Verba et Facta Ludicra Et Jocosa: Thomas Aquinas on the Moral Limits of Playful Enjoyment Elisabeth Uffenheimer PLAY HAS BEEN STUDIED over the past decades by scholars from various disciplines. Psychologists have stressed its role in child development, animal play has puzzled ethologists, and historians have understood play to be the central element for understanding culture. Philosophers have asked questions about its definition, its goal, its rationality. As a source of relaxation, it has been opposed to work, to seriousness, and to daily life.1 Thomas Aquinas wrote one explicit text on play—question 168 of the Secunda secundae2—in which he embeds his insights about the human being as a homo ludens in a rich philosophical [End Page 245] anthropology: we enjoy playing as rational, sensitive-emotional, embodied, and social beings. A subcategory of play is humorous words and deeds. In contrast to present-day studies on humor, Thomas is interested in the morality of humor rather than in its essence, thereby taking a fundamentally positive stance towards humorous play. For him the human person is homo ridens, the only creature that has the capacity to laugh and to make laugh.3 Throughout my analysis of Thomas’s texts, I shall argue for the following claims. First, Thomas’s texts on play and humorous play show that he considers the human being to be a homo ludens, homo delectans, and homo ridens. The capacity to play and to enjoy, and the possession of a sense of humor are undeniable and positive aspects of the make-up of the human being. Second, play can best be understood against the background of two passions of the soul, tristitia and delectatio. This point has not been stressed enough in the secondary literature on this topic. Third, eutrapelia, the specific virtue of play, concerns not only the mean between excess and lack of enjoyment, but is essentially a social virtue. Play contributes to our well-being as individuals in so far as it includes respect for our fellow human beings. As such it can help to express, sustain, and maintain our ethical relationships with our social surroundings.4 In the light of the above, this article is divided into three parts. Parts I and II will map out the philosophical anthropology [End Page 246] behind the idea of homo ludens. Part II discusses the pivotal role of the emotions in play. Part III will show that eutrapelia is essentially also a social virtue by focusing on two specific kinds of humorous play: derision and blasphemy. In the conclusion, I will point briefly to the relevance of Thomas for the contemporary discussion about the moral limits of play in general and of humorous play in particular. I. Homo Ludens: Play and Rest The Latin word for play (ludus) has different meanings: it can be a game of some kind, public games, sport; it can be spectacle, show, stage play, or social entertainment; it can be pastime, diversion, having fun, amusing oneself with others; and finally it can also be jest, joke, mockery, mimicry, banter, or ridicule. In this last case play includes humor and can be verbal or nonverbal. The different meanings of play show that one can be actively or passively involved in play. The common denominator of these different meanings is that play provides diversion, amusement, or enjoyment.5 Play is discussed by Thomas in his questions on temperance, and more specifically in his analysis of the annexed virtue of modesty, which concerns, among other things, our bodily movements and actions.6 The words and deeds of human social interaction can be either serious or playful (ludus).7 The point of departure in our analysis of play according to Thomas is that he emphasizes its beneficial consequences and distinguishes between its social and its individual purpose. Presupposing that we have a social nature, Thomas writes that play not only takes place in a social setting, but that it is necessary for human interaction (ludus est necessarius ad conversationem humanae vitae). It enhances community relations by bringing [End Page 247] about cohesion in a group of people.8 In his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle...
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