Soviet Proposals Research Articles

Prioritization of Soviet-Finnish negotiations of 1938-1939.

This article examines the complex of Soviet-Finnish negotiations through the lens of the issue of priority of Soviet demands in the period of the autumn negotiations of 1939. The negotiation process between the USSR and Finland, concerning the relations between the two states against the background of Germany's aggressive policy, began not in the fall of 1939, but a year and a half earlier - in the spring of 1938. The points of the Soviet demands voiced by the Soviet side during the negotiation process were changed and adjusted. Moreover, in comparison with the Soviet proposals of 1938, there were new points that had not appeared before. The study of the reasons for the changing rhetoric in the negotiation process between the USSR and Finland will help to understand the nature of the breakdown of the negotiations in the fall of 1939. The problem of the article is the question of the correctness or incorrectness of the thesis about the priority of the goal of moving the land border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad during the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1938-1939. This thesis has not been questioned in domestic historiography, apparently because only the Soviet demands of 1939 were taken as a basis and less importance was attached to the proposals put forward by the Soviet side during the negotiations of 1938 and the spring of 1939. The confirmation or refutation of the thesis about the priority of the clause in the text of the memorandum on the movement of the land frontier on the Karelian Isthmus should be the outcome of this study.

Coordination of National Economic Plans of the USSR and CMEA Countries

The article describes the development and functioning of the mechanism for coordinating state long-term (five-year) economic development plans of the CMEA countries. Special attention is paid to the period of the late 1960s, when dissatisfaction with the achieved level of CMEA work, including in the field of coordination of plans, gave rise to a wide discussion about ways to reform CMEA, which resulted in the adoption of the Comprehensive Program of Socialist Economic Integration. Analysis of a mechanism of bilateral consultations, which became the main form of coordination of plans after the failure of Soviet attempts to increase the role of CMEA in 1962—1963, made possible to figure out the pros and cons of this mechanism. The article describes various Soviet proposals to change it made by the USSR State Planning Committee and the CMEA itself. It is shown that the USSR State Planning Committee resisted the ideas of strengthening the role of CMEA in the process of coordinating the plans of the CMEA countries. It is concluded that the State Planning Committee was guided not only by institutional competition. He sought to guarantee the Soviet economy from the consequences of rash decisions to increase supplies of fuel and raw materials to the European CMEA countries, which the State Planning Committee considered unprofitable.

Beyond the Shoe: Rethinking Khrushchev at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

History tends to remember Soviet participation at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA, September 1960–April 1961) because of Nikita Khrushchev’s shoe. On October 13, 1960, the Soviet leader allegedly banged his shoe against his desk in the General Assembly hall to protest a speech he did not like.1 The incident is among the most well known in the history of the Cold War. However, despite the interest it has generated, Khrushchev’s conduct was the least important aspect of Soviet relations with the UN in 1960–61. This article reassesses Soviet participation at the Fifteenth Session of the GA in light of its medium- and long-term consequences for UN structure, practices, and vision. It also brings the issue of Moscow’s relations with UN members from the Third World, until now overlooked in the existing literature, into the story of this UN session. ... The Congo crisis was the key event that soured Soviet-UN relations in the second half of 1960. The USSR had been deeply involved in Congo since the early stages of the crisis, which was caused by foreign intervention and the attempted secession of a Congolese province in July 1960. Baffled by the West’s superior influence on the UN operation set up in Congo to address the crisis, the USSR attempted to change the balance of forces by trying to attract the support of the non-aligned bloc and reform the whole UN organization. The Fifteenth Session of the GA, which Khrushchev decided to attend in person, was meant to be the decisive moment. According to most of the existing literature, the plan did not succeed, and Khrushchev was reduced to banging his shoe in frustration. This view argues that the Afro-Asian countries remained indifferent to Khrushchev’s grievances and calls for reform, and thus did not support Soviet proposals to radically redesign the UN structure, notably by eliminating the post of Secretary-General (SG), and to change the way the UN mission operated in Congo, reducing Western influence.2 In his recent book on the USSR and the UN, Ilya V. Gaiduk writes that “Khrushchev’s plans to get rid of [UN Secretary-General Dag] Hammarskjöld and to change the UN policy in the Congo and elsewhere, while gaining the newly independent countries’ sympathies for Moscow’s position, failed abjectly.”3 Lise Namikas supports a more balanced view in her book on the Congo crisis. She maintains that the United States largely succeeded in using the UN “to achieve its own goals in the Congo,” but she concedes that the UN operation in Congo “allowed a degree of influence that Moscow lacked in Africa previously, and for that Khrushchev should be given credit.”4

Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War

In his recollection of recent events such as the Bandung Conference, the Soviet proposals for a unified and neutralised Germany, and the signing of the Austrian Treaty, veteran journalist Hanson W....

Israeli-Soviet relations, 1953-1967: from confrontation to disruption

Part 1 From severance of diplomatic relations in February 1953 to their renewal in July 1953: idealogical and psychological aspects of the USSR's decision to sever its relations with Israel changes in Soviet internal and foreign policy after Stalin's death and the resumption of Israeli-Soviet diplomatic relations. Part 2 Bilateral relations - from their resumption to their severance: Israel between East and West phases in the USSR's attitude towards Israel, 1953-1967 trade relations cultural and scientific relations Aliyah, emigration from the USSR and eastern Europe to Israel. Part 3 The Jewish problem in the USSR: continuity and change in Soviet policy regarding the National Question and its attitude towards the Jewish nationality in the USSR the national awakening of the Jews in the USSR and Israel's dissemination of information among them the struggle on behalf of Jews in the USSR. Part 4 The impact of the East-West superpowers' confrontation on the Arab-Israeli conflict and on Israeli-Soviet relations: the Middle East in the Soviet strategy the USSR's policy during and after the Sinai Campaigh Soviet proposals for the prevention of world war and improvement of relations between states intensification of Soviet activity in the Arab states and intensification of tension the Six Day War and the breach of Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations.

The Superpowers and an Arab-Israeli Political Settlement: The Cold War Years

From about 1950 until the end of the cold war in the late 1980s the Arab-Israeli conflict became entangled in the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The prevalent view in the United States was that the Soviet Union sought to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to drive the West from the Middle East and secure its own domination over the area. From this perspective, Soviet ambitions were antithetical to the prospects for a settlement of the conflict that would protect the legitimate security interests of Israel, America's principal regional ally. For these reasons the United States ignored various Soviet proposals for mutual superpower disengagement from the Middle East and sought to exclude the Soviet Union from diplomatic efforts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. In some ways American policy succeeded: the Soviets became increasingly less influential in the Middle East from the early 1970s onward, and the United States was able to unilaterally mediate partial Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements in the mid-1970s and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979. However, the price of this success was high. The argument of this article is that American policy was based on misperceptions about Soviet interests, objectives, and behavior in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result of these misperceptions the cold war was exacerbated, there were several near-confrontations between the superpowers, and most importantly opportunities to reach a comprehensive settlement of the ArabIsraeli conflict were squandered.

The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's pact with Hitler

Author's Note: Glasnost and the Pact. Chronology of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1933-41. 1. Introduction 2. History and Politics in the USSR: The Case of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. 3. From World Revolution to Collective Security: Foundations of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-33. 4. The Rise and Fall of Collective Security, 1933-8. 5. Bridge-Building in Berlin: Soviet-German Relations in the Collective Security Era. 6. Alliance versus Isolation: Soviet Foreign Policy after Munich. 7. Failure of an Accord: The Triple Alliance Negotiations with Britain and France, 1939. 8. The Isolationist Alternative: Stalin's Pact with Hitler. 9. From the Baltic to the Black Sea: Soviet Security Policy, 1939-40. 10. The Unholy Alliance: Soviet-German Economic, Military and Political Co-operation, 1939-40. 11. To the Brink of War: Anglo-Soviet-French Relations, 1939-40. 12. Strategic Crisis: The Breakdown of the Alliance with Germany, 1940. 13. Unequal Contest: The Soviet-German Struggle in the Balkans, 1940-41. 14. Diplomacy on the Periphery: Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Japan and Great Britain, 1940-41. 15. The Road to Disaster: 22 June 1941. 16. Conclusion. Notes. Appendix 1 Soviet Politburo Proposals on Collective Security, December 1933. Appendix 2 Soviet Proposals to Britain and France for a Triple Alliance, April 1939. Appendix .3 Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Non-Aggression Between Germany and USSR, August 1939. Appendix 4 Secret Supplementary Protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, September 1939. Appendix 5 Soviet Statement to Italy on South-Eastern Europe, June 1940.

The Soviet‐Norwegian Maritime Disputes in the Arctic: Law and Politics

Abstract Norway is involved in two maritime boundary disputes with the Soviet Union. In relation to Svalbard, the Soviet Union argues that the archipelago has a continental shelf and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of its own to which all parties to the Svalbard Treaty have equal access. This is disputed by Norway, which maintains that such a view of the matter implies an expansive interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty for which there is no support in international legal practice. In the Barents Sea there is a continuing dispute between Norway and the Soviet Union over the proper location of the continental shelf and EEZ boundaries. This article sets out some of the reasons behind the different arguments on which the two base their respective cases, and the reasons why Norway in the absence of a delineated boundary has refused to accept Soviet proposals for economic cooperation in the disputed ocean area. Major emphasis is placed on the confluence of several circumstances inter alia, geopolitical and his...

The United Nations system and the future

The effectiveness of the United Nations is mainly determined by two factors, the international climate and the way governments choose to use the organization. There is now an extraordinary change in both of these conditions. We hear no more talk of the 'evil empire' and, instead of Soviet negative rhetoric and blocking tactics, there is a veritable cornucopia of neo-internationalist Soviet proposals. President Reagan, addressing the General Assembly on 26 September 1988, said, 'A change that is cause for shaking the head in wonder is upon us . . . the prospect of a new age of world peace. The United Nations has an opportunity to live and breathe and work as never before.' If I had been writing about the United Nations two years ago I should probably have adopted a somewhat wistful tone of 'What might have been' and 'What on earth can we do now?' I might have mentioned Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's 1982 annual report on making the United Nations, and especially the Security Council, work better and have said that it was a pity that the Security Council had been unable to act on it. I would have referred to the necessity of unanimity and of East-West cooperation in the face of threats to the peace. I would have spoken of the dream, apparently never to be realized, of a collegial Security Council rising above national preoccupations to fight for the common good. I would have referred to the desirability of pre-emptive international action to prevent disputes developing into conflicts. I would have extolled the desirability of fact-finding to establish the real situation in incipient conflicts. I would have suggested means of strengthening peace-keeping. I should have urged that governments not rest on their laurels when they had managed to agree on the text of a resolution, but follow up that resolution with all the support necessary to make it a reality. I would have urged the diminishing of rhetoric and the use of the United Nations less for confrontation and more for cooperation on difficult problems. I might have expressed regret that in an age of revolutionary change, old political relationships and problems had so far prevented the recognition of the undoubted fact of interdependence. In other words, I should have pronounced a lament for 40 years of tiptoeing around the Cold War, and especially around the obstructions of Soviet policy. I might have tried to revive my own spirits and those of the audience by talking of what had been achieved by people simply doing what they could in an inclement international climate and impossible political conditions, and of how it was surprising that so much had been achieved.

Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options

Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options

The Ethics of Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense

In 1967 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty. The treaty went into effect on October 10, 1967 and prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies. Both nations apparently perceived benefits in preventing escalation of the arms race into space. Space exploration could concentrate upon nonmilitary missions such as medical research, or military missions designed to guarantee peace, such as orbiting spy satellites. The weapons-of-mass-destruction clause in the treaty is officially inter preted as including only nuclear weapons. In 1981, the Soviets proposed a treaty at the United Nations calling for a ban on the stationing of weapons of any kind in space and, in 1983, they presented a resolution seeking the prohibition of space based antisatellite weapons (ASATs).1 Of course, Soviet proposals are always met with a great deal of skepticism. Colin Gray, for instance, warns us that Soviet calls for negotiations to prevent the militarization of space are part of a Soviet plan to untrack the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Gray remarks that SDI will need ASATs to defend against Soviet satellites whose mission will be to destroy SDI tracking in stallations on space-based platforms.2 Regardless of what the real intentions of the Soviets are, it is fair to say that the U.S. has undertaken a new orientation toward space-based weapons under President Reagan. In his now famous speech, Peace and National Security, delivered on March 23, 1983, Reagan urged the development of a defensive system which would make nuclear weapons ob solete. The speech presented a vision of a population defense which would free citizens from the threat of nuclear destruction and allow the United States to abandon reliance upon the immoral policy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) for deterrence.3 SDI will be a layered system with many space-based components. The version envisaged by James C. Fletcher, head of the Reagan-commissioned Defense Technologies Study and current director of NASA, involves four defensive layers correlated to the phases of a ballistic missile's flight: boost, post-boost, midcourse, and terminal.4 Three of these layers rely upon space-based weapons. It is doubtful that any of the layers would involve

Soviet proposals for the Arctic: a policy declaration by Mr Gorbachev

Soviet proposals for the Arctic: a policy declaration by Mr Gorbachev

Soviet proposals on the militarization of space

The USSR has submitted several proposals to the United Nations in recent years which are aimed at avoiding the militarization of outer space. This article examines three of the proposals and evaluates them in the context of existing treaties, to see whether or not they could resolve the political and legal problems which might arise. The reactions of the United Nations General Assembly and individual nations are also considered. The author concludes that several questions regarding the military aspects of space activity are left unresolved by the Soviet proposals.

Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Assessments

A reexamination of revolutionary processes in the developing countries indicates mounting doubts among Soviet academic specialists that radical third-world policies will redound to the U.S.S.R.'s advantage. The author investigates the following topics: the relationship of socialist orientation to socialism; shortcomings of the vanguard parties; correct foreign and domestic economic policies; the suitability of the Marxist model for Eastern societies; and the evolution of the non-aligned movement. The congruence between these academic discussions and fresh official formulations could give Western analysts and policy makers valuable insights into new Soviet proposals for reducing East-West tensions over events in the third world.

Soviet proposals

Soviet proposals

The Legal Regime of Russian Territorial Waters

Several elements have interacted to influence the course and pattern of the boundaries and the regime of Soviet territorial waters. The foremost of these is national security. All of the seas bordering the U.S.S.R. have narrow entrances which can be commanded easily by hostile foreign Powers. During the Russian Revolution and subsequent Civil War, German vessels and, after the War, Allied vessels in the Baltic and the Dardanelles restricted to an uncomfortable extent the freedom of action of the Soviet Government. Soviet weakness in the Baltic theater was a major factor in determining Soviet policy towards Finland and the Baltic states during the 1939-1941 period, and the proximity of NATO naval forces to the Baltic continues to provoke Soviet proposals to close the sea to noncoastal Powers. Similarly, the U.S.S.R. was compelled to endure Turkish violations of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits during World War II while its Black Sea fleet was immobilized. The Pacific coast seas and the Atlantic and Pacific approaches to the Arctic seas are also susceptible to a blockade by hostile Powers. Even the Arctic seas themselves, once regarded as an unguarded but impregnable frozen boundary, have become unexpectedly vulnerable with the development of nuclear submarines.

Japanese-African Relations: Problems and Prospects

Research Article| July 01 1965 Japanese-African Relations: Problems and Prospects James R. Soukup James R. Soukup Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1936) 5 (7): 333–340. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642292 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation James R. Soukup; Japanese-African Relations: Problems and Prospects. Far Eastern Survey 25 March 1936; 5 (7): 333–340. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2642292 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Mongolia: The Uneasy Buffer

Research Article| January 01 1965 Mongolia: The Uneasy Buffer M. T. Haggard M. T. Haggard Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1936) 5 (1): 18–24. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642177 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation M. T. Haggard; Mongolia: The Uneasy Buffer. Far Eastern Survey 1 January 1936; 5 (1): 18–24. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2642177 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Soviet proposals

The Soviet proposals

The Unsolved German Settlement

Three realities of the German situation must be accepted in any peaceful settlement of the short-run aspects: the division of Germany into two separate states, the rearma ment of Germany, and the division of Berlin with continued presence of Western troops in West Berlin. The main dispute is over recognition of East Germany, since the Soviet and United States proposals on Berlin are close enough to be negotiable— Soviet proposals have not called for elimination of Western gar risons. The major American concern over recognition involves the West German reaction, with its possible effect on NATO. West Germany, the mainstay of the alliance, also refuses to ac cept East Germany and its frontiers, insisting that a reuni fied Germany embracing 193 7 frontiers can be achieved by a "policy of strength in NATO." In considering whether the military risks of making a German settlement outweigh the military risks of not making one, major questions are (1) whether there exists a threat of Soviet military aggression against Western Europe and (2) whether NATO can long con tinue in its present form in any event. Although West Ger many will doubtless have closer relations with the Soviet Union in the future, a "deal" involving the sacrifice of East Germany by Moscow is no longer likely. Whether a West German-So viet rapprochement will prove deleterious to the United States depends in large part on whether the United States and the Soviet Union can reach a détente before it occurs.