1580s either under the Act or for other forms of ‘heated’ speech. As the Church sought to implement the Reformation, it was most concerned about challenges to the liturgy, clergy and officers. Changes in the language of prosecution show how court priorities were altered. A shift from formulaic Latin to English reflected the disruption of gendered assumptions, as the courts placed new emphasis upon speech actions rather than reputation. To criticize authority was to do more than to speak words; it was to commit an offence. The gendered terms of scolding and brawling were combined in a charge which could be brought against either men or women. Gendered contrasts between male and female speech were maintained, but were pushed aside by concerns about the threat which disorderly speech presented to religious and political authority.

The Case Against Free Speech

Free societies employ a variety of institutions — including courts and schools — in which speech is heavily regulated on the basis of its content (and with regard to the cognitive infirmities of listeners) in order to promote other desirable ends, including discovery of the truth. I illustrate this with the case of courts and rules of evidence. Three differences between courts and the polity at large might seem to counsel, of course, against extending that approach more widely. First, the courtroom has an official and somewhat reliable (as well as reviewable) arbiter of the epistemic merits, while the polity may not. Second, no other non-epistemic values of speech are at stake in the courtroom, whereas they are in the polity. Third, the courtroom’s jurisdiction is temporally limited in a way the polity’s may not be. I argue that only the first of these — the "Problem of the Epistemic Arbiter" as I call it — poses a serious worry about speech regulation outside select institutions like courts. I also argue for viewing "freedom of speech" like "freedom of action": speech, like everything else human beings do, can be for good or ill, benign or harmful, constructive or pernicious, and thus the central question in free speech jurisprudence should really be how to regulate speech effectively — to minimize its very real harms, without undue cost to its positive values — rather than rationalizing (often fancifully) the supposed special value of speech. In particular, I argue against autonomy-based defenses of a robust free speech principle. I conclude that the central issue in free speech jurisprudence is not about speech but about institutional competence; I offer some reasons — from the Marxist "left" and the public choice "right"— for being skeptical that capitalist democracies have the requisite competence; and make some suggestive but inconclusive remarks about how these defects might be remedied.

The regulations relating to foodstuffs for infants and young children (R 991): A formula for the promotion of breastfeeding or censorship of commercial speech?

The regulation of commercial speech in the interests of public health is an issue which recently has become the topic of numerous debates. Two examples of such governmental regulation are the subjects of discussion in this article, namely the prohibition on the advertising and promotion of tobacco products, as well as the proposed prohibition on the advertising and promotion of infant formulae and other foods and products marketed as being suitable for infants or young children. The article seek to evaluate the recently proposed regulations published in terms of the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act in the light of the reasoning by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Limited v Minister of Health 463/2011) [2012] ZASCA 107 (20 June 2012) decision, and in particular in terms of the section 36 test of reasonableness and proportionality found in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It argues that, although the South African Department of Health must be applauded for its attempt at improving public health in the country, some of the provisions of the proposed regulations are not constitutionally sound. It will be contended that, despite the fact that the promotion of breastfeeding is a laudable goal, the introduction only of measures which restrict the right to advertise these types of products will not necessarily achieve this objective.

Regulation of Speech and Media Coverage of Corruption: An Empirical Analysis of the Mexican Press

Restrictions to media freedom, in the form of repressive defamation legislation, are thought to affect the amount of information about corruption that the media report. Exploiting variation in regulation of speech across states in a federal country, Mexico, and using a novel data set based on content analysis of the local press, I estimate the effect of lack of freedom on the coverage devoted to acts of malfeasance by public officials. Corruption receives significantly less attention in states with a more repressive defamation law. Instrumental variable models corroborate the interpretation of the negative association between regulation and coverage as a causal “chilling effect.”

Does it Matter <u>How</u> One Opposes Hate Speech Bans? A Critical Commentary on <i>Libertt Pour LLHistoire</i>'s Opposition to French Memory Laws

This paper examines Liberte pour l'Histoire, a group of French historians who led the charge against that nation’s memory laws, in the process raising unique arguments not found elsewhere in the debate over hate speech law. Some of these arguments – such as a focus on how the constitutional structure of the Fifth Republic encouraged memory laws – advance our understanding of the connection between hate speech bans and political institutions. Other arguments, however, are more problematic. In particular, Liberte historians struggle to distinguish the Holocaust (which is illegal to deny) from the Armenian Genocide (which is not). The Liberte historians also quite hostile toward multiculturalism. While this reflects the French culture in which the historians operate, it is normatively quite unappealing. This is especially true given the existence of other, more inclusive European arguments against hate speech regulation, such as those of Danish cartoon publisher Flemming Rose and Maltese Judge Giovanni Bonello. There has to be a better, more inclusive way to oppose French memory laws.

The Fourth Circuit's Hocus-Pocus First Amendment Analysis of Sign Regulations

In Brown v. Town of Cary, the Fourth Circuit found a town's ordinance that regulated the size of residential signs, yet had an exception for holiday decorations and public art, was a content neutral regulation and constitutional. Although initially the court had to decide whether the deceased plaintiff had standing, the lynchpin issue was whether the ordinance was content neutral or content based regulation of speech. Content neutral laws, referred to as such because they are justified without reference to the content of regulated speech, are to intermediate This intermediate scrutiny requires a court to determine whether the law tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and whether it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. On the other hand, content based laws are specifically created to regulate speech based on its subject matter and are subjected to the strictest scrutiny. If the court determines that a law content based, the government must demonstrate that the law is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' Therein lies the rub.

Regulation of Speech in Multicultural Societies: Introduction

What to do about speech which vilifies or defames members of minorities on the grounds of their ethnic or religious identity or their sexuality? How to respond to such speech, which may directly or indirectly cause harm, while taking into account the principle of free speech, has been much debated in contemporary Europe, not least with respect to speech about, or by, Muslims. This introduction to the Special Issue on the ‘Regulation of Speech in Multicultural Societies’ argues that a sociopolitical approach, and sensitivity to power configurations, is necessary to complement the legal-normative perspective which predominates the ‘hate speech’ literature. Such an approach takes into account the national and international sociopolitical contexts which interactively shape and are shaped by debates about hate speech and its regulation. The politics and politicisation of speech and its regulation (both within and aside from state law) may thus offer a way of understanding specific forms of contestation and provide a framework for comparative analysis.

Freedom of Expression versus Racist Hate Speech: Explaining Differences Between High Court Regulations in the USA and Europe

The USA and European countries have developed radically different approaches to regulating racist hate speech over the past 50 years. This divergence is largely a function of rulings by the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. While the Supreme Court has elected to uphold the freedom to express inflammatory racism in public, the European Court has almost always sided with its 47 member states when they have enforced laws curbing racist hate speech. Although a number of scholars have described the differences between the USA and Europe, there is currently no theoretically informed explanation of this important divergence. In this article, I draw on scholarship about comparative law and freedom of expression to develop and test hypotheses about judicial regulation of racist speech in the USA and Europe. I argue that political cultural variables, legal texts and differences in jurisprudential norms strongly influence the overarching patterns of outcomes we see across jurisdictions. Yet, preferences of individual judges also matter, especially in cases that have shifted the trajectory over time within a region, or that have cut against the grain of the predicted pattern. I examine the course of hate speech regulation in the USA and in Europe, illustrating how the variables identified in the model affected court decisions in each region and reviewing specific cases that constituted turning points in the regulation of racist speech.

Hate Speech and Dialogue in Norway: Muslims ‘Speak Back’

This article addresses regulation of speech in culturally diverse contexts through a study of interfaith dialogue between the Church of Norway and Islam, using Jürgen Habermas' concepts ‘public discourse’ and ‘post-secular society’ and Katharine Gelber's idea of ‘speaking back’ to hate speech. The analysis is situated in the context of international and national human rights debates and integration policies and the political right's claims regarding the incompatibility between Islam and human rights, in particular freedom of speech. By claiming that Muslims cannot be integrated into Norwegian society because of an essential value conflict between Islam and Norwegian values, the right challenges the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state and its civic integration policy. Correspondingly, the interfaith dialogue which identifies with state integration policy has enabled some Norwegian Muslims to ‘speak back’ to right-wing discourse, and the act of ‘speaking back’ has increased these Muslims' capabilities to publicly identify with human rights at both national and international levels. This furthers their participation in public deliberation and strengthens the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state's civic integration project but raises the bar for the right.

Social Media in the Workplace From Constitutional to Intellectual Property Rights

Social media has become a dominant force in the landscape of modern communications. From political uprisings in the Middle East to labor disputes in Washington State, social media has fundamentally disrupted the way in which communications take place. As noted constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky explained, “technology has changed and so has First Amendment doctrine and American culture. It now is much more clearly established that there is a strong presumption against government regulation of speech based on its content.” Just as the government must tolerate more speech, the same thing is true about employers. Chemerinsky further notes that “for better or worse, profanities are more a part of everyday discourse.” Abrasive speech may be coarse from the word choice or may more readily upbraid the objects of the speech. Whether foul or abusive, such speech now pervades commercial and social media.Social media fundamentally upends the notion of the traditional commercial media environment and with that, it reverses the established legal doctrine from constitutional assumptions to everyday rules involving copyright, defamation, and unfair labor practice. For employers, these rules are particularly important to navigate because they effect the manner in which the companies communicate with the public, how employees communicate with each other, and how laws are restructuring the employee-employer relationship. The transformation is taking place with changing policies affecting trade secrets, confidential information, copyrighted material, aggregated data, trademarks, publicity rights, and endorsements.This article highlights the nature of the changes as they present the new paradigm shift and provides some guidance on how to prepare policies for the transitional model. The article tracks the rise of the many-to-many model of social media, its effect on commercial speech, intellectual property, and labor law. The article concludes with suggestions on employment policies geared to managing these changes in the modern workplace.

Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality

When then-Professor Elena Kagan emerged on the public stage in the mid-1990s, she declared “the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech serves as the keystone of First Amendment law.” In the last decade and a half, commentators and Supreme Court opinions regularly echoed that declaration. Yet the First Amendment does not mention “content neutrality.” It is an artifact of modern constitutional doctrine - a doctrine subject to a sustained barrage of judicial and academic criticism.Most scholarly critiques of content neutrality focus on First Amendment theory and Supreme Court opinions. After surveying these critiques, along with the incomplete defenses of content neutrality, this Article seeks illumination by shifting to a more grounded focus. I compare the 614 reported cases in which the lower federal courts deployed the doctrine between September 2009 and February 2013 with the First Amendment cases decided by the Roberts Court. I analyze what political science and behavioral psychology tell us about the way that the content neutrality doctrine is likely to function in setting the terms of interaction between the private actors and government officials who actually populate and seek guidance from the case law.Unlike the recent Supreme Court docket, contemporary content neutrality cases in the lower courts center on contests between potential “village tyrants” - local officials and street level bureaucrats who will often find it difficult to hold fast to tolerant ideals - and local dissenters who are likely to provoke them. In these struggles, there are important reasons to prefer a strong doctrine of content neutrality to its proposed doctrinal competitors. Content neutrality is important not as a first best rule to assure that the Supreme Court properly implements a theory of the First Amendment, but as a usable norm for the government actors who make decisions before court proceedings commence and for the polity to which those actors answer.Content neutrality frames the terms of engagement between the governed and the governors of the United States in ways that incline the “general spirit of the people and the government” to the protection of rights of free expression. Its flamboyant protection of speech repugnant to a variety of constituencies means that the lived reality of free expression will mobilize support from an array of political factions. Content neutrality is, as the Court maintained in laying the doctrine’s foundations, an important practical element of constitutional architecture that preserves a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”.

The Freedom to Offend? How the "Mohammad Cartoon Controversy" Has Influenced Public Debate on Canada's Hate Speech Regulation

The Mohammad cartoon controversy began in Denmark in 2006 when a Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, published twelve cartoons, the majority of which depicted the Islamic Prophet Mohammad. Denmark had already been engaged with questions about Islam's compatibility with Danish culture, and the murder of Theo Van Gogh made international headlines in 2004. Writer Kare Bluitgen's failed attempt to find an illustrator for his children's book about Mohammad prompted public debate.1 This debate revolved around self-censorship, and the publication of twelve cartoons of Mohammad was the response of the editorial department of Jyllands-Posten. The initial reaction was local, limited to discussion and a few protests, the largest of which included 5,000 peaceful protesters.2 It wasn't until a delegation of Danish imams went on a tour of the Middle East with a dossier including the cartoons that it sparked many protests, some peaceful, some violent, and subsequently became a global story. An interesting element of the controversy is how it started as a consideration of reactions to the images of Mohammad, yet it spawned a variety of other controversies, such as the acceptability of republishing the images at the center of the main story to accurately address the major controversy. In Canada, controversy surrounding the republishing of the Mohammad cartoons led to a national discussion on the purpose, legitimacy, and usefulness of Section 13, the hate speech regulation, of Canada's Human Rights Act and its implementation by the Canadian Human Rights Commissions. This discussion subsequently resulted in the Parliament of Canada's vote to repeal the controversial hate speech law in June 2012.

Internet Jurisdiction: A Survey of Legal Scholarship Published in English and United States Case Law

This study provides a survey of the case law and legal literature analyzing jurisdiction for claims arising out of Internet activity in the United States. A companion study, released simultaneously, explores similar issues as they are treated in the German legal system. The goal of the report is to identify trends in legal literature and case law and to serve as a comprehensive, objective resource to assist scholars and policy-makers looking to learn about the issues of jurisdiction on the Internet. The U.S. study shows that most academic scholarship discusses all three aspects of jurisdiction law — personal jurisdiction, choice of law and jurisdiction to enforce — within the individual articles. In addition, the literature treats a noticeably wide variety of legal areas — including, for example, analyses of specific cases, particular issues related to e-commerce, and the regulation of online speech — but overall, does not appear to have a consensus on an approach or solution that cuts across the varied areas of law addressed by the scholarship. Thus, in effect, a review of academic scholarship shows that Internet jurisdiction is as varied as the legal issues and fields of law it permeates.With respect to U.S. case law, Fordham CLIP's research indicates that issues surrounding Internet jurisdiction gravitate toward the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit more so than other federal circuits. Moreover, contrary to the body of academic literature, the research demonstrates that U.S. courts predominantly adjudicate matters of personal jurisdiction in Internet cases rather than other subsets of jurisdiction, and that Internet jurisdiction issues trend toward intellectual property and defamation cases. Lastly, the case law shows that, although the Zippo and Calder decisions remain the clear, predominant legal standards and tests for Internet jurisdiction matters, when and how these rules are applied by U.S. courts lacks uniformity.