FARID MASROUR’S PENETRATING COMMENTS, focussing mainly on my essays The Given and Intentional Objects, fall into two parts. The first part describes three theses that characterise my views – (1) the non-relational character of intentionality; (2) content pluralism; and (3) phenomenal intentionalism – and argues that there are three specific tensions between all or some of (1)-(3). The second part questions whether I can hold that concrete particular objects are the intentional objects of mental states, compatible with my internalism about the mind. First, the tensions between (1)-(3). The first tension relates to (1) and (2). Masrour claims that a pluralism about content ought to eliminate the motivation for anti-realism about content, and he takes the non-relational view of intentionality to be a form of anti-realism about content. Just as Davidson’s pluralism about meaning removes the disagreement between different moral systems (since they must be interpreted as meaning different things with their evaluative words) and can lead to a kind of realism about morality; so Chalmers’s content pluralism removes the disagreement between Russellianism and Fregeanism about propositions, and leaves room for a genuine “relationism” about intentionality:
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