Soviet Symbols Research Articles

Ukrainian Art of the Totalitarianism Epoch: the Case of the “Zhovten” Association

The present article focuses on the transformation of style and sense of Ukrainian art in the 1930s, in the context of the “Zhovten” Association designers’ creativity. Ideological pressure became determinant in the work of Ukrainian artists. Period of repressions led to decay of art in general, and dramatic reduction in style directions. Industrialization in the USSR, carried out in the 1930s, and measures to accelerate the development of industry were the main themes imposed on artists. Ideologically biased theoretical foundations of the new artistic style typical for the 1930s were clearly manifested in the declaration of the “Zhovten” Association. The ranks of this association, founded in 1930, included some former members of the Association of Revolutionary Art of Ukraine and the Association of Contemporary Artists of Ukraine. The theory spelled out in the declaration of unification was significantly ahead of its practical implementation, the artists themselves gradually switched to new forms and content in their works, without breaking ties with the national and European school. The “Zhovten” Association became a true litmus test of those phenomena that dominated in the art of the Stalin era. At the same time, it crossed out all the achievements of the associations-predecessors, creating a version of the all-Union ideologically engaged associations in Ukraine. A sharp change took place in the artistic environment when the question of form ceased to be a vital topic. The attention was focused on the content of artworks. The ostentatious elated mood of works of art hid the realities of the time like a screen. It camouflaged serious constraint in artistic statements, offering the only “correct” chartered way forward that made it impossible for any artist to make their own graphic statements. A tangible ideological pressure prompted the artists to abandon their creative originality, and strive for maximum realism. They added cliché images to their works: portraits of ideologists, workers, flags, Soviet symbols, and the like. At the same time, the authors lost their creative identities, and their artworks were deprived of any artistic value.

Three Shades of Red: Power of Symbols or Soviet Legacy in Contemporary Inner Asian Capitals

The paper focuses on Soviet symbols in Inner Asian capitals and the conflicts around socialist legacy. We analyze Ulaanbaatar, Kyzyl, and Ulan-Ude as three different models of transformation of political symbols in urban space. All three capitals in their names contain the word “red” semiotically associated with communist ideology. Correspondingly, we see three different models of symbolic struggle for urban space. Theoretically, the paper is based upon the model of symbolic politics. Empirically, the research is based on materials of our own observations, discourse analysis of media, and official municipal documents. In general, the research is an analysis of symbolic practices of power in the conditions of a number of complex changes in Inner Asia.

Роль советской символики в формировании национально-государственной идентичности россиян

This study is devoted to the study of the reasons for the high importance of Soviet symbols in the process of reproduction of the national-state identity of Russians. The research methodology is built by combining structural analysis with secondary processing of quantitative sociological research data. The theoretical foundation of the presented work is formed by the concept of social identity by G. Tajfel and D. Turner. The author has come to the conclusion that the special role of the Soviet symbolic heritage in ensuring the reproduction of the national-state identity of the citizens of the Russian Federation is determined by a complex set of factors, within which the nostalgia of the older generations or the sympathy of a part of the population for communist ideas do not play a primary role. The absence of an attractive image of the future and achievements in the present, comparable in scale with the victories of the past, cause a situation in which the justification of the in-group favoritism of Russians acquires a retrospective vector. As a result, the most significant events of the Soviet period, reflected in the memorial “tradition of the winners,” begin to play the role of a paradigmatic element in the structure of substantiating the prestigious nature of the identity of Russians. The high importance of Soviet symbols is determined by the presence in its semantic basis of such a value element as social justice. The latter is extremely in demand among the broad strata of the population of the Russian Federation at the moment. In addition, the additional significance of the symbols of the USSR is brought by its decommunization in the eyes of some of the bearers of right-wing views. Due to the latter, Soviet symbolism is beginning to be perceived as “imperial”, which gives it a positive character in the eyes of a part of the right-wing public

Introduction

Introduction Victoria Donovan (bio) and Iryna Sklokina (bio) Introduction On 24 March 2021, as we were finalizing the contributions to this collection, Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of Ukraine's Council for National Security and Defense, announced that Donbas no longer existed: "The word 'Donbas' is not written in any of our state's regulatory or legal documents. This is a definition that the Russian Federation has imposed upon us: 'the Donbas people,' 'the choice of Donbas,' 'Donbas will not be brought to its knees.' We need to abide carefully by our regulatory and legal documentation.… There are specific names for the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, no Donbas of any kind exists, it is very dangerous when we start to say these things."1 The announcement did not come out of the blue. It was rather the culmination of recent public debate concerning the political implications and utility of the term in light of the ongoing, Russia-backed violence in the Ukrainian East.2 Indeed, already in 2014, a Russian-speaking writer and historian from Donetsk, Olena Stiazhkina, voiced her opinion that "Donbas does not exist. There will be just Ukraine or nothing … the word Donbas does not define anything." In Stiazhkina's opinion, the very notion of "Donbas" was rooted in the Stalinist discourse of the region, which focused on coal and steel and no longer corresponded to the region's contemporary realities. When, following the outbreak of war in the East in 2014, the term began to be enthusiastically used in separatist rhetoric, opinions such as Stiazhkina's found more traction among the Ukrainian population. Danilov's 2021 announcement was thus the continuation and conclusion of these ongoing socio-symbolic debates. From 2015, the Ukrainian government has implemented a policy of "decommunization," prohibiting the use of Soviet symbols, toponymy, and monumental [End Page 1] objects in public spaces.3 This policy has been linked by public figures and scholars in Ukraine with the need to decolonize cultural memory, to delink contemporary Ukrainian culture from the oppressive influence of the Soviet cultural and symbolic infrastructure.4 Within this discussion, the politics of Donbas toponymy has drawn particular attention. Critics argue that the term Donbas, a contraction of "Donetsk Coal Basin" (Donetskii kamennougol´nyi bassein), manifests an extractivist attitude to the region's human and environmental resources and carries the taint of Soviet political violence. At the exhibition Rebellious Gene, which opened at the displaced Donetsk Museum of Local History in Kramatorsk in November 2020, for example, curators drew critical attention to the perceived colonial origins of the signifier.5 Instead of Donbas, the curators argued for the use of alternative, more locally rooted designators, such as "Donechchyna" and "Luhanshchyna." This practice was presented by the organizers as a means to challenge historic tendencies to reduce the cultural meaning of the region to merely its extractable mineral resources. Donbas is certainly a vexed territorial signifier whose imperial origins, extractivist implications, and semiotic transformations deserve to be scrutinized critically. It is also a term with a range of resonances among communities living in the region. Following Danilov's announcement, media outlets across Ukraine ran editorials and expert discussions exploring the public reception of the minister's proposal. Iryna Sklokina (coeditor of this collection) was invited to speak at one such event on "Suspilne. Donbas" radio station, where her opinions were considered alongside those of community residents, piped into the studio live and in prerecorded form. Local reactions to the announcement differed dramatically: while "Donbas" was rejected as a viable form of self-designation in Mariupol, a huge industrial center on the Azov Sea that has traditionally competed for economic prominence with Donetsk, responses were more ambiguous in Sloviansk, at the region's northern administrative border, where no coal has ever been mined and picturesque local landscapes around the Donets River are more reminiscent of nearby, rustic "Slobozhanshchyna." Indeed, the radio host even commented (ironically, it would appear) that the radio station's name, which translates as "Public. Donbas," had [End Page 2] been thrown into doubt and should perhaps be changed in accordance with Danilov's trendsetting statement. This issue explores the cultural construction of Donbas through word, image...

Условия лояльности национальных элит к центральной власти в советский период российской истории

The article deals with the analysis of the Soviet national policy from a historical perspective with a focus on investigating into conditions of the loyalty of national elites towards the central government in the last period of the USSR existence. The indicators of the low level loyalty are as follows: supporting the ideas of national sovereignty and independence, participating in the national movement by ruling cadres, influential intellectuals and population. The author shows low sympathy of both groups of representatives: elites and broad population to nationalist ideas. The analysis is based on comparing contrastive cases – the Soviet elites of the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) and Belorussia in their interactions with the central government as well as local population in the period from 1945 to 1991. These republics, their population and elites were similar regarding some important aspects such as historical and cultural as well as demographic characteristics in the case of Belorussia and Lithuania; some important features of the industry (big export-oriented enterprises) regarding Estonia, Latvia and Belorussia. At the same time, these cases showed a different level of the loyalty towards the Union center, namely, relatively high among the Belorussian Soviet ruling cadres and population and relatively low in the Baltic republics by the end of 1980s. The important aspect of the Soviet national policy was establishing new national elites, educational and cultural institutions preserving their native languages as well as the promotion of native cadres into the positions of power in the regional administration. In some respects, this policy was similar to the “indirect rule” implemented in the imperial period of Russian history and consisted in the cooperation between the central government and local elites as the main approach to administrating a multinational state. However, in comparison with the previous practice tending to include national elites in the imperial nobility, the post revolutionary approach considered the creation of national elites through promoting local cultural and educational institutions that offer quite prestigious but specific positions occupied mostly by representatives of the respective ethnic group. Creating local elites reduced the competition for “universal” positions since socialization and career of “national staff” were oriented towards national institutes. However, increasing numbers of “national staff” with limited positions for them had negative social consequences (elite overproduction). Intra-elite tension increased due to the migration from other regions (in the case of Latvia and Estonia). The other reason of this phenomenon was pursuing socialization strategies oriented to the places of origin (in the case of Lithuania). The attractiveness of the Baltic republics both for local population and migrants from other regions of the USSR was caused by a relatively high level of living standards in these union republics. Location of big export-oriented enterprises in the territory of Belorussia created conditions for preferring socialization strategies oriented towards integration with the Soviet Union economy and, therefore, enhanced loyalty towards the USSR center from both elites and population. Besides, the administrative apparatus of the Soviet Belorussia was recruited extensively among participants of the Soviet partisan movement 1941–1944 what explains the devotion of the Belorussian elite to the Soviet symbols and values. At the same time, the base of the legitimization of the Soviet Lithuanian elite was its ability to control the anti-Soviet (nationalist) movement as well supporting national culture and language.

Influence of early Soviet symbols of Russia on the formation of the State power signs of the PRC in 1949

Influence of early Soviet symbols of Russia on the formation of the State power signs of the PRC in 1949

The Real Consequences of Symbolic Politics: Breaking the Soviet Past in Ukraine

Conflicts over symbolic issues are prominent in public affairs, but do they have wider political consequences, and if so, why? We study the electoral effects of Leninopad (``Lenin's free fall''), a sudden wave of demolitions of Soviet monuments in Ukraine. Difference-in-differences estimates show that the removals of the Soviet symbols mobilized supporters for parties with a relatively sympathetic view of Ukraine's Soviet past. We attribute this backlash effect to a signaling mechanism: the removals indicated the weakening power status of the Soviet legacy parties, which motivated their supporters to turn out in elections. This backlash dissipated once the Soviet symbols ceased being a contentious partisan issue due to the escalating secessionist war. Symbolic politics has real, non-symbolic consequences, but only when it maps onto partisan cleavages.

Revisiting Great Soviet Symbols of World War II. The Young Guard Now and Then

Revisiting Great Soviet Symbols of World War II. The Young Guard Now and Then

Stalinizmas ir etnokultūros institucionalizavimas. Pirmoji Dainų šventė sovietinėje Lietuvoje 1946 m.

decided to re-establish the tradition of song festivals and organize the first such festival in 1946; and to what extent the implementation of the said idea was successful. Analysis of the history of the first Soviet song festival and circumstances surrounding the preparation for the event is based on the little known or practically unknown documents kept in the archives of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. The government of Lithuania viewed the organization of the “first Soviet song festival” as a possibility to demonstrate its concern with Lithuanian folk culture, its development, and promotion. This kind of policy was intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the Soviet government and make it seem more “Lithuanian”. The fact that Lithuanian folk culture helped spread the new Soviet ideology also cannot be ignored. The song festival was not only amply decorated with Soviet symbols, attempts were made to couple the attributes of the Soviet culture with the values of folk culture. On the other hand, organizing the festival the leadership of Soviet Lithuania wanted to show that the Soviet political regime can be in “harmony” with Lithuanian ethno-culture and the new government was a natural successor of former ethnic traditions. However, alone, without the approval of the Lithuanian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the support from Moscow, the government of Lithuania was unable to organize the festival. This suggests that the leadership of the Soviet Union was rather tolerant to the manifestations of “national Communism” not only in the countries of Central Europe that fell under Moscow’s influence but also in Lithuanian SSR. Besides, the decision to organize the festival in Vilnius was not a random one. Crowds of singers that came to the city from all around Lithuania changed its national composition – Vilnius for once became more Lithuanian. This not only demonstrated the government’s aspiration to show off its “Lithuanian” nature but also its ambition to make Vilnius the centre of Lithuanian (Soviet) culture. Finally, the government of LSSR was satisfied with the organization and course of the festival and believed that it managed to achieve its goals and objectives. Probably the success of the first Soviet song festival resulted in them being organized periodically.

Some Aspects of Identity Politics of Kharkiv Local Authorities After 2013

Abstract The paper analyzes the transformation of identity politics of Kharkiv local authorities after the Euromaidan, or Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea, and the War in Donbass. Being the second largest city in Ukraine and becoming the frontline city in 2014, Kharkiv is an interesting case for research on how former pro-Russian local elites treat new policies of the central government in Kyiv, on whether earlier they tried to mobilize their electorate or to provoke political opponents with using soviet symbols, soviet memory, and copying Russian initiatives in the sphere of identity. To answer the research question of this article, an analysis of Kharkiv city and oblast programs and strategies and of communal media were made. Decommunisation, as one of the most important identity projects of Ukrainian central authorities after 2014, was analyzed through publications in Kharkiv’s city-owned media as well as reports from other scholars. Some conclusions are made from the analysis of these documents: Kharkiv development strategy until 2020, Complex program of cultural development in Kharkiv in 2011–2016 (and the same for 2017–2021), The regional program of military and patriotic training and participation of people in measures of defense work in 2015–2017, Program of supporting civil society in 2016–2020 in Kharkiv region and the city mayor’s orders about the celebration of Victory Day (9 May), the Day of the National Flag (23 August), the Day of the City (23 August) and Independence Day (24 August) in 2010–2015.

The power of place, or powerless places? Hybrid attitudes towards Soviet symbols in post-Soviet Georgia

ABSTRACTThis article explores the hybridity of commemoration by analysing people’s attitudes to three types of contested Soviet symbols in post-Soviet Georgia. I draw on 62 in-depth qualitative interviews conducted in 2012–2013 with Georgians in Tbilisi, Georgia. These interviews focused on what people thought about places of memory, Soviet symbols in public space, and memory politics and policies in contemporary Georgia. I examine their opinions of three different types of reminders of the Soviet past in public space: general Soviet symbols; street names; and the Stalin monument in Gori. This analysis reveals their diverse understandings of place and highlights the hybridity of their responses to the different elements of Soviet symbolism. This not only prevents one from creating ideal typologies when considering places of memory, but also highlights the impact of the form and location of the symbol. I also identify two ways that people conceptualize place, one that recognizes the power of place, and the other that perceives place as powerless.

National originality of the architecture of Khreshchatyk as a unique ensemble of the period of totalitarianism

Khreschatyk is a page apart in the history of world architecture. While it has a number of distinct characteristics of totalitarian architecture, Khreschatyk is the only architectural ensemble of the period to combine na-tional tradition with the exalted sentiment of Soviet architecture of the Stalin era. Also, it uniquely matched architecture and landscape. The façades has elements of Ukrainian baroque, which sets Khreschatyk apart from similar ensembles of the 1940s-1950s in other countries that mainly drew upon Ne-oclassicism or Modernism. While period architecture in other countries is typically marked by its grand scale and heavily accentuated civic spirit – complete with a denigration of the individual at the expense of the manifest greatness of Authority, Khreschatyk stand out for its pronounced harmony as an environment based on the careful preservation of old heritage, the skill-ful use of the landscape, and the introduction of traditional motifs, alongside an almost total lack of Soviet symbols. Unlike the grim grandness of totali-tarian architecture in other countries, the facades of the residential buildings that line Khreschatyk emanate joie de vivre and admiration for the fertility of Ukrainian soil.

Negation, Inclusion, Gradual Oblivion: State Strategies on Soviet Heritage in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan

In the year of 100th anniversary of the October Revolution, the author turns to the question of the Soviet heritage influence on nation- and state-building processes in three countries of the South Caucasus –Azerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgia. The article postulates clear differences between the study of postcolonialism and the post-Soviet space, and therefore the author presents his own operationalization of the "imperial heritage" study. The countries of the South Caucasus are compared based on the following criteria: a number of ethnic Russians as the main constituent of the Soviet people living in the country; a status of the Russian language; national symbols (statutes, architecture, Soviet state symbols, the hierarchy of military ranks), and political practices (functioning of the party systems, type of sovereignty, degree of freedom of speech and political competition). StudyingAzerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgiadifferently coming out of theUSSRand using the disintegration of theUSSRto construct their national narratives in accordance with their own ideas about the ways of development, the author finds a repetition of the Soviet system elements. Each of the states demonstrates a unique combination of “post-Soviet Soviet” phenomena. The difference lies in the ratio between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet elements. Azerbaijanseems to maintain a pro-Soviet narrative more than the others. It inherited the Soviet cult of personality and combined this practice with a completely non-Soviet (Eastern) tradition of political dynasties covered by the election system. The Armenian political tradition includes reference to Soviet Armenia as theSecondRepublic, which distinguishes the country from the neighbors who consider themselves to be the successors of the democratic republics that emerged during the Civil War inRussia. Despite competitive elections and free media, the Armenian leadership seeks to establish a political system with a single dominant party and formally maintain electoral competition. This conjunction of Soviet symbols (Armeniadid not carry out systematic decommunization) and political practices is oddly mixed with the image of GareginNzhdeh as “the father of nation”, a person who was accused in theUSSRfor collaborating with the Third Reich. Georgia tries to part with the Soviet Union to the maximum extent at a symbolic level, has made great progress in building formal democratic institutions, but in reality it is still managed through informal procedures, to which discursive and symbolic decommunization did not affect in principle. Discursive and symbolic decommunization had no impact on the way this country is ruled. The study is based on the data from national censuses, sociological studies, texts of official documents and, especially, the invaluable experience of the included observation of symbolic politics in all three countries.

Negation, Inclusion, Gradual Oblivion: State Strategies on Soviet Heritage in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan

In the year of 100th anniversary of the October Revolution, the author turns to the question of the Soviet heritage influence on nation- and state-building processes in three countries of the South Caucasus –Azerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgia. The article postulates clear differences between the study of postcolonialism and the post-Soviet space, and therefore the author presents his own operationalization of the "imperial heritage" study. The countries of the South Caucasus are compared based on the following criteria: a number of ethnic Russians as the main constituent of the Soviet people living in the country; a status of the Russian language; national symbols (statutes, architecture, Soviet state symbols, the hierarchy of military ranks), and political practices (functioning of the party systems, type of sovereignty, degree of freedom of speech and political competition). StudyingAzerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgiadifferently coming out of theUSSRand using the disintegration of theUSSRto construct their national narratives in accordance with their own ideas about the ways of development, the author finds a repetition of the Soviet system elements. Each of the states demonstrates a unique combination of “post-Soviet Soviet” phenomena. The difference lies in the ratio between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet elements. Azerbaijanseems to maintain a pro-Soviet narrative more than the others. It inherited the Soviet cult of personality and combined this practice with a completely non-Soviet (Eastern) tradition of political dynasties covered by the election system. The Armenian political tradition includes reference to Soviet Armenia as theSecondRepublic, which distinguishes the country from the neighbors who consider themselves to be the successors of the democratic republics that emerged during the Civil War inRussia. Despite competitive elections and free media, the Armenian leadership seeks to establish a political system with a single dominant party and formally maintain electoral competition. This conjunction of Soviet symbols (Armeniadid not carry out systematic decommunization) and political practices is oddly mixed with the image of GareginNzhdeh as “the father of nation”, a person who was accused in theUSSRfor collaborating with the Third Reich. Georgia tries to part with the Soviet Union to the maximum extent at a symbolic level, has made great progress in building formal democratic institutions, but in reality it is still managed through informal procedures, to which discursive and symbolic decommunization did not affect in principle. Discursive and symbolic decommunization had no impact on the way this country is ruled. The study is based on the data from national censuses, sociological studies, texts of official documents and, especially, the invaluable experience of the included observation of symbolic politics in all three countries.

Ustawy dekomunizacyjne na Ukrainie

In 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a series of laws on national remembrance policy, commonly known as ‘decommunisations laws’. This was consequence to the changes taking place in society after the Euromaidan. Laws make important changes in the historical policy, especially in the context of the memory of World War II and fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century. It is important to prohibit the propagation of Soviet symbols, which breaks with the Soviet narrative and results in the need to renaming of many places and objects. Therefore, implementation of decommunisation laws may be more time-consuming and complicated than it was assumed.

The thematic triangle of the politics of memory in new post-Soviet democracies

The article is aimed at building a theoretical framework for an empirical analysis of the politics of memory in a new post-Soviet democracy. We elaborate on the concept of new democracy and highlight that in late post-Soviet countries it might be defined through three interrelated variables of trustworthy institution building, promotion of civil rights, and consistent foreign policy. We refine the concept of the politics of memory underlining the electoral origins of public policies addressing the painful issues of the past. To find out how the politics of memory evolves in the new post-Soviet democracy, we distinguish three memory issues of highly contentious nature: lustration, ban on public display of Soviet symbols, and compensation from Russia for Soviet occupation.

A Community of Violence: The SiPo/SD and Its Role in the Nazi Terror System in Generalbezirk Kiew

This essay reconstructs the activities of the German Security Police (SiPo) and Security Service (SD) field office in Generalbezirk Kiew—the German administrative unit carved out of the Kiev and Poltava provinces in Ukraine. It sheds light on the role of the SiPo/SD in the mass murder of Soviet citizens and on the social and psychological profile of its functionaries. The latter ranged from dedicated zealots to “ordinary men,” but all fulfilled their murderous tasks. “As soon as the Germans entered Kiev,” recalls a Kiev resident, “the SD and the Security Police, known among the population simply as ‘Gestapo,’ inherited the gloomy gray building on 33 Korolenka Street ... . At the door of this building stands a sentry in thick boots. His profile and helmet are clearly imprinted on the background of a black flag with the two lightning-like letters ‘SS.’ The banner is mounted in an iron base adorned with the Soviet symbols of stars, hammer, and sickle ... . Such a combination seems incredible.” 1 Despite this odd amalgamation of Nazi and Soviet emblems, Kiev city dwellers considered the installation of the German security services on 33 Korolenka Street befitting. Not only did the “Gestapo” inherit the Soviet security police (NKVD) headquarters—the point of no return for alleged “enemies of the people” in the 1930s—but it further enhanced its own notoriety by the reign of terror that soon engulfed the Kiev region. Thousands of people passed through its torture chambers and prison cells and were sent to their deaths just outside the city. Consequently, although other German counterintelligence and police forces also operated in Kiev and its vicinity—the military intelligence and counterintelligence (Abwehr); the Secret Field Police (Geheime Feldpolizei, GFP); the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei, OP, including the Municipal Police or Schutzpolizei in urban areas and the Gendarmerie in the countryside)—the average Soviet citizen labeled them all inclusively “Gestapo,” a sinister omnipresent force overshadowing everyday life. 2 While relatively small branches, the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei, SiPo) and the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) in occupied Ukraine consisted of