Soviet Leadership Research Articles

Self-Government in Late 1980s Czechoslovakia: The Slovak Philosopher Miroslav Kusý against the Communist Party

Self-government is one of the most popular terms in left-wing political thought. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was used and discussed both in Western liberal democracies and in the communist bloc. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev used this notion from the mid-1980s onwards, forming part of his wider policy of perestroika. Although the Czechoslovak leaders were not interested in political reforms and were largely sceptical about economic changes, the Soviet example resonated with the public and impacted on official discussion in Czechoslovakia. In this context, the Czechoslovak parliament adopted the Act on State Enterprise in July 1988, which was preceded by the discussion of the Proposal on the Act on State Enterprise (1987). This article draws attention to Czechoslovak dissident milieus and the response to the parliament’s proposal. It focuses on the Slovak philosopher Miroslav Kusý (1931-2019), who articulated the most substantial critique of the official plans. While accepting the principle of self-government, he argued that the proposal was subject to fundamental misinterpretations. In assessing his arguments, the article traces a particular intervention within the wider debates on state socialism in the 1980s.

Politicization and militarization of children’s leisure in Soviet Ukraine in 1929–1939

The article analyzes the peculiarities of the process of politicization and militarization of children’s leisure in Soviet Ukraine in 1929–1939. The content of the transformation of traditional and creation of new forms of children’s leisure is revealed. The key concepts of ideological substantiation of the need to maximally fill the child’s free time with political and educational practices are identified. The evolution of the new tradition of club leisure and its filling with political content is analyzed. Forms of political and educational work with children in their free time have been reconstructed. The methods of involving children in the political campaigns of the Soviet government by filling the discourse of children’s leisure with the political and militaristic rhetoric are described. The mechanisms of introduction of the state control over such kinds of children’s leisure as reading, thanks to the formation of new children’s literature and creation of the system of propaganda of new work are investigated. It shows how a network of libraries was built into this system, which was tasked with organizing the work of forming a new mass reader. The process of involving children in the culture of the new Bolshevik holidays and its connection with the main tasks of the government in the field of education of conscious and loyal citizens is demonstrated. During the second half of the 1930s, at the initiative of the Ukrainian Soviet leadership, the Christmas tree was restored and transformed, which was filled with new ideological content and used to promote Bolshevik’s achievements and demon- strate the Communist Party’s concern for young citizens. The influence of the political situation on the development of the game sphere of children’s leisure is highlighted, and the power of the process of its militarization on the eve of the Second World War is emphasized. This applied to both mobile children’s games and board games, which were made according to the party’s tasks with an ideological load and included political games and military-themed games. Children’s toys were also modernized, including Christmas tree decorations and toys related to military equipment, military and political events, collective farm construction, and Soviet symbols were added to the traditional toy theme.

“The First Swallow”: Avian Metaphors in Nikita Khrushchev’s Political Discourse

Birds are a rich source for metaphors in paremias that are known to be a significant rhetorical force in various modes of communication. This article deals with the repertoire of ornithological proverbial texts utilized in the Soviet leader’s public speeches and memoirs, as well as in their English translations. The metaphor human is bird, in which there are various grounds of comparison, is explored. The peculiarities of using avian metaphors in the context of the original and the ways of their translation into English are scrutinized as well. The analysis of the material shows that the main features, shared by the Target (human) and the Source (bird species), are grounded on physiological characteristics and behavioral traits, having a negative slant. The equivalent and literal translations are applied as the main methods of rendition. Of particular interest are the metaphorical “animalistic metamorphoses” found in translation.

Cooperation of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR in the UN during the Perestroika Period

The article examines the main directions of activity and forms of interaction between the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR in the UN and its specialized institutions during the years of perestroika (1985 - 1991). To disclose the topic, materials from the journal “International Affair” were used (reviews of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the foreign policy of the USSR, articles by the foreign ministers of the Union republics, primarily Ukraine and Belarus), book and journal publications of Union / Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian scientists, documents of the United Nations and foreign policy of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR. The author’s conscious emphasis on the union level reflects the real situation in relations between the Union Center and the republics in the Soviet federation during the perestroika period, when these relations rapidly evolved from the foreign policy dictate of the Center to greater autonomy of the republics in the international arena, which ultimately has led to the collapse of the USSR and the proclamation of independence all union republics. The article analyzes such issues as the new approach of the Soviet Union to the UN in the years of perestroika, the formation of new relations between the Union republics and the Center, diplomatic cooperation of Soviet delegations and representatives of socialist countries in the UN, Belarusian initiatives at the 45th session of the UN General Assembly (1990). During the years of perestroika, the Soviet leadership and the union Foreign Ministry did a tremendous job of clearing the rubble of the Cold War, developing broad international cooperation and integration the USSR into the world economy. The Belarusian and Ukrainian diplomatic services have made a significant contribution to this activity within the framework of the UN and its specialized agencies and have received much broader opportunities for realizing the national interests and needs of their peoples within the framework of radically renewed relations between the Union Center and the republics. The article is one of the first attempts in post-Soviet historiography to investigate the activities of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR in the UN and its specialized institutions during the period of perestroika

Activities of Consulates of Socialist Countries in Kyiv (Late 1940s – 1980s)

The purpose of the study is to clarify the main activities of foreign consulates in Kyiv in the period after World War II to the restoration of state independence of Ukraine in 1991 and to determine the features of their interaction with public authorities and NGOs of the Ukrainian SSR. The research methodology is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, systematization. General scientific and special scientific methods are used, in particular archival heuristics, potestar imagology, prosopography. The scientific novelty of the research results consists in the reconstruction of activities of foreign consulates in Kyiv during the researched period, the creation of a collective portrait of foreign representatives in Kyiv, the clarification of the personalities of consuls general and features of their interaction with the state government and public organizations of the Ukrainian SSR based on the archival information found in published and unpublished sources by the author. Conclusions: The right of the Ukrainian SSR to foreign policy was restored on February 1, 1944, but the Soviet leadership did not intend to give the republic real powers. This decision was due to the desire of the USSR to get the opportunity for the largest possible representation in the emerging UN. The center of the formation of organizational and legal bases of the interaction of the Ukrainian foreign policy department was the Soviet People's Commissariat (later - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Central Committee of the CPU exercised control over the implementation of the center's decisions. In the cities of destination, foreign missions were under the triple supervision of the foreign ministry, party bodies and the soviet KGB structures, which led to their balancing between official cooperation and veiled ideological confrontation. Given the subordinate status of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, there were established not diplomatic missions (embassies), but consular offices (consulates general and consulates) in its administrative center Kyiv. Foreign consuls were mostly career diplomats with work or study experience in the USSR or party workers

1991: at the Origin of Building Hungarian-Ukrainian Inter-State Relations

On 31 May 1991, during the three-day visit of the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR to Budapest, there were signed nine documents, which ultimately were crucial for the development of Hungarian-Ukrainian bilateral relations. The working visit of the Ukrainian delegation, headed by the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Leonid Kravchuk, was preceded by many months of intensive preparatory work on both sides. In this study, the author tries to give an overview of this process based on declassified archival documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary and primarily referring to the Hungarian bibliography. At the beginning of the study, the author gives a brief description of the foreign policy goals of the Republic of Hungary to the Ukrainian SSR on the verge of the 90s. Then will be given a brief description of the content of the main meetings that were organized between the Hungarian and Ukrainian sides, as well as the reaction of the Soviet leadership to the mutual rapprochement of the two neighbouring states. Based on archival materials, the author pays special attention to issues that were of great importance in the development and regulation of Hungarian-Ukrainian bilateral relations, namely 1) the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation, 2) the Declaration on National Minorities and 3) the Consular Convention. The paper concludes with a brief review and assessment of the visit of the Ukrainian delegation to Budapest in May-June 1991 and gives a summary of the content and the terms of all nine signed documents

Nikita Khrushchev and the Compromise of Soviet Secret Intelligence Sources

How securely did Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handle secret intelligence? Former Soviet officials have claimed that he carelessly revealed intelligence and certainly in conversations with American, Italian, and Iranian diplomats and ministers Khrushchev put at risk Soviet sources by boasting about intelligence successes and disclosing information that could only have come from intelligence. While Soviet officials appear to have overestimated the security impact of Khrushchev’s revelations, he may have compromised a covert KGB mission in Iran and an important surveillance operation against the American embassy in Moscow.

«Япония все ближе и ближе пробивается к границам Монголии… Как думаете отстаивать свою независимость?» (О беседе Сталина с П. Гэндэном 24 ноября 1934 г.)

Introduction. The early 1930s saw a more active Russian-Mongolian interaction, including regular meetings and confidential conversations between the leaders of the USSR and the Mongolian People’s Republic. I. V. Stalin and the others of the top Soviet leadership started to pay more attention to the situation in Mongolia. This was largely justified by the sharp aggravation of the international situation in the Far East, with aggressive acts of imperialist Japan in the region and its further plans on the Asian continent, of which they made no secret. Under the circumstances, the USSR leaders sought to ensure the protection of its interests in the region. This article aims at examining and interpreting the significance of the Soviet-Mongolian summit that took place on November 24, 1934. Data and research methods. The author draws on a collection of documents on Russian-Mongolian military cooperation, which contains recordings of conversations between the top leadership of the two countries on military cooperation. Results. The main issue of the confidential conversation between Stalin, with the closest to him in the top Soviet leadership, and the Mongolian delegation, with Prime Minister Peljidiin Genden at the head, was a discussion of the urgent problem of how Mongolia would uphold its independence in the event of an attack from Japan: “what will you do if your situation worsens”? (Stalin) The materials of the meeting allow to understand the role of the USSR’s foreign policy in relation to Mongolia; to consider the course of discussions around the principal issues that interested both sides; and to shed light on the influence exerted by the Kremlin on the policy of the Mongolian government in terms of the ways of protecting the independence of the MPR. Stalin stressed the need to conclude a pact of mutual assistance; Genden agreed to start negotiations and was ready to elaborate practical steps. The Mongolian leadership was fully aware that the USSR was the only ally of the Mongolian People’s Republic in the Far East. Conclusions. The summit meeting of November 24, 1934 became an important milestone in the history of bilateral relations between the USSR and the MPR. The negotiations proved to be of key importance for promoting their further military cooperation. The pact of mutual assistance signed in 1936 provided for the presence of the Soviet armed forces in Mongolia and served as a guarantee of the country’s security.

The history of urbanization processes in the single-industry towns of Lisakovsk and Arkalyk of Kostanay region: similarities and differences, prospects for further development

The article considers the urbanization processes in two single-industry towns of Kostanay region: Lisakovsk and Arkalyk. Both cities were created during the Soviet period for the development of mining. Lisakovsk has always been a regional city, while Arkalyk has been the center of the Turgay region for a long time. However, Arkalyk has been steadily losing its population since 1991, when the decline was up to 40 % percent, and until now. The closure of the leading enterprise of the city, a branch of JSC «Aluminum of Kazakhstan» TBOM may lead to a further increase in the outflow of population, which in the long run may lead to the loss of the city status. In contrast, the population of Lisakovsk continued to grow even during the period of economic instability after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The city had a special economic zone status, which contributed to the momentum of food development. The article also traces the development of cities from their foundation to their current situation. The differences in the goals and methods used by the Soviet leadership for the formation of future single-industry towns are shown. The critical problem stages in the transition period of the 90s of the XX century are described.

Transformation of the image of the nazi regime in the soviet propaganda (23 august 1939 – june 1941): a source study aspect

The article, based on a wide range of historical sources, examines the key events associated with changes in the coverage of the Nazi regime by Soviet propaganda bodies in connection with the signing of the Soviet-German treaties: on non-aggression (August 1939), on friendship and the border (September 1939 g.). It is noted that both sides tried to find common ground on a number of secondary, "peripheral" issues, that the turn in Soviet propaganda, which began in August 1939, gave an impetus to create a positive cultural image of the former enemy. However, for reasons, primarily of an ideological nature, it was not possible to fully use the expected advantages from this political rapprochement in order to develop cultural ties. The reasons for the unsuccessful attempt at cultural rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich are analyzed. It points to the attempts of the Soviet leadership to study the experience of propaganda work in Germany with a view to further use. It is noted that, starting in the summer of 1940, in the conditions of a gradual deterioration in Soviet-German relations, the nature of the activities of propaganda structures is gradually changing. Increasingly, criticism of the Nazi regime is voiced in a veiled form. It is shown that in May June 1941, a new anti-Nazi turn in Soviet propaganda took place. It is concluded that if during the warming of relations with Germany in Soviet propaganda the class paradigm was temporarily replaced by a national or cultural-historical one, then the political and ideological campaign that unfolded in May-June 1941 had a clearly anti-German and anti-Nazi character.

"BANQUET CHRONICLE" A.Ya. VYSHINSKY: FROM THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KUIBYSHEV (1941-1942)

The article examines an episode from the everyday life of Soviet diplomats during the Great Patriotic War. The reports of one of the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei Vyshinsky on diplomatic receptions in November 1941-1942 are analyzed. These receptions took place in Kuibyshev, where employees of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, headed by Vyshinsky, were temporarily evacuated. Reports on them have been preserved in the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation and are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. They were sent by Vyshinsky to Moscow in the name of Stalin and Molotov. The sources identified by the author of the article, together with memoirs, make it possible to reveal various aspects of the culture of everyday life of Soviet diplomats who were temporarily in Kuibyshev. First, they give an idea of the participation of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in festive commemorations (anniversaries of the October Revolution), which were one of the components of the ceremony for the representation of power. Secondly, the recordings of Vyshinsky's conversations, reflected in his reports, contain important information about the moods of representatives of the diplomatic corps, in particular, ambassadors and envoys of the member states of the anti-Hitler coalition. It was used by the Soviet leadership in solving foreign policy tasks during the most difficult period of the war.

Lend-lease Program through the Prism of Official and Ego Sources

Discussions around various aspects of World War II in the world’s scientific space and memory field have continued throughout the postwar decades. Initially, they were determined by polar and antagonistic ideological paradigms, and after the end of the Cold War – the discovery and introduction into scientific circulation of previously classified sources, testing of avant-garde methods of scientific knowledge, the development of interpretive tools.
 In the late 1930s, the Soviet Union found itself virtually isolated, alone with the Axis bloc and their allies. It was difficult for the Soviet leadership to overcome the existing threats on its own, especially after the German attack. Only the realization by the Western Allies that Berlin’s aggressive course had become a global challenge made it possible to find a constructive way to join forces in the fight against a common enemy. One of the channels of cooperation between the states of the Anti-Hitler Coalition was the organization of supplies to the USSR of military equipment, ammunition, food, and materials necessary for the facilities of the Soviet military-industrial complex within the framework of the land lease program.
 Until recently, the problem of land lease was more in ideological discourse than in purely scientific. The currently available source base allows for an unbiased analysis of this phenomenon and elucidation of the place and role of foreign revenues to the USSR in strengthening its defense capabilities during the war against Germany and its allies. However, to this day, the researchers look out of focus, because of the perception of this phenomenon by veterans who fought on foreign military equipment, ate food from overseas. The authors of the article sees their task as combining these two dimensions of the lend-lease and finding out its impact not only on the scale of the large-scale armed confrontation, but also on the moral and psychological condition of the Red Army, for whom the war was an extremely difficult test.

The Sakharov-Medvedev Debate on Détente and Human Rights

Abstract This article examines the debate between Soviet dissidents Andrei Sakharov and Roy Medvedev in the 1970s concerning the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and détente. Although both dissidents stood for East-West détente and democratization of the Soviet system and believed in the possibility of a dialogue with Soviet leaders until 1970, they later diverged in their views about methods of action. As Sakharov lost faith in the possibility of influencing the Soviet regime headed by Leonid Brezhnev, he shifted to a more radical position, adopting the language of human rights and turning to Western politicians and public opinion as an audience for his calls. Sakharov's public embrace of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was in line with his advocacy of freedom of emigration and his belief that the West should extract concessions in the field of human rights before granting trade benefits to the Soviet Union. Medvedev, by contrast, argued that the amendment was counterproductive insofar as it risked alienating Soviet leaders and triggering adverse results. He considered that détente should be encouraged for its own sake, with the hope that over time it would spur democratization in the country. Medvedev's argument had much in common with the West German leader Willy Brandt's notion of “change through rapprochement,” a concept invoked as a rationale for Brandt's Ostpolitik. Although Sakharov's position earned him the Nobel Peace Prize, the Helsinki Accords showed how détente could serve the cause of human rights even with the Cold War under way.

Operation “Denver”

Abstract This second part of a two-part article moves ahead in showing how the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) came to play a key role in the disinformation campaign launched by the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) in 1983 regarding the origins of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The KGB launched the campaign itself, but in the mid-1980s it sought to widen the effort by enlisting the cooperation of intelligence services in other Warsaw Pact countries, especially the Stasi. From the autumn of 1986 until November 1989, the Stasi played a central role in the disinformation campaign. Despite pressure from the U.S. government and a general inclination of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to curtail the campaign by the end of 1987, both the KGB and the USSR's official Novosti press agency continued until 1989 to spread false allegations that HIV was a U.S. biological weapon. Even after the KGB curtailed its disinformation in 1989, the Stasi continued to disseminate falsehoods, not least because it had successfully maintained plausible deniability regarding its role in the campaign. The Stasi worked behind the scenes to support the work of Soviet–East German scientists Jakob Segal and Lilli Segal and to facilitate dissemination of the Segals’ views in West Germany and Great Britain, especially through the leftwing media, and to purvey broader disinformation about HIV/AIDS by attacking U.S. biological and chemical weapons in general.

Between Two Millstones, Book 1: Sketches of Exile, 1974–1978

Between Two Millstones, Book 1: Sketches of Exile, 1974–1978

Ten Days in Harlem: Fidel Castro and the Making of the 1960s

Ten Days in Harlem: Fidel Castro and the Making of the 1960s

Tony goes out into the world: The official travels abroad of the President of Czechoslovakia, Antonín Novotný (1953–68)

The long-term First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and later also President of the Republic, Antonín Novotný (1904–75), was popularly known as “Nice Tony”. As a communist politician and statesman, Novotný was well known as a great disciple and follower of Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, famous for his personal and very contact-oriented diplomacy. The main contours of several of Novotný's official visits have already been analysed from political and diplomatic history perspectives. Based on archival research and available memoirs, this article tries to reconstruct the still non-visible and unknown view of transport history and, consequently, traveling and tourism history. It outlines the general contours and several aspects of V.I.P. communists’ international travels on the cases of several trips abroad which took place during the 1950s and 1960s of the Cold War era.

Penkovsky, the Spy Who Tried to Destroy the World

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lore and popular culture tout Col. Oleg Penkovsky as “the spy who saved the world” during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. In fact, his contribution to U.S. intelligence and policymaking is exaggerated, distorted, and in several instances falsified. More disturbing, Penkovsky harbored a murderous rage against the Soviet system and repeatedly tried to inveigle the West in a quixotic quest to destroy it. He devised a plan to blow up Moscow, advocated preventive war against the Soviet Union, fanned the flames of the Berlin crisis with false reports of Kremlin mobilization for war, and recommended assassinating Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Penkovsky allegedly provided critical information that bought time for President John F. Kennedy to devise a diplomatic solution to the Cuban crisis before Soviet missiles were ready to fire. Not true, according to the president’s advisers. New information reveals that some Soviet missiles were combat-ready two days before U.S. intelligence discovered the first incomplete launch site. The State Committee for Security (KGB) allowed Penkovsky to continue spying for at least ten months after he came under suspicion, perhaps to protect a mole in American or British intelligence. A senior CIA officer claimed that, meanwhile, the Soviets controlled and manipulated Penkovsky without his knowledge. Even after his arrest, Penkovsky may have attempted to instigate a nuclear war by tricking the KGB into sending a false alert of an impending Soviet surprise attack on the United States.

Problems of organization and activities of guerrillas of Ukraine during the summer of 1941-1942 from the point of view of the modern western historiography

The article analyzes the peculiarities of western scientists’ coverage of the problems of organization and effectiveness of the guerrilla movement in Ukraine, which, in their opinion, had a rather complex and ambiguous phenomenon. The role of various factors that took place in the creation and leadership of the detachments, including both the factor of upper leadership of the movement, and the factor of spontaneity, has been examined. The circumstances that served as an accelerator for its expansion in 1943 have been clarified; the thesis of the "nationwide struggle against the Nazi invaders", to which western scientists have always been skeptical, has been considered from a critical point of view. There are some contradictions in the works of historians of Western Europe, the United States, Canada and other countries to the estimation of the effectiveness of guerrilla action. The authors did not ignore the typical problems associated with the attitude of Soviet leaders to the seemingly excessive independence of the guerrillas. Western historians also clarify the relationship between the guerrillas and the local community, which has not always been cloudless. In addition, they constantly emphasize the indifference of guerrilla leaders to the events of Holocaust. Moreover, as a rule, partisans of Jewish origin often felt protected from anti-Semitic manifestations only in mono-ethnic Jewish detachments. The situation of girls and women guerrillas was rather difficult; many of them were forced to become mistresses of certain captains due to the aggressive behavior of male guerrillas. It should be highlighted that the classic work of D.A. Armstrong (1922-2010), Professor of the University of Wisconsin, "Soviet guerrillas. Legend and Reality, 1941-1944” stated that by the autumn of 1942 there were almost no guerrillas in Ukraine. The exceptions were the regions of Sumy and Chernihiv; according to his estimates, even at the beginning of 1943 there were no more than 20,000 guerrillas in Ukraine. It is noteworthy that the historical department of the US Army during the Cold War was monitoring closely the Soviet publications on the activities of Soviet guerrillas. In 1965 the bibliography of books, essays, memoirs, and collections of documents on the guerrillas group in the occupied territory of the USSR, which was collected there, figured up to 227 titles. Western scientists supported the formula of the "involuntary Resistance Movement" that existed in the occupied lands not only in Ukraine. According to them, the activities of the guerrillas had more psychological and political significance than purely military one - that is, the population should have felt that they were the representatives of the Soviet government.

United States Diplomacy in Berlin During the First Phase of the Cold War: Does It Define US Foreign Policy?

The Cold War was one of the longest conflicts of the Twentieth Century with lasting consequences. Although the United States and the Soviet Union would never fight a war directly against each other, the fear of a disastrous nuclear war and the spread of communism encapsulated American foreign policy during the Cold War. The Cold War drastically changed the alliances of the United States everywhere. The United States started helping the countries that it fought with during World War II, while at the same time, it became archenemies with its former allies. The United States would gain many more allies and protect them from falling to communism, and it would lose some of its allies that fell into Soviet influence. As a result, American foreign policy had to be alert to various places around the globe. The tensions during the Cold War would stem from disagreements between the Allies during World War II. Tensions escalated due to warring economic ideologies of communism and capitalism, fight for the access to natural resources, and the fear of global spread of communism. The Cold War was a global conflict with many small hotbeds popping up around the world. Divided Germany, especially the divided Berlin, would witness one of the most threatening escalations. In 1961, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would call Berlin the “most dangerous place on Earth.” American diplomacy in Germany became the center of American foreign policy during the first phase of the Cold War, setting the stage for the rest of the Cold War, and revealing the chaotic tensions and events that took place during that time period.