Soviet Economic Development Research Articles

The Role of the Consumer in Soviet Economic Development

The Role of the Consumer in Soviet Economic Development

Technology Transfer to the USSR, 1928-1937 and 1966-1975: The Role of Western Technology in Soviet Economic Development. By George D. Holliday. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. xiv, 225 pp. $18.50.

Technology Transfer to the USSR, 1928-1937 and 1966-1975: The Role of Western Technology in Soviet Economic Development. By George D. Holliday. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. xiv, 225 pp. $18.50. - Volume 39 Issue 4

Limits of Economic Measurements

The basic line of reasoning in the excellent and thought-provoking article by Professor Rosefielde is: The Soviets claim and some Western scholars agree that from 1928 to 1932 the economy of the USSR grew dramatically, that, at the expense of an agricultural surplus, industry made a big leap forward “which virtually assured the success of future Soviet economic development.” A common belief of specialists (Professor Rosefielde included) is that although some value indicators, especially prices (price changes), could be distorted, in general, Soviet statistics are “not freely invented,” and “it is unlikely that the Soviets kept two sets of books.” Thus, some scholars have corrected the price basis of the calculation of the rate of economic growth during 1928-32 (instead of 1928 prices, the prices of 1937/50 were used) and obtained much less spectacular, but still very impressive, figures demonstrating growth of the economy, particularly in industry and construction.

Why did NEP fail?

Why did NEP fail? I should like to distinguish three ways in which this question has been answered, indicating why the third appears to me to be the most satisfactory. In the first view, NEP was abandoned because it was inconsistent with any further industrial development of a socialist kind, and its abandonment was therefore a rational economic decision. In the second view, strongly reacting against the first, NEP is seen as consistent with a wide variety of development patterns, including the industrial development actually achieved in the inter-war Five Year Plans. Therefore the abandonment of NEP had no strictly economic rationale, but was an outcome of brute political struggles and the formation of the Stalinist political system. In the third view, NEP is seen as inconsistent with the degree and rate of industrialization actually undertaken from 1928 onwards, but contained the possibility of alternative development patterns involving a lesser commitment to industrial growth. In this case, the abandonment of NEP was neither simply rational (according to the first view) nor irrational (according to the second), but was the outcome of a political conflict over the course of Soviet economic development.

GENERAL TENDENCIES OF DEVELOPMENT OF TERRITORIAL—PRODUCTION COMPLEXES

The evolution of the Soviet Union's resource-based territorial-production complexes is traced through three stages of the country's history of economic development and within three basic macrozones distinguished in terms of levels of economic development: highly developed, moderately developed, and underdeveloped. Production complexes in various temporal and spatial settings have not followed identical paths of development. In the most highly developed zone, essentially the European USSR, resource-based production complexes began to arise from the earliest period of Soviet economic development as large, diversified industrial nodes. At the present time, the resource factor is declining in significance because of resource depletion and environmental pressures, and manufacturing is becoming more significant as a factor in the formation of production complexes. In the moderately developed zone (essentially western and south-central Siberia), production complexes began to arise later (with the exception of the Kuznetsk Basin), and assumed the character of large-diversified industrial nodes only in the developed southern belt of Siberia, along the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Small, isolated industrial nodes are found elsewhere in this zone, and they are the general rule in the third, least developed zone of the USSR.

The Soviet Economy in the 1920s and 1930s

In the history of Soviet studies in Britain, Marxist ideas and influences have always been an undercurrent. This undercurrent has sometimes acted as a positive force; sometimes it has been merely argumentative and factitious. But it has never escaped its subordinacy. Individual Marxists have worked in isolation, reliant upon the research, the formulations and the good will of non-Marxist colleagues. For the most part the influence of Marxism has been deflected, absorbed or contained. Thus, in examining the British field today, among the most important questions are the health and strength of bourgeois scholarship, and the prospects for developing a creative Marxist tendency capable of transcending its past “moral and intellectual” encirclement. Here one clarification is necessary. I have referred to the position in Britain, but the links between English and American scholarship are many and obvious. Is there, in fact, a specifically “British” Soviet studies? The internationalisation of Soviet studies has proceeded a long way, but it is far from complete. While language barriers, which separate British from Italian, French or German work, do not inhibit the emergence of an “Anglo-American” enterprise, the very different political conjunctures continue to distinguish the balance of tendencies in Britain and North America. And I must make it clear that for me Britain is “here” and North America is “over there”. I can only write about this relationship from my own experience and knowledge, and inevitably my perception of the influences emanating from “over there” will be incomplete. Finally, I shall seek to examine a number of positive developments in the study of the inter-war Soviet economy and its socialist transformation, and I shall cover the decade which began in 1966. This decade has a special significance. It began with the publication of the last, sixth edition of Maurice Dobb’s Soviet Economic Development since 1917, and finished with his death. If, as I shall argue, the last decade has been one of transition, Dobb was a central figure in that process.

The Impact of Adjusted Factor Cost Valuation on the CES Interpretation of Postwar Soviet Economic Growth

Assessing the determinants of Soviet postwar economic growth has proven to be an enticing but elusive pursuit. Various aggregate production function studies carried out with both official Soviet and Western data have yielded results that raise as many questions as they clarify (principally Weitzman, 1970, subsequent comments on his study, and the studies of Desai, 1976, and Gomulka, 1974). In addition to sundry interpretive difficulties of a purely technical sort, deep problems of valuation continue to obscure the analytic significance of any parametric estimation of postwar Soviet economic growth. This paper seeks to illuminate these issues by testing the CES specification of Soviet growth in adjusted factor cost prices, which more closely approximate the neoclassical opportunity cost norm than do valuation schema employed in previous studies. A two-step estimation technique is utilized for estimation purposes, the results of which reveal that the rate of neutral technical change has been greater, and the degree of capital utilization less, than formerly supposed, while the elasticity of substitution remains essentially unchanged from the already low estimates reported by others for this important parameter. Moreover, in the broader perspective of Soviet economic development, our analysis suggests that the Soviets may be more firmly shackled to their traditional growth model than recent scholarly speculation indicates. Before proceeding to a detailed consideration of postwar Soviet growth valued in adjusted factor cost prices, however, fundamental problems of aggregation raised by the peculiar nature of Soviet price formation must be addressed.

American credits for Soviet development

No Western legislature has devoted as much time to examining the political issues of economic relations with the U.S.S.R. than the United States Congress. The reason is in no wise to be found in the magnitude of those relations, but in their potential size and in their implications for confrontation or detente between the two super-powers of the globe. A remoter history has, however, played its part, for much United States technology and capital equipment and some entrepreneurship assisted Soviet economic development between the two world wars.

Anthony C. Sutton. <italic>Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965</italic>. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University. 1973. Pp. xxxi, 482. $15.00

Anthony C. Sutton. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University. 1973. Pp. xxxi, 482. $15.00 Get access Sutton Anthony C.. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University. 1973. Pp. xxxi, 482. $15.00. Gertrude E. Schroeder Gertrude E. Schroeder University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 80, Issue 3, June 1975, Page 695, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/80.3.695 Published: 01 June 1975

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965

Professor Schroeder’s Report on Soviet Economic Development Trade with Eastern Europe: A Comment

In my comment paper on Professor Schroeder’s report (1974) I shall discuss two points. First of all I intend to examine whether the benefits that the Soviet Union gained and is gaining from its trade with the Comecon countries can be meant as due to «exploitation » or a « discrimination » against them. The second topic on which Professor Schroeder’s paper (1974) mainly caught my attention is that of Comecon integration. In the last part of my paper I shall therefore attempt an evaluation of the integration efforts within the Comecon compared with the parallel efforts made in Western Europe in the framework of the EEC.In the economics relationships between the Soviet Union and the Comecon countries Professor Schroeder (1974) distinguishes two main periods and argues that until 1956 the Soviet Union benefited from a net capital transfert from Eastern Europe, whose size however cannet be specified. This «unequal partnership » was made possible by the political dominance of the Soviet Union and its means were war reparations, unrequited export deliveries to Eastern Europe and discriminatory pricing in trade. Professor Schroeder (1974) seems therefore to support the opinion that during the first main period in the Comecon’s life. the Soviet Union, in a sense, « exploited » and « discriminated » its socialist partners in Eastern Europe.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930 to 1945.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930 to 1945.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930 to 1945. Anthony C. Sutton

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsWestern Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930 to 1945. Anthony C. Sutton Christopher FreemanChristopher Freeman Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 81, Number 2, Part 1Mar. - Apr., 1973Part 1 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/260054 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1973 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Vladimir Kontorovich A Cold War Creature which Sat out the War, Europe-Asia Studies 66, no.55 (May 2014): 811–829.https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2014.905009

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917 to 1930

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917 to 1930

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930-1945. By Antony C. Sutton, Second volume of a three-volume series. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. xxiv, 401 pp. $12.50.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930-1945. By Antony C. Sutton, Second volume of a three-volume series. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. xxiv, 401 pp. $12.50. - Volume 31 Issue 4