Soviet Delegation Research Articles

Le jeu du pouvoir soviétique à Brest­Litovsk

Soviet Power’s Games at Brest­Litovsk. The peace treaty of Brest­Litovsk was signed by the Central Powers and Soviet Russia on March 3, 1918. But peace negotiations had started on December 22, 1917. The bolsheviks tried to prolong the proceedings in the hope of the outbreak of revolution in other countries . In fact , their leaders, such as Lenin, Trotsky or Bukharin , not speaking of the Socialist Revolutionaries, were not unanimous at all. Trotsky, for instance, head of the Soviet delegation since January 9, called for a recess, Lenin was reluctant. So the discussions lasted quite a time and meanwhile the Kiev Rada , on behalf of the Ukrainian Republic , also signed a peace treaty on February 9, 1918. It seems that the harsh civil war which began in May 1918 is largely the consequence of the signature of the peace in Brest­Litovsk .

Споживча кооперація УРСР у міжнародному кооперативному русі у другій половині ХХ ст. як прояв ідеологічної боротьби із Заходом

The participation of consumer cooperation of the Ukrainian SSR in the international cooperative movement in the second half of the twentieth century is considered. In particular, the article analyzes the established procedure for celebrating the International Day of Cooperation in the Ukrainian SSR. In the conditions of the Soviet reality, the celebration of this day was purely formal. Namely: a grand meeting with the pronunciation of ritual speeches, a concert with the participation of folk amateur performances and relevant publications in the central and regional periodicals. In fact, the international day of cooperation under Soviet conditions turned into another of the so-called industry days, such as the day of the police, the day of the miner, the day of the metallurgist, etc. In addition, attention was focused on identifying the forms of participation of Soviet cooperation in the international cooperative movement. Cooperators of the Ukrainian SSR established a predominant number of international contacts with the neighboring countries of the socialist camp, such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The usual form of such international activity was the socalled "delegation exchanges". In most cases, given the subordinate nature of cooperation in the socialist countries, these exchanges acted as ordinary visits of politeness. The activities of the Soviet delegation in the International Cooperative Alliance were also investigated. It is revealed that the main task of the Soviet cooperators was to support the external efforts of the USSR aimed at ideological and diplomatic confrontation with the countries of the West. In general, the international activities of both the Ukrainian SSR and its consumer cooperatives were not independent, but strictly followed the plans developed in Moscow.

How Marxist history of science can inform a pedagogy of science for social justice

The scope of this paper is to examine the perspectives for a pedagogy of science for social justice situated in the framework of Marxism by proceeding to an analysis and a contemporary evaluation of the work of the scholars who are considered as the initiators of the Marxist history of science. In this paper therefore, I review N. Bukharin’s and B. Hessen’s seminal papers as presented in the 2nd International Congress of History of Science and Technology in 1931 in London. This Congress was marked by the appearance of the Soviet delegation influencing a generation of radical scientists in Britain with the most prominent figure being J. Bernal. I present J. Bernal’s views as developed in his most important work “The Social Function of Science” with an emphasis on his writings on science education and the role of science teachers for the emancipation of society. Finally, I present the work of the Austromarxist and member of the Left Vienna Circle E. Zilsel on “The Social Origin of Modern Science” contemplating on his work as an adult educator in the period that Vienna was governed by the Austrian Social Democratic Workers Party. Emphasis is placed on the role of science and education as a vehicle for raising proletarian self-awareness. The analysis of the legacies and works of these scholars of the Marxist tradition in the history of science shows that it can form the basis for a Marxist pedagogy of science that can change society and its practices in our epoch when education in science and pedagogy of science are considered one of the most important pillars of contemporary science policy.

Russian and the Making of World Languages during the Cold War

AbstractThis essay uses the case of Russian, in its relation to other languages, to look at the ways in which the architects of internationalism in the aftermath of World War II established a new hegemony of world languages, responding to the challenge posed by the rise of Russian as a scientific and political language. What was initially a campaign by the Soviet delegation at UNESCO for one cause—recognition of the status of the Russian language within the organization—was turned by other delegations into a campaign for a different cause—multilingualism. Rather than establishing Russian on a par with English and French, the Soviet intervention helped to create a new triumvirate of world languages—Russian, Spanish, and Arabic—as these were recognized by international organizations such as the United Nations and UNESCO. The case of the rise of Russian as a language of science and politics helps to underscore the complexities and the ambiguities involved in the negotiation of the language regime, in which p...

Lev Kamenev at Nestor Makhno’s (Huliaipole, May 1919): The Four Stages of a Narrative

This article is devoted to a meeting between the anarchist leader Makhno and the Bolshevik leaders Lev Kamenev and Kliment Voroshilov in early May 1919. This meeting took place in Ukraine, in Huliaipole, the headquarters of Makhno, as the civil war was raging. A detailed narration of Kamenev’s expedition was published in the Soviet journal Proletarskaya revolyutsiya in 1925. Written by a member of the Soviet delegation, it is the only remaining testimony of the expedition and the meeting. It is this text, written by a member of the Soviet delegation, that Russian historians use when referring to the Bolshevik expedition in Ukraine and the meeting between Kamenev and Makhno. Until now, historians did not know the identity of its author. But this article brings to light the identity of the “anonymous chronicler” of the expedition, who happens to be Vladimir Sokolin, a Russian who grew up in Geneva and joined the Tsarist army before converting to Bolshevism and becoming Kamenev’s secretary in November 1918. His archives are kept in Geneva and Moscow. Sokolin is the author of four texts about the expedition in which he participated. The texts were written at different times and in different political contexts: between 1919 and 1966 in the USSR and Switzerland. After recounting the story of the texts, this article analyses their differences. Even though they seem minor at first sight, the differences allow us to think about the way past events are transmitted by a witness, as well as the use that historians can make of such accounts.

Executed Bundists, Soviet Delegates and the Wartime Jewish Popular Front in New York

Executed Bundists, Soviet Delegates and the Wartime Jewish Popular Front in New York

A foot in the door: the Lacy–Zarubin agreement and Soviet-American film diplomacy during the Khrushchev era, 1953–1963

Signed in Washington, DC on the 27 January 1958, the Soviet-American executive agreement on cultural, educational and scientific exchanges – known as the ‘Lacy–Zarubin agreement’ – brought cinema to the forefront of the cold war. It arranged for the organization of premieres, ‘cinema weeks’, visits by Soviet and American delegations, as well as film exchanges and co-productions. A by-product of the era of ‘peaceful coexistence’, the agreement offered the Soviet Union unprecedented opportunities for cultural expansion. While the political relaxation following Stalin’s death known as the ‘Thaw’ drastically improved the quality of Soviet movie production, the Soviet film industry still needed a major boost to improve exports. This paper argues that the 1958 agreement did just that, allowing the main film import/export organization, Sovexportfilm, to benefit from direct contacts with Hollywood studios. The benefit was not evident from the start, however, since film exchange was influenced not only by the political context of the cold war but also by economic difficulties encountered by the US film industry. Moreover, cinematic diplomacy and commerce were the constant targets of conservatives in both countries. Despite many ups and downs, the 1958 agreement remained in force and ultimately helped pave the way for the Oscar-winning 1969 hit, War and Peace.

Soviet Foreign Relations “Hard” and “Soft,” 1917–45

Sabine Dullin, La frontiere epaisse: Aux origines des politiques sovietiques (1920-1940) (The Thick Border: On Origins of Soviet Politics [1920-40]). 360 pp. Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, 2014. ISBN-13 978-2713224560. 24.00 [euro]. Jean-Francois Fayet, VOKS: Le laboratoire helvetique. Histoire de la diplomatie culturelle sovietique durant l'entre-deux-guerres (VOKS: The Swiss Laboratory. A History of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy between Wars). 598 pp. CheneBourg: Georg editeur, 2014. ISBN-13 978-2825710340. 35 CHE These two amazing books examine from different perspectives one large theme: Stalinist state's interaction with outside world. In big scheme of things, they tell a similar sad story: Soviet movement away from relative openness to, and search for contacts with, the West toward increasing self-isolation and self-adulation from 1920 through early 1940s. Sabine Dullin focuses on history of Soviet borders, not so much their movements in space and time as their construction and consolidation and their changing meanings in Soviet official discourse and policy. Paraphrasing Peter Sahlins, she sees the as a process of learning rupture in contiguity, as a complex process of establishing a difference that ends up in creation of a system (21). (1) Narrated in this way, story of Soviets' (mostly but not exclusively western) frontier offers us fascinating insights into evolution of Soviet regime and society in general. (2) One of many fortes of this profoundly researched and beautifully written book is elegant and persuasive way it reminds us of many roads open to Soviets in earlier phases of their regime that were either never tried or abruptly abandoned. To begin with, very existence of borders was initially perceived by Soviet leaders, bent on spreading proletarian revolution all over world, as a temporary and inconsequential nuisance. As Julian Marchlewski (Iulian Markhlevskii), who was one of Soviet negotiators with Poland in Riga and in 1921 led Soviet delegation in negotiations with Finland over delimitation of borders, put it, only hyperborean troglodytes would obsess over each piece of land. (He was ostensibly referring to his Finnish counterparts but might have had some of his Soviet colleagues in mind too [98].) The exact trajectory of borders was a matter of secondary importance as long as revolutionary crisis was certain to make them all obsolete in apocalypse of universal emancipation. If borders still somehow mattered, it was more due to opportunities they offered as outposts for revolutionary agitation rather than as protective barriers over lands under control of Soviet regime. Even in this very early stage of Soviet policy, however, revolutionary elan coexisted with a more sober and traditional view of things, as represented, in particular, by Georgii Chicherin, head of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel). Chicherin's influence steadily grew as time went on. In first three years right after Civil War, frontiers became institutionalized and regularized. Increasing emphasis on protection and sovereignty led to appearance of what Dullin calls a thick border area consisting of two zones: 500 meters along and an additional 7.5 kilometers right next to it. The first zone was reserved for deployment of GPU (State Political Administration, later Unified State Political Administration [OGPU]) troops, second for rear services for these troops; in both, a strict regime of surveillance over residents and their movements prevailed. Paradoxically, in early to mid-1920s, renewed emphasis on security in expectation of a new war coexisted with establishment of a relatively flexible regime of transborder cooperation. The USSR negotiated agreements with neighboring states for common usage of pastures and fisheries by residents on both sides of as well as for easing restrictions on transborder petty trade (123-26). …

Polska wobec emancypacji politycznej Łotwy i Estonii w latach 1989‑1991

Poland’s attitude towards political emancipation of Latvia and Estonia in 1989‑1991
 Year 1988 saw the beginning of the political emancipation of Latvia and Estonia. Both republics declared that the decisions about their incorporation in the Soviet Union – taken by their respective parliaments in 1940 – were illegal, and therefore null and void. Both countries took advantage of the freedoms gained as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s political reforms, and obtained international support for their independence aspirations. Poland found itself in a tricky situation. On the one hand, it supported Latvia and Estonia’s endeavours, but on the other hand, it advocated the territorial integrity of the USSR. Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski defined the policy towards the former Soviet republics as a policy of adaptation to the progressing “pluralism” within the Soviet Union (so‑called ‘dual‑track policy’). Poland maintained interministerial contacts with the Baltic republics, accepted their delegations, supported their gradual emergence in the international arena as individual entities, even though within the framework of the Soviet delegation. However, Polish officials avoided actions that could be regarded as formal recognition of the Baltic states’ independence. Given the restrictions that tied up the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was the delegates and senators from the CPC club that performed a significant role in the Polish diplomatic efforts. Their visits to the Baltic republics, seen as part of interparliamentary contacts, encouraged trust in the mutual relations and contributed to the promotion of the Polish dual‑track policy. Once the independence of the Baltic states was officially recognised by the Soviet Union, Poland resumed the relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The Cold War and the 1984 Olympic Games: A Soviet-American Surrogate War

<i>The Cold War and the 1984 Olympic Games: A Soviet-American Surrogate War</i>

Yalta 1945: the Black Sea Straits and the War in the Far East

In the scientific literature on the Yalta conference of leaders of the three powers of the coalition there are no studies that reveal its naval aspects. Meanwhile, among the issues that had significance for the Soviet delegation, they held even if not the first priority, but were quite prominent. In the Russian historiography attention to these matters appeared only in the early 1990s, most likely because the Soviet side in negotiations had a negative impact on the formation of the post-war world order. Contemporary Russian historians are in line with the tradition, a feature of which was a lack of attention to the maritime policy of the Soviet Union, especially in the 1921 - 1955. It is clear, however, that projects of this scale, which required the mobilization of all resources of the Soviet state, creation of the most advanced shipbuilding and entirely new industries for the country and high-tech industries, could not arise in a vacuum. Behind this processes were certain political goals, and when the war began Stalin stopped work on the first "big shipbuilding program" though it did not mean that he refused them. This hypothesis is based and presented in this article.

Five Tourniquets and a Ship's Bell: The Special Session at the 1931 Congress

A mythology surrounds the 1931 Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology. The event is portrayed as a calm and learned gathering where political dispassion and liberal tolerance towards the Soviet delegation were the order of the day. This is, in fact, a myth circulated by some of the participants who wanted to gloss over the conflict that actually characterized the congress. The notion finds its apex in the events surrounding the Special Session that is often positioned as the platform created for the Russians to deliver their papers. This was not the case. A persistent clash occurred between the Soviet delegation and Charles Singer throughout the congress, fuelled by Singer's attempts to generate publicity for the event and a powerful press reaction to the presence of the Soviets. The Congress became a significant focus for politics in Britain and Singer reacted by trying to silence the Soviets. The Special Session, far from being a platform for Marxist history of science, turned into a failed public relations exercise, and ultimately became the stage for the public humiliation of the Soviet delegates.

Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended the Cold War

<i>Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended the Cold War</i>

Wizyta prawników radzieckich w Polsce w 1955 r. Dokument archiwalny o tematach i wynikach prawniczych konsultacji polsko-radzieckich

In 1955 the first official visit of Soviet lawyers to Poland took place. It is somehow strange that it took place so late, when the process of Sovietization of Polish law was already very advanced. The chairman of the delegation was Professor D. S. Kariew, who was also a high ranked official of the Soviet Ministry of Justice. The document presented below is the minutes of the last meeting of the delegation with Polish Minister of Justice, Henryk Świątkowski. The Soviet delegation was suggesting to implement many Soviet regulations into Polish law. Among them were: the election of judges (complete fiction) and abolishing the self-government of advocates. They were also pressing on increasing the Ministry’s supervision over judges. At the time the Polish party seemed to accept these proposals but in the event none were implemented into Polish law. This was so because of political changes in Poland in 1956, when Stalin’s period in Polish history ended. The process of reception of Soviet law in Poland then stopped, but not completely.

Uneasy Alliances: Bolshevik Co-optation Policy and the Case of Chechen Sheikh Ali Mitaev

On 15 January 1923, a high-ranking Soviet delegation traveled to Urus-Martan, the biggest aul (village) of Chechnya. The purpose was to inform the population that the Soviet government had granted the an autonomous region (avtonomnaia oblast'). (1) Originally, the meeting was to be held in Groznyi, which was not an administrative part of the new Chechen region, but where the newly established Revolutionary Committee (revkom), the provisional government of Chechnya, had its seat. If the larger population was to become acquainted with Soviet power, however, the news had to be conveyed outside the confines of Groznyi, a city living largely on its oil industry and inhabited mostly by Russians, to the auls of the Chechen populated countryside. (2) The Soviet delegation was led by Anastas Mikoian, head of the Southeastern Bureau, the North Caucasus office of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party located in Rostov-on-Don. The delegation included Kliment Voroshilov, a member of the bureau and commander of the North Caucasus Military Region, as well as two of his deputies, Semen Budennyi and Mikhail Levandovskii. Also joining the Soviet delegates was Tashtemir ETdarkhanov (1870-1934), one of the few indigenous Chechen Communists and head of the Chechen revkom, and several other members of the Chechen government. Although the Soviet delegates considered a journey to a risky undertaking, they did not want to appear as a hostile power and thus refrained from bringing a military escort. They were, however, accompanied by two military bands whose musicians apparently had weapons hidden under their coats. (3) Some 2,000-3,000 riders on horseback accompanied the delegates on the last section of their journey to Urus-Martan, where they were greeted by some 10,000 people, including inhabitants of Urus-Martan as well as representatives from different Chechen auls. (4) The large number of village elders and religious figures among them gave the Soviet delegates a friendly welcome. After the Bolsheviks and the Chechen representatives held their speeches, the village elders managed to convince their guests not to return to Groznyi but to stay overnight. (5) The atmosphere during the evening was festive, dances and plays were organized, and Budennyi, who according to Mikoian had already made a most favorable impression on the during his speech, successfully performed the lezginka, the traditional dance of the mountaineer peoples of the Caucasus. (6) Although the meeting with the was largely harmonious, the world the Bolsheviks encountered was far from their liking. According to Voroshilov, who described his impressions in a letter to Stalin on 21 January 1923, the Chechens were no better or worse than other mountaineers [gortsy], yet they had more mullahs, sheikhs, and other devilry [chertovshchina] than others--for example, the Karachai and even the Kabardian peoples, and their fanaticism, backwardness, and ignorance [were] extraordinary. (7) Voroshilov was convinced that a socialist transformation of mullah-dominated Chechnya would eventually become possible, but only once the Bolsheviks were able to rely on a cadre of efficient and loyal party workers. As long as this was not the case, he saw no other option than to cooperate with mullahs and similar such gentlemen [mully i prochie gospoda]. (8) To be sure, he also greatly disliked El'darkhanov, whom he described as a spineless, weak-minded, stupid, and arrogant old geezer. (9) This attitude was typical among leading Bolsheviks toward indigenous local Communists, whom they often regarded as too lenient and inclined to compromise and thus not likely to enforce radical changes. Yet Voroshilov acknowledged that for the time being, there simply was no alternative. (10) The Bolsheviks' readiness to cooperate with Muslims and thereby to accept, at least for the time being, the existence of sharia courts, Islamic schools, or Islamic charitable endowments (waqf), did not reflect a tolerant mindset. …

Remembrances of a UK scientist in Russia. 1966-67.

David Phillips was a post-doctoral fellow on a Fulbright Scholarship at the University of Texas, Austin, where he acted as host and chauffeur to one of the IUPAC representatives, the Soviet delegate, Professor Nikolai N. Kondratiev, then Deputy Director of the Institute of Chemical Physics in Moscow. During the course of ferrying him around, Nikolai asked .David about his plans after his two-year stay in Texas, David replied that he had intended to return to Europe, but was looking for one more year as a post-doctoral fellow before seeking an academic position probably back in the UK Nikolai invited him to spend time in his Institute, and eventually, through the Royal Society/Academy of Sciences Exchange programme, this came to pass. Professor Phillips now describes his experiences, both cultural and scientific, in Russia during 1966-67 where he learned much about the Russian people, and also about himself. He returned with a taste for good music, Russian literature and language, and travel generally, and for taking chances in life.

Stirling Auchincloss Colgate

Physicist, astrophysicist, experimentalist, and theorist Stirling Auchincloss Colgate died at home in White Rock, New Mexico, on 1 December 2013 after a prolonged illness. He had a zest for life and a drive to understand that could not be contained in a single subject or career.Stirling Auchincloss ColgateLOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORYPPT|High resolutionStirling was born in New York City on 14 November 1925. As a young man, he attended the Los Alamos Ranch School. He was familiar enough with nuclear physics in 1942 that when a stranger in a fedora showed up to shut down the school, he recognized J. Robert Oppenheimer and deduced that the goal was to build an atomic bomb. Stirling went to Cornell University for a year and then joined the US Merchant Marine in 1944. He amazed his superiors by single-handedly fixing a large electric motor and explaining what happened in Hiroshima.In 1946 Stirling returned to Cornell, where he earned his BS in 1948 and a PhD in nuclear physics in 1952 under Robert R. Wilson. As a postdoc at the University of California, Berkeley, he was among the first scientists at the birth of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). He designed and led the neutron and gamma-ray diagnostics for the March 1954 Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test, the first to use the compact lithium deuteride technology. He was 29. Contemplating shock breakout from the device also led him to ponder shock breakout in supernovae. In 1959 Stirling served as a senior scientific adviser to the State Department in the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. He argued that satellite detectors might mistake supernova emission as a weapon test. A Soviet delegate brushed him off with the question, “Who knows what a supernova looks like?” Stirling took that as a challenge.Beginning with papers on supernova shock breakout, Stirling became a leading contributor to astrophysics. His groundbreaking work in 1966 on the neutrino deposition model of core- collapse supernovae remains the basis of the theory today; the essence of the theory was verified two decades later by the discovery of the neutrinos from SN 1987A. He contributed substantially to our understanding of how radioactive decay powers supernova light curves. While president of the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology from 1965 through 1974, he foresaw the era of mass automated detection of supernovae before large detectors and fast computers made it possible. He called the technology “dig-as,” for digitized astronomy, a colorful name that did not catch on.From 1976 until his death, Stirling was a senior fellow in the theoretical division at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). He had a keen interest in magnetic fields dating back to his days at LLNL, where he led laser fusion and magnetic fusion programs. He was fascinated by the origins of cosmic magnetic fields, cosmic rays, and black holes, and he was a strong proponent of the “magnetic universe.” He argued that a significant fraction of the energy liberated by the formation of black holes at the centers of galaxies is converted by dynamos into magnetic fields, which are then transported to intergalactic space by jets and radio lobes. To the end of his life, he worked at New Mexico Tech on an experiment to demonstrate a magnetic dynamo in rotating cylinders of liquid sodium.Stirling developed techniques of stress engineering to support mine shafts and theories about vision and the origin of human intelligence. He recognized the danger of HIV before the topic was widely discussed publicly, and he called for understanding its biology as the only practical solution. Attempting to understand Oklahoma tornadoes, he flew his private plane and fired instrumented rockets through them. He recognized the dangers of stoichiometric mixing of the liquefied natural gas in a fully loaded tanker and claimed to have saved Heimaey, an island off Iceland, from the threat of a proposed diversion of lava to the sea, where dynamic self-mixing could have released the thermal energy of a thermonuclear bomb.Associated with the Aspen Center for Physics from its earliest days, Stirling promoted astrophysics as one of the key disciplines there. He was also a cofounder of the Santa Fe Institute. He made major behind-the-scenes contributions while working at both LLNL and LANL. He once remarked that one of the most difficult aspects of his life was maintaining that duality: total secrecy in defense work and the total intellectual openness that characterizes academic research.A visionary with a fountain of ideas, Stirling was an inspiration to others and was especially generous to young scientists. His friends and colleagues remember him with warmth as they share Stirling stories.© 2014 American Institute of Physics.

Lebow, Katherine. Unfinished Utopia: Nowa Huta, Stalinism, and Polish Society, 1945–56 (review)

REVIEWS 575 Lebow, Katherine. Unfinished Utopia: Nowa Huta, Stalinism, and Polish Society, 1945–56. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London 2013. xiv + 233 pp. Illustrations. Notes. Select bibliography. Index. $45.00. Unfinished Utopia is an impressively researched and beautifully illustrated book which draws on a wide range of archival, primary and secondary sources. Though rich in detail, Unfinished Utopia never seems cluttered and the main themes and arguments are always clearly apparent. Katherine Lebow presents a history of the new town and steelworks at Nowa Huta, but she also uses her case study to offer many insights into Stalinism in general and the book presents a fascinating portrait of the lives of Polish peasants in the process of becoming industrial workers. Lebow begins her history of Nowa Huta by discussing the projects of Polish urban planners between the two World Wars — plans realized most spectacularly in the creation of Gdynia on the Baltic Coast, but which also included an ambitious project for poverty-stricken south-east Poland. The post-war authorities picked up the project, and in 1947 placed an order with a Chicagocompanytodesignthenewsteelworks.However,theshifttofull-blown Stalinism in 1948 led to the re-conceptualization of Nowa Huta as a gigantic Soviet-style plant, a ‘signature investment to represent the Six-Year Plan, a focal point for popular mobilization and a showcase for socialist production’ (p. 25). The final choice of site was made by a visiting Soviet delegation against the advice of local planners and ‘with dizzying speed’ confirmed by the Polish government (p. 26.) However, ‘since the socialist city could not wait for its architects’ (p. 35), workerswererushedtostartbuildingontheclayeymudandsobeganthechaotic and inefficient process of construction. Although the Russian steelworks was duly built, creating the socialist city was a much more haphazard affair: the budget was drastically cut, everything was done as cheaply as possible (often pulling things down and beginning all over again) and in the end many of the planners’ dreams remained unrealized. Perhaps oddly, the Polish leaders did not even seem particularly interested in fully exploiting the opportunities for social engineering and Nowa Huta was unceremoniously annexed as a suburb of conservative Kraków. Nonetheless, Lebow charts how Nowa Huta, for all its shortcomings, did in fact offer a life-changing opportunity for thousands of peasants, although this was largely because conditions were so miserable in the countryside: ‘the push of the village as a motivating force could be as strong as, or even stronger than, the pull of Nowa Huta (which, in any case, was a fairly abstract concept for most of the young people described here)’ (pp. 50–51). Although many were disappointed with Nowa Huta and passed on to other places, and SEER, 92, 3, JULY 2014 576 though propaganda about labour competition and cultural enlightenment was accompanied by considerable cynicism and disorganization, nonetheless the autobiographical evidence and contemporary sociological research suggest that Nowa Huta also inspired enthusiasm and affection. This was especially true by the 1960s, when the infrastructure had finally been built, living standards had improved considerably and ‘skilled workers almost universally aspired for their children to gain a university degree’ (p. 158). On the other hand, for some groups opportunities closed in parallel with de-Stalinization. Lebow shows how both women and Roma benefited from equal opportunities campaigns during the Stalinist period but saw these gains rescinded after 1956. ‘Nowa Huta, meant to have led the way toward women’s equality at work, now exhibited the reverse trend: by the late 1950s, the district had one of the lowest rates of female employment in urban Poland. […] The shift was officially framed as a return to a traditionally Polish understanding of women’s essential role as a mother and a rejection of the “foreign” [i.e. Soviet] idea that women should perform the same work as men’ (p. 122). Although the book’s title suggests that it ends in 1956, in fact chapter six continues the story through to 1989 and beyond. Lebow suggests that ‘Nowa Huta’s embrace of Solidarity in the 1980s […] cannot simply be seen […] as a shedding or rejection of the Stalinist experience, a kind of prodigal son’s return’ (p. 154). Instead, there was always opposition, most...

Curriculum and pedagogy in higher education to fulfill the knowledge demands required for a master of science in aviation security management: a qualitative inquiry of aviation security professionals

The attacks on America witnesses by the world on September 11, 2001, provided proof of the efficacy of asymmetrical warfare. The attacks exploited weaknesses in aviation security measures extant. The concepts of using commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction were not entirely unknown. In November of 1991 an Islamic fundamentalist plot to hijack commercial aircraft in Spain was foiled. It was determined the terrorists were to fly aircraft into two separate buildings, killing U.S. President George Bush and the second aircraft would kill the Soviet delegation (Thomas et al. 2008). Aviation has been targeted by terrorists many times and will continue to be a very attractive target to achieve their objectives. September 11, 2001, emphasized the need for revised security practices in order to deter, detect, and mitigate the risks of attacks on aviation. Prior to September 11, 2001, aviation security was a low national priority and security managers were ill prepared to protect aviation from this threat. There exists a noticeable lack of aviation security course work or degree offerings in higher education to empower the future work force. The focus of this research was to determine graduate course work, pedagogy, and the need for a graduate degree in aviation security management. This was a qualitative study conducted by interviewing ten aviation security professionals in the private and governmental sectors to determine knowledge demands for course offerings for a Master of Science degree in Aviation Security. The analysis of the data disclosed course work in seven areas of knowledge in aviation security. These seven knowledge areas included: behavioral profiling, risk management, leadership, critical thinking, terrorism, airport environment, and aviation law.

S.A.A.F. IN KOREA

Sixty.four Days in Korea 2 Squadron SAAF: 22 April 1951 . 24 June 1951 On 23 June 1951 Yakov Malik, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, hinted at the possibility of a cease fire in Korea.' The attainment of the revised political objectives of the United Nations was in sight. The Communists were soon to approach the conference table. The use of force had become less profitable to them than negotiation. Prior to this development the war had been in progress for twelve months. The two months preceding Malik's peace approach are of interest in the general history of the war; and in particular, they provide an interesting insight into the role of 2 Squadron, SAAF, its achievements and its problems.