Soviet-Egyptian Relations Research Articles

Soviet-Egyptian Relations (1970–1973)

In this article, the author examines the history of political relations between the USSR and Egypt after the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 and the beginning of the era of President Mohammed Anwar el-Sadat, as well as the difficulties and turmoil that directly arose in relations between the two countries. The aim of the study is to analyse the approach of Egyptian policymakers towards the Soviet Union in the early seventies. On the other hand, to highlight the position of Soviet leaders towards Sadat’s rise to power and his attempts at a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, the author examines the most significant factors, ups and downs of relations between the two countries during this period, i.e. from the signing stage of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, military assistance to Egypt with arms to the crisis related to the termination of the mission of Soviet military advisors and experts in Egypt. This study focused on a combined analysis of sources and studies in Arabic and Russian in order to objectively highlight the point of view of each of the participants in the relationship, as well as some Western views according to English-language sources. The study as a whole explains the crucial motives behind the crises that had an obvious impact on the Soviet-Egyptian relations and how, through joint efforts, the leadership of both countries managed to eliminate these crises before the October War of 1973.

«Американский фактор» в советско-египетских отношениях в первый год президентства А. Садата (по воспоминаниям участников событий)

The article based on the memoirs of Soviet and Egyptian politicians and diplomats, examines the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations in the first year of Anwar Sadat's presidency and the influence of the “American factor” on them. The subjective reasons for the new foreign policy of the country arising from the ideological and political views of the Egyptian president are analyzed, its consistent and purposeful implementation aimed at moving away from friendly relations with the USSR to cooperation with the United States is shown. The argumentation and methods of implementing a new direction in Egypt's foreign policy are revealed. The details of the behind-the-scenes game of politicians, which is not reflected in the official diplomatic documentation, are highlighted. The veil is being lifted over previously unknown plots of the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations and the influence of the “American factor” on them. There is an opportunity to look into the “corridors of power”, to see the real picture of negotiations and discussions of sensitive diplomatic topics at the highest level. The memoirs reflect the political and social atmosphere of Egyptian society at a turning point in the history of this country. They most clearly show the influence of the “human factor” on the adoption of certain political decisions. The comparison of memoir sources al-lows us to get as close as possible to the authentic history of American influence on Soviet-Egyptian relations in the first year of Sadat's presidency.

Soviet Historiography of Egypt 's relations with the USSR in 1967-1977

The subject of the study is Soviet historiography about Egypt's relations with the USSR. Soviet-Egyptian relations have a long history and have passed an unprecedented stage in their life. During the Cold War, Egypt was the main ally of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Therefore, the prepared studies on the history of relations between the two countries at that time occupy an important place in Russian science. In this article, the author seeks to present the historical background, goals, objectives, methods and features of the USSR's policy towards Egypt, as well as its development in the 60s and 70s of the twentieth century. The novelty of the research lies in the coverage of various criticisms, comments and points of view of researchers, writers, politicians and diplomats who devoted their works to the goals of Soviet foreign policy towards Egypt during the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author of the article also spoke about the course of relations between the two countries, explaining their strengths and weaknesses. The article highlights the mistakes and crises of political and military relations and their impact on both countries, which helps to avoid future mistakes between Egypt and the Russian Federation. The history of the USSR is the basis of the history of modern Russia.

The struggle for power in Egypt in May 1971 and its impact on relations with the USSR

The subject of the study is the power struggle that unfolded in Egypt in May 1971 between President M. A. Sadat and a group of prominent statesmen led by Vice President A. Sabri. He had close ties with the leaders of the USSR. When the struggle ended with the removal of Sabri and his group from their posts, which was called the May Correctional Revolution. These events affected relations between Sadat and Soviet leaders, given that Sabri was a favorite of the USSR in Egypt after the death of President Nasser. On the other hand, at that time there were many attempts by the United States to expand ties with Egypt. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that more than 50 years after the end of the power struggle that took place in Egypt in May 1971, accusations, gossip and rumors still resound in the minds of many. This struggle had a great impact on Soviet-Egyptian relations during the era of Egyptian President M. A. Sadat. Therefore, the author of the article seeks to analyze the events and development of this struggle or correct the distortion of facts with the help of memoirs and works of diplomats and politicians published over the past 50 years in Russian and Arabic. This undoubtedly provides an opportunity for a clearer and more comprehensive conclusion about the reality of the relationship between Sadat and the Soviet leaders after the overthrow of the Ali Sabri group, which resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Egypt on May 27, 1971.

Muhammad Anwar Sadat and Soviet-Egyptian Relations in Mid-1950s — Early 1970s: Memoirs of Soviet and Egyptian Politicians

The Soviet-Egyptian relations from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s are analyzed through the prism of their perception by Soviet and Egyptian politicians and diplomats. The ideological, political and world views of the second Egyptian President Anwar Sadat are shown, which predetermined the turn of Egypt’s foreign policy from cooperation with the USSR to an alliance with the USA. Subsequently publishing his “Autobiography”, Sadat hoped to use it as a tool in solving current political problems, in particular, as a means of substantiating the turn he had made. The argumentation and methods of implementing a new direction in Egypt’s foreign policy are disclosed. The details of the behind-the-scenes game of politicians, which are not reflected in the official diplomatic documentation, are highlighted. The real picture of negotiations and discussions of delicate diplomatic topics at the highest level is being reconstructed. The memoirs reflect the political and social atmosphere of Egyptian society at a turning point in the history of this country. They most clearly trace the influence of the “human factor” on the adoption of certain political decisions. Numerous characteristics of the Soviet and Egyptian partners in the negotiation process are given. Comparison of memoir sources allows us to get as close as possible to the reliable history of Soviet-Egyptian relations of that time.

"...НАУЧНЫЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЯ СЕЙЧАС ВОЗОБНОВЛЯЮТ СВОИ ОТНОШЕНИЯ С УЧРЕЖДЕНИЯМИ ДРУГИХ СТРАН": ДОКУМЕНТЫ ВСЕСОЮЗНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА КУЛЬТУРНОЙ СВЯЗИ С ЗАГРАНИЦЕЙ О КНИГООБМЕНЕ СОВЕТСКИХ ЕГИПТОЛОГОВ С КОЛЛЕГАМИ ИЗ ЕГИПТА (1940-Е ГГ.)

On the basis of the archival materials from the Foundation of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries of the State Archives of the Russian Federation, the author considers the process of the book exchange in 1944–1946 between Soviet Orientalists and their Egyptian colleagues. That exchange played an important part in the Soviet-Egyptian relations, the genesis of which was interrupted with the beginning of the “Cold War”. The book transaction was carried out largely due to the activities of the Soviet Egyptologist, TASS correspondent M.A. Korostovtsev, who was sent to Egypt at the very beginning of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between the USSR and Egypt. The documents of the above Foundation cover the contacts between the Orientalists within the framework of the major institutions: the French Institute of Oriental Archeology in Cairo and the Permanent Archaeological Mission of France in Lebanon, on the one hand, and the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, on the other. As part of the shipment, the Soviet side sent the works on Iranian studies by V.V. Bartold, Arabic studies by I.Yu. Krachkovsky, the textbooks on the History of the Ancient East by B.A. Turaev and V.V. Struve, the works of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the copies of the Journal of Ancient History for 1937–1941, as well as the five-volume edition of works by N.Ya. Marr. The article is based on the archival documents that are introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

Soviet-Egyptian political relations in the views of the Egyptian publicist Mohamed Heikal

The article is devoted to the activities of Egyptian publicist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal and his views on Soviet-Egyptian political relations in the second half of the 20th century. In the early 1950s Heikal took a high place among Egypt’s popular writers. He is considered the first correspondent of Arab modern journalism, which absorbed some Western approaches and traditions. The political life that was unfolding before his eyes, the friendship with President Gamal Abd Nasser, many trips to different countries of the world, shaped his rich experience as a journalist. The materials of the study were the books of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, reflecting the diplomatic relations of the two countries. The article notes that throughout his activities Haikal advocated the establishment of Soviet-Egyptian relations and praised the role of the USSR in supporting Egypt. He wrote about this in several journalistic books “For Egypt, not for Nasser”, “Sphinx and the Commissioner”, “Cairo Documents” and “Soviet Earthquake”, based on documents and personal impressions of events which he witnessed personally. The books of Egyptian journalist and publicist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, his views are a reflection of the realities of the modern Arab world. Heikal School - School of Journalism. Submitting information in his newspaper Al-Ahram, he analyzed events, relying on facts and documents, thereby influencing the minds of readers. Heikal worked in various directions, created a center for strategic policy research, which studied the influence of the West on the Middle East. Heikal's work was described as “controversial”, “intriguing”, “based on the unique information” of this “most informed journalist in the Arab world”.

Egypt in Middle East policy of the USSR (1957-1961)

The article examines Soviet-Egyptian relations from the beginning of 1957 (the completion of the Suez crisis) to the Autumn 1961, when the XXII Congress of the CPSU took place. The Egyptian vector of Soviet foreign policy is sufficiently studied in modern historiography. Soviet-Egyptian relations were the object of study of such researchers as A. Vasilyev, A. Fursenko, Y. Primakov, S. Sinayskiy, M. Gat, J. D. Glassmen, R .Ginat, I. Ginor and others. However, today far from all aspects of the problem are examined, especially concerning 1957-1961. The purpose of this article is to fill in the some gaps in modern historiography. We need to highlight the Egyptian factor in the policy of the USSR regarding the Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese crises of 1957-1958; the supply of arms to the Arab States during that period; economic and cultural cooperation between countries. The aim of the article is analysis the policy of the Soviet Union regarding Egypt from the end of the Suez crisis, which radically strengthened the interaction between the two powers, until the XXII Congress of the CPSU (October 1961), which fixed the final normalization of Soviet-Egyptian relations. After the Suez crisis, the USSR significantly expanded the range of cooperation with Egypt. The aim of the Soviet Union was to consolidate and strengthen its influence in the Arab world on the wave of propaganda success after the Suez crisis. In general, the Khrushchev leadership managed to achieve the set tasks. Moscow focused on exporting arms and expanding economic assistance. Because of the emerging of the United Arab Republic and the Panarabist and anti-communist policy of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in the late 1950s, the ideological contradictions between the two states had worsened. Despite ideological disagreements with the President of the United Arab Republic, during the series of Middle Eastern crises of 1957-1958, the Kremlin invariably took the side of Arab nationalists to protect them from the actions of other states. The volume of military and financial and technical assistance to Cairo has also steadily increased, despite any ideological contradictions. Due to the new wave of socialist transformations in Egypt, the disintegration of the UAR and the beginning of the persecution of Communists and Kurds in the Iraq, the disagreements gradually came to naught, was recorded by the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961.

Re-evaluating the Yom Kippur ‘Intelligence Failure’: The Cultural Lens in Crisis

ABSTRACTHenry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur in cultural terms, asserting that Western analysts were unable to understand Arab rationality in ‘starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.’ This article fundamentally challenges this conventional understanding of the 1973 surprise attack. Drawing on recently declassified material and interviews with veteran diplomats and intelligence professionals it will show that both the British and American intelligence communities had an excellent sense of Egyptian President Sadat's intentions in waging war against Israel. Rather the evidence suggests that misconceptions about Egyptian military capability were more important. These misconceptions derived from particular ideas about Arab culture and Soviet–Egyptian relations following the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972. The article thereby illuminates wider questions about how we define ‘failure’ in intelligence and the role of cultural ideas in international history.

Guns for Cotton? Aid, Trade, and the Soviet Quest for Base Rights in Egypt, 1964–1966

This article reexamines the economic and strategic aspects of Soviet-Egyptian relations in the mid-1960s based on recently declassified documents from Russian archives and recently published memoirs in Arabic. The article explores the tensions that developed between the Soviet Union and Egypt as the Soviet government exploited Egypt's economic difficulties to press for basing rights that would help to offset the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In addition to offering a corrective to scholarly understanding of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship at this time, the article provides a fascinating glimpse into the mechanics of Soviet foreign economic policy and carries revisionist implications for students of the origins of the Six-Day Mideast War.

Stepping Back from the Third World: Soviet Policy toward the United Arab Republic, 1965–1967

This article shows that for two years prior to the June 1967 Six-Day Mideast War, Soviet-Egyptian relations had begun to fray because the Soviet Union wanted to loosen its ties with radical regimes in the Third World, including Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Soviet leaders urged Nasser to reform the Egyptian economy, decrease Egypt's military involvement in Yemen, and allow the Soviet Navy unfettered access to Egyptian ports. But like numerous other small powers during the Cold War, Egypt was able to fend off the pressure of its superpower ally. In May 1967, when Egypt unilaterally decided to bring its forces into the Sinai, Soviet leaders were divided over how to respond to the crisis that engulfed the Middle East. In the end, the more cautious faction in Moscow prevailed, and the Soviet government continued to be wary of becoming embroiled in conflicts initiated by radical Third World regimes.

British Concoction or Bilateral Decision? Revisiting the Genesis of Soviet-Egyptian Diplomatic Relations

Diplomatic relations between Egypt and the USSR were established in August 1943. The motives behind the Egyptian government's decision to take this step have so far remained obscure. In fact, this subject has not yet been probed thoroughly or systematically and has not been given appropriate attention by either Soviet or Middle Eastern research. Studies dealing with Soviet-Egyptian relations or with Soviet policy toward the Middle East tend to allude only briefly to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cairo and Moscow in 1943. The explanation for this lack of interest is probably the widespread belief among scholars that Soviet interests and political activity in the Middle East during the Stalinist period were marginal, focusing mainly on nurturing local communist parties. These studies have held that a full-fledged Middle Eastern policy crystallized gradually only after Stalin's death in March 1953.

Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions: Interpreting Soviet Arms for Egypt in 1973 Through Process or Domestic Bargaining Models?

How should we explain why a state sometimes adopts a foreign policy in one region that interferes with its concurrent policies elsewhere? In their article in the March 1989 issue of thisReview, Stewart, Hermann and Hermann proposed a three-level process model of foreign policy to explain such Soviet behavior towards Egypt in 1973. The analysis has continuing interest because it interprets the puzzling behavior as a manifestation of general problems of information processing in making foreign policy choices. Richard Anderson suggests that a two-level model of domestic bargaining better accounts for the causal sequence in Soviet-Egyptian relations and is in general more parsimonious. Margaret and Charles Hermann defend their substantive analysis and argue in any case for the complementarity of process and bargaining approaches.

Soviet-Egyptian relations, 1945–85

Soviet-Egyptian relations, 1945–85

Soviet-Egyptian Relations, 1945-1985. By Mohrez Mahmoud El Hussini. Foreword by Mohamed Abd Halim Abou Gazala. Preface by Ali Gad. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987. xix, 276 pp. Maps. Table. $49.95, cloth.

Soviet-Egyptian Relations, 1945-1985. By Mohrez Mahmoud El Hussini. Foreword by Mohamed Abd Halim Abou Gazala. Preface by Ali Gad. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987. xix, 276 pp. Maps. Table. $49.95, cloth. - Volume 47 Issue 4