Soviet Intelligence Services Research Articles

The Film Ivan by Oleksandr Dovzhenko in the Light of the Soviet Intelligence Services

A set of archival documents of the Soviet secret services (agent messages, reports, summaries, etc.) related to Dovzhenko’s work on the film Ivan in 1931–1932 is analyzed in the article. Ivan is just the film that has the largest number of documents of this kind among the works. The agents have informed the secret services about the work on the script, its passage through the censorship authorities, and the filming period in their reports. The criticism of the author has started in Ukraine after the completion of the film. During this period the agents have recorded the artist’s difficult moral and psychological state, his negative statements against the Ukrainian party leadership and representatives of the literary and artistic intelligentsia, and the measures taken by the leaders of the Ukrainian and Soviet cinematographers to level the negative assessment of the film in the press. Relevant experts have been engaged to write reviews to obtain more complete information about the film. The director has been forced to move to Moscow because of the considerable pressure and negative attitude in Ukraine. He is introduced to Joseph Stalin there. The dictator has liked the movie. Following Stalin, official criticism also has changed its mind about Ivan, and the film was allowed to be shown. Dovzhenko was saved from seemingly certain death. The director has soon started work on his next film, called Aerograd. But the Soviet secret services did not let the artist out of their sight in Moscow. In general, the surveillance of O. Dovzhenko during his work on the film Ivan was part of a much wider range of operational activities of the special services to obtain compromising materials about the artist’s “anti-Soviet” activities and continued until his death.

ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ ПОДРАЗДЕЛЕНИЙ НКВД СССР В ПЕРИОД ВТОРОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЫ

The purpose of the study is to study the role of the NKVD in the USSR during the Second World War. The issue is highly relevant in the context of historical research, as well as for understanding the events of this period. The NKVD played a significant role both in the defense of the country and in organizing the rear, counterintelligence and maintaining order in the occupied territories. The study allows to understand the mechanisms of functioning of the Soviet special services during the war, their contribution to ensuring the country's security, as well as assess the influence of NKVD units on the course of events and the outcome of the war. Analysing the NKVD activities during the Second World War helps to expand knowledge about the complex and multifaceted role of this department during the war years. This also helps to deeper understand the sacrifices and exploits of NKVD employees, their contribution to the country's defense and the fight against the enemy. To study the NKVD history on the military front and in the rear in order to identify lessons and examples that can be used in modern conditions to ensure the country's security and protect the interests of the state Iis of great importance. The methodology includes various approaches and methods for studying historical sources. The methods help to study archival documents, eyewitness accounts, publications and scientific research related to the activities of the NKVD during the Second World War. Analysing official documents helps to reveal the functions and tasks of the NKVD, their participation in military operations and interaction with other structures. Comparing the activities of the NKVD in the USSR with other military and intelligence services of other countries during the Second World War reveals the features and effectiveness of the actions of the Soviet intelligence services. It is necessary to take into account the historical and political context of the time in which the NKVD units operated in order to understand the motives and reasons for their actions. Currently, in accordance with modern trends in the development of Russian society; With the growth of patriotism, interest in history, and understanding of spiritual and moral imperatives, interest in the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, the role of both individual fighters of various branches of the military, and the entire people as a whole, is being updated. The author makes an attempt to understand the role of NKVD during the Second World War, especially during its most difficult period, namely 1941–1943, when NKVD employees faced new tasks, new challenges, which had to be answered necessary as quickly and professionally as possible. In many ways, these challenges are consonant with the modern realities of the activities of employees of the internal affairs bodies of the Russian Federation. Based on the analysis of the data, the author concludes that the contribution of the NKVD in various aspects of wartime was significant. The study of the role of the NKVD in the USSR during the Second World War is an important and relevant historical research area, contributing to a deeper understanding of the history of the Soviet intelligence services and their impact on the events during the war.

Soviet and Russian Diplomatic Expulsions: How Many and Why?

Between 1946 and 1991, over 1,500 Soviet officials—mostly intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover—were expelled from diplomatic and other government representations around the world. Expulsions often involved single or small groups of officials, but occasionally occurred en masse. Countries chose to expel Soviet officials for four reasons: in reaction to anti-Soviet regime changes and political reversals, in retaliation for Soviet covert activities and political manipulation, in reaction to Soviet intelligence officer defectors and intelligence obtained from penetrations of Soviet intelligence services, and, most frequently, in retaliation for espionage. Recent expulsions are modern adaptations of a method that was common during the Cold War with commonalities of purpose, but some variations, especially in scale and level of international cooperation.

Forty Years of Soviet Spying in NATO: A Preliminary Study

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s security against Soviet espionage was devastating. Open sources reveal more than 60 spies unmasked, named, and accused of directly stealing NATO secrets on behalf of Soviet intelligence services, the State Committee for Security (KGB) and Main Intelligence Directorate, while NATO’s own secret report estimated 300 spies. These unmaskings attested to the efficacy of Western counterintelligence, but nevertheless evidenced deep and sustained infiltration by Soviet agents. This study, unfortunately, may only be considered preliminary because it is the first one to examine the totality of espionage within NATO during the Soviet years, even though the complete historical record remains inaccessible. Second, most of the information has been gleaned from journalistic sources. Third, the real damage of stolen classified materials remains elusive owing to laws that prevent disclosure. Absent a practical way to verify compromises, NATO officials had little recourse but to assume that Moscow possessed all classified information exposed to spies.

Agential and operative activities of Soviet intelligence services relating to discovering and eliminating the OUN underground movement in Zaporizhzhia (1943-1950)

Agential and operative activities of Soviet intelligence services relating to discovering and eliminating the OUN underground movement in Zaporizhzhia (1943-1950)

Американская женщина в пропагандистских играх холодной войны: Аннабелла Бюкар и ее «правда об американских дипломатах»

In February 1949, the book with the title The Truth about American Diplomats by Annabelle Bucar was published in the Soviet Union. The author was a former officer of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The activity of her colleagues in this book was shown as very unpleasant. One year before this event, Bucar left the U.S. Embassy and married to a Soviet citizen, but she did not imagine that the fact of her transition on the side of the strategic enemy of the United States could be used as much as possible by the Soviet Intelligence services. The article analyzes how this situation has become a part of Soviet propaganda during the Cold War. Particular attention is paid to the problem of the authorship of the book, the main purpose of which was to create a negative image of American diplomacy among the Soviet readers during the period of growing confrontation between the USSR and the USA.

Soviet Intelligence Discourse about Caliphate Question in 1920s: Musa Bigiev, Eastern Department OGPU and Islamic political unity

This article deals with the study of the views of the Soviet intelligence on the so-called short-lived “Caliphate movement”, which originates from the then British India. Even after its official abolition in 1924, this institution did not lose its symbolic appeal for Muslims across the world. As an idea it continued offering the Muslims a sense of the umma i.e. the global community of Muslims. The author offers the Soviet intelligence interpretation of the idea of the Caliphate movement in the context of the Soviet “eastern” foreign policy. The article describes this issue through the prism of interaction between the Eastern Department of the OGPU (USSR Secret service) and Musa Bigiyev, a prominent Russian Muslim leader of the 19th–20th cent. Based on hitherto unknown archival materials and the most recent Russian and foreign historical studies, the author offers a comparative analysis of the attitudes of various Soviet and Communist Party institutions to the Caliphate idea and the Caliphate movement in the context of anti-colonial, anti-European struggle. In conclusion article shows the discrepancy between the strategy and tactics of Soviet intelligence services as opposed to the views of European (in particular, British) intelligence services. As a result, these activities contributed to the restriction of independence of the Russian Muslim elite on one handside, strengthening the anti-Caliphate feelings and Islamophobic views among the Soviet management elite on the other.

Soviet intelligence and the 1957 Syrian crisis

This article assesses a claim by Khrushchev that warnings from the Soviet intelligence services enabled to him to deter a Turkish invasion of Syria in 1957. The article shows that the United States and Turkey did aim to overthrow the Syrian government, with the Turks massing an invasion force on Syria’s border. Soviet intelligence detected this threat and was able to alert Khrushchev, who took diplomatic and military countermeasures. However, while the Soviet intelligence services did provide advance warning, Khrushchev overestimated the extent to which the United States was committed to a Turkish invasion.

Zadnja bitka v Stalinovem imenu: Vittorio Vidali, komunizem na obalah Jadranskega morja in boj Informbiroja proti Titu (1947-1954)

The essay aims to analyse the "Adriatic communism" policy implemented in the period from World War II to the eve of the schism between Stalin and Tito in 1948, with the subsequent rift in relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the expulsion of Belgrade from the socialist camp. The essay focuses on the figure of Vittorio Vidali, an Italian communist leader (born in Muggia, near Trieste) with a long and prominent militant role in the Soviet intelligence services as evidenced by his involvement in various events both in Europe and the United States.The choice to focus the analysis on Vittorio Vidali is based on the decisive role he played in the "Adriatic communism" in the stages immediately preceding the Tito–Stalin split and then during the years of the Cominform's opposition against the Party and the Yugoslav regime after 1948.

Razem czy osobno: próba „organicznego połączenia” wywiadów Polski Ludowej w latach 1947–1950

Together or Apart: an Attempt at an ”Organic Union” of the Intelligence Services of People’s Poland in 1947–1950 The Intelligence Services of People’s Poland were established in the summer of 1945 and modelled on their Soviet counterparts i.e. they comprised two separate entities: military (Second Department of the General Staff) and civilian (Second Special Department of the Ministry of Public Security). A year later, however, Waclaw Komar, head of the Second Department, proposed to recognise Army monopoly of all Intelligence activity. In July 1947 this notion was partly implemented as a “personal union” and Komar was entrusted with the Services while retaining their organisational distinctness. Since at the time both Soviet Intelligence Services became united within the newly established Information Committee of the Council or Ministers, there are premises for assuming that the authorities in Warsaw partially copied the decisions made in Moscow. The symbiosis of the Intelligence institutions of the Ministry of Public Security and the General Staff considerably stimulated their activity and assisted the modernisation of operational and analytical work. Nonetheless, the middle of 1949 – when a battle was waged against the “internal enemy” and the “rightist–nationalist deviation” – witnessed the initiation of the disassembly of the existing configuration, starting with a purge of the personnel, which ended formally on 22 June 1950 with the dismissal of Komar from his office in the Ministry of Public Security. At the same time, a reversal from the conception of a uniform Intelligence Service took place also in Moscow, though the reasons for the changes differed from those in Poland. The episode of the creation and dissolution of an ‘’Intelligence community” under the aegis of General Komar is interesting not only from the point of view of the history of Polish Intelligence, but also as a fragment of the political history of the period. The article is based on extensive archival studies and the rather modest literature on the topic (W. Bagienski, S. Cenckiewicz, Z. Siemiątkowski, Ch. Andrew).

What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa by David E. s> Murphy (review)

REVIEWS 563 returned refugees in theconstruction ofindependent statesin theaftermath of WorldWar One? These are amongthe importantquestionsraisedby the contributors. In addition,theyreflectupon the politicsof displacement and actionsundertaken towards groupsofrefugees (thehelpprovided to themand the distrust, reluctanceand consequentsupervision thesegroupsfaced).For instance,Latvians wereoftenconsidered to be Germansandpersecuted as a result.DuringandafterthewarJewssuffered a similarfate,as didPolesand membersof manyotherethnicandcultural groups. Contributingauthors (predominantlyhistoriansbut sociologistsand philosophers as well)live in the regionthey writeaboutand consequently theyintroduce andconfronta Westernaudiencewithhistorical literature and originalarchivematerials fromEasternEurope(Latvian, Polish,Belarusian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, etc.).AijaPrieditedescribesthe impactLatvianwar refugeeshad on the independence of Latviaafterthe war.ValentinaUtgof writesabouttheroleplayedbyBelarusian refugees intheprocessofconstructing the independenceof theirnation.Tomas Belkelisdescribesthe state's policytowardsrefugeesreturning to Lithuania; and KonradZielin'ski shows how a newlyindependent Polandtriedto controlthe movementof refugees acrossitsborders.In thiscase,themainpreoccupation of thePolishauthoritieswas to preventan influxinto Polandof Ukrainians andJews.Kateryna Stadnik analyses thesituation in SovietUkraineduringtheyearsI921-22 and describesthe processof repatriation. LucjaKapralska in turnlooksat the returnof Polesfrom Siberiaand Manchuriaand identifiesproblemsthese peoplefacedaftertheirreturn.Gennadii Kornilovdocuments theproblems of refugees in theUralsduringtherevolutionary yearsI9I7-25.The lastofthese casestudies(byPeterGatrellandJo Laycock) is devotedto population movements ,refugeecrisesandefforts toformanindependent stateofArmenia. The book is complemented by the introduction and conclusions writtenby the editorswhocorrectly stressthatallof thecontributors provideanopportunity not onlyto learnaboutthepost-World WarOne population movements and theirimpacton discussions aboutidentitybut to hearthe voicesof refugees andheroesof thatstoryaswell. Thisis a sophisticated, richandexploratory workwhichcontributes to the fieldsof migrationand culturalhistory,nationalidentityandpolitics.Baron andGatrellhaveprepared an important andhighlyinteresting volumewhich no historian of migrations or anyoneinterested in therepercussions of World WarOne on EasternEuropecan ignore.Furthermore, becausetheseevents foreshadow andevenexplainpresent-day issuesin theterritory of theformer SovietEmpire,politicalscientists willfindthiscollectionespecially useful. Jagiellonian University, Krak6w A. WALASZEK Murphy, David E. M7Eat StalinKnew:TheEnigma ofBarbarossa. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT and London, 2005. xxii + 3IOpp. Illustrations. Maps. Appendices. Glossary.Notes. Index. ?I9.95. THIS book provides the most recent and detailed account availablein English of the way in which the Soviet intelligence services reported on the German 564 SEER, 84, 3, JULY 2006 threat from 1939 until 22June I94I. David E. Murphy is a career intelligence officer, formerlyChief of Soviet operations at CIA headquartersin the USA. He has based his book on Soviet archivalmaterialpublished in the I99os. His principalsourcesare the two volumes of AleksandrN. Yakovlev's1941 god, published in I998, the two volumes of the Federal Service of Counter Intelligence (FSK, later renamed the Federal Security Service, FSB) Organy Gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSRv Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine, published in I995, and Sekrety Gitlera na stoleu Stalina,publishedjointly in the same year by the FSK and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The only new unpublished material to which he had access was the personal file of Ivan I. Proskurov at the Russian State Military Archive. Otherwise he was denied, apparently as a result of considered policy, all access to the pre-war archives of the Soviet intelligence and security services. It is unlikely that any independent researcherwill fare better than Murphy in the foreseeablefuture. Stalin, until 22 June 194I, clung to the belief that the Germans would not attempt to make war on the Soviet Union until they had defeated Britain. Murphy sets out to explain why Stalin denied the possibilitythat Hitlerwould invade the USSR although very detailed evidence that he planned to do so was made available to the Soviet leadership not only by Roosevelt and Churchillbut also in copious detail by his own intelligence services. Murphyprovidesa well orderedaccount of the high qualityof Soviet intelligence sources and the informationwhich they provided to the leadershipof the Soviet Union. He uses the careersand variedfates of Proskurov,Fitin and Golikov to bring to life the nature of Stalin's relations with his advisers. Proskurovis the real hero of this book. Brave, modest, intelligent, a distinguished combat airman, carefulfor the welfare of those who workedfor him, Proskurov was appointed Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate in I939. He provided Stalin with assessments,including notably a scepticalview of Germany's ability to invade England, that were at odds with Stalin'sown poorly founded beliefs. Proskurovwas dismissed in 1940 and shot without trial in I941. In the same year Fitin became head of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD. Fitin, the organizer of intelligence on the US developmentof the atomic bomb, was an able, accurateand effectivemanager of intelligence. He was saved from the consequences of these virtues by his understanding that acceptabilitywas more important than truthfulnessand...

The KGB in Eastern Europe during the Cold War: On Agents and Confidential Contacts

Ben de Jong from the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands, discusses the ways in which the KGB collected information about political developments in Eastern Europe during the Cold War and tries to shed some light on the question whether Soviet intelligence services recruited full-fledged agents to acquire the necessary information in the same way as they did in the West. De Jong concentrates on Poland but also tries to grasp the bigger picture and focusses on the distinction between fully-fledged agents and so-called confidential contacts. Records from the KGB archives on this topic are completely absent from the public domain but this article tries to elucidate this interesting question with the help of the writings of several former KGB officers and other materials.

Espionage and the Roots of the Cold War: The Conspiratorial Heritage

From the 1930s to the 1950s a large number of left-wing men and women in the USA, Britain, Europe, Australia and Canada were recruited to the Soviet intelligence services. They were amateurs and the reason for their success is intriguing. Using Soviet archives, this work explores these successes.

Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45

The intelligence war in Russia 1941-45 was waged on a scale unmatched in any other theatre of the second world war. Nevertheless, for various reasons, the conflict between the German and Soviet intelligence services has not received the attention that it deserves. In this paper, an effort is made to discuss certain facets of German intelligence operations on the Russian Front, specifically, the work of Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), 'Foreign Armies East', the department of the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) responsible for the evaluation of all military intelligence about the Soviet Union, including the analysis of Soviet intentions and strategy; and Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the military intelligence service under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), whose field headquarters in the East were responsible for clandestine collection, special operations, subversion, and counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. Abwehr operations against the Soviet Union did not fall within the strict scope of FHO activities. However, these operations are noted here, because Abwehr headquarters in Berlin furnished intelligence to FHO from the beginning, and the Abwehr field organization in the East responsible for espionage, sabotage, and counter-intelligence, Stab WALLI, was placed under the control of FHO in the spring of 1942 (departments I (espionage) and III (counter-intelligence) only). A forthcoming paper will examine Soviet intelligence operations on the Russian Front.2 For lack of space, there is no detailed treatment of the other German intelligence organizations that provided information to FHO, in particular, Fremde Luftwaffe Ost, German Air Force intelligence, and the Wehrmacht signals intelligence organization in Russia, Leitstelle fir Nachrichtenaufkldrung Ost. The operations of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), including the sabotage and subversion organization in Russia,

Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943

For students of the Soviet-German war, the revelations concerning Allied signal intelligence between 1939 and 1945 only underscore our ignorance of the intelligence aspects of the second world war's greatest land campaign. Where the course and outcome of operations in western Europe, the Atlantic and the Pacific can now be seen in clearer perspective, the Eastern Front remains in twilight and shadow. The lack of Soviet documentation, always a handicap, becomes even more acute in this field, as analysis necessarily diminishes to conjecture, with the focus of research shifted away from the organization, methodology and technology of Soviet intelligence to the activities of master spies and highly-placed traitors. The results can be seen in the treatment of the Soviet espionage network known as the 'Lucy' ring, and especially in the latter's perceived decisive contribution to Soviet victory at the Battle of Kursk in summer 1943. Vital intelligence of German plans supplied by 'Lucy' has received much of the credit for defeating the longdelayed offensive (codenamed 'Zitadelle' or 'Citadel') against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient. The search for the exact identity of the intelligence sources working for Lucy has generated a prodigious amount of literature over the years, of variable quality and disparate conclusions. Far more significant than any of their findings, however, is the tendency to denigrate the performance of other Soviet intelligence services in the field. A recent study illustrates this tendency with the observation: