In a recent paper, Stephen Barker and Phil Dowe (2003)1 argue that multilocation is impossible. An object enjoys multi-location just in case it is wholly present at more than one (distinct) space-time region (106). One popular view that is committed to multi-located objects is endurantism, the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each time they are located.2 So if Barker and Dowe are right, endurantism is in big trouble. I am not an endurantist, but some of my best friends are. Fortunately for them, Barker and Dowe’s paradox can be resisted. Here, I attempt to show how. Here is a brief summary of Barker and Dowe’s argument. Endurantists say that enduring objects are not extended in time, which suggests that they are three-dimensional entities.3 Consider an enduring object O that is wholly present at each three-dimensional space-like hyperplane of a fourdimensional space-time region R. So for each such hyperplane r in R, O is wholly present at r. So O completely fills a four-dimensional region of space-time. Moreover, for any r in R, O has a part at r. But then O is