Soviet Troops Research Articles

Red army in Iran: Unknown «occupation»

The article is devoted to an actual topic, practically not covered in the historical literature and devoted to the stay of the Red Army in Iran during the Second World War. A legal assessment was given of the events of August 1941 - the entry of Soviet troops into Iran. The author proves that the actions of the government of the USSR from the point of view of international law cannot be characterized as «occupation». The article gives a detailed analysis of the Iranian claims regarding the stay of the Red Army units in Iran. Claims of both a material nature and with respect to the behavior of the Red Army are covered. It was proved that the overwhelming majority of claims were unfounded, and in those rare cases when the complaints of the Iranian side were based, the Soviet military authorities conducted thorough investigations, punishing the perpetrators. The article highlights the activities of the Red Army to ensure security of supplies under lend-lease, to combat banditry and terrorism on the Trans-Iranian railway, which transported military cargo to the USSR. The question of the relationship of soldiers and officers of the Red Army with the allies on the Anti-Hitler Coalition is being raised. The conclusion is drawn that the relations of the Red Army men with the Americans were more or less friendly. Soviet-British relations were tense. Also, the article raises issues related to the daily life of the Red Army in Iran - the problems they encountered in everyday life. The main scientific result obtained by the author is that the article substantiates the need for the Red Army to stay in Iran, stresses the importance of their contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany.

Red army in Iran: Unknown «occupation»

The article is devoted to an actual topic, practically not covered in the historical literature and devoted to the stay of the Red Army in Iran during the Second World War. A legal assessment was given of the events of August 1941 - the entry of Soviet troops into Iran. The author proves that the actions of the government of the USSR from the point of view of international law cannot be characterized as «occupation». The article gives a detailed analysis of the Iranian claims regarding the stay of the Red Army units in Iran. Claims of both a material nature and with respect to the behavior of the Red Army are covered. It was proved that the overwhelming majority of claims were unfounded, and in those rare cases when the complaints of the Iranian side were based, the Soviet military authorities conducted thorough investigations, punishing the perpetrators. The article highlights the activities of the Red Army to ensure security of supplies under lend-lease, to combat banditry and terrorism on the Trans-Iranian railway, which transported military cargo to the USSR. The question of the relationship of soldiers and officers of the Red Army with the allies on the Anti-Hitler Coalition is being raised. The conclusion is drawn that the relations of the Red Army men with the Americans were more or less friendly. Soviet-British relations were tense. Also, the article raises issues related to the daily life of the Red Army in Iran - the problems they encountered in everyday life. The main scientific result obtained by the author is that the article substantiates the need for the Red Army to stay in Iran, stresses the importance of their contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany.

The Liberation of Northern Norway in Stalin’s Post-War Strategy

ABSTRACT In the fall of 1944, during the stage of the preparation of the Soviet offensive in the Arctic, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union prepared several memoranda with the proposal to revise not only the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 in favor of the USSR, but also to install several Soviet military bases on the territory of Northern Norway, all the way up to Tromsø. Negotiations on this issue continued until 6 August 1945, when they were suddenly terminated. After 10 days, on 16 August 1945, the Soviet side not only renounced its claims to Svalbard and Bear Island, but also organized an urgent withdrawal of its troops from Norwegian territory. On 25 September 1945, all Soviet troops left Norway. What was the reason for such a rapid change in the behavior on the Soviet side? The hasty withdrawal of Soviet troops was associated with more favorable conditions that could be obtained by Stalin in the course of the post-war world order than the acquisition of military bases in the Arctic. Subsequent events showed that in exchange for the withdrawal of troops from Norway, Moscow received a number of very important concessions in Europe. In addition, Norway declared the Northern border province of Eastern Finnmark a demilitarized zone. This policy of the Soviet Union toward Norway at the end of the war largely determined the choice of the Norwegian government in favor of joining the NATO bloc in 1949 — an event that led to a new round of escalation of the Cold War in the Arctic.

Security policy of the Baltic states on the eve of World War II actions of the USSR to ensure its security in the Baltics

The article analyzes the situation in the Baltic countries during the interwar period with an emphasis on the period preceding the outbreak of World War II. Based on the analysis, a conclusion is drawn on the reasons and prerequisites for the annexation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the USSR, followed by the introduction of the Soviet troops on the territory of these countries.

FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)

FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)

What war-related sexual violence against Japanese women in Manchuria tells us about democracy in contemporary Japan

At the end of the Second World War, numerous Japanese women who resided in colonised areas of Imperial Japan, particularly Manchuria, were subject to sexual violence at the hands of Soviet troops and colonised local residents. ...

Evacuation of the German Population from the Zhytomyr General District (November 1943 – March 1944)

During the autumn of 1943, a mass evacuation of the German population took place from several occupied regions of Ukraine. One of them was the Zhytomir general district, where at that time more than 40,000 ethnic Germans lived. By early November 1943, its territory came under attack from the advancing Soviet troops. This was the impetus for the evacuation of the local German population. Its main initiator was the civil administration. SS personnel often played a supporting role. The Wehrmacht also took a noticeable part in this operation, especially from transport support. For transportation of the contingent, quite often (and at the beginning of 1944 exclusively), trains were used, which significantly accelerated the evacuation. Carts and vehicles were actively used only during its first phase. According to documents, the vast majority of refugees evacuated voluntarily, as they seriously feared new repressions by the Soviet government. At the same time, there were cases when the occupying authorities resorted to threats and forceful pressure against persons who, for one reason or another, decided to stay. The bulk of the refugees were initially transported to the General District of Volhynia and Podolia. Since January 1944, they were evacuated to the territory of the Bialystok district, where, according to the initial plans of the SS leadership, in the future, they were destined the role of settlers. However, in March 1944, this contingent was completely exported to Warthegau, where it remained until the end of hostilities in Europe.
 In the framework of this article, based on attracting documents from German archival funds, the organization, the course, and features of the evacuation of the German population from the territory of the Zhytomyr General District in November 1943 – March 1944 are considered.

HISTORY OF ONE CRIME: ANDRIY SPSAY AND THE CRACKS OF THE XX CENTURY

The article deals with the biography of the peasant Andrii Sapsai, whose life came at a time of the great turmoil in the first half of the twentieth century.On the eve of the 1917 revolution his family successfully farmed in the village Pryyut of Katerynoslav province. In the post-revolutionary years they continued to farm: they kept cattle, cultivated land. The turning point for the family was the dislocation and eviction from the village.The whole family was deported to live in the Urals at the Lisna Vovchanka station. There Andrii was sentenced under a political article. On the eve of the German-Soviet war he returned to Ukraine and settled not far from the village Pryyut.With the arrival of German troops he volunteered with the police, moved to the village Pryyut where he settled down in his house. He was responsible for sending local youth to Germany, searching the villages of those in hiding, and sending them to the collection point in the village Friesendorf, and from there escorted to the train station. Aboveall, Andrii Sapsai participated in the execution of the Jews of the village Kamyana in the Berestianabalka.In May 1942, police officers from the area were summoned to the Friesendorf meeting, for a total of 50 men arrived. The police chief Keller ordered everyone to get into two trucks and to go to the village Zlatoustovka.The policemen were brought to the Berestiana balka, which was located near the village, where a hole up to 20 m long, 2 m wide and 2 m deep had already been dug.They were informed that the Jews were going to be brought now and they would have to be shot. Those who would refuse to participate in the shooting would face severe punishment. Following the police the chief of the Friesendorf Gendarmerie, who had organized the whole process, arrived. In 1934 he left the territory of Ukraine together with some German troops, reaching Romania and leaving them there. In the summer of 1944 local authorities gathered those who had retreated with the Germans at the camp and they worked to rebuild the airfield and then they were transferred to the Soviet command. Then Andrii was called to the ranks of the Red Army by the field enlistment office. To the 4th platoon of the 1st military company, 375 special assault battalion 41 rifle regiment of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.He participated in the battles for the liberation of Hungary, in January 1944 became a German prisoner, and in May 1945 in the territory of Austria he was liberated by Soviet troops and again drafted into the army, where he served until 1946.

Perspectives on The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War

Perspectives on <i>The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War</i>

Evacuation of the German Population from Transnistria in March–July 1944

Introduction. During autumn 1943 – spring 1944 the systematic phased evacuation of the German population was carried out from the occupied Soviet regions. Its final phase was the operation of relocating more than 130 000 ethnic Germans from the Transnistria Governorate controlled by Romanian authorities to the territory of Warthegau. Materials and methods. The presented research is based on the historicism and objectivity principles. In the course of the work, the author uses special methods such as historical-systematic, chronological, historicaldescriptive, and historical-genetic. The Source base of the research consists of documents of archival funds of Germany, memoirs and partly materials from the German press. Analysis. The decision of the SS leadership to execute the evacuation of ethnic Germans from Transnistria was due to the further advance of Soviet troops in the southern direction. However, even at the planning stage, the German side was faced with serious problems that could disrupt the entire operation. Due to the fact that control over many transport communications was lost, evacuation routes could only run through the territory of Romania, Bulgaria, occupied Serbia and Hungary. Therefore, the German leadership had to initiate urgent negotiations with the authorities of some of these states. Especially difficult was the negotiation process with the Romanian side which did not want to provide any assistance in the evacuation of the Germans from Transnistria. The High Command of the Wehrmacht was also in no hurry to provide assistance (for example, in transport support). Results. Despite the above-mentioned problems, the SS leadership was still able to carry out this resettlement action for several months. Most Germans decided to leave their homes not under the administrative pressure from the occupying authorities, but voluntarily, guided exclusively by the instinct of their survival.

ДМИТРО БІЛІНЧУК-"ХМАРА" – ІСТОРИЧНИЙ ПОРТРЕТ КОМАНДИРА УПА ГУЦУЛЬЩИНИ

The author examined the life military and political activity of Dmytro Bilinchuk, who was the commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA – in Ukrainian) and the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) on the territory of the Carpathian region of Ukraine during the armed activity of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The researcher studied the history of D. Bilinchuk’s service in the «Peremoha» battalion of the Kolomyia Tactical Group of UPA (TV-21 «Hutsulshchyna») and his work in the underground of the OUN. The scientist analyzes the work of D. Bilinchuk in the Security Service of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, his participation in armed actions in the UPA military and combat units against the German and Soviet troops and security forces on the territory of Hutsul region. The author made a study of the Bilinchuk’s family investigated the reasons and prerequisites for D. Bilinchuk’s accedence to the Ukrainian liberation movement. The scientist used in the research a scientific historiographical base, archival published and unpublished materials from the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Kyiv. The basis of this scientific work is the Soviet criminal case No. 9866 (contains interrogation protocols of this UPA commander), which was not studied in the context of the study of the biography of D. Bilinchuk. At the same time, in the article the researcher provides biographical information of others UPA commanders and OUN supporters. In general, the author has studied the biography of D. Bilinchuk in the context of the history of the Second World War and the activities of the Ukrainian liberation movement in the middle of the XX century.

Призов, що не відбувся (до питання про спробу призову українців до польської армії у 1920 р.)

Background: In the summer of 1920 the Polish-Soviet reached its apogee. While Soviet troops were approaching Warsaw, the fate of Polish statehood was to be decided. Having suffered numerous casualties, captivity and desertion of servicemen, the Polish army needed additional replenishment. Desertion, panic, self-harm of the military turned out to be especially destructive for the army, which badly undermined its fighting capacity. Under such circumstances, the Polish authorities took the decision to conduct general conscription campaign, which also included national minorities. The topic of conscription into the Polish army in the summer of 1920 in Eastern Galicia, involving also Ukrainians, has not been the subject of special investigation. Some aspects are only partially mentioned in the works by Polish researchers. Domestic scientists have hardly touched upon this problem. Given this, the following topic remains its relevance. Purpose: The work is aimed to analyze the circumstances under which the military-political authority decided to conduct additional conscription campaign into the Polish army in the summer of 1920, to determine the attitude of conscripts to military service duty, and to reveal the factors that influenced the mobilization and its results. Results: The conscription campaign in Eastern Galicia in the summer and autumn of 1920 did not live up to the country authority’s expectations, since most conscripts avoided joining the army. That was due to the unfavorable development of the situation at the front (Soviet offensive, desertion), disorganization of the administrative apparatus, because of panic, and hasty evacuation), infectious diseases, Soviet propaganda. The failure of conscription was also caused by some subjective factors such as low level of national consciousness of recruits, poor understanding of the tragic circumstances in which the country found itself, unwillingness to serve and fight owing to the work in households, survival instinct, and cowardice. The attempt and idea to conscript Ukrainians into the Polish army was unrealistic from the very beginning due to the tense social and political relations, the negative attitude of Ukrainians towards the Polish state, and the unpredictable outcome of the situation in case of increasing number of Ukrainians in the army. Therefore, realizing the challenges associated with the growth of the number of Ukrainians in the army especially at the front country's authorities refused to implement this plan. Key words: 1920, Polish Army, deserters, conscription, Eastern Galicia, national consciousness.

„Na posterunku bojowym”. Wojska radzieckie w radzieckiej strefie okupacyjnej Niemiec/ Niemieckiej Republice Demokratycznej 1945–1954. Wybrane aspekty

The Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany was formed in June 1945. It consisted mainly of the troops of the 1st Belarusian Front with marshal Georgy Zhukov as the first commander-in-chief of the Group. The main task of these troops was to supervise the process of demilitarization and democratization of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany. Occasionally, the Group also secured the process of dismantling a large part of the German industrial infrastructure. The cost of living of the Soviet troops was a major burden on the budget of this zone, which was transformed into the German Democratic Republic in 1949. The significant demobilization of the Red Army (the Soviet Army since 1946) also affected the units stationed in eastern Germany. Their numbers fell in 1947, but some of them were not disbanded or withdrawn to the USSR; they remained as so-called cadre units, with limited numbers, fully armed and equipped. It was their development in 1949 and 1950, in the face of the tightening international situation, that allowed to significantly increase the numbers of the Group’s troops, estimated in the mid-1950s at around 500 000. The Group consisted of the best equipped and trained units of the Soviet Army. These troops guaranteed the stability of local communist regimes (e.g. during the suppression of the East German uprising of 1953), as well as a potential instrument of aggression or defense in the event of war in Europe. In 1954, the Soviet Armed Forces stopped functioning as occupying forces in the GDR. Since then, they were only an element of the system of the mutual balance of forces between blocks competing in Europe. This was also the beginning of doctrinal changes in the Soviet Army. It had to adapt not only to the changed international situation, but above all to the completely different conditions of war on the atomic battlefield.

СТАВЛЕННЯ АФГАНСЬКИХ СТУДЕНТІВ В УРСР ДО РАДЯНСЬКОЇ ІНТЕРВЕНЦІЇ В АФГАНІСТАН ТА ВИВЕДЕННЯ РАДЯНСЬКИХ ВІЙСЬК (1979–1989)

The article examines the political views of Afghan students studying in the Ukrainian SSR and their attitude towards the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country. The sources of the study were KGB analytical reports from the Branch Archive of the Ukrainian Security Service, documents of educational institutions in Kirovohrad where Afghans studied, from the State Archives of Kirovohrad region, texts of the Soviet-Afghan educational cooperation agreements, notices and diary records of the USSR ambassador in Afghanistan and other Soviet officials on meetings and conversation with Afghan politicians. It was proven that the studying of Afghans in the USSR was one of the means of the Soviet policy toward Afghanistan aimed at its forced socialist modernization. The studying of Afghans in the Soviet Union led to emergence of a large pro-Soviet stratum of the Afghan society. The factors that determined the different attitudes of Afghan students studying in the Ukrainian SSR to the armed Soviet intervention in the Afghan crisis in December 1979 were identified. Most Afghans endorsed the USSR's military intervention in the "Afghan crisis". They believed that this was necessary to protect the achievements of the "April Revolution" and to counter "world imperialism". Some of them expressed concern, fear, and even negative attitudes toward the USSR policies. These sentiments were influenced by a factional affiliation: supporters of the "Parcham" and the "Hulk" group associated with N. M. Taraki endorsed the Soviet intervention, while supporters of H. Amin condemned it. The Afghan students in the Ukrainian SSR largely rejected the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989. Most of them viewed it as a betrayal by the Soviet Union. They were convinced that this would lead to the fall of M. Najibullah's regime and the defeat of the "April Revolution" in Afghanistan.

A magyarországi volt szovjet katonai repülőterek természetre gyakorolt hatásai és jelenlegi állapotuk

Magyarországon a második világháborútól a varsói szerződés felbomlásáig állomásoztak szovjet katonai alakulatok, amelyek létszámáról, tevekénységéről pontos információk ma sem állnak a kutatók rendelkezésére. Hazánkban 1991-ig több szovjet katonai repülőtér működött. A szerző ebben a cikkben részletesen ismerteti ezek működésének történetét, bemutatja jelenlegi funkciójukat, műszaki állapotukat. Vizsgálja, hogy működésük során, valamint mostani állapotukban milyen káros hatást gyakoroltak és gyakorolnak ma is a környezetükre, továbbá milyen lehetséges következményekkel kell számolni. A fentieken túl a szerző átfogó képet ad a repülés és a repülőterek működésének környezetterhelő hatásairól, valamint ismerteti a károk felszámolásának lehetséges formáit és módszereit. Végezetül javaslatot tesz a hazai szovjet repülőterek okozta környezeti károk felszámolásának folyamatára és a létesítmények további hasznosításának lehetőségeire.

A Look at the History of the Training Brigade of the Northeast United Anti-Japanese Army through the Prism of the Soviet-Japanese War

The training brigade of the Northeast United Anti-Japanese Army (also known as the "88th Separate Rifle Brigade of the Far Eastern Front") was created in August 1942. The bulk of the Chinese and Korean officers and soldiers of the "Northeast United Anti-Japanese Army" border in the Far East around 1940. After its creation, most of the time the training brigade was on the territory of the Soviet Union for political and military training. During this period, she returned to Northeast China in the form of small military groups, which were engaged in carrying out information and reconnaissance work and solving other tasks for the Soviet Far Eastern Front and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Since the beginning of the Soviet-Japanese war, the leadership of the Far Eastern Front intended to bring the training brigade into the war, but Japan announced its surrender before the brigade had time to enter hostilities. In September 1945, the leadership of the Far Eastern Front ordered Zhou Baozhong and Kim Il Sung to lead the Chinese and Korean part of the soldiers in the Training Brigade and return to Northeast China and the occupation zones of the USSR in Korea, respectively, to help Soviet troops maintain order on these territories.

THE INFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY ON THE SOVIET INFORMATION SPACE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AFGHAN WAR (1979-1989)

The article characterizes the influence of ideology on the Soviet information space in the context of the Afghan war (1979–1989). It is determined that during the period of the existence of the Soviet Union, almost all of its mass media were under the strict ideological control of the government and the Communist party leadership. At the same time, it is noted that it is propaganda in the form of informational influence that has a significant ideological load on the consciousness of people. Hundreds of thousands of people became victims of such ideological propaganda, who to one degree or another suffered from the Afghan adventure of the Kremlin leaders. The traditional principles of conventional warfare and the unconventional warfare that took place in the Afghan War waged by the Soviet Union for nearly a decade. It was emphasized that elements of hybrid and information-sabotage confrontation were also used in it. It is noted that the leaders of the Soviet Union at any cost sought to provide precisely the ideological and informational and propagandistic basis of their "Afghan policy". At the same time, quite often large losses of material and even human resources did not have such a significance for the Soviet leadership in this military adventure as the military-political component. It was concluded that for the Soviet participants in the Afghan war, according to the information coverage of the latter, perhaps the most outrageous was the fact that the mass media of the Soviet Union covered almost all the events of the latter as actions of the government troops of Afghanistan. But the participation of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in this war was subject to an informational taboo. Also, the soldiers could not remember a single new kindergarten or school, which was often written about in Soviet newspapers.

Висвітлення воєнних дій СРСР у Демократичній Республіці Афганістан у радянській науковій, науково-популярній літературі та публіцистиці

Introduction . Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is covered in more than a thousand articles, monographs, essays. Most researchers ignore popular science and non-fiction works. However, they formed the idea of Afghan war in the mass consciousness and reflected the official Soviet policy towards it. The aim of the article is to investigate the evolution of coverage of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Afghan crisis, to find out the role of censorship and propaganda in this. At the core of the research methodology is the method of a content analysis of historical sources, problem-chronological, typological, comparative methods. Main results and conclusions . From December 1979 to mid-1985, the decisive factor was the complete silence of the participation of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the war in Afghanistan. From the mid-1985 to the late 1980s, there was a partial relaxation of censorship restrictions, which made it possible to get into publications half-truth. It was only in the last years of the Soviet Union that there was a qualitative transition to a scientific and impartial study of the USSR’s participation in Afghan events, initiated by the works of D. Gay and V. Snigeryov, as well as O. Lyakhovskyi and V. Zabrodin. The predominance of publications and studies of the official version of events led, on the one hand, to the formation of a distorted view of war in Afghanistan by Soviet society, and, on the other, contributed to the decline of confidence in power and ultimately accelerated the collapse of the communist regime in the USSR. Originality . More than a hundred scientific, popular science and non-fiction works published in the USSR in 1980-1991 that deal with Soviet aggression in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have been investigated in the article. The content of the regulatory framework which determined the contents and nature of the information has been analyzed that could be published on the pages of Soviet editions. On this basis, the evolution of the official version of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Afghan crisis has been traced and reflected in scientific literature and journalism. The role of censorship and the propaganda orientation of most publications have been established, which makes it possible to define them as part of the internal policy of the Soviet leadership to propagate the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The stages during which the nature of Afghan-related publications was altered have been highlighted.

Советская делегация на Ялтинской конференции 1945 г.: слагаемые успеха

The article analyzes the external and internal conditions that enabled the Soviet delegation’s successful work at the Yalta Conference in 1945. The military balance on the war fronts was of decisive importance, and above all the successes of the Soviet troops, which significantly strengthened the position of the USSR within the anti-Hitler coalition. Factors of personal understanding among I. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, acting on a solid foundation of geopolitics, and their working together played a major role. Intensive informational and analytical work, in preparation for a postwar settlement, greatly contributed to the Soviet delegation’s success. Other elements included, for instance, Stalin's strengths as a negotiator, as well as a number of infrastructural advantages and opportunities which the host country always possesses during negotiations, and which were effectively used during the Crimean conference.

ПЕРІОДИЧНІ ВИДАННЯ В СИСТЕМІ НАЦИСТСЬКОЇ ПРОПАГАНДИ НА ОКУПОВАНИХ ТЕРИТОРІЯХ УКРАЇНИ У 1941–1943 РОКАХ

In this article, the role of periodicals in the propaganda activities of the occupation authorities of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the military administration zone has been revealed; the content and types of periodicals have been shown; the task set before them by the Nazi occupation authorities in forming appropriate ideological structures to influence the population of the occupied territories of Ukraine has been disclosed. It is shown that Hitler’s governance used the press as one of the effective means of influencing not only the opinion, but also the consciousness of the population of the temporarily occupied territories. The subject of the study is the content of periodicals and their influence on the behaviour, moral and psychological condition of the population of the Ukrainian territories occupied by the Nazi army. The main aspects of Nazi Germany’s information policy in the occupied territories have been revealed with the use of comparative-historical and problem-chronological methods, as well as content analysis, which allowed to analyse the content of periodicals and to highlight the features of their content lines. The occupation administration used various forms of propaganda: publishing newspapers and magazines in Ukrainian; demonstrating special films in cinemas; releasing visual agitation in the form of posters and leaflets, as well as documentary exhibitions; through theatre plays, radio broadcasts in Ukrainian, Russian and other languages. It resorted to the modern methods of using the press in times of the war. The population of the temporarily occupied territories of the USSR demanded news as the only opportunity to navigate in those difficult conditions. That is why Hitler’s governance used the press as one of the effective means of influence not only the opinion, but also the consciousness of the population of the temporarily occupied territories. The German occupation authorities tried to take advantage of the “information hunger” that prevailed after the retreat of Soviet troops and to fill the information vacuum with their own propaganda. In order to spread the necessary information among the population, the Nazi occupation authorities published newspapers and magazines in each region, district, city.