Soviet Advisers Research Articles

How the first revolution affected the second: The setback of 1927 for the Chinese Communist Party Revolution in the 1920s

AbstractThe Bolsheviks’ world revolution encountered setbacks in the 1920s. Among the bloodiest of these was the massacre of 1927 when the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) entire central leadership was killed in the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (GMD) coup. Existing explanations highlight Moscow’s miscalculation, infighting within the Kremlin, Soviet advisers’ information dilemma, and the CCP leaders’ political inexperience. This article compares the opening stages of the Bolshevik (or Russian) and Chinese Communist Party revolutions to explain why the 1927 setback became a catastrophe. It argues that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 caused fundamental changes, which thwarted any attempt to replicate the 1917 victory in the post-1917 world. The CCP in 1927 faced three disadvantages that the Bolshevik Revolution had engendered: a misleading myth about the October Revolution, a Bolshevized system of repression created by Soviet advisers to the GMD, and the ‘red scare’ in Japan and British Southeast Asia, which blocked members of the CCP from escaping overseas. This article draws on leaders’ biographical materials to compare the two parties’ learning from foreign revolutions, records in suffering repression, and experiences as overseas refugees. The comparison shows that the Bolsheviks did not face these three disadvantages before 1917.

Soviet Coordinators of International Economic Cooperation in the Eastern Bloc in the Period 1948-1953

This article is a discourse on the main trendsetters of international economic cooperation in the Eastern Bloc in the period 1948-1953. Special emphasis is placed on the architects of cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, since both countries established themselves as economic leaders after the Second World War and, moreover, developed a number of specific close links between their industries. The article focuses on the role of top officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In addition, the paper also explores the role of Soviet advisors who stewarded the economies of the other Eastern Bloc states, both from Moscow and as seconded delegates directly from the ministries and enterprises of the individual members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

중일전쟁시기 소련 군사고문의 역할과 평가

In China’s modernization, which began to overcome the crisis brought on by the Western powers, it was important to invite foreign advisers to have modern military power. At that time, the foreign advisors invited were generally in the form of inviting a small number of individual foreign experts. However, in order to overcome the disorder at home and abroad, the national government invited foreign military advisers in the form of an advisory group. The invitations of the military advisers were in the order of Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The activities of the Soviet advisory group, which began one year after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, led the Chiang Kai-shek government, which was fully invaded by Japan equipped with modern armed forces, to continue the war. Therefore, later people valued the role highly.BR From the Military Affairs Commission in the central government to each front, Soviet advisers supported the development of the battle plan. In addition, the advisors suggested improvements to the insufficient situation of the National Government Army, such as unit operation, improvement of the treatment of soldiers, rewards, training, and organization, and also helped with post-battle review and analysis. According to the records, at the time, the adviser

On the History of the Entry of Soviet Troops into Afghanistan. Commentary

The author analyzes in detail the circumstances of the April Revolution in Afghanistan, believing that it was a coup carried out by revolutionary-minded officers of the Afghan army in spring 1987, which predetermined the subsequent entry of Soviet troops in 1979. This event, as the author argues, was completely unexpected not only for the Soviet leadership, but also for the USSR Embassy in Kabul. Relations between the USSR and former Afghan leadership were quite successful. Neither the USSR embassy nor Soviet advisers in various state structures provided assistance to the rebels. However, the course proclaimed by the new leaders of Afghanistan, N.-M. Taraki and Amin towards building socialism, demonstrative orientation towards the USSR, and reliance on its support in combating political opponents turned the Soviet Union into a forced ally of the government led by the PDPA. D.B. Ryurikov explores the gradual escalation of the Soviet–American conflict. In his opinion, a mixture of truthful information and seemingly plausible “bogus stories” from various sources, which led Soviet decision-making bodies to military intervention, assessed the situation and its prospects as very difficult, which led to the entry of a limited Soviet army contingent into Afghanistan.

Figura krwiopijcy w dyskursie religijnym, narodowym i lewicowym Polski roku 1945/1946. Studium z antropologii historycznej

The Figure of the Bloodsucker in Polish Religious, National and Left-Wing Discourse, 1945/1946: A Historical Anthropology StudyDespite the fact that after 1945 all anti-Jewish pogroms in Poland (except one) involved a blood libel – a rumor about Jewish murderers of Polish children – this fact has not attracted the attention of historians until recently. Conspiracy theories, however, were a lot more popular and noted that the pogroms had been provoked by “Soviet advisers” or “Zionists”. The author of this essay argues that participants of anti-Semitic violence, the assailants as well as policemen, prosecutors, and judges involved in controlling the events – though they represented a variety of different political approaches – were all united by a common socio-mental formation, and remained united by a figure of the Jew as bloodsucker (this mystic figure is described here according to Mary Douglas). Many of them, security and secret services functionaries included, succumbed to a suggested blood libel. Moreover, some traces of blood libel are still present in Poland, not only as folk beliefs (cf. the research conducted under the present author’s direction in Sandomierz).The essay’s aim is to present a structural background of slowly growing “Polish national socialism” on the one hand and old anti-Jewish resentments on the other, as both were a ground for a specific anti-Jewish alliance in the first period after World War II. Thus, the author claims that a synthesis of religious anti-Semitism (“Jew-kidnapper-bloodsucker”), modern anti-Semitism (“Jew-capitalist-bloodsucker”) and the “Judeo-communists” occurred in Poland, which crippled a healthy body of the nation and the communist party.The essay is based on, inter alia, letters intercepted by the censorship in 1946, the reports made by some anti-communist underground fighters, a number of memories and documents of communist secret services officers, as well as documents accumulated in the course of investigations held by the authorities after the pogroms of 1945 and 1946.

VISIT OF A.S. BUBNOV’ COMMISSION TO CHINA IN 1926 AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KUOMINTANG POLITICAL PARTY AND THE USSR

In this work, the “A.S. Bubonov’s Commission” sent by the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) to China in 1926 is considered as the main object of research. The purpose of this study is to clarify the main tasks and activities of this commission, especially the commission’s attitude of the incident by Chiang Kai-shek on March 20 in Guangdong. An attempt was also made to determine the role of A.S. Bubnov’s decision on the development of the political fate of Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang and the Chinese revolutionary movement, their consequence of the interaction of the USSR with the Kuomintang. To achieve this goal, a source of archival and historical documents was used, in particular, the archive of the RAGSPI, diaries of Soviet advisers and memoirs of Chinese leaders. The results of the study show that the visit of the commission to China became a turning point for cooperation between the USSR and the Kuomintang, since then the USSR has constantly lost the initiative in bilateral relations.

The effect of the Cold War era on maps for public use in the Eastern Bloc countries: Tourist maps

Abstract. Cartography of the Cold War era was very characteristic in the Eastern Bloc countries. The abnormal secrecy instructions forced by military cartographic authorities (following the Soviet advisors) influenced the making of all kinds of large- and medium-scale cartographic products for public use. Most of these maps were somehow distorted, although it was not easy to implement the technology of distortions developed by cartographers in the analogue map production era in the early 1960s. Tourist maps are expected to be created using topographic maps, but the access to classified topographic maps (both civilian and military) was limited for civilian users (even for civilian national mapping agencies, at least in the early years of the Cold War era). The tourist maps of this era were quite different from country to country in the Eastern Bloc, partly due to their cartographic traditions and to the relationships between the military and civilian cartography even influenced by the users’ demands.

The Anatomy of Stalinist Police States

Abstract This article examines the building of Communist surveillance networks in Czechoslovakia and Poland in the early 1950s, focusing on the methods employed by the operational divisions of the secret police in these countries and their system of “preventative policing,” and shows how the secret police networks shaped the information reaching Communist party leaders and Soviet advisers in East-Central Europe during the Stalinist period. By examining how the regimes collected information on the economy, religious institutions, higher education, and other areas of everyday life, the article traces how blanket surveillance networks became more institutionalized, insular, and scripted over time, hindering the state's ability to collect and process meaningful information. These problems were symptomatic of larger informational barriers facing Soviet-style regimes.

Making China Modern: From the Great Qing to Xi Jinping

Making China Modern: From the Great Qing to Xi Jinping

Polish Censorship during the Late Stalinist Period

The aim of the study is to present selected aspects of the history of censorship in Poland during the Stalinist period (1948−1956). The article presents the circumstances of the establishment of the censorship office in Poland — the Central Office for the Control of Press, Publications and Events (GUKPPiW) — which was set up in January 1945 and operated throughout the period of the Polish People’s Republic, until April 1990. The article also gives an answer to the question about the role of the so-called Soviet advisers who came to Lublin in December 1944 and took full control of the process of creating state censorship. The employees of the Soviet censorship sent from Moscow were tasked with creating an institution that would control the media and operate according to the mechanisms established in the USSR. In the process of organizing the censorship apparatus, the Polish communists played a marginal and servant role towards the Soviet military (including General N. Bulganin) and advisers who came from Moscow. The most important decisions were made by the employees of Glavlit, whose recommendations were treated by the management of the Polish Workers’ Party as orders. Glavlit officers, who arrived in Lublin in December 1944, recruited censorship employees, developed instructions for them, rules for publishing and issuing printed works and drafted a decree on the control of the press, publications and performances, a draft order of the minister of public security regarding the introduction of censorship. The work also describes the process of recruiting censors, as well as the reasons and scope of censorship interventions.

Secret services of the USSR in Spain and their role in the military and political conflict of 1936–1939

The article is dedicated to the activities of the Soviet intelligence agencies in Spain during the Civil War of 1936–1939. By June 1936, diplomatic relations between USSR and Spain were absent. Due to the putschist revolt and the appeal of the legitimate government of Spain to the USSR, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) made a decision to establish diplomatic, military, and trade delegations in Spain. The intelligence agencies of the USSR planned operation ‘X’ for military assistance to Spain. As part of this operation, a Soviet advisory staff concerning military and foreign intelligence was formed. The author brings to light the goals of the secret service authorities of the Soviet Union, including such particular ones as the removal of Spain’s gold reserve and the creation of the 14th Partisan Corps. The article analyses the activities of the advisory staff, their role in the development of the largest military operations during the Spanish Civil War, and traces the fate of the conflict’s most active participants. Based on the analysis of new data introduced into the historical discourse in recent years, the author concludes that the secret services of the USSR played a large role in this conflict. The Soviet advisors and specialists obtained unique experiences, including conducting large-scale operations; military equipment was tested in actual battle activities; intelligence specialists enlisted information sources with great potential. Many military specialists tried and trained in Spain in 1936–1939 later played an invaluable role in the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

Was Maoist China a Clone of the Soviet Union?

Was Maoist China a Clone of the Soviet Union? Felix Wemheuer Lucien Bianco, Stalin and Mao: A Comparison of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, translated by Krystyna Horko. 448 pp. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2018. ISBN 978-9882370654. $65.00. Elizabeth McGuire, Red at Heart: How Chinese Communists Fell in Love with the Russian Revolution. 462 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 978-0190640552. $34.95. It has become fashionable in Western China studies to write about transnational entanglements between the People's Republic (PRC) and the Soviet Union or to compare the development of both countries. The similarities of Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China are obviously many, making it impossible to cover them all in a single text. Two new books approach this comparison from different angles. Lucian Bianco looks at the great leaders and macropolitics in Stalin and Mao: A Comparison of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, while Elizabeth McGuire uses a focus on personal relations and microhistory in Red at Heart: How Chinese Communists Fell in Love with the Russian Revolution. This review discusses the two monographs within the larger context of Western China studies and with attention to paradigm shifts in Sino-Soviet relations. Paradigm Shifts in Western China Studies Since the mid-1930s, Western scholarship regarding the impact of the Soviet Union on the Chinese Revolution and later the PRC underwent several paradigm shifts. During World War II and under the alliance of the United States and China against the Japanese Empire, Chinese Communists were often considered anti-imperialists and nationalists. The bestseller Red Star over China, written by the American journalist Edgar Snow, contributed to [End Page 442] the view of Mao Zedong as a grassroots revolutionary. The lives of communist leaders in the revolutionary base area in Yan'an were presented by Snow as simple and egalitarian. Therefore, Snow saw Chinese communism as an alternative to bureaucratic state socialism in the Soviet Union.1 When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949, the Cold War had already started. Anticommunist hardliners in the McCarthy era blamed "liberals" of the former Roosevelt administration and scholars in China studies for underestimating the communist threat and causing the "loss of China." In the 1950s, the newly founded PRC was often seen in the West as a "Soviet satellite state" and "totalitarian dictatorship." Western perception started to change significantly due to the rise of the Anti–Vietnam War movement and the New Left around 1968. Activists and many scholars then saw Maoist China through the lenses of anti-imperialism and Third World liberation movements.2 The New Left considered the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) an experiment in mass participation and rural based-development strategies. Western media reports about the horrors of the Cultural Revolution were often ignored as "anticommunist propaganda"; violence was rationalized, because "revolution is not a dinner party," as Chairman Mao had said. The guerilla fighter and the "barefoot doctor" became poster children for an alternative development model to Western and Soviet modernity. CCP criticism of "Soviet revisionism," and in part Western scholarship, emphasized the "Chinese way" of building socialism.3 From the 1930s until the early 1990s, the history of the CCP was often written as step-by-step emancipation from domination by the Comintern and the Soviet Union. The departure from revolutionary Maoism in China after "Reform and Opening" in 1978 destroyed many dreams and illusions. However, it was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the archives of the Comintern and CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), that the history of the Chinese Revolution was rewritten again. The new findings from archives deconstructed the myths that the CCP had taken an independent path from the Soviet Union. Stalin's guidance and Soviet support had played [End Page 443] a crucial role in creating the second United Front with the Nationalists (GMD) against Japan in 1937 and in bringing the CCP into power in 1949.4 Archival documents show that Soviet advisers influenced the development of the political and economic system in China in the early 1950s based on the Stalinist model. In the fields of culture, education, agriculture, and policies...

UNA NUOVA GUERRA FREDDA?

Quando visitò la Cina nel giugno del 1989 Michail Gorbaciov, segretario generale del PCUS e presidente dell'Unione Sovietica, aveva due obiettivi. Voleva rendersi conto personalmente del modo in cui le riforme di Deng Xiaoping stavano trasformando il Paese e sperava di rattoppare gli strappi politici e ideologici che avevano turbato le relazioni fra Mosca e Pechino, dal ritiro dei consulenti sovietici all'epoca di Krushev sino ai duri scontri militari sull'Ussuri nel 1968 e alla diverse posizioni assunte dai due Paesi durante la crisi afghana del 1979. Allo stesso tempo il presidente sovietico avrebbe cercato di spiegare a Deng la sua perestrojka. Le intenzioni erano ragionevoli, ma il clima cambiò quando la presenza del leader sovietico a Pechino ebbe l'effetto di entusiasmare i giovani della capitale. Mentre i dirigenti cinesi stavano gradualmente introducendo nell'economia le regole del mercato, Gorbaciov parlava di "glasnost" e sembrava deciso a cambiare quelle del sistema politico. Non appena i sovietici lasciarono Pechino per tornare in patria alcune migliaia di giovani cinesi cominciarono a darsi appuntamento in piazza Tienanmen per chiedere riforme democratiche. Da quel momento il leader sovietico smise di essere per la Cina un possibile modello e la sua caduta nel dicembre 1991 dimostrò alla dirigenza cinese che la riforma tentata da Mosca era un rischio da evitare. Credo che questo spieghi perchè la data del 3 giugno 2019 sia stata attesa da Xi Jinping, presidente della Repubblica popolare cinese, con una certa apprensione. [Continua]

Mission from Moscow: Soviet Advisers and the Second Indian Five-Year Plan

Mission from Moscow: Soviet Advisers and the Second Indian Five-Year Plan

„Klasszikus” új művészet. A gipszminták szerepe a szocreálban

With the victory of the Hungarian Workers’ Party – the communist party – in Hungary in 1949 the “reform” of the institutions of tertiary education including the Academy of Fine Arts and Academy of Applied Arts took place, meaning their transformation upon Soviet models. In daily training, in teaching the techniques of drawing and painting, they returned to the copying of plaster casts, which had already been discarded by the free school of Simon Hollósy in Munich in the 1880s for the benefit of a naturalist approach. This principle was promoted further by the art colony of Nagybánya started in 1896, and it was the guideline when after 1920 the Academy of Fine Arts was reorganized. The traditional academic approach had its roots in J. J. Winckelmann’s Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture published in 1755, while the nature-centric thought of free schools could draw on J-J. Rousseau’s Émile, or on Education (1762). In the seething period of Soviet painting in the 1920s an increasingly strengthening current among the greatly diverse trends was the one announcing the slogan of “heroic realism”; it was represented primarily by the Society of Painters of Revolutionary Russia (AHRR). N. B. Terpsikhorov’s The first slogan was painted in 1924; it shows an artist painting the Leninian slogan All power to the soviets! on a red tapestry at the foot of the plaster replicas of the Venus of Milo and the Borghese gladiator. In addition to the guidance provided by Soviet advisers visiting Hungary in the 1950s, several Hungarian artists could study at Russian academies; they recalled that the basis for learning socialist realism was precise draughtsmanship and the requirement that a work be completed. The demand for high quality socialist realism weighed down upon the teachers with mature ideas socialized in earlier decades and often receiving the badge of “formalism” and on students having to interrupt their art studies for the world war as unattainable. Making copies – in painting and sculpture – was not only part of the training process, but also satisfied the demand of public institutions for representation: replicas of several famous Soviet works, including portraits of Lenin and Stalin were ordered for decoration in buildings, and the program of a museum for the state collection of copies was also deliberated.

Institute of the Soviet Advisors in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

А role and place of soldiery and civil advisers as an important instrument of soviet politics in the Democratic republic of Afghanistan are investigated in the article. It is well-proven that on a quantity, scales of activity and sphere of plenary powers the institute of soviet advisers in Afghanistan did not have analogues in history of the "cold war". The attempt of determination of degree of efficiency of realization of orders of soviet guidance by advisers is realizable. Factors that influenced on their activity are found out. Question about responsibility of soviet advisers for the failure of socialistic experiment in the Democratic republic of Afghanistan discussed in the article. Also heaved up the problem of interpretation of institute of the soviet advisers as an important instrument of the soviet occupation Afghanistan in 1979–1989. The researches based foremost on the memoirs of the soviet advisers. Like research is at first carried out in Ukrainian historiography.

Central Office of Press Control/ Main Control Office of Press, Publication and Performances – background, audit scope and staff

The aim of the article was to present the circumstances of the establishment and the scope of activities of the Central Office for Control of the Press, which was transformed into Main Office for Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances in November 1945. The article is an attempt at answering the following questions: who were the first censors? From what communities/ professional groups did they come? According to what criteria were the censors selected shortly after the founding of the Center? How did the so-called Soviet advisors influence the process of the emergence of institutional censorship in the Polish territory during World War II?

Translating the State: Czechoslovakia's Search for the Soviet Model of the Secret Police, 1945–52

Translating the StateCzechoslovakia's Search for the Soviet Model of the Secret Police, 1945–52 Molly Pucci (bio) In January 1948, a month before the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, Czech secret police official Jindřich Veselý went on an observation tour of the Polish secret police. His aim, as he wrote to the Central Committee in Prague, was to "become closely familiar with the organization of the Ministry of Public Security of Poland and, above all, the work of the state security organ and intelligence services."1 While there, he conversed with Polish secret police officials, took notes on the organization of their forces, and compared and contrasted what he saw with the policing institutions of his own country. His notes reveal the differences in the communist secret police forces that had been built in each country since the end of World War II. Since there was no equivalent in Czechoslovakia to the institution Veselý was touring in Poland, he described what he was seeing to leaders in Prague in terms of analogy: the authority of the Polish secret police and its affiliated militia approximated the force of Czechoslovaks' civil police, criminal police, and regional and district government authorities. Veselý had helped organize communist secret police networks in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948. He was observing the Polish secret police forces created during the same era. Although these institutions were supposedly built on the same "Soviet model," they had developed different [End Page 317] structures, personnel, and methods of violence from the mid- to the late 1940s. As Veselý discovered, the Polish Communists and their Soviet advisers had created a military-style force of around 30,000 officials who worked from 1945 to 1947 in a state governed by martial law.2 Polish secret police officials, most recruited from communist partisan groups and military units, carried weapons and had the authority to arrest citizens and hold them for up to 48 hours.3 In contrast to Czechoslovakia, Veselý noted, all political trials in Poland took place in military courts. By 1948, the Polish secret police had developed a massive infrastructure that reached into most areas of Polish public, civic, and state life and could, as Veselý described, "allow or ban meetings, allow or ban clubs, distribute permits to carry weapons, etc., etc.," and conduct surveillance on political parties, the youth, the intelligentsia, the church, and the state administration. As was evident from his conversations with local officials, Veselý concluded that the "Ministry of State Security is a decisive power factor in Poland. There is no area in which it does not intervene in a decisive way."4 The Czechoslovak secret police he had helped organize, in contrast, was a network of around 200 agents who were not allowed to carry weapons or arrest suspects. Communist intelligence agents in Czechoslovakia dressed in civilian clothing and worked covertly in the official intelligence services of the National Front, a democratic multiparty government, to collect information on noncommunist political parties for communist leaders.5 Veselý's trip to Poland was one of several covert observation tours that East European secret police agents took to each other's countries between 1946 and 1954, the foundational years of communism in the region. What do these trips tell us about how East European agents learned to build communist policing institutions after World War II? What do they reveal about how East European Communists interpreted the Soviet model of political policing? As the Czechoslovaks' tour of the Polish forces shows—Veselý's trip was one of several—answering these questions requires adopting a multinational, comparative approach to policing between the mid-1940s and the 1950s. Such an approach is not only a methodological decision; it is [End Page 318] a reflection of the decision-making processes and self-perceptions of agents and officials at the time, who consciously studied and integrated the practices of the policing systems of other countries of Eastern Europe. Almost a decade before the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, agents, ideas, surveillance technologies, organizational practices, and institutional models crossed the national borders of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, allowing Communists to coordinate their security forces and study...

Re-evaluating the Yom Kippur ‘Intelligence Failure’: The Cultural Lens in Crisis

ABSTRACTHenry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur in cultural terms, asserting that Western analysts were unable to understand Arab rationality in ‘starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.’ This article fundamentally challenges this conventional understanding of the 1973 surprise attack. Drawing on recently declassified material and interviews with veteran diplomats and intelligence professionals it will show that both the British and American intelligence communities had an excellent sense of Egyptian President Sadat's intentions in waging war against Israel. Rather the evidence suggests that misconceptions about Egyptian military capability were more important. These misconceptions derived from particular ideas about Arab culture and Soviet–Egyptian relations following the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972. The article thereby illuminates wider questions about how we define ‘failure’ in intelligence and the role of cultural ideas in international history.

Agents of Change: Soviet Advisers and High Stalinist Management in China, 1949–1960

This article chronicles the interactions between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the years of the Sino-Soviet alliance (1949–1960) as experienced by the Soviet advisers in China. Based on interviews, archival sources, and other materials, the article shows that the Soviet advisers who came to the PRC during that time brought with them the management techniques of the late Stalin period, known as High Stalinism (meaning strict Communist Party control over all aspects of political, cultural, and economic life and severe management methods including a heavy reliance on mass methods, education and reeducation techniques, coercion, and the threat of imprisonment). High Stalinism was a useful management tool that fit into Mao Zedong's own plan for the “economic Stalinization” of China and helped to pave the way for Mao's later radicalization. After differences emerged between the two countries in 1956 about the merits of de-Stalinization, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party began promoting radical policies such as the Great Leap Forward, which dramatically deviated from the Soviet experience and led to the removal of Soviet advisers in 1960.